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HELLAS AND THE  
BALKAN WARS







H.M. KING CONSTANTINE.

Frontispiece.







# HELLAS AND THE BALKAN WARS

By D. J. CASSAVETTI, M.A. OXON.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY  
THE HON. W. PEMBER REEVES



*παθήματα μαθήματα*

WITH 10 MAPS AND 74 ILLUSTRATIONS

T. FISHER UNWIN  
LONDON: ADELPHI TERRACE  
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TO  
THE GREEK NATION

XVIII, "The Spirit of Hellenism." Possibly that chapter does not indicate sufficiently clearly that the failings of the Greeks therein referred to would probably soon largely decrease with the introduction of broader educational methods.

As regards the portion descriptive of the naval and military campaigns of the first war, I should say that the information was collected at the time, and thus although this book is published some time after those events, it does not pretend to supply an account based on the consideration of all the facts and documents which bear on them.

I am indebted to my father for much assistance over the chapter on Finance, and to Mr. Anthony Kephala and also to my father for their help over the chapter dealing with Agriculture, and also to Commander Cardale, R.N., for his co-operation in the preparation of the account of the naval engagement of December 16, 1912, and for making the plan of it.

Of the photographs, many were taken by myself. I am indebted to Miss C. von Birnen for the photograph of Mr. Venizélos, to Colonel de la Porta for that of the destroyed gun on Bezane, to Dr. Manuel for that of the late Constantine Manos, to Mr. Alexander Melas for the photograph of the late Paul Melas, to Miss Euphrosyne Kephala for those of the Lake of Janina and Lieutenant Votsis, and for other photographs to kind friends who wish to remain anonymous.

My acknowledgments are due to *The Times* in respect of material contributed by me to its columns.

D. J. CASSAVETTI.

SHENLEY,

HERTFORDSHIRE.

December 2, 1913.

## INTRODUCTION

MODERN Greece and her people have very seldom been highly favoured by English officialism and the English Press, and, therefore, by English public opinion. Perhaps it was inevitable that during the last twelve months this ill-fortune should have been especially noteworthy. The Greeks have this year not only had to fight the Turks—whom they rightly attacked—and the Bulgarians—who attacked them, but have offended the pride of military Austria, and have come into direct and special conflict with the greed and ambitions of the politicians of Italy. This has meant that immensely powerful influences have been at work against them. The friends of four or five nations have attacked them in print from four or five different points at once. The cross-fire has been heavy. And the man in the street cannot be blamed if he has supposed that a nation which is assailed so fiercely here and abroad by so many enemies—some of them quite respectable—must be in the wrong. Or at any rate a little State whose claims cause friction among great Empires must be a danger and a nuisance, to be snubbed and suppressed right or wrong. So has thought the average Briton.

This is natural but none the less unjust. The friends of Greece are beginning to protest against it. Individually they are numerous and do not lack ability. If they are to work effectually upon public opinion they must, however, organize. It is with much pleasure that I am able to say that, roused by a sense of the ignorance, indifference, and misunderstandings prevailing in this country about

Hellenic affairs, the friends of Greece are organizing to some purpose. In the good missionary work which they will undertake Mr. Cassavetti's book will, I venture to think, play a most useful part. In its temperate and quietly worded pages it states the Greek case and the part played by Greece in the Balkan imbroglio. These are set out very soberly but very well. One feels that one is reading the words of a patriotic Anglo-Greek, but also of a candid and not uncritical writer. Pleasant and altogether readable, the book, in addition to its story of the war, contains far more information about Greece and its affairs than the incautious reader would suspect from its chatty and unpretentious style. It will do good teaching work, dispel prejudice, and, I venture to predict, bore no one whatever.

W. P. REEVES

*December 8, 1913.*



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# Hellas and the Balkan Wars

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTORY: CAUSES OF THE WAR

THE causes of the Balkan War are not difficult to find so far as Greece is concerned ; rather is it difficult in her case to distinguish those events in the history of the Balkan Peninsula which have no connection with the general movement which resulted in the Balkan War from those which formed part of that movement. The best course, therefore, appears to the writer to be to refer briefly to such portion of the history of the Peninsula as will illustrate the course taken by the events immediately prior to the war.

The quarrel between Mohammedan and Christian has existed ever since the former spread into Europe. The prestige of the Turks was at its highest after the capture of Constantinople in 1453, and continued at high-water mark until the defeat inflicted upon them by Johann Sobieski in front of the walls of Vienna, which was followed by the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699. This was the turning-point of Turkish supremacy in Eastern Europe ; it was this check which arrested the victorious advance of the all-conquering hordes, and prevented their inroad into Western Europe. From this moment the Near Eastern Question came into being, and gave the diplomats of Europe work which has left them scarcely any respite for two centuries.

It was Sobieski who enabled Christianity to turn the tide of Mohammedanism, but it was the Greeks who always kept opposition to the Turkish conquerors alive in the territory

which remained under their dominion. It was they who were the first to throw off the Turkish yoke as the result of their revolution in 1821; for though the Servians benefited by the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812 to gain partial autonomy, they did not gain complete independence until 1856. After the lead had been given them by the Greeks and the prestige of the Turks had been thoroughly shaken in Europe, the other Balkan races successively obtained their independence. The principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which had been tributaries of the Porte for five centuries, were united into one State in 1859 under the name of Roumania. This arrangement was formally accepted in 1861 by the Sultan, who, however, retained his suzerainty, and continued to receive tribute from the united principalities. In 1866 Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was elected Prince of Roumania, and was received in that capacity at Bucharest on the 22nd of May. On the 21st of May, 1877, Roumania proclaimed her independence of Turkey, and finally, on March 26, 1881, she declared herself a kingdom, and her Prince assumed the title of King Carol I. Much later the Bulgarians were granted autonomy as a direct result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 by the Treaty of San Stefano, which was a gross infringement of the rights of other nationalities. By the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 Bulgaria was limited to the country in which the Bulgars indisputably formed a majority of the population, and Eastern Roumelia, in which besides the Turks and Bulgarians there was a large Greek element, was formed into a distinct semi-autonomous province under a Greek Governor-General appointed by the Porte. By this treaty, too, Austria-Hungary received a mandate to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina as a reward for her neutrality in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. In 1885-6 Bulgaria infringed the Berlin Treaty by occupying and annexing Eastern Roumelia, and in this year the Servians, egged on by Austria-Hungary, attacked the Bulgarians, and were completely defeated by them under Prince Alexander at Slivnitza. In October,

# SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE





1908, Bulgaria repudiated the suzerainty of the Sultan and declared herself independent, Prince Ferdinand assuming the title of Czar of Bulgaria. A day later Austria-Hungary definitely annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in spite of the protests of France, Great Britain, and Russia (who had hardly recovered sufficiently from her war with Japan to take more energetic action). The only possible excuse for the course taken by the Dual Monarchy was that she had granted Bosnia and Herzegovina her previous protection.

Whereas, however, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Serbia all managed to obtain complete independence for the greater part of their countrymen, only one-quarter of the Greek race had gained its freedom. This generalization is not meant to include Bulgars, Greeks, or Serbs who had left their homes and settled in territories beyond the spheres in which their nationality preponderated, but those who remained in the land of their birth. The Bulgarians forty years ago, before the foundation of the new Exarchist Church and before their propaganda had spread over Macedonia, practically did not extend beyond the old boundaries of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. No Roumanians except the mysterious Kutzo-Vlachs (if they can be classified as Roumanians) remained subjects of the Ottoman Empire, though many were incorporated in Austria-Hungary. This is true of the Servians too, except that there remained a certain number of Serbs in Old Serbia and North Western Macedonia. The Servians included within the Austrian Empire are of course counted by millions, but they do not affect the force of the argument. Of Greece, however, only the Peloponnesus, a few of the Ægean Islands, and the mainland south of Thessaly were freed from Turkey when the Kingdom of Greece was established. Great Britain handed over the Ionian Islands to her in 1863 after the accession of King George, and in 1881 Greece, after protesting against the iniquitous Treaty of San Stephano, succeeded in obtaining Thessaly and a small part of Epirus through the Berlin Conference. Throughout the period of her independence Greece has been struggling to

obtain the rights of free citizens for the Greeks living in European Turkey.

There are two great causes which have brought about this persistent struggle for freedom on the part of the Greeks; one is their own strong spirit and desire for liberty which has never been crushed, and the second is the incapacity of the Turks to govern them. The second cause has helped very greatly to keep the first always at work.

The Turks began as a race of camp fighters and have never developed into a civilized nation. All that they have been able to do, put baldly, is to establish a kind of primitive government which preserved a semblance of peace among people of alien race who tried to develop their industries and practise their arts to such an extent as the inadequate laws under which they had to live permitted them.

It is possible that the spirit of the Greeks living in European Turkey and on the Asiatic shores of the *Ægean* might have been curbed for many years to come, because their enterprising nature enabled them to obtain such advantages through their association with foreign countries that from the material point of view it was to their interest to restrain their patriotic desire to become subjects of the Kingdom of Greece. This might have happened if it were not for the peculiar geographical features of the Island of Crete, whose nature is such that the Turkish influence never managed to obtain any real hold over it. The Cretans, as pure Greeks as exist to-day, themselves retained their national instincts and aspirations in the security of their mountains, and being men of turbulent character they were never able to remain satisfied or peaceful so long as the Turks were in occupation of their island. It was Crete that helped, directly or indirectly, to bring about all the previous conflicts between Turkey and Greece, notably the war in 1897; and it was Crete which would have brought about this war, if not immediately, at any rate within the next two or three years, had not other events precipitated it.

As has been said, if it were not for Crete the aspirations

of the Greeks of European Turkey might have remained dormant; provided that the Turks committed no fresh glaring faults of administration. The Abdul-Hamidian Government was one of comparative toleration so long as the Greeks created no public disturbance. It is true that from time to time there were massacres which caused a smaller or larger upheaval among the Greeks, but it is quite possible that none of these events would have led for the present to the Greeks of European Turkey arising and demanding their liberation and union to Greece.

It has been stated that the Turks had only established a primitive form of government; this is true up to the time of the New Turkish Revolution and the overthrow of Abdul Hamid in 1908, but after the establishment of the Constitution by the Committee of Union and Progress the Turks disregarded the lessons of their past history and attempted to establish a State on European models and to do in a few years what other nations have taken centuries to accomplish.

The evil results of this administration showed themselves first in Macedonia, and it is to the recent events in that province that we must look for the key of the puzzle which has been placed before us by the events of the last few months.

The geographical position of Macedonia made it natural that it should be the scene of the next movement against the Turkish domination. It lies between Montenegro, Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece, and is separated from Constantinople by Thrace. Albania is, it is true still farther removed from Constantinople; but if we except what is sometimes called Southern Albania, but is more properly called Epirus, there were few Greeks or other Christian peoples in Albania suffering under the Mohammedan yoke.

The question of Albania will be discussed in a later chapter in this book and so its racial characteristics need not be entered into now; it is sufficient for the present purpose to say that few of the Albanians who were converted to Christianity ever at any time became Christians by conviction and that their attitude towards the Turk has conse-

quently never been quite the same as that of the other Christians of the Balkan Peninsula.

Many Greeks in Constantinople and its neighbourhood became—owing to their natural intelligence, superior education, and commercial ability—men of position in the Ottoman Empire and thus their influence with the Porte helped to make the lot of the poorer Christians in Eastern Thrace a happier one than that of their brethren elsewhere in the Turkish dominions. The Macedonia Greeks and Christians generally, on the other hand, had no opportunities of obtaining social status and influence unless they lived in Salonica or other large centres. Thus all the evils which the Christians in Europe had complained of under the Turkish regime for centuries were still to the fore in Macedonia.

The Macedonian question was an extremely difficult one to settle, as there were so many different influences at work in the province. There was a large Greek population, and the Bulgarians had for the last thirty years been systematically colonizing parts of Macedonia and not least in the neighbourhood of Salonica. Further, the Roumanians had made wide propaganda in favour of their kindred the Kutzo-Vlachs; and in addition to those of the Roumanians there were other racial interests, such as those of the Servians and Albanians. The Turk had thus no easy task in governing and controlling all this ethnical miscellany. The Greeks had an organization for the protection of their compatriots in Macedonia from their oppressors, and had been working systematically with a view to their ultimate liberation from the Turkish rule. The priesthood had perhaps done the greater part of this work, and in connection with them should be mentioned the name of Basilios Balkos, a native of Preveza, a man who had studied in the Theological College on the Isle of Chalke, near Constantinople, with the intention of taking the orders of priesthood, but remained what is known as a "teacher" (*διδάσκαλος*); he and others had spent the last eight years travelling all over Macedonia, interviewing bishops and their clergy and organizing the movement. As an instance of the



attitude adopted by the priests in Macedonia may be mentioned the exploit of the Bishop of Monastir, Joachim Phoropoulos, a native of Chios, who not long ago preached a sermon with the words "I know thee from the terrible cut of thy sword ; I know thee from thy glance which measures the earth with force. Arising from the sacred bones of the Greeks and as though in the first vigour of your manhood, hail, O freedom!" from the Greek National Anthem as text.

So suspicious did the Turks become of what was going on among the Greeks that they would not allow any of them to be armed. The priests, consequently, in order to arm all the people, which was part of their scheme, used to carry rifles and cartridges under their robes and distribute them to the villagers in their villages secretly. It is, perhaps, the part played in this movement by the more important of the Macedonian clergy which gave rise to the impression in the writer's mind that they are as much statesmen as priests. The writer has been much struck by the extremely cultivated and clever faces which he has noticed among the younger bishops, several of whom he had the opportunity of seeing during the war.

The Roumanians, unlike the Bulgarians, did not attempt to colonize Macedonia, but to prove that Macedonia, was already Roumanian. The basis of their contention, was provided by the Vlachs, or Kutzo-Vlachs, who though claimed by the Roumanians as of common origin with them, have always shown sympathy with Greece. To such length did the Roumanians carry their programme that in order to show that Roumanians had died there, they would buy corpses and have mock funerals. The writer was told by an acquaintance of his, who was a friend of one of the Greek bishops of Macedonia, that he found the bishop on one occasion very much perturbed over an application for a burial licence by a Roumanian. The bishop heard that there had been no death which necessitated a subsequent burial, and was therefore very much perplexed as to what he should do: he eventually issued the licence

but published his suspicions among the Greek women, with the result that ten thousand women collected when the funeral procession started and attacked it, and so the Roumanian priests and attendants had to fly for their lives. The Roumanians, however, found that their propaganda did not make much headway and so to a great extent relaxed their efforts during the last few years.

The Bulgarian movement was a much more serious matter. At the same time as they were colonizing Macedonia they were Bulgarizing its existing inhabitants. This is the only word which will describe a process which will produce the following curious conditions in a family living on Turkish territory, viz., a paterfamilias who can speak only Greek, a son who can speak both Greek and Bulgarian, and a grandson who can speak only Bulgarian. Cases of this kind were found recently in villages within a few miles of Salonica. The instruments by which the process of Bulgarization was worked were at first the peaceful ones of the school and the Church. Operations were begun in the poorest villages which were not provided with a Greek school and which readily fell into the trap. The advantage of a school in one's own village was not one to be lightly refused; particularly by the Greek, who was ever fond of learning. Before these villages were thus provided with schools of their own the children had in most cases to make long journeys in order to attend school, which in some districts could not be undertaken during rainy weather. Thus to some the choice was practically one between a Bulgarian school and no regular schooling at all. The establishment of a school was usually followed by the conversion of the villages to the exarchist *millet* and the dismissal of the Greek priest. In the more prosperous villages which had Greek schools these peaceful methods usually failed, and in them the Bulgarians resorted to intimidation. They organized bands which instituted a reign of terror among the villagers and persecuted those who did not espouse the Bulgarian cause. The Greek Government did not realize that the Bulgarians were systematically





PAUL MELAS.

To face p. 9-

denationalizing the Macedonians, and these did not at first assert themselves, but soon they suffered so much from the cruel excesses of the Bulgarian Komitadjes that the Greek organization, which has been described as being used against the Turks, was directed chiefly against Bulgarian influence. The Greeks and Bulgarians came into conflict chiefly over the schools and the churches: so bitter were they in their competition against each other that there were in many cases not enough pupils for the schools which were established. Under the auspices of the *ἑθνικὴ ἑταιρεία* (National League), Greek armed "bands" had been organized, who roamed the mountainous districts of Southern Macedonia keeping alive the patriotism of the Greek peasants. When the Greeks realized the effect of the activity of the Bulgarian Komitadjes in Central Macedonia, their "bands" were sent farther north for the protection of the Greek villages in the Monastir and more easterly districts. New "bands" were organized by wealthy Greek families such as the Dragoumis, and the more enterprising Greek army officers became leaders of these bands. Among them should be mentioned Paul Melas, a son-in-law of M. Stephen Dragoumis, one of the ablest and bravest officers in the Greek Army, who was so much influenced by this movement that he left his home, went to Macedonia and became captain of a "band." When he left Athens he told his friends that within ten years the day of the delivery of Macedonia would come, and he gave up his life gladly, happy in his optimism, a victim of Bulgarian treachery. He heard that a Bulgarian "band" had planned a raid on a Greek village named Statista, near Kastoria, so he took his "band" there to defend it. The Bulgarians, having obtained knowledge of his movements, gave information to the commander of the local Turkish troops to the effect that a Bulgarian band had invaded the village in question. Thereupon the Turkish commander surrounded the village and fighting began, the Turks and the Greeks each believing that their opponents were Bulgarians, during which Paul Melas lost his life. The mistake was

soon discovered on both sides, and then the Turks were annoyed and grieved at the sacrifice through a dishonest stratagem of a man whom they had learnt greatly to respect. His widow, by her work as a nurse in the war, has nobly followed in his footsteps.

The Bulgarians, after the failure of the Greeks in 1897, thought them of no consequence, but men like Paul Melas showed them that the Greeks were a factor to be taken into account, and then they perceived that the Greeks had only been unlucky in their war against Turkey. From the moment that the Bulgarians realized that the Greeks were a nation to be reckoned with, they understood that it was to their interest to compromise with them. It was then that M. Venizélos brought about the arrangements as to the joint schools in Macedonia, which paved the way to the adoption of common measures against Turkey.

The advent of the young Turk regime made matters much worse : there was much less security of life and property for the Christians than there had been under the despotic rule of Abdul Hamid. Turkish officials who formerly had been afraid of exploiting their offices now had nothing to fear. As a result of this the whole of Macedonia was ready to rise against the Turks at the first opportunity.

In the meantime events had moved in Crete : a new party had arisen under the leadership of M. Venizélos and had caused Prince George to leave the island, and from that time the Cretan deputies agitated for seats in the Greek Parliament. The *coup d'état* of the Greek military league under Zorbas was instrumental in bringing M. Venizélos to Athens and the Cretan influence with him. This weighed heavily in the scale against Turkey.

Finally, by the summer of 1912 the Balkan Alliance was formed, the moving spirit being M. Venizélos. It is interesting to observe that the man who first conceived the idea of a Balkan Alliance was the most distinguished of former Greek premiers, Tricoupis, but his proposals had been betrayed to the Porte by Stambuloff, who was then at the zenith of his powers.

By September the relations between the Balkan States and Turkey in regard to Macedonia had become so strained, and the allies had adopted such a determined attitude, that the Powers considered it their duty to intervene. They accordingly made representations to Turkey, urging that autonomy should be granted to Macedonia, after adopting the qualification proposed by Austria-Hungary to the effect that this autonomy should be under the sovereignty of the Sultan.

Turkey did not see her way to offer anything more than a scrupulous undertaking to apply the law of 1868 (previously a dead letter) to the provinces of European Turkey and also to Crete, and her reply was to that effect. As Turkey had shown no indication of a desire to carry out the provisions of this law during the past years, the Balkan States felt themselves unable to treat the proposal seriously. It was by that time generally admitted that the only alternative to the autonomy of Macedonia would be a system of reforms administered under the superintendence of the Powers themselves, with or without the assistance of the Balkan States. Thereupon the Powers made representations to Turkey for the introduction of reforms on the lines suggested by the Balkan States, but Montenegro forestalled any issue of the negotiations by declaring war on Turkey. It was generally believed that Montenegro's action was taken by arrangement with her allies, just as in December last it was thought that it was by agreement with Bulgaria and Servia that Greece refused to sign the armistice. However, just as Greece acted independently in regard to the armistice, so Montenegro declared war on her own responsibility and not by arrangement with the other Balkan States. By this time the Turks were also thirsting for the fray. Their attitude became uncompromising, and realizing that Bulgaria and Servia were in earnest, they declared war on both States.

The venerable Kiamil Pasha, the only far-seeing Turkish statesman, strove hard to detach Greece from the Balkan Alliance, for he realized that the command of the sea was

imperative if Turkey was to be successful in her campaign against the Bulgarian and Servian armies. He made most favourable proposals to her, comprising the release of the Sultan's suzerainty over Crete and the granting of substantial privileges to the Greeks throughout the Empire. But Greece, loyal to her bargain with her allies, refused this offer and promptly herself declared war upon Turkey.

It has been suggested that the Balkan States showed a lack of chivalry in challenging Turkey at a moment when she was crippled by her war with Italy. This would possibly have been true in the case of any State but Turkey; the Balkan States, however, rightly considered that to Turkey chivalry was a meaningless term, for the Turk had never kept to his bargain in the past. Indeed, they looked upon the Turk as a foe against whom civilized weapons were useless. In point of fact it was only a coincidence that the Balkan States attacked Turkey at that particular moment, and they would probably have done so in any case. Turkey may be said to have been unlucky, but not badly treated. The proper inference to draw from what happened at the time is that the Balkan States conferred a very great service on Italy by declaring war at that moment and so enabling her to obtain peace on better terms than she would otherwise have done, for which she does not of late appear to have shown much gratitude to them.



## CHAPTER II

### ELEUTHERIOS VENIZÉLOS

THE family of Crevata is a well-known family name in Greece at the present time ; a Greek bishop bears that name. A branch of the family is known to have been resident at Sparta from the beginning of the eighteenth century, and was still there at the time of the Greek Revolution. A member of this family, Venizélos Crevata, left Sparta and settled in Crete during the first half of the nineteenth century. In that island at the time not much store was set by surnames, and the new-comer was generally known by his Christian name of Venizélos, which he himself seems to have adopted as his surname, for we do not find that the name of Crevata was used subsequently either by himself or his descendants. The choice in a family of the Christian name of βενεζήλος, or Benezelo (possibly Bengelo), suggests that the family had some connection with Italy, but there is no historical evidence that they intermarried or are in any way connected with the Florentine Dukes of Athens of that name whose descendants are still to be found in Athens and elsewhere in Greece. The name Crevata, perhaps, suggests a Norman origin, like the name Passava, which is a corruption of "Passe-Avant," but it may very well be a Greek name. Venizélos Crevata had a son "Kyriakos Venizélos," who remained in Crete and retained his Greek nationality, which he had acquired from his father. It is noteworthy that the Turkish authorities tried to compel him to abandon his Greek nationality and become a Turkish subject, and

that on more than one occasion he was obliged to leave Crete in order to escape persecution, but that his love for his home made him return on each occasion when the cloud had blown over. Kyriakos Venizélos married a Greek lady at Canea, and by her had issue five daughters and a son, Eleutherios. The birth of the latter took place at a village known as Murniæs, within about an hour's walk of the town of Canea, in 1864.

His childhood and boyhood were comparatively uneventful in spite of the revolution of 1868, in which he does not seem to have played the rôle of a precocious infant, and after which Crete enjoyed a period of comparative quiet. He attended the Greek school at Canea until 1877, when he went to the Lykeion Antoniadou at Athens, where he spent about a year. From there he went to the Gymnasium at Syra, whose schools had been pre-eminent ever since the beginning of the eighteenth century, for the wealthy merchants of Syra, many of whom had migrated from Chios, being men of culture, took steps to provide as good teachers for their sons as could be found at the time, so that Greeks of various parts used to send their sons there to be educated. Eleutherios Venizélos passed through the Gymnasium with great distinction and became the first scholar of it in his last year.

At the end of his school training he joined Athens University as a student of law, but his career there was considerably interfered with by indifferent health. In 1885 he was prostrated by a severe attack of typhoid fever, which nearly proved fatal. However, he subsequently completed his course of studies and took his diploma in 1887.

He then returned to Crete and immediately set up as a lawyer at Canea, in partnership with Mr. Spiridion Moatzo. This association lasted for ten years, during which time M. Venizélos came to be recognized as about the most able lawyer in the whole island, and was retained in practically all the most important cases. He married an Athenian lady, but was left a widower with two sons, of whom one is now a

military cadet and the other a university undergraduate, and both of whom fought in the war.

His political career also commenced soon after his return to Crete, for in 1888 he stood and was returned as deputy in the Cretan Assembly for the district of Kedonia round Canea. From the start his policy was one of co-operation between the Cretans and the Greeks of the Kingdom of Greece, with a view to the union of Crete with Greece. Thus in the small Cretan revolution of 1889 he fell under suspicion and was obliged to leave Crete secretly at night and go to Greece. He subsequently took a leading part in the agitation which finally succeeded in 1895 in recovering for the Cretans the political rights which they had lost by that revolution.

In the Cretan revolution of 1896, M. Venizélos took a very prominent part. He donned the Cretan costume with its vracas and top-boots, and was prominent in the fighting at Akroterion. He showed consummate military powers of organization and strategy, and so earned the admiration of the Italian Admiral Canevaro, the commander of the international fleet which made a demonstration against the revolutionaries. He took part in all the chief engagements and underwent all the hardships which fell to the lot of the Cretan troops. At the same time he represented the Cretan temporary Sedition Government, of which he became a member, in the negotiations with Europe. In connection with this it is related how, among a deputation of wild-looking Cretans in national costume, who came aboard the British admiral's flagship one morning, was one man who reappeared the same evening, to the admiral's astonishment, as one of the two or three representatives of the Cretan Government who had been invited to dinner, irreproachably attired in conventional evening dress. The reader may not be surprised to hear that this man was Eleutherios Venizélos. It is interesting to note that it was about this time that M. Venizélos took up the study of and mastered the English language (at any rate so far as reading is concerned), in order

that he might be able to understand our Blue-book dealing with Crete.

In 1897 the representatives of the Powers were instructed to grant autonomy to Crete, and M. Venizélos was elected President of the Cretan National Assembly. In order, however, that he might be able to play a more active rôle in the organization of the new Government, he prevailed upon his old friend, Dr. John Sphakianakis, a Cretan by birth, a distinguished doctor of medicine, and a man of much culture and learning, who, after spending a considerable time in Germany, had settled in Greece proper, to come and succeed him in the post of President of the National Assembly. The Assembly then appointed an executive committee composed as follows: (1) Dr. Sphakianakis, (2) M. Venizélos, (3) Anthony Chatsidakis, (4) Nicholas Gianalakes, (5) George Melonojannes.

Prince George of Greece arrived in Crete as High Commissioner on the 12th of December, 1898. In the Government which was formed subsequent to his arrival M. Venizélos combined the offices of Minister of Justice and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He proceeded to give a further example of his very exceptional powers of organization by reconstituting the Cretan Courts of Justice with such ability that Lord Salisbury, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs, was able to state in the House of Lords that ample justice was administered in the Cretan Courts. The aims of Prince George did not, however, coincide with those of M. Venizélos, who always continued to work for the ultimate complete union of Crete with Greece by means of a transitional period of autonomy. The Prince attempted to keep up a somewhat despotic rule, which did not admit of the free democratic Constitution which M. Venizélos wished to see established, and even tried to keep Crete in ignorance of the line of diplomacy followed by Greece towards Turkey. Finally, in 1901, the friction had become so great that M. Venizélos was obliged to resign office. The Prince then commenced his now famous campaign against M. Venizélos, in

which he prevailed on Eumenios, Metropolitan of Heracleum, to accompany him on tour round the island, and denounced M. Venizélos publicly as a man who was an enemy of Crete in that he did not desire its union to Greece. It need scarcely be pointed out after the account which has been given of M. Venizélos's aims that no allegation could be wider of the mark. At the General Election which ensued the tide turned against the Government, but M. Venizélos as well as ten of his associates were re-elected to their seats, his party being in a minority of 11 to 56, the total number of Cretan deputies being 67.

The Prince, as is well known, succeeded in guiding affairs on the lines of his own policy until the year 1905, when matters came to a head with the famous Therissos movement. M. Venizélos was at the head of this movement, and the extraordinary secrecy with which he organized it was in its way as remarkable as his recent *coup* of the Balkan Alliance. On the 20th of March, 1905, an army was found assembled at Therissos without so much as the authorities having an inkling that any trouble of any kind was brewing. That night M. Clearchos Marcantonakis, the lifelong friend and associate of M. Venizélos, who now acts as his private secretary, was sent to Greece as the envoy of the revolutionaries. He carried with him a letter written by M. Venizélos, explaining the reasons for the steps taken by his party, and was received by M. Delijannis, who was then Prime Minister. This mission had no immediate effect, and when the position in Crete became hopeless, a commission of the following friends of M. Venizélos—(1) Scoulas, (2) Marcandonakis, (3) Gianalakis—approached the King and laid their case before him, but without success. This was followed by a fresh deputation from the whole of Crete to Prince George, to beg him to desist from his campaign and from stating that there were Cretans who did not desire the union with Greece, which was equally unsuccessful. Then M. Venizélos and some friends went to Greece to place the matter before M. Theotokis, who had replaced

M. Delijannis, but he refused to receive them. The insurgents had now been in camp for several months, and the crisis was only ended by the arrival of delegates from the Powers who held an inquiry, as a result of which the Prince retired and was replaced by M. Zaimis. It is related how when Prince George had turned many of the electors against M. Venizélos, a resolution was passed at a village meeting for the taking of his life by force. M. Venizélos, hearing of this, went alone to the village in question, where he was not personally known, addressed a meeting of the villagers, and explained to them his aims and then revealed his identity. The meeting closed with a vote of confidence in him, and in this way he won over his would-be assassins as devoted adherents. A coalition Government was formed, in which M. Venizélos again held the portfolios of Foreign Affairs and Justice. In 1909, when this Government retired over the question of the hoisting of the flag and Proclamation of Union with Greece, M. Venizélos became Premier in the new Government. Towards the end of that year he went to Athens to advise the Government of the Military League as to the policy which they should adopt.

In June, 1910, his life was again in danger, this time from a serious attack of phlebitis, in which he was treated by the distinguished Athens surgeon, Dr. Geroulanos, who was called to Crete for the purpose. After this he travelled with M. Marcantonakis to Lausanne. This was M. Venizélos's first visit to Western Europe, and he did not complete his studies either at Lausanne or in Germany, as has been widely stated in the newspapers. He mastered both the French and German languages with his teachers during his school-boy days. In August of that year he refused an invitation to become a member for Attica in the Greek Parliament, but was elected in his absence, in spite of his refusal. He left Lausanne about the time that the election took place, and he first heard of his success from a sheaf of congratulatory telegrams which he found awaiting him on his arrival at Lucerne several days later. From Lucerne he went to

Rome where the ambassadors of the Great Powers were then sitting in conference over the question of Crete. The result of this visit was to make him decide to accept the invitation to go to Athens, but as he was still Premier of Crete, and had therefore to arrange matters there before he could enter upon his new duties officially, he decided to arrive in Athens incognito and so avoid the public demonstration that had been got ready for him. He left the train from Patras at Megara and was there met by a motor-car belonging to his friend M. Negropontes, in which he completed his journey while M. Marcantonakis continued the journey ostentatiously by train, and faced the populace, who discovered that they had thus been baulked of their reception of their future idol. M. Venizélos then returned to Crete for a few days and resigned the Cretan Premiership, and in September he was fetched from there to Athens in a special steamer by a committee sent for the purpose by the Government of M. Stephen Dragoumis (afterwards the Governor of Crete, and now Governor-General of Macedonia), who was then Greek Premier.

In Athens at the time the Constitution was still suspended as a result of the bloodless revolution of the Military League under Zorbas, and M. Venizélos was on his arrival requested to form a Government out of the National Assembly (*ἐθνικὴ συνέλευσις*), which consisted of double the number of deputies contained in the ordinary Parliament. At this time the Athenian democrats were crying out for the abolition of the existing Constitution and the substitution of a new one; but M. Venizélos was averse to this, and persons who were present will recollect his answering the clamour of the crowd for a new Constitution with the word *ἀναθεωρητικὴ* ("revisionary"), which he pronounced in the Cretan way with the *k* soft—"anatheoritichi." At the time he asked the Assembly for an unconditional vote of confidence, but as this was refused him he threatened to hand in his resignation unless the King sanctioned a dissolution. He carried his point, and after the elections had returned him to power

with an immense majority, the new double Parliament which assembled in that month voted the revision of the existing constitution.

During the period of more than a year, for which the double Parliament lasted, a great deal of most salutary and urgent legislation was accomplished under M. Venizélos's guidance. Of this, perhaps the most striking was the amendment of the criminal law. One of the most successful changes was the lenient treatment held out to cattle thieves if they voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. These had been a regular pest, and had infested the frontiers of Epirus and Thessaly. The alteration in the law had an almost immediate effect, and within a year the cattle thief had become a *rara avis*. M. Venizélos also introduced the more stringent execution of severe criminal sentences. Murderers condemned to death were practically never executed, and they were frequently allowed to be at large after a few years. M. Venizélos began by ordering the prompt execution of some thirty murderers who had been condemned to death but who were still alive in prison. The stricter measures adopted caused the dignity of the criminal tribunals to be advanced, and a reduction in the worst forms of crime was soon noticeable.

During this time also the reformation of some of the branches of the public service were taken in hand: French and British missions were brought to Athens for the Army and Navy respectively; and as the Italians had been notably successful in organizing the Cretan Gendarmerie, M. Venizélos brought an Italian mission to reform the Greek police. The Italians have scarcely been so successful in Greece as they were in Crete. It cannot be said that the Greek police are, as a whole, either smart or trustworthy, though they appear to have carried out their duties satisfactorily in the new districts taken over during the war.

M. Venizélos had always had the idea of the Balkan Alliance and had been a great admirer of Tricoupis, though it cannot be said that he was his successor in Greek politics,



for M. Venizélos's political aims are far more democratic than were those of Tricoupis. The latter was by nature a Tory, and the tragedy of his political career can be traced to the antagonism which existed between his own Tory tendencies and the democratic views of his colleagues and his supporters. It must have been gratifying to M. Venizélos to see that even Mr. Bouchier, in his account of the formation of the Balkan Alliance in *The Times*, has admitted that he was the mainspring of the alliance, and that it was Tricoupis who first tried to form one over twenty years ago. He does not, however, explain that Stambuloff, the Daneff of those days, was the principal cause of the failure of Tricoupis's plan, for he denounced it to the Porte in return for the grant of various privileges to the Bulgarian residents in Turkey.

In March, 1912, there was a General Election, at which M. Venizélos's Government was returned to power with an overwhelming majority, which materially strengthened his hand for concluding the alliance with the other Balkan States against Turkey. The figures in this election show the remarkable hold which he had gained over every class in the nation, for which there are really very few parallels in history. His statesmanship inspired a confidence in the Government of the country which the opportunist policies of other Greek Premiers had very nearly destroyed. In his ideas and schemes for a greater Greece he has never lost touch with facts, and any step which he has taken has been first thoroughly tested as regards all its possible consequences. Numbers of Greeks in all parts of the world who had almost given up their country of origin, to a great extent owing to the misgivings which they felt in its future under incompetent administrations, felt drawn to Greece once more; and it will be interesting to see whether, when everything has settled down again in the Balkans, many of them will go back and make their homes there. The return of 30,000 Greek volunteers to fight for Greece is a tribute to the personality of M. Venizélos. The greater number of them, as well as of the 40,000 or 50,000 soldiers who had emigrated and who

took their places in the ranks as conscripts will, according to inquiries made among them by the writer, probably return to their adopted countries to prosecute their businesses further, at any rate for some time; but when they have amassed sufficient wealth according to their needs, it will be surprising if they do not return and make Greece their permanent home, retaining business connections with America and elsewhere through young relatives and friends.

Where other Premiers used their powers and position for the purpose of keeping themselves in office, if not for ulterior personal objects, M. Venizélos has never thought of what the people are thinking of him, or in any way courted popularity. He has only thought of the good of his country; yet his personal magnetism has gained him an apotheosis wherever he has gone. Perhaps the most striking instance of his strength of purpose was his refusal to admit to the Greek Parliament his old confrères, the Cretan Deputies.

It is early yet to estimate the value of the services which M. Venizélos has rendered to his country, but so far as can be judged what he has already accomplished places him on the level of a Bismarck or a Cavour. The dominating personality is present in him as much as it was in the two statesmen to whom he has been compared, but it is of a much less aggressive kind. Where Bismarck showed the mailed fist, Venizélos uses a velvet glove; and so while winning his diplomatic victories by his suavity and courtesy, he avoids making the enemies which men such as Bismarck made. The charm of his manner is so unfailing that, however overworked he may be, he never shows to anybody who has the privilege of an interview with him that there is any subject more pressing for his attention than the one on hand. This habit was possibly contracted during his career as a successful and busy lawyer, but is inseparable from his innate and kindly courtesy. His relations with the Court are an example of his invariable tact and courtesy. Not unnaturally, as a result of his conflict with Prince George



ELEUTHERIOS VENIZÉLOS.



in Crete, he arrived in Greece by no means a *persona grata* to the Greek Royal Family. In addition to this he came under the auspices of a group who had forced the princes to retire from the Army. The late King George believed that he had to do with a man who might before long be planning the abolition of a dynasty, and so at first looked upon him very coldly. However, when as Premier M. Venizélos unfolded the Government programme to him, the King was so delighted with it that he said of it to a friend of the writer: "It might have been my own programme." And so M. Venizélos earned the confidence of King George, and at the same time succeeded in using the dynasty as a check on ultra-democratic Greek tendencies.

One of M. Venizélos's most remarkable qualities is his thorough grasp of detail. Though he has always cherished the ideal of a Greater Hellas, he has not been carried away by the vista of possibilities in the contemplation of which most Greek statesmen must have lost touch with hard facts.

His idealism has been kept in check by a practical perception of the factors with which he has had to deal, and he has always cut his coat according to his cloth. Thus his great moderation has been conspicuous throughout the series of crises in the Balkans, and he has coolly accepted the principle of giving up a large Greek population in Thrace in a way which some of his less practical colleagues failed to understand.

At present it appears as though M. Venizélos has come to be looked upon as indispensable by so large a section of all classes of the population, that his continuance in power is certain for many years to come, in spite of the fact which writers about Greece have never tired of repeating to us, that the Greeks are not constant in their affections except in the case of their Church and the Greek idea.

However good it may be that in times of national peril the whole nation should follow the man who is at the helm of State, a sane and steady opposition party is needed which may help to promote healthy discussion of all measures

which are brought before the House of Deputies and prevent hasty legislation. At present the twenty or so opponents of the Government in the *Boule* scarcely exceed in numbers the different parties which exist, and so intelligent debate becomes almost impossible. It is said that M. Venizélos himself is perturbed by this absence of effective opposition, and would be glad to see his ex-colleague in the Cabinet, M. Dimitracopulos, who was formerly Minister of Justice, organize a united opposition party. If this project be successfully accomplished, Greek politics should once for all be put on a firm basis.

In a memorable speech which he made in the *Boule* at the commencement of the war against Bulgaria, M. Venizélos described the relations of Greece and Bulgaria from the first pourparlers with a view to an alliance until the final breaking of the bond of union. He explained how, after a defensive military convention had been entered into, Greece was only given four days in which to make up her mind whether she would join the other Balkan States in making war on Turkey or not. The other States having decided upon war, he had to choose between three courses of action, (1) joining the Balkan League, (2) assisting Turkey, (3) strict neutrality. He was obliged as a *pis-aller* to trust in the honesty and promises of Bulgaria, as in those of Servia and Montenegro, and embark on the war without any previous agreement as to a division of territory. Unfortunately his hopes of Bulgarian good faith were disappointed, but he was the last person to admit this, and in fact did not do so until a premeditated and treacherous attack on Salonica by the Bulgarians made it no longer possible for him to proclaim the preservation of the integrity of the Balkan Alliance to the world at large.

The speech is distinguished by an absence of rhetorical expression, and yet by a direct and forceful eloquence always full of sound common sense. In reading it the farsightedness of his statesmanship is brought home to us.

Throughout the trying negotiations over the terms of peace with Turkey he showed himself a match for the

diplomats of the Great Powers, under the well-meaning but short-sighted leadership of Sir Edward Grey. In this same speech M. Venizélos described the Great Powers as "those who when they can agree together, regulate as they please the affairs of the small," an admirable satire on the treatment of the heroic Montenegrins.

It will be remembered that before the outbreak of the Turko-Balkan War M. Venizélos wished hostilities to be postponed until the following spring, for he considered that Greece was not fully prepared. As events showed, however, Greece was found to be much better equipped than any of her allies in hospital arrangements and the auxiliary branches of military organization ; and she alone possessed an adequate motor transport service. This was chiefly due to M. Venizélos, who, when one or two friends of his offered their motor-cars and their own services as chauffeurs, welcomed them warmly and encouraged them to persuade their friends to come too. The result of this was that the Greek Government had some fifty gentlemen from Athens, Cairo, Constantinople, Paris, and London, and other European capitals (some of whom, though of Greek descent, scarcely knew a word of Greek), to manage and drive their motor-cars and lorries, who were expert drivers, and at the same time men in whom trust and responsibility could be reposed. Again, although M. Venizélos for months hoped, or at any rate persuaded others to believe that he hoped, that all outstanding questions would be settled with Bulgaria without an open rupture, he took good care that all was fully prepared for the eventual death struggle. And so he was able confidently to say to the Greek Parliament on the outbreak of the war with Bulgaria, "The war with Turkey has made Greece greater, but this new war will make her very much greater still."

On first taking up office he told King George, "I shall take up my work and I am sure—in fact, it is my firm conviction—that Greece will in five years' time be unrecognizable." Two of these five years still remain, and who knows what they may have in store for Greece if M. Venizélos be spared to her?

## CHAPTER III

### THE NAVY AND NAVAL CAMPAIGN

A MEETING was held at Sofia some weeks before the outbreak of the war, at which M. Gueschoff and the Servian, Montenegrin, and Greek Ministers were present. The discussion turned upon the numbers of the forces which each of the allies would be able to place in the field against Turkey. M. Gueschoff stated that Bulgaria could supply 400,000, the Servian Minister answered for 200,000, and the Montenegrin representative for 50,000. Thereupon they all turned towards M. Panas, the Greek Minister; he said "Greece can supply 600,000 men." They all looked at him with amazement, if not incredulity written upon their faces, and asked him how that was possible. He replied, "We can place an army of 200,000 men in the field, and then our fleet will stop about 400,000 men being landed by Turkey upon the southern coast of Thrace and Macedonia, between Salonica and Gallipoli!" *Se non è vero è ben trovato.* The story, in the opinion of the writer, makes a true point. It cannot be contended that if Greece had not the command of the sea Turkey would have been able to land as many as 400,000 of her Asiatic troops in the few weeks which preceded the signing of the armistice. In view, however, of the shipping which Turkey had at her disposal, she should have been able to land some 2,000 troops a day; so that at least 150,000 men might well have been ready in Thrace within ten weeks. The strengthening of the Turkish forces in Thrace would almost certainly have placed the Turks in such a position



that they would not have wanted to sign an armistice when they did, and within about six months at the outside the figure of 400,000 would have been reached.

On an examination of the ships making up the Greek fleet and their armament, a comparison between the naval forces and the land forces of the Balkan Allies appears quite ludicrous; the same criticism applies to the Turkish fleet. The armies, amounting in all to one and a-half million men, had ample provision of the latest field and mountain guns, telephones, etc., which, at any rate so far as the allies were concerned, were used with skill and ability in no way behind that of the armies of the great Powers; while the fleets had not one single modern battleship and only one modern cruiser between them. Yet the fact that the superiority of a primitive Greek fleet over a primitive Turkish fleet decided the course of the whole war is only a fresh instance of the supreme value of sea power to nations which have a sea board of any extent.

The Greeks have been sailors ever since ancient times; the legends of the *Argo* and the wanderings of Ulysses could only be the products of the imagination of a maritime nation. Thus in the War of Independence the Greeks, without having anything worthy of the name of a fleet, did a great deal of fighting on the sea, and such men as Kanaris and Miaoules perhaps earned more fame than any of their compatriots who fought on land.

Any one who had any acquaintance with the Greek mariner, or had ever travelled in Greek steamers, could not help realizing that they are born sailors. People who knew the Near East were equally aware that the Turk has no vocation for the sea. Whoever combined any knowledge of Greece and Turkey could not help smiling when he read most of the forecasts which appeared in the British Press of the probable result of an engagement between the rival navies. Practically one and all omitted to take the personnel of the two fleets into account, and treated the subject as though it was merely a question of ships and guns, and not

also of the men controlling the ships and behind those guns.

The resourcefulness of the Greek sailors is well illustrated by the following occurrences. Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Greek Government had sent instructions to the Greek merchants ships at Constantinople to steam out into the Ægean Sea. Information was, however, subsequently received through the Greek Legation at Constantinople that the ships were being detained by the Turkish authorities. It was therefore desired to save any further ships from passing into the Sea of Marmora and being stopped there. A Greek merchant captain was asked to take his station outside the Bosphorus and warn any Greek ships to turn back. The Turkish authorities, however, were advised of this move, and sent a torpedo boat to prevent him carrying out his purpose ; he, on seeing the torpedo boat coming, steamed for Varna in order to warn the Greek ships there. The torpedo boat chased him under full steam. As the light began to fail in the afternoon the torpedo boat was seen to be closing up, and soon after this, when they were not far from Varna, it became quite dark. The Greek captain ordered all lights out in his ship and went about and steamed southwards. The Turkish torpedo boat went on its course without observing his manœuvre, and the gallant merchantman was then able to steam into Varna and warn the other Greek ships.

Another example of their smartness was furnished during the last insurrection in Crete. A Greek boat was blockaded in a small harbour by a Turkish torpedo boat ; the Greek captain immediately had a great quantity of brushwood collected on the shore, and lit his fires so that a dense smoke was seen to be issuing from his funnels, and this he kept up for several days. The trick was completely successful ; the Turkish commander thought that the Greek boat was preparing to make a dash out to sea, and kept up steam and thus exhausted all his coal. Finally the Turkish torpedo boat was obliged to steam away to fill up her bunkers,

and then the Greek ship was able to escape to a place of safety.

Tricoupis saw that a nation which depended on the sea for ways of communication, and which could furnish such good seamen, might have a great future as a maritime power, and at any rate could not hope to do much without a fleet to support her policy. He accordingly set to work to form the nucleus of a fleet with five torpedo boats and the three cruisers, *Psara*, *Hydra*, and *Spetsai*. Before the acquisition of these ships, apart from the antique *Basileus Georgios* which was scrapped a few years ago, the Greeks had nothing that could be called more than a gunboat. Owing to the financial difficulties in which Greece was plunged in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the supremacy of "Little Greeks" in the political field, the good work inaugurated by Tricoupis was not continued until after the death of Averoff, the greatest of the many public benefactors of Vlach descent, who showed themselves such enthusiastic Greek patriots. The only purchase made during the intervening years was that of some destroyers in 1906. However, fortunately there were found men in Greece public-spirited enough to vote the sum of money required to supplement Averoff's legacy sufficiently for the purchase of a first-class cruiser, and so the *Georgios Averoff* was commissioned at Leghorn.

A tabulated statement of the units of the Greek fleet at the commencement of the war is given on page 30.

The four ocean-going destroyers *Leon*, *Panther*, *Aetos*, and *Ierax* were purchased at a rather inflated price on the eve of war, at the request of the Bulgarian Government, who, however, do not appear to have contributed in any way to their cost, much less shown their gratitude to the Greek Government for having complied with their request.

In addition to the regular fleet, merchant ships, as on page 31, were commissioned as auxiliary cruisers or gunboats.

	When built.	Tonnage.	Armament.	Complement.
Armoured Battleships—				
Averoff ... ..	1910	10,118	{ 4 9·2 inch 8 7·5 inch 3 torpedo tubes	Officers 30 Petty Officers 286 Men 355
Psara ... ..	1890	5,000	{ 3 10·8 inch 5 6 inch 1 4 inch 3 tubes	Officers 20 Petty Officers 92 Men 245
Hydra... ..	1889			
Spetsai ... ..	1889			
Destroyers—				
Thyella ... ..	1906	400	{ 2 12 pounders 4 6 pounders 2 tubes	Officers 5 Petty Officers 22 Men 37
Sphendoni ... ..				
Lonchi ... ..				
Naukratoussa ... ..				
Aspis ... ..	1906	350	{ 2 12 pounders 4 6 pounders 2 tubes	Officers 5 Petty Officers 22 Men 37
Niki ... ..				
Doxa ... ..				
Velos ... ..				
5 Torpedo boats	1885	85	{ 4 1 pounders 2 tubes	Officers 1 Petty Officers 12 Men 12
Corvettes—				
Acheloos ... ..	1884	410	2 3·7 inch	{ Officers 8 Petty Officers 20 Men 82
Alpheios ... ..				
Evrotas ... ..				
Peneios ... ..				
Sphakteria ... ..	Bought in 1887	1,000	dispatch vessel	{ Officers 4 Petty Officers 31 Men 70
Crete ... ..	Captured 1897	1,000	2 small guns	{ Officers 6 Petty Officers 29 Men 54
Kanaris ... ..	1877	1,100	2 4 inch 4 tubes	{ Officers 6 Petty Officers — Men —
Aktion... ..	1881	484	{ 1 6 inch 3 12 pounders	{ Officers 5 Petty Officer & Men (about) 50
Ambrakia ... ..				
Salamina ... ..	1859-60	380	1 3·4 inch	
Syros... ..				
Monemvasia ... ..				
Aigialla ... ..				
Nauplia ... ..	1881	90	—	{ Officers — Petty Officers 3 Men 12
Kissa... ..				
Kikle ... ..				
Aedon... ..				
Miaoulis ... ..	1878	2,000	Depot ship	
3 small Gunboats	1877	50	1 4 inch	
Destroyers—				
Leon ... ..	1912	1,050	{ 4 4·7 inch 4 tubes	{ Officers 6 Petty Officers 36 Men 89
Panther ... ..				
Aetos ... ..				
Ierax ... ..				
Keravnos ... ..	1912	560	{ 4 3·5 inch 2 tubes	{ Officers 5 Petty Officers 34 Men 58
Nea Genea ... ..				
Submarine—				
Delphin ... ..	1912	{ 310 (460 sub-merged)	5 tubes	{ Officers 2 Petty Officers 13 Men 4

Name.	Armament.	Complement.	
Auxiliary Cruisers and Gunboats—			
Macedonia <sup>1</sup> ... ..	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 4 \text{ 4'7 inch} \\ 2 \text{ 3 inch} \\ 2 \text{ Maxims} \end{array} \right.$	Officers	20
		Petty Officers	43
		Men	197
Athenai ... ..	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 2 \text{ 6 inch} \\ 1 \text{ 3'5 inch} \\ 2 \text{ Maxims} \end{array} \right.$	Officers	13
		Petty Officers	28
		Men	158
Hesperia ... ..	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 3 \text{ 3 inch} \\ 6 \text{ Maxims} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Officers} \\ \text{Petty Officers} \\ \text{Men} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 11 \\ 32 \\ 177 \end{array} \right.$
Arcadia ... ..	6 Maxims	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Officers} \\ \text{Petty Officers} \\ \text{Men} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 9 \\ 29 \\ 89 \end{array} \right.$
Mycale ... ..	6 Maxims	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Officers} \\ \text{Petty Officers} \\ \text{Men} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 3 \\ 11 \\ 47 \end{array} \right.$
Ares ... ..	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Carrier of offensive} \\ \text{and defensive} \\ \text{mines} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Officers} \\ \text{Petty Officers} \\ \text{Men} \end{array} \right.$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 3 \\ 9 \\ 37 \end{array} \right.$

At the outbreak of the war Greece had 407 officers in active service and 91 officers on the reserve list; she had 1,175 petty officers on active service, and 700 on the reserve list, of whom 389 were called upon. The total personnel of the Greek Fleet under arms was 468 officers, 1,564 petty officers, and 9,200 men, between 11,000 and 12,000 men all told.

It should be mentioned that the Greek Government was able to commandeer a large number of merchant vessels as transports. The Greek Mercantile Marine has made immense progress latterly, and a great deal of the carrying trade of the Eastern Mediterranean is in its hands. The following table shows the extent of Greek and foreign shipping at the Piræus and the former's great increase during the ten years from 1901 to 1911:—

<sup>1</sup> After the bombardment by the *Hamidieh* the *Themistocles* took her place.

Year.	Steamships entering Port of Piræus.	Tonnage.	Greek Bottoms.	Tonnage.
1901	2,018	2,187,939	674	650,940
1902	2,256	2,574,493	775	762,381
1903	2,556	2,873,066	886	880,980
1904	2,411	2,810,666	838	826,627
1905	2,451	2,845,045	959	868,519
1906	2,322	2,907,580	814	814,408
1907	2,711	3,276,263	1,134	1,017,583
1908	2,610	3,532,587	1,155	1,026,000
1909	2,663	3,593,679	1,246	1,095,427
1910	2,747	3,763,583	1,313	1,228,951
1911 <sup>1</sup>	2,709 <sup>1</sup>	3,695,644 <sup>1</sup>	1,300 <sup>1</sup>	1,200,000 <sup>1</sup>

These transports did immense service throughout the war in transporting Greek, Servian, and Bulgarian troops to points where they were required. Thus a Greek division was landed at Aikaterine in October, some 20,000 Bulgarian troops were transported from Salonica to Dedeagatch in November, three Greek divisions were taken from Salonica to Preveza in December and January, over 20,000 Servian troops were taken to the Montenegrin and Albanian coasts from Salonica in February, and smaller bodies of Greek troops were continually being transported from point to point.

The organization of the Greek Fleet had not had any very great attention paid to it until the British Naval Mission was sent out to Greece in 1911. Unfortunately our Government do not appear to have treated the matter quite as seriously as they might have. Instead of sending some of the best tried instructors chosen from among the officers who had made themselves more or less experts in the various branches, they sent out a group of some eight officers under the command of an admiral on the half-pay list; all of them were made to retire from the service. It is not, as a rule, advisable to make comparisons, but the Greeks could not help comparing the British Naval Mission with the French Military Mission, which comprised some of the

<sup>1</sup> Approximately.

ablest officers from the various technical branches of the French Army. The French Government seems to have treated their mission as one of instruction, and the officers retained their ranks in the French Army, and received their promotion in due course, and wore French, not Greek, uniforms. The members of the British Mission appear to have been officially looked upon as outcasts from the British Navy, and somewhat incongruously wore the Greek, not British, uniform. In the short time which it had at its disposal, the British Mission accomplished a great deal for the discipline of the service, and greatly improved the general smartness and appearance of the sailors. The *Averoff*, to which particular attention was given by Admiral Tuffnell, created a very favourable impression by her extremely spruce appearance in the summer of 1912 wherever she was seen.

It was on the technical side that the mission scarcely fulfilled expectations. The Greek is, as is known, extremely intelligent and astute, and when he interests himself in any technical matter he goes very deeply (perhaps too much so) into the theoretical side of the question, and being a good linguist he follows up all the latest developments in those countries which are most advanced in the particular subject in which he is interested. The Greek naval officer is no exception to this; in fact, many of them have been trained in the American, Austrian, Italian, or French navies: they thus soon noticed that Britain had scarcely given them of her best. There was no time to teach the Greek gunners such technical knowledge as fire control before the war, otherwise the results of the Greek fire on the Turkish ships would have been much more deadly in the two naval engagements.

A month before the war, apparently at the request of the Greek Government, Commander Cardale, R.N., a destroyer officer, was sent out to teach the Greeks the management of their light flotilla. This officer was in active service, and was allowed to retain his place on the active list. In one

month, however, it was manifestly quite impossible to teach the intricate manœuvres in which modern destroyers must become thoroughly practised if they are successfully to perform their task of night attacks in naval warfare. This is perhaps an explanation of the failure of the attempts made to put the *Hamidieh* out of action, after its reappearance from the Red Sea and Suez Canal, though it was probably the lack of a fast cruiser which could pursue the *Hamidieh* by day and so locate it for a destroyer attack by night, which was the principal reason why its raids met with such impunity.

What has been said about the work of the British Mission must not be taken as reflecting upon the zeal and ability with which the individual members applied themselves to their task. They all worked unsparingly, though it may be said that perhaps not all of them managed to get in touch with the ways of thinking of the Greek officers or men, and so failed to earn their respect. The work done by Engineer-Commander Watson in refitting the ships during the six months during which the blockade of the Dardanelles was maintained can only be described as marvellous. However, an entirely new naval mission, consisting of officers in active service under the command of Admiral Kerr, has now been sent out to join Commander Cardale.

At present the writer has been given to understand that the Greek naval officers do not form a sufficiently homogeneous body. Among the older officers there are those who have not studied abroad and whose student days long preceded the existence of any naval college. The naval horizon of some of these officers is hardly wider than that of the heroic mariners of the Greek Revolution. There are some, however, among the older officers who have pursued their nautical studies in England and elsewhere out of Greece. Of the younger officers, on the other hand, many have not only been trained, but have actually served with the Austrian, American, Italian, or French navies. The Greek is so receptive and so adaptable that these officers



betray at first sight the navy in which they have been trained. The writer recollects an occasion upon which, on being introduced to a Greek naval officer, he mistook him for an Austrian, and another occasion on which he judged a Greek naval officer to be an American. He afterwards learnt that these two officers had served in the Austrian and American navies respectively. It will be concluded from this that a distinctive type of modern Greek naval officer has not yet been evolved. This is true to a certain extent, and it is decidedly a failing of the Greek Navy. However, an admirable college for naval cadets has been in existence during the last few years, known as the Bassanios Schole. This college is beautifully situated close to the sea, on the land which projects far out between Phaleron and the Piræus, and has fine buildings and grounds. The regime of food, work, and play here is well varied and excellent, and the boys receive a first-rate intellectual, physical, and moral education. The life of the cadets approximates more to that at one of our public schools or our naval colleges than that of any other institution in Greece that has come to the notice of the writer. The cadets have early tea at six o'clock in the morning, they have a regular English breakfast at eight o'clock, they have dinner at midday, and tea and supper. They are allowed adequate time for out-door games, and have their own tennis court as well as facilities for boating and bathing. Hitherto, even some of these boys have completed their training in a foreign navy, but their early training has modelled them more completely, and so they are less apt to be influenced by foreign surroundings.

The proximity to the capital of the existing naval base at Salamis has prevented the formation of a naval society, such as is found at Portsmouth or at Kiel, in which the naval officers who have been trained in Austria, France, or Italy, as the case may be, would associate when off duty and so mutually assimilate their widely differing points of view. For the *esprit de corps* of a navy to be at its strongest, there must be a common code and common ideals among the officers.

The war has doubtless done much to bring every type of naval officer together, and it is hoped that in future some naval station will be chosen farther from Athens than is Salamis, where the naval officers would have to live with their families, and would find facilities for games and sport and other innocent recreations, which would prove a better relaxation from hard work than sitting in a café. Again, the discipline among officers on board ship, and especially the respect due from the junior to senior officer when on duty, is not as zealously observed as it should be. The tendency of the Greek naval officer has been to show more respect to his commander in a restaurant or a drawing-room than on the bridge. The British instructors will, no doubt, do their best to correct this attitude, which is so contrary to the traditions of our navy. The Greek is docile and, if the members of the new British Naval Mission gain his sympathies in the way which Commander Cardale has done, their task will not be beyond them.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE NAVY AND NAVAL CAMPAIGN (*continued*)

THE first scene of the naval operations was the west coast. It will be remembered that during the Turco-Italian War the Duke of the Abruzzi sank a Turkish torpedo boat in the Ambracian Gulf. The Turks had always had another gunboat, the *Attaleia*, stationed there, and thus had the command of the Gulf. The natural line of communication with Arta, the base of the Greek military operations in Epirus, was across the Gulf from Vonitza. It was, therefore, essential that Greece should obtain command of the Gulf. The entrance to it is magnificently defended; the channel to the small Bay of Preveza is guarded by two forts armed with nine- and ten-inch guns, and there are also forts commanding the passage from Preveza Bay to the Ambracian Gulf.

Captain Damianos was entrusted with the mission of running the gauntlet of the forts and forcing the passage to the Gulf. He was given two torpedo boats, each provided with a couple of three-inch quick-firing guns; he managed to pass through into the Gulf with both ships unharmed by the Turks. The crew of the *Attaleia* scuttled her when they saw the Greek ships attacking them. It should be mentioned that there were five Greek transports within the Gulf, and thus Greece was provided with the means of conveying her men and stores from the south to the north of the Gulf.

This performance is a good example of the quiet and

efficient manner in which the whole of the Greek campaigns have been conducted. The importance of obtaining the control of the Ambracian Gulf was realized, and no time was lost in making the attempt needed.

On the 18th of October the main squadron of the Greek fleet put to sea from the Piræus. The King, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Marine, M. Stratos, were present at the ceremony of departure. They all addressed the fleet in turn, and the promotion of Koundouriotis from commodore to rear-admiral was announced. The address of M. Venizélos was so appropriate in striking exactly the right chord that a translation of it is worth setting out in full :

"There are moments in the lives of individuals when they regret the career they have chosen. I must own that I find myself in this predicament just now. I regret that my career has brought me to the helm of the State, instead of being one of you, no matter who, be it an officer, a petty officer, or even an able seaman.

"Yes, I assure you at this moment I envy you all, even to the common sailor, for it is to you that our country is now entrusting her fate with every hope!

"We enter the struggle full of confidence on land, for have we not our allies? but our confidence is no less great at sea where our allies have entrusted their fate to us.

"We are full of hope, for we know the stuff you are made of and that you are well prepared, and above all we know the courage that inspires you all.

"Our country expects you not merely to die for her, for that is little indeed; she expects you to conquer! That is why each one of you, even in dying, should be possessed by one thought alone—how to eke out his strength until his last breath, so that the survivors may conquer.

"And you will conquer! I am more than sure of this!"

The order of the day, which reads as follows, should be noticed :



ADMIRAL KOUNDOURIOTIS.

To face p. 38.



"To the Captains, Officers, and Crews of the Fleet of the Ægean, and the Captains, Petty Officers, and Men of the Squadron of the Ambracian Gulf:—

"War has been declared against Turkey, our country calls upon you to do your duty.

"N. STRATOS,

*"Minister of Marine."*

After that the fleet put to sea.

On the 20th of October Greece notified the Foreign Powers of the blockade of the coast of Epirus from Goumenitsa (Ressardier) in the north to the Gulf of Arta in the south, twenty-four hours being the period fixed within which neutral ships should leave the zone of blockade.

The chief function of the Greek fleet was, it need hardly be said, to "bottle up" the Turkish fleet within the Dardanelles. It was, therefore, advisable that a temporary base should be found within a reasonable distance of the entrance to the Straits, and so the first of the operations of the fleet was the landing, on the 21st of October, of a body of five hundred men, under Captain Kondaratos, at Lemnos, after the proclamation of a blockade of the Turkish coast and the ports of the Ægean. The landing was made in the harbour of Moudros at eight o'clock in the morning, and by eleven o'clock the men were all ashore and marched to the city of Kastro. Part of the garrison surrendered at once, but the remainder wished to resist, with the help of some armed citizens, and so the march on the town was continued at night and it was occupied by force.

It is amusing to read that only about £60 was found in the official treasury, but that nearly £2,000 was afterwards discovered in the house of the Governor.

Lemnos, with its excellent harbour Moudros, provided the fleet with a good base for operations against the Turkish fleet. The only fault that could be found with it is that it is rather far from the entrance of the Dardanelles. However, it is not often that a base is found so close to the point where watch has to be kept.

Having secured its base, the Greek fleet employed its spare time, while keeping a strict blockade upon the Dardanelles, in seizing the various islands which still remained part of the Turkish Empire and which had not been occupied by the Italian fleet. On the evening of the 30th of October, the *Hydra*, *Spetsai*, *Thyella*, and *Lonche* were sent, under the command of Captain Ghines, to occupy Thasos. The landing was made at eight o'clock on the morning of the 31st of October: the Turkish authorities surrendered without offering any resistance.

In ancient times there were gold-mines and marble quarries in this island, and some famous statues were made of Thasian marble. Polygnotus, the painter, and Theogenes, the Olympian athlete (recipient of four hundred wreaths), were perhaps its most famous citizens of those days.

On the 31st of October the Kanaris occupied the small island of Strati, which lies south of Lemnos, and which has a population of 1,300 Greeks. On the same day the *Averoff*, *Psara*, and *Naukratoussa* occupied Imbros. In each case a detachment of marines or infantry were landed from a transport. The island of Imbros has a Greek population of 5,000.

The doings of the Greek fleet on this day do not, however, end here. That night Lieutenant Votsis, on torpedo boat No. 11, managed to find his way into Salonica harbour and blow up the Turkish gunboat *Fetik Bouled*; he left Eleutherochori at 9 p.m., passed between Fort Karaburnu and the mouth of the Vardar unseen. His own report tells the story of his exploit admirably. It is as follows:—

“PATRIS,

“October 20, 1912, Votsi.

“I steamed from Litochori in the morning and I arrived at Skala, off Eleutherochori, where I remained till 9 p.m., when I put to sea for the attack.


“Karaburnu was constantly lighting the sea by her search-lights, but I passed unobserved between Karaburnu and Vardar. Then I entered the harbour of Salonica at full







THE WHITE TOWER AT SALONICA.



LIEUTENANT VOTSIS ON THE *NICOPOLIS* (FORMERLY *ATTALEIA*), CAPTURED FROM THE TURKS.

speed, and at 9.20 I distinguished unmistakably the Turkish ironclad at anchor off the western end of the pier, with its bow pointing in a north-easterly direction.

"At the opposite, the right end of the pier (the usual place for anchoring), there was a Russian man-of-war, and I dare say others too. I manœuvred quietly, still unobserved, and I pointed the bow of my ship on the Turkish ironclad amidships. I first fired the starboard bow torpedo at 11.35 p.m. from a distance of 150 metres. Then I bore slightly to port, moving closer in, and fired the port side torpedo; then I slipped away at full speed in order to be far from the explosion. The bow of my ship being already turned to port I also fired the deck torpedo, which bent and exploded on the pier with a loud report after the explosions of the other two, which were simultaneous. For an instant we thought that it was a cannon-shot from shore. At the moment of the first explosion we noticed lights moving on the enemy's ship as well as sirens. The officers' quarters were lighted up. The explosion took place a little for'ard of the funnel to the right. Smoke came copiously from the funnel: the ship was clearly sinking by the bow, with a list to starboard. Thereupon I steamed out of the harbour at full speed over the line of the mines that were sunk outside the harbour, relying on the small draught of my ship, and I passed in front of Karaburnu, which having apparently been advised in the meantime from Salonica lighted all her searchlights.

"Nevertheless, I slipped through unobserved, and when I was opposite the promontory, according to a promise previously made to my gunners, I commanded them to fire one shot at the fort from our quick-firer from a distance of 2,500 metres. Thence I made for Aikaterine at 4 a.m., to continue landing provisions for our army."

Providence seems to have assisted him in his venture, for as he himself said, "Whenever I wanted to see my way the moon came out, and whenever I wanted to be hidden she disappeared."

The *Fetik Bouled* was an old ship built in 1870, but was refitted at considerable expense in 1905 or 1907. However, apparently she was not of much use to the Turkish navy as a man-of-war, and it was said that she was being fitted up as a hospital ship. Yet the importance of Votsis' action should not be minimized; Salonica was the second most important city of European Turkey, and the blowing up of a ship within its harbour would have no small moral effect on the Turks. Added to this is the consideration that Salonica was at that moment threatened by the Greek army. It was the eve of the battle of Jenitsa, and the news of Votsis' feat must have been most disconcerting to the Turkish commanders, as it suggested that Salonica was not safe even from a sea attack. Then the Fort of Karaburnu, which completely commands the entrance to the harbour, is armed with very fine guns and a very strong searchlight, the rays of which were visible to the writer at Veria. Also it should be noted that the harbour of Salonica was mined in a most scientific manner.

Lieutenant Votsis comes of a distinguished Greek naval family; his grandfather commanded the *Ares* outside Navarino. He has been A.D.C. to the Minister of Marine, and recently married an Anglo-Greek lady from London. Almost the most striking feature of his action was his choice of one of the oldest torpedo boats, so that in case of disaster one of the least valuable ships should be lost. This boat fired the old 1870 Whitehead torpedo of an obsolete pattern. It was impossible to find a fuse to fit it, and so one had to be evolved in Greece.<sup>1</sup>

On the 1st of November the whole fleet, except such small craft as were keeping up the blockade of the Dardanelles, sailed to the island of Samothrace and landed a force which occupied the official buildings. There was no garrison in the town, except about six soldiers under the command of a corporal. The island has a population almost wholly Greek; in fact there are said to be 4,000 Greek families and only two

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant Waring of the British Naval Mission deserves great credit for his ingenuity: he prepared it before war was declared.

Turkish families there. Of course no sort of resistance was offered.

On the 4th of November Commander Vratsanos, on the *Ierax*, occupied the island of Psara, and by doing so, as the official dispatch said, saluted the island of his grandfather, a native of Psara, who distinguished himself in the war of 1821. Psara is the island which was such a thorn in the side of the Turks in the Greek Revolution; the Sultan hearing of the damage that had been done to the Turkish fleet at that time, sent to the Grand Vizier and asked him what the trouble was. He said it all arose in the island Psara. "Show me Psara on the map," said the Sultan. On being shown the map he deleted the island of Psara and said, "Alright; let it be done away with." In spite of this Psara has remained to take its part in this war almost a century later.

On the 5th of November the *Georgios Averoff*, *Panther*, *Ierax*, and the *Thyella*, under the command of Admiral Koundouriotis, put to sea from Lemnos and sailed into the harbour of Daphne, on the promontory of Mount Athos, the easternmost prong of the peninsula of Chalkidike. A body of troops was landed and marched to Karya, the capital of Mount Athos; the orthodox monks appeared marching in a procession and chanting the old doxology to the Virgin, "ἄξιον ἔστιν . . ." ("It is fitting . . .")

Another detachment was landed in the harbour of Amouliena. There was only a section of twenty-four soldiers scattered over Mount Athos, and consequently no resistance was offered; and so the whole of the sacred mountain was occupied by the Greeks.

On the 6th of November the transport *Helena* was sent with a body of troops to occupy the promontory of Cassandra, the westernmost prong of the peninsula of Chalkidike. The troops were landed and occupied twelve villages unopposed.

It should be noted that the population of the whole peninsula of Chalkidike is, with the exception of three Slavonic monasteries on Mount Athos, almost wholly Greek.

On the 17th of November the island of Icaria was occupied. On the 21st of November the *Averoff*, *Psara*, *Hydra*, *Spetsai*, *Aspis*, and *Thyella*, and torpedo boats and transports, landed a large force at Mytilene under Major Giannakis. The town surrendered, but the garrison, estimated at over 3,000 men, though it refused to surrender, did not attempt to oppose the landing of the Greek force but took refuge inland. Thus the occupation of the island of Lesbos, under the auspices of practically the whole fleet, was in the nature of a naval and military demonstration. Great doings took place that night in the town ; the whole of the inhabitants gave their liberators a royal welcome. One old man of Mytilene put to sea in a boat and begged to be allowed to board the *Averoff* and do homage to the ship which had brought his country freedom. Having received the necessary permission, he went on board and knelt down and solemnly kissed the deck, and invoked the blessing of God upon the ship and her crew.

The Turkish force kept up a guerilla warfare on the hills inland for about a month, and finally, after various small successes by the Greeks and the capture of detachments from time to time, the remainder of the garrison, 1,700 in number, surrendered on the 20th of December.

On the 24th of November the transatlantic liner *Macedonia*, which had been fitted with a set of four 4·7 inch Bethlehem quick-firing guns similar to those of the four new destroyers bought from Messrs. Cammell, Laird & Co., and the *Hesperia*, under the command of Captain Damianos, were ordered to occupy Chios. They were accompanied by transports containing two battalions of the 7th Regiment, one battalion of the 1st Regiment, and one mountain battery. There was a strong Turkish garrison of about 4,000 men in the island, and the landing was opposed. However, under the fire of the *Macedonia*, which was most effective, a strong detachment was landed under the command of Colonel Delagrammatica and the town of Chios was occupied. The Turkish garrison, as at Mytilene moved inland, and entrenched itself on Mount Aipos. There

was some serious fighting, during which great losses were inflicted on the Turks and numbers of prisoners were captured. Finally the Greeks established themselves at Agioi Pateres, supported by the fire of some auxiliary cruisers and gunboats which bombarded the mountains behind the plain of Aipos. The Turks were thus driven into a confined space, and their remnant of 1,800 men surrendered, with two field guns and a considerable amount of army stores, on the 3rd of January.

The island of Chios is perhaps the one among the islands which, next to Crete, has played the greatest rôle in the history of the Greek race during the last century. Many of the better-class inhabitants were members of families which had migrated from Constantinople in the eighteenth century. Its inhabitants generally were exceptionally cultured, and pre-eminent even amongst the Greeks for their commercial instinct. The large clan of the Rallis, many of whom have settled in England, are of Chios origin. It is said that there is a certain amount of Semitic blood in these families, which can be traced to the Jewish immigrants from Venice, and this is supported by an examination of the types of some of the members of certain of the best-known Chiot families. This may be the explanation of their surpassing even their own countrymen in commercial aptitude. The Chiots are perhaps the only Greek merchants who have preserved great wealth in their families, and the only Greek firm in London which has attained world-wide celebrity is that of Ralli Brothers, which is now the greatest British commercial firm in India. It is reported that the head of the house of Ralli promised a donation of £100,000 to the Greek Government towards the war fund as soon as the island of Chios was united to Greece. If the report be true, the offer is a striking instance of the patriotism and generosity of the descendants of Greeks who have left their country and settled abroad. On the landing being made, the Greek Government sent a congratulatory telegram to Sir Lucas Ralli, Bart., who is the head of the firm.

The total population of Chios amounts to 60,000. With the exception of 1,000 Turks and 1,000 Italians all are Greeks. The wealth of the produce of Chios is remarkable. Its tanneries are perhaps the most flourishing branch of its industries. There are some famous monasteries there, of which the most interesting is Nea Mone, which is built on a fortified hill, and also some interesting nunneries. The climate is in some respects like that of Crete.

Towards the end of November a large number of Greek transports were placed ready at Salonica for the conveyance of the Bulgarian army corps to Dedeagatch. As it was, one-half of these was sent by land across to Tchataldja; the other half, however, was transported, under the protection of the Greek fleet, from Salonica to Dedeagatch in the course of one day. It is said that this piece of work was done most efficiently, and the whole of the troops and their beasts were landed at Dedeagatch without any fuss or mishap of any kind. It reflects the greatest credit on the Greek fleet, which was not a large one, that it was able, while maintaining an effective blockade of the Dardanelles, to complete the occupation of all these islands, and at the same time to convoy troops, besides the Bulgarian troops from Salonica, to Chios, and from Salonica to the Piræus. On the other hand it is most surprising that the Turkish fleet did not during this time make any attempt to come out and make raids, if they were not prepared to fight an open-sea action, though from about the 4th of November until the truce was signed part of it, especially the large ironclads, were needed at Tchataldja to help the land forces in repelling the Bulgarian attacks.







THE GEORGIOS AVEROFF.

## CHAPTER V

### THE NAVY AND NAVAL CAMPAIGN (*continued*)

IT must be remembered that during all this time a close watch was being kept upon the mouth of the Dardanelles, the blockade being carried out mostly by the small destroyers, but for two months no sortie was ventured upon by the Ottoman Navy. On the 14th and 15th of December the Turkish cruiser *Medjidieh* and destroyers appeared at the mouth of the Dardanelles and retired without giving battle to the patrolling destroyers. In consequence of this activity the Greek battle squadron, consisting of the armoured ships *Georgios Averoff* (flagship of Rear-Admiral Paul Koundourioits), *Spetsai* (Commodore Ghines), *Hydra*, *Psara*, and the ocean-going destroyers *Leon*, *Panther*, *Aetos*, *Ierax*, put to sea from Lemnos on the afternoon of the 14th of December and relieved the blockading destroyers on their patrol, the latter returning to Tenedos. During the night of the 15th and 16th the fleet kept watch on the Straits, patrolling on a line approximately S.W. by S. and N.E. and N., and at 8.15 a.m. it was reported to the admiral that the *Medjidieh*, unarmoured cruiser, accompanied by eight destroyers, was in sight in the mouth of the Dardanelles.

The weather was bright and clear, with a slight haze over the land, sea smooth, no motion on the ships.

The Greek squadron continued their course to the south-westward until 8.38, when alteration of course was made towards the land and shortly after this, at about 8.45, the Turkish battle squadron was sighted approaching the mouth

of the Dardanelles in single line abreast to port, the *Barbarossa* (flagship) being the starboard wing ship with the *Turgut Reis*, *Messoudieh*, and *Assar-i-Tewfik* on her port beam, about two cables apart, in the order named.

On the arrival of the Turkish battle squadron the *Medjidieh* and destroyers took station close to Kum Kale Fort, where they remained during the action. On sighting the Turkish fleet, Admiral Koundouriotis signalled to his squadron as follows :

"With the help of God and the good wishes of our King, and in the name of Justice, I sail confident of victory against the enemy of our race.—KOUNDOURIOTIS."

The signal was read to all ships' companies of the fleet, and was greeted with cries of "*Zeto!*"

Admiral Koundouriotis communicated by wireless with the smaller destroyers and the submarine *Delphin*, which were at Tenedos, ordering them to join the fleet and prepare to attack with torpedoes, but they arrived too late to take any part in the action.


When well clear of the Straits, the Turkish fleet altered course eight points to starboard (a right angle to the northward), thus bringing them into battle formation (single line ahead) passing within two miles of Cape Tekeh, steaming at a speed of about six knots only, which speed they did not exceed during the battle.

The Greeks also turned to the northward, and were in line ahead in the following order : *G. Averoff*, *Spetsai*, *Hydra*, *Psara*, with the scout destroyers *Leon*, *Panther*, *Aetos*, and *Ierax* also in line ahead stationed on the port beam of the armoured ships.

After turning, the Turks opened fire at a range of about 10,500 yards, apparently with all guns. Their fire, though well aimed and controlled, fell short.

The Greek fleet continued their course, which converged on that of the Turks, speed being at about eight knots, and opened fire at a range of 7,500 yards, but their fire was not effective

# PLAN OF ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN GREEK & TURKISH FLEETS DECEMBER 16<sup>TH</sup> 1912





until 9.40, when the range was about 5,000 yards. In the meantime (at 9.30) the Commander-in-Chief ordered Commodore Ghînes to take command of the squadron, and signalled that the *Averoff* would act independently, upon which the *Averoff* increased speed to twenty knots and endeavoured to head off the Turkish squadron, keeping up a heavy fire the while, being enveloped in clouds of smoke and showers of spray from the projectiles which were bursting round her without doing any noticeable damage.

At 9.52 the *Averoff* was nearly ahead of the *Barbarossa* and at 3,500 yards range, the remainder being about 4,500 yards from the Turkish squadron.

At this time a salvo of six 9.2 projectiles from the *Averoff* was observed to strike the *Barbarossa* on the fore turret and conning-tower, upon which she turned sixteen points to starboard (a half circle) without signal. She ceased fire from this moment and did not fire again during the action, although the remainder of the Turkish squadron kept up a desultory fire from their stern guns. The remainder of the Turkish fleet followed suit, and all steamed for the Dardanelles in disorder, pursued by the *Averoff*, which was then bringing all her bow artillery to bear on the rear of the Turkish line. Her fire was observed to be particularly effective against the broadsides of the Turkish vessels as they turned to round Cape Hellas.

The remainder of the Greek squadron, led by the *Spetsai*, turned also sixteen points and pursued at eleven knots, but undoubtedly their fire was masked during a portion of the time that the Turks were retreating by the *Averoff*, which steamed between the two squadrons. At 10.30 the chase was abandoned and fire ceased.

The Greek fleet then re-formed and remained on guard outside the Straits until nightfall.

A plucky, though unscientific, manœuvre was executed by the *Ierax* (destroyer) in the action during the time that the two squadrons were steaming to the northward. She was the rear vessel in the scout destroyer line and on the port

beam of the *Psara*, the rear ship in the battle line, and observing that the Turkish fire was not very effective, she turned to starboard and took up a position astern of the *Psara*. She opened fire on the *Messoudieh*, firing 65 shells from her four 4-inch 50-calibre guns, and then returned to her station in the destroyer line.

It is worthy of note that practically all reports mention that when the Turkish fleet turned at the critical moment of the engagement and steered for safety, the *Messoudieh* had a distinct list to starboard, and also that at an early period of the action she dropped from her position as No. 3 to No. 4 (the last of the line).

The personnel of the Greek ships showed excellent morale throughout the action. The stokers and others below decks are reported to have sung and cheered as the salvoes were fired. It is curious that no signals seem to have been made by the Turkish fleet during the action.

#### *Damages sustained by the Greek Fleet.*

The *Averoff* was struck about fifteen times by shell from small calibre guns and once on the armour belt by a heavy projectile, either from the forts or the *Barbarossa*. The damage sustained by her was roughly as follows: one steamboat and one other large boat splintered, a ventilator damaged, the main derrick shot away and stanchions, rails, etc., bent and broken; no damage to armament or structure. Her casualties were Sub-lieutenant Mamouris and four men wounded, the former having since succumbed to his injuries.

The *Spetsai* was struck four times without much damage; one large shell, which burst in the armourer's workshop on the upper deck and penetrated the cook's galley, which was adjacent, slightly wounded a cook and capsized the dinners which were in the process of cooking. The *Hydra* once by a small shell, damage negligible. One hour after the engagement, the *Hydras* steering gear broke down. This does not appear to have had any connection with the damage sustained by her from the shell which struck her.



The *Psara* not at all.

It will be observed that no damage to either armament or machinery was sustained by the Greek vessels.

*Damage inflicted on the Turkish Fleet.*

*Barbarossa*.—The striking of the fore turret and conning-tower at about 9.52 has already been mentioned. The remainder of the damage done is problematical, although there is no doubt that the *Barbarossa* was rendered *hors de combat*. Many eye-witnesses mention that the navigating bridges were seen to be destroyed. Advices from Constantinople stated that her stem was struck at the waterline leaving a large hole, and that the armoured deck at the stem was forced upwards, also that she had a large hole on the waterline aft, that shells had penetrated one or more of her boilers, and that several stokers had been killed by the escape of steam. A refugee stated that numbers of dead were landed on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles near Kum Kale and interred there before the Turkish fleet steamed on to Nagara, where they are reported to have anchored, and that Rear-Admiral Hamel Pasha and four officers of the *Barbarossa* were killed in the fight.

The *Barbarossa* undoubtedly bore the brunt of the battle, but although one heard no detailed account of damage to the other vessels, there is little doubt that they all suffered in a minor degree; the *Messoudieh* having, as previously mentioned, returned with a list, was reported from Constantinople as requiring many weeks' repairing before she would be ready for service.

*The part taken by the Forts in the Engagement.*

The forts at Seddil Bahr and Kum Kale appear to have opened fire at the same time as the Turkish fleet, and continued to fire during the action whenever the range was clear. It is reported that a number of field guns (15 or 18 pounders) were entrenched on the shore line north of Seddil Bahr, and that these fired a number of rounds at

the *Averoff* when she turned in chase from her position ahead of the *Barbarossa*, and that a large percentage of the damage received by her was from the fire of these field pieces, her distance from them when at the nearest position to the shore being about 3,000 yards. The *Averoff* also came within a range of 5,800 yards from the Seddil Bahr Fort and 8,000 yards from Kum Kale.

#### *General Conclusions.*


The two fleets engaged possessed an equal number of armoured ships, and while ship for ship the Turkish vessels were superior in armament and armour protection, the Greek ships had the advantage in speed. As a result of the engagement the Turkish fleet had only two armoured ships capable of going into action.

In the writer's opinion the causes of the Turkish defeat may be attributed to (1) The superior discipline and gunnery of the Greek ships, (2) the superiority in speed possessed by the Greek squadron generally and the greater tactical ability shown by their Commander-in-Chief. Its importance to Greece and her allies cannot be over-estimated, for had the engagement gone against her, and her fleet been reduced to a negligible asset, there would have been nothing to stop a Turkish fleet and transports from steaming to the Piræus to dictate their own terms of peace; and in the event of hostilities being resumed by all the Balkan States, the Greek fleet would have been unable to prevent as heretofore bodies of troops being sent by sea to various strategic points.

A few days later the Turkish fleet made a demonstration in force outside the Dardanelles towards Tenedos, it being observed that both the *Barbarossa* and *Messoudieh* were absent, and that the Admiral's flag was flying on board the *Turgut Reis*.

On the 14th of January a thrill of excitement passed through Athens with the news that a Turkish cruiser, first reported to be the *Medjidieh*, but afterwards found to be the *Hamidieh*, had bombarded the town of Syra and sunk the





Sifton, Praed & Co. L<sup>td</sup> London.

Scale

0  $\frac{1}{4}$   $\frac{1}{2}$   $\frac{3}{4}$  1 Mile

auxiliary cruiser *Macedonia*, which was at the time in its harbour. It was stated that the roving ship had also fired on the powder magazine along the coast to the west and on the coal store and on the electric light power station in the town.


The Greek fleet were heavily censured for allowing it to escape from the Dardanelles at night. In the fright of the inhabitants it was thought that Piræus, although an unfortified harbour, would be bombarded during the night.

The real facts connected with the escape of the *Hamidieh* and its visit to Syra appear to be as follows: During a demonstration made by the Turkish fleet on the 7th of January, the *Hamidieh*, instead of turning southward with the rest of the fleet, turned northward along the coast of Thrace. The *Averoff*, when advised of the sortie of the Turkish fleet, moved so quickly towards the mouth of the Dardanelles, that the *Hamidieh* found that she would probably be cut off if she attempted to re-enter the Straits. She was therefore obliged to turn northward, and executed the manœuvre unobserved of the *Averoff*; thus she did not succeed in rejoining the rest of the fleet. This theory is supported by a dispatch from Admiral Koundouriotis, which described how a day or two later the Turkish small craft came out of the Straits and darted about as though they were looking for something, and it was no doubt the *Hamidieh* which was the object of their search. The *Hamidieh* spent several days cruising around the coast of Thrace as far as Chalkidike, and it is said that she escaped observation by hoisting the British and Italian flags at different times and by her crew all removing their fezzes. What the object of her dash southward was cannot be said, unless she despaired of being able to rejoin her fleet and her coals were running short. The attack on Syra was no doubt due to the desire for revenge for the harm done by the *Macedonia* at Chios and Mytilene. Her whereabouts are said to have been betrayed to the Turkish authorities by some of their officers imprisoned at the Actaion Hotel at New Phaliron, who abused the con-

fidence of the Greek Government by breaking their parole. The success of her raid on Syra was no doubt due to the topographical knowledge of one of her seamen gunners, a Greek, who had been dismissed from the Greek navy for misconduct and had subsequently offered his services to the Sublime Porte. The shape of the Harbour of Syra is shown in the accompanying map. The *Hamidieh* first of all appeared off the east end of the harbour; she later steamed out southward and fired about a dozen shot, mostly 4·7-inch and perhaps one or two 6-inch shell at the gunpowder depôt from the distance of about 1,000 yards. Most of these shell found their mark, but though they exploded they could not have been charged with any high explosive, for they caused little damage. Fortunately they did not happen to strike any of the powder magazines; it is almost a miracle that the whole of the depôt was not blown up. She later steamed to the northward again and fired from 15 to 20 shell, mostly 4·7 inch (but one which fell on shore was a 6-inch shell) at the *Macedonia*; all except three appear to have hit the ship. These three, which were aimed at the bridge, seemed to have passed through it; one of them entered the electric light station through a window and exploded inside it, temporarily stopping the work of the dynamos, and another passed over the building, struck a wall, and cut off the arm of an employee of the Eastern Telegraph Company, and killed a work girl. The third struck a house on the front and exploded in a room which was full of the wedding presents of an engaged couple. The wedding was to have taken place in October 1912, but owing to the bridegroom, who was an engineer, being called to serve as a reserve engineer officer in the fleet, the wedding was postponed until after the war.

The *Hamidieh* after firing the shots steamed away. The captain of the *Macedonia* found that he could not answer the fire of the *Hamidieh* with any success and decided to try and save his ship by scuttling her. He therefore ordered his crew ashore and opened the vents. Unfortunately discipline failed and the men dispersed under no sort of control. The





THE *MACEDONIA*, SHOWING HOLE MADE BY SHELL.



THE *MACEDONIA*. THE FIRST-CLASS SALOON AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT.

To face p. 55.



depth of water in the harbour was not great, and thus the ship was not completely under water. The shells set her alight and she continued to burn all night, some of the ammunition on her going off about midnight with loud reports. The captain, having sunk his ship, went ashore and appeared to think that he had no more responsibility as regards her, and thus no attempt was made to stop the fire from spreading. The damage done to the ship was very serious, and not a piece of woodwork was left on her; the first-class saloon was reduced to a ruin, and the amount of the damage sustained probably amounted to very nearly £100,000. The fears of the inhabitants of Piræus and Athens were not verified, but the authorities did not improve matters by placing some siege guns along the shore, for there was an encouragement for the enemy's ship to fire on the port. The *Hamidieh*, which it was thought might have steamed into Smyrna Harbour, next appeared in Port Said. By doing this she contradicted the theories which were current, that she had come out in order to escort a mysterious Turkish submarine which had been reported to have been sighted off the coast of Algiers a day or two before. The *Hamidieh* claimed to stay at Port Said for an indefinite time, as being a Turkish harbour, but the British Government decided that it must be treated as a neutral harbour, and after twenty-four hours she was obliged to leave. It is said that she obtained more than her proper allowance of coal, and it was supposed that for this reason she had been persuaded by the British Government to go down the Suez Canal.

The *Hamidieh* being for the moment, at any rate, out of harm's way, the mouth of the Dardanelles again became the scene of naval interest. During the next few days some Turkish craft were constantly reconnoitring the mouth of the Straits. The Turkish fleet, under pressure, it is said, of public opinion at Constantinople, and believing that the *Averoff* had left its post at the Dardanelles and had gone in pursuit of the *Hamidieh*, decided to risk disaster in its

crippled condition and made another sortie. Apparently they considered that they were more than a match for the rest of the Greek fleet, for they steamed quite a long way out on this occasion. On the evening of the 17th they effected a reconnaissance between Tenedos and the Rabbit Islands, and on the morning of the 18th steamed northward. Then leaving Imbros to the north, they steamed in search of the Greek fleet at Lemnos. The *Turgut-Reis* again on this occasion occupied the position of flagship, and it is probable that the *Barbarossa* had not the use of some of her heavy guns. When the Turkish ships had reached a point some twenty miles north-west of Tenedos, the *Georgios Averoff* made its appearance, followed by the rest of the Greek fleet. On seeing the *Averoff* the ardour of the Turks cooled down, and they thereupon turned sixteen points and steamed back for the Dardanelles. The *Averoff* at first tried to steam to a point between the Turkish fleet and the entrance to the Straits, so as to cut off its retreat. Admiral Koundouriotis soon found, however, that he had too much leeway to make up, and thereafter he took up a stern chase and then engaged the *Turgut-Reis* and the *Barbarossa*, and to a less extent the *Messoudieh*. The engagement lasted about two hours, during which time the Turkish ships managed to make the mouth of the Straits, considerably the worse for their rash expedition. The *Averoff* reached fairly close quarters during the last hour, and there is little doubt that the Turks had very severe casualties, the killed and wounded probably exceeding three hundred. The encounter resulted in completing the damage begun in the previous engagement, and rendered all the Turkish battleships unfit to put to sea except the *Assar-i-Tewfik*, which, owing to insubordination on the part of the crew, appears not to have come into action at all. The other Greek ships also failed to come into action, only the *Averoff*, owing to its superior speed, being able to get within range of the Turkish fleet before it succeeded in taking refuge in the mouth of the Dardanelles. The *Averoff* thus engaged the Turkish ironclads singlehanded. It should be observed that

although more actual damage appears to have been inflicted on the Turkish fleet in this engagement than in that of December 16th, its fighting power had been greatly impaired on that day, so that on January 18th it fell an easy victim to the *Averoff*, which it had not expected to have to meet.

Thus this engagement was not so important as the earlier one, but still it had the effect of finally assuring the command of the sea to the Greek fleet. The *Averoff* was practically undamaged in the engagement, and its crew did not suffer one single casualty.

This was the end of the Turkish battleships so far as the Greek fleet was concerned, though after the resumption of Turco-Bulgarian operations their guns were used to support the Turkish troops at Bulair to repel the Bulgarian attacks at that point. The *Hamidieh*, however, again appeared in the Mediterranean, the protest of the Greek Government against her breach of the rules of belligerent ships at Port Said not having been effective. It was not deemed advisable to remove the *Averoff* from the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and so the *Psara* and four destroyers were sent in chase. However, this ship was much too slow for the Turkish light cruiser, and the destroyers never succeeded in occupying positions favourable for a night attack with torpedoes. The *Hamidieh* roamed the waters of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Adriatic almost at her will. She was weather-bound for some days at Malta, and afterwards nearly inflicted a great disaster on the allies in the harbour of San Giovanni di Medua, where Greek transports were in the act of landing some 20,000 Servian troops who were going to help the Montenegrins in the siege of Scutari. However, the Greek merchant captains with great presence of mind ran their ships aground wherever they could, and some Servian artillerymen, with much sangfroid, trained some heavy guns, which were being transported, upon the *Hamidieh*, with the result that that ship put out to sea without having done much damage. It continued to roam the seas for one month, earning for itself

a sinister reputation not unlike that of the Flying Dutchman, until it was with feelings of considerable relief, if also of disappointment at its escape, that the residents of Athens heard one day that it had again retired into the Suez Canal, and the coastlights, which had been extinguished, again projected their hospitable rays.

Early in the spring Admiral Koundouriotis occupied the Island of Samos, and so when the Peace of London was signed Greece was in possession of all the *Ægean* Islands except those held by the Italians.

Besides their aeroplanes, the Greeks had two hydroplanes fitted up at their naval base at Lemnos in the new year. After the first Peace Conference had resulted in no settlement being reached, there was talk of a combined attack on Constantinople by the Bulgarians and the Greeks, the plan being that the latter should effect a landing on the Asia Minor coast, and at the same time try to force the passage of the Dardanelles with their fleet. As a matter of fact this came to nothing owing to the jealous attitude of the Bulgarians, who wished to allow the Greeks no opportunity of making any claims upon Thrace. In the meantime Lieutenant Moutoussis (Engineers), who had previously made some successful flights in Epirus, made some reconnoitring flights towards the mouth of the Dardanelles, one of them being a particularly daring voyage with a passenger as far as the entrance to the Sea of Marmora. This is a unique performance, for which the Greeks should have the credit which they deserve. Naval historians should bear in mind that it was the Greeks who were the first to use the hydroplane in actual warfare.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE ORGANIZATION AND MOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY

IN Greece there is a system of conscription similar to the French system. At the age of twenty-one every Greek subject is liable to do two years military service. The term of two years applies to all classes ; there is no privileged class like the German "Einjähriger." Until the war, however, the regulations were not so strict in Greece as they are in Germany, or in France, and single sons and frequently the eldest sons of families were before 1904 exempted by law. Then University students were allowed to postpone their term of service until after they had completed their student's career. Also, besides those who were absolutely exempt owing to physical infirmity, there were others who obtained relief on the ground of unfitness for soldiering, but yet, not being absolutely incapacitated by any radical infirmity, were liable to be called upon in case of need to do army service work.

A special difficulty has existed in the case of Greeks resident abroad ; their number is exceptionally great in proportion to the population of Greece. Many of them have themselves done their term of service and have settled abroad, but have not become naturalized subjects of the country in which they have settled. Their sons are Greek subjects and therefore liable to serve ; most are not, however, registered in Greece and consequently, used not to be called upon to serve. In some cases they did not realize their liability to military service, and in others they may have

shirked it: a few may have even avoided becoming naturalized subjects of the country of their birth, in order to escape military service altogether.

Difficult cases have arisen, such as that of a Greek resident in England who has become a naturalized British subject and has had sons born in England. His sons have been born British subjects: the father has subsequently returned to spend the rest of his life in Greece. If one of his sons goes to Greece, the Greek Government claims him as a Greek subject, and would call upon him to do his military service and to fight for Greece. The British Government would apparently in such a case waive the Foreign Enlistment Act and their rights in favour of the Greek Government.

It will be seen that the executive of the Greek Government who are responsible for the application of the regulations regarding conscription have no easy task.

Before the war, the peace establishment provided about 28,000 non-commissioned officers and men. They were officered by a corps of some 2,000 commissioned officers, of whom between 1,800 and 1,900 represented the permanent establishment and the remainder officers who had been given commissions during their term of service. The number of non-commissioned officers was about 2,500. Practically no privates remained on the permanent establishment, except a few ne'er-do-wells who preferred soldiering to living in the workhouse.

The peace establishment consisted of 12 line regiments of infantry, each containing two battalions 600 strong, three cavalry regiments, total strength 2,000 men, 18 batteries of field artillery, and three batteries of mountain artillery, each containing four guns, and three battalions of engineers, each 500 strong.

In addition to this there were six battalions of Evzoni, or Highlanders, each about 600 strong. The Greek word (well-girded) is a term similar to the Latin word "*succinctus*," which was applied to Cæsar's light troops, and they take the place of the *ψιλοὶ* of the ancient Greek armies.

They wear the fustanella, or kilt, of the country, close-fitting white hose, and peasants' shoes with long turned-up point known as tsarouchia. These shoes are found admirable for walking on the mountains; the long point, which bends back considerably and finishes in a tuft of worsted, makes the shoe very springy and is said to help the foot to obtain a firm grip on steep slopes. The kilt is white and fuller than the Scottish kilt. The costume is completed by a white frilled shirt with baggy sleeves, a very short cream sleeveless tunic embroidered with gold or black lace with brass buttons and with two hanging flaps which can be fastened over the sleeves if required, and a cap which is half-way between a Turkish fez and a Rugby football cap with a very long hanging tassel.

The Evzoni are drawn principally from the mountain and upland villages throughout Greece, including the islands, though most of them come from the Peloponnese, Acarnania, Aetolia, and Thessaly. The infantry are more or less territorial, the other arms being made up without territorial reference.

The unit of the Greek Army is a division. The peace establishment contains four divisions, of which the first has its headquarters at Larissa, the second at Athens, the third at Missolonghi, and the fourth at Nauplia. Each division consisted of two infantry regiments, one or two battalions of Evzoni, and the usual complement of cavalry, artillery, and engineers. It will be seen that a division in peace time musters between 7,000 and 8,000 strong.

The mobilization was proclaimed on the 3rd of October, 1912, and the following were summoned:—

- (1) All men who had been called upon to serve between the years 1903–1911 (inclusive).
- (2) All men who had served with the rank of non-commissioned officers between the years 1892–1902 (inclusive).
- (3) All who had actually served between the years 1885 and 1902 inclusive, with certain exceptions.

- (4) All who had served between the years 1882 and 1902 inclusive, and who were natives of places on the railways or other lines of communication. These constituted a Landwehr.

Within five days there were 115,000 men under arms in Greece. The four divisions constituting the peace establishment were each brought up to about 15,000 men, the full war strength. This figure was arrived at by adding a third battalion to each infantry regiment and bringing the strength of each battalion up to 1,000 men, and by bringing the strength of each battalion of Evzoni from 500 up to about 1,600 men. Thus these four divisions in war time contained a little under 60,000 men.

It was apparently on this basis that military critics at home estimated the fighting force of the Greek Army. The Greeks themselves just before the war, as we have seen, estimated the army which they could place in the field at 200,000 men. This estimate has been more than justified, but before discussing the force which Greece mobilized after the outbreak of hostilities, it is best to consider the organization of the men who were collected before October 17th, the date on which war was declared. As a matter of fact the Greek General Staff had during the previous three years planned the invasion of Turkey with an army of 120,000 men, consisting of eight divisions. The Greeks had, however, earned a reputation for *bragadaccio* in the war of 1897, and it seemed to them best that the European Chancelleries should believe them incapable of placing any larger forces in the field than they had mustered fifteen years before. Thus the staff made their preparations with all secrecy. Three other divisions, the 5th, 6th, and 7th, were formed of about the same strength each, and later on the force sent to Epirus was formed into an 8th division. In addition to these there were three or four independent battalions of Evzoni, each numbering about 1,500 and 1,600 men, and there was an independent Cretan regiment 2,500 strong. Besides these troops there were at first about 2,000 irregulars, of whom more hereafter.



The King is, according to the Constitution, Commander-in-Chief of the Army as well as of the Navy, but King George was content, like King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, merely to give to the Army his fatherly care. The Ministry of War appointed the Crown Prince Constantine to the command of the main army to co-operate on the frontier of Thessaly, and General Sapundzaki to the command of a small army operating from Arta on the frontier of Epirus.

The seven divisions formed at the time of the outbreak of the war were all sent to Thessaly, and the Epirus army consequently consisted only of the 15th infantry regiment of Missolonghi (which was taken out of the 3rd Division), the 3rd, 7th, and 10th battalions of Evzoni, and the Cretan regiment. The irregular troops co-operated with this force. It should be noticed that the Crown Prince did not have any irregulars working under his orders. It must not be understood from this that there were no irregular bands at work in Northern Thessaly and Macedonia during the advance of the Greek army to Salonica. There were, of course; but they were not authorized at that time or under the command of the military authorities.

The Greek Army did not distinguish itself in the war of 1897. The organization was bad and the discipline was worse, the officers were badly trained, and most of them were as deficient in technical knowledge as they were in the capacity to command. With all its disasters the war of 1897 showed, however, that the Greek soldier, at any rate the Highlander, was fine material for an army, who could, if well led and husbanded, fight courageously and well. Some of the officers, wise in their generation, realized that there was much ground to be made up if the Greek Army was to become an efficient fighting organization. A considerable number went to Germany and others to France to follow military studies. The firearms with which the Army were equipped were antiquated and wholly inadequate, and these officers set to work with great seriousness of purpose to try to improve the conditions and gradually provide the forces

with good guns and rifles. The army was thus silently reforming itself, and it was this process which led up to the bloodless revolution, or rather *coup d'état*, of 1909, known as the Revolution of Zorbas. Not the least striking aspect of this *coup d'état* was the bursting of the bonds of political inefficiency and corruption by the vigour and desire for efficiency of the Army. At the same time it was Zorbas who was indirectly responsible for bringing M. Venizélos to Athens.

It was not, of course, until the arrival of the French Military Mission, with General Eydoux at its head, in January, 1911, that the systematic reorganization of the Army was taken in hand. There was much to be done, but the ground on which they had to work was well prepared, and apart from this the Greek, when he applies his mind to a subject, is able to learn quicker than almost any one else. The result is that a great deal—far more than was thought possible by any authorities on military affairs—was accomplished in a very short time. Even this could not have been done if the French officers who formed the Mission had not put their heart into their work and laboured continuously and without sparing themselves.

The Männlicher (Austrian) rifle was introduced before the arrival of the French Mission, in place of the old pattern Graz, which had been so greatly outranged by the Mauser of the Turks in 1897. It was found to be well-balanced, accurate in its aim, and easy to manage, besides being very light. It has a very small bore, the bullet being less than  $\frac{3}{8}$  inch in diameter; the cartridges are in frames, each containing five, and the whole frame is attached below the breech and forms a magazine. The loading is thus extremely simple. Greek soldiers claimed that it surpassed the Mauser in range and accuracy. It was retained with the full approval of the French Mission.

With regard to the field guns more difficulty was found. The existing guns were Krupps of an old model, which were not very satisfactory. The choice resolved itself into whether the new model Krupp should be procured, or whether

the Creusot should be introduced. Some very elaborate competition trials were then made with Creusot and Krupp guns, with the result that the Creusot were adopted and the eighteen batteries were furnished with Creusot 3-inch field guns. In the mountain batteries the Krupp was replaced by the Schneider-Canet-Dangles, which fires a 3-inch projectile, but with a smaller charge than that propelled by the Creusot. This decision, though not universally popular at the time—for it will be remembered that there were various military and other ties with Germany, not least being the fact that a considerable number of the more efficient officers had been trained there—is one which, as subsequent events have proved, is by no means to be regretted.

Apart from the technical knowledge which they have imparted, the French Mission have taught the Greek Army the secret of good fellowship and cordial relations between the men and their officers: these relations had suffered a great strain in 1897. In this connection the writer may perhaps be allowed to mention what is in his opinion probably the only respect in which the French training is not altogether suited to the Greek soldier. The chief fault of the Greek in Greece is that he has not learned the habits of mental discipline, for he has never been through the mill; life is too easy for him there, and so the iron does not enter into his soul. The habit of camaraderie in the military camp suits the Frenchman admirably: he is methodical and precise, and it may be that he is kept better up to the mark when treated as a friend by his commanding officer; he may slouch in his march and dress untidily, but his mental habits are so orderly that this does not react on them. The Greek, on the other hand, needs all the outward discipline that he can get, for his mode of life, if not his natural inclination, has made him unmethodical. This criticism is supported by the case of the 50,000 odd soldiers who came from America and who had learned the lessons of life and the importance of a disciplined mind in the more strenuous atmosphere which is found in that country. It has no application in the case of

the Evzoni. A German military regime might for this reason possibly have given to the Greek soldier the discipline which the French regime may have failed to impart. On the other hand, the German regime crushes all individual initiative and turns the men into mere machines. This is not good for the Greek who, like the Englishman, is a man of resource, and while learning strict obedience to his superiors, ought to be taught to think for himself. A staff of experienced British drill sergeants would probably form the best complement to the French technical instructors. The Greek staff seem to have grasped in what respects the French training is defective, but the shortcomings are not such as they could remedy for themselves, and there is room for improvement in the smartness of the soldiers in marching and on parade.

The Evzoni are drawn from the population inhabiting the mountain villages, and are for the most part descendants of the Greeks who showed most spirit during the Turkish domination. When attempts were made to coerce the Greeks into becoming Mohammedans, those who had the greatest pluck would leave the towns and the villages on the plains and take to the mountains, where they were known as Klephts. The Greek word of which this is the translation means "robber," but it is not correct to class them with the Italian brigands. The various songs known as Klepht songs, which are really Greek folk-songs, best show the part which these men played during the Turkish domination. The following poem, of which a translation is appended, brings this out particularly well :

“Μάννα σου λέω δὲν ἤμπορῶ τοὺς Τούρκους νὰ δουλεύω  
Δὲν ἤμπορῶ δὲν δύναιμαι, 'εἰ μάλ' ἂν κερδίῃς' ἡ καρδιά μου.  
Θά πάρω τὸ ντουφέκι μου, νὰ πάω νὰ γείνω κλέφτης,  
Νὰ κατοικήσω στὰ βουνὰ, καὶ σταῖς ψηλαῖς ραχούλαις  
Ν' ἀχῶ τοὺς λόγγους συντροφιὰ, μὲ τὰ θεριὰ κουβέντες  
Ν' ἀχῶ τὰ χιόνια γιὰ σκεπή, τοὺς ἑράχους γιὰ κρεββάτι,  
Ν' ἀχῶ μὲ τὰ κλεφτόπουλα καθημερινό λημέρι.  
Θά φύγω, μάννα καὶ μὴν κλαῖς, μόν' δόμου τὴν εὐχή σου,

Κ' εὐχήσου με, μανοῦλά μου, Τούρκους πολλοὺς νά οφάξω,  
 Καὶ φύτεψε τρανταφυλλιά καὶ μαῦρο καριοφύλλι  
 Καὶ πότιζέ τὸ ζάχαρι, καὶ πότιζέ τὸ μόσχο.  
 Κ' ὅσον π' ἀνθίζουν, μάννα μου, καὶ ἐγάζουνε λουλούδια,  
 Ὁ υἱός σου δέν ἀπέθανε, καὶ πολεμάει τοὺς Τούρκους,  
 Κι' ἂν ἔρθῃ ἡμέρα θλιβερὴ, ἡμέρα φαρμακωμένη,  
 Καὶ μαραθοῦν τὰ δυὸ μαζὺ, καὶ πέσουν τὰ λουλούδια,  
 Τότε κέγῳ θά λαβωθῶ, καὶ μαῦρα νά φορέσης.

Δώδεκα χρόνια ἐπέρασαν, καὶ δεκαπέντε μῆνες  
 Ποῦ ἀνθίζαν τὰ τριαντάφυλλα, κι' ἀνθίζουν τὰ μπουμπούκια  
 Καὶ μίαν αὐγὴ ἀνοιξιάτικη, μιὰ πρώτη τοῦ Μαΐου,  
 Ποῦ κελαδοῦσαν τὰ πουλιά, κι' ὁ οὐρανός γελοῦσε  
 Μὲ μιᾶς ἀστράφτει καὶ ἔρουντ' αὐτὰ καὶ γίνεται σκοτάδι.  
 Τὸ καριοφύλλι ἐστέναξε, τριανταφυλλιά δακρύζει  
 Μὲ μιᾶς ξεράθηκαν τὰ δύο, κ' ἔπесαν τὰ λουλούδια.  
 Μαζὺ μ' αὐτό σωριάστηκε κ' ἡ δόλιά σου μανοῦλα.

"Mother, I tell you, I cannot slave for the Turks, I cannot bring myself to do it, my heart is weary o' 't. I shall take my gun and go and be a Klepht in the mountains and the lofty crags. The dales shall be my comrades, with the beasts I shall hold converse: the snows shall be my shelter and the rocks my bed, and I will hold daily traffick with the young Klephts.

"I am going, Mother, do not weep, but give me your blessing, and pray, Mother mine, that I shall slay many Turks; and plant roses and black clove, and sprinkle them with sugar and water them with musk.

"And so long as they bloom, Mother, as one and grow blossoms, your son is not dead but fights the Turks, and if there come a wretched day, a poisoned day, and both wither and the blossom fall, I too shall be smitten, and then do you wear black.

"Twelve years have passed and fifteen months, and still the roses bloom and the buds blossom; and one spring morn, a first of May, as the birds sang and heaven smiled, all at once there was lightning and thunder, and darkness fell and the clove sighed and the roses wept: both withered at once and the blossoms fell: then, too, your poor mother was struck low."

Thus the Greeks, from whom the Evzoni are drawn, never really became subservient to the Turks, and have, though in a limited sphere, managed to preserve their freedom of

thought and action. Also they appear to have had their minds disciplined during their association with their native hills. For the benefit of those who do not know the hills of Hellas, it should be pointed out that the spell of these hills is such that they stir the imagination, and so contribute in forming characters of steadfast purpose and orderly minds such as are not frequently found among the dwellers in her towns.

The Greek infantry are dressed in khaki uniforms similar to those adopted by our troops in South Africa. The boots appeared to the writer not to be strong enough to resist the rigours of a winter campaign, and they did not seem to stand the rains and marshes of the Romuluk and the snows round Bezane very well. If Salonica had not fallen such an easy prey to the Army, a great deal of suffering might have arisen as the result of inadequate boots. The answer given to the writer's criticism was that the Greek is accustomed to wear very light footgear and cannot march in a heavy boot. This rejoinder exemplifies the lack of method in the Greek mind; one might as well say that the Greek is not accustomed to carry 50 lb. on his back, and therefore cannot carry war kit. The uniform was completed with gaiters or puttees, or else boots with extended uppers but not coming as high as a field-boot, the preserve of the British war correspondent. Every infantry soldier carries a piece of waterproof about 6 feet long by about 4 feet wide, of which he can, by clubbing together with two or more of his fellows, form a small tent, and which he can, when marching in the rain, hang over his shoulders, a blanket, a great-coat, a change of linen, a water-bottle, a stiff canvas rucksack bound with leather, a saucepan for cooking, a first-aid case, a cartridge-belt with 150 rounds, and provisions for forty-eight hours. The rucksack when packed full was on occasion used by bodies of troops halting to form a screen in case of a sudden attack.

The Evzonos in war time is provided with a long khaki tunic reaching just above the knees, and a khaki cap similar in shape to his other cap. His kit consists merely of a



TO SHOW KIT OF INFANTRYMAN AND EVZON.



AN EVZON SERGEANT.





blanket or a shepherd's *capa*, a waterproof, a saucepan, a haversack and water-bottle; thus, including his cartridge-belt and his rifle, the total weight of his kit is very much smaller than that of the infantryman. It is evident that he can move much quicker than his colleagues of the line, but it is equally evident that only very hardy men can go on a campaign with such little provision.

The transport of the Greek Army was at first chiefly furnished by mules: double bullock carts and double and single horse carts were also used along carriage roads. Mules can of course follow the mountain tracks. Motor lorries were also used along the main roads to Veria and Janina; the number available was not great at first, but in the second stage of the Epirus campaign very many were in use. A glance at the map of Macedonia and Epirus will show that the transport problems which Greece had to face were extremely difficult: they will be described in subsequent chapters.

The seven divisions under the command of the Crown Prince, and the troops originally placed under the command of General Sapundzaki, and the troops stationed along the lines of communication to the frontiers from Athens, exhaust the 120,000 men whom the first call collected. By the 31st of December, 1912, however, over 240,000 men were drawing soldiers' pay, that is to say, had been enrolled as conscripts or else as volunteers. The volunteers are divisible into several classes:

(1) Andartes (irregulars), who were formed into bands varying in number from about ten to about forty. The greater number of these were drawn from Crete; the rest chiefly from Epirus and other parts of European Turkey. They were provided with arms and sent to Epirus. Nearly all had their *capa*, a shepherd's cloak with hood, in which they wrapped themselves at night, sleeping in the open. They received pay just as the regular troops. From these must be distinguished the bands of andartes who worked chiefly in Macedonia on their own account. They were

mostly men who had been armed during the last six years by the priesthood for the purpose of defending the Greek villages from oppression. The word "andartes" is applied to any one who takes a gun and goes to the front with the intention of putting a few bullets into the enemy. Thus one of the writer's most amusing experiences during the war was a meeting with an acquaintance—a Greek gentleman, a well-known game shot, resident in European Turkey—at a small khani (inn) outside Gida Station; the said gentleman was dressed in a town suit, stout walking boots, and a cloth cap; a cartridge-belt was slung over his shoulders, and he carried a modern rifle. He was sitting drinking coffee with two or three other more suitably attired andartes. He said he was on his way to snipe a few Turks on the banks of the Vardar River in case he saw any attempting to blow up the railway bridge. "I have shot duck there very often," he explained, "and so I might do more good than some." He had only had ten minutes in Athens in which to catch the boat, and so had not been able even to change into more comfortable clothes for the purpose. Most of these independent andartes are very far removed from this gentleman in the social scale, but they all took the field in the same sporting spirit.

(2) Those who volunteered for the Regular Army. They consisted of (*a*) Greeks whose particular class had not yet been called; (*b*) men of Greek extraction from European Turkey, from Egypt, and in fact from all over the world, but not Greek subjects. Such volunteers were at first refused, but after the declaration of war they were accepted and were enrolled in the Regular Army.

(3) Men of any nationality who offered themselves for the Garibaldian Volunteer Regiment, who were dressed in the red Garibaldian uniform, and were under the nominal command of a grandson of the great Garibaldi. Italians and Greek volunteers formed the bulk of this regiment, but there were men in it from most countries.

The men originally called who presented themselves before the outbreak of war have now been accounted for; but the



EPIROT ANDARTIS.



ANOTHER TYPE OF ANDARTIS.



existing machinery did not provide for the mobilization of more than 120,000 men.

The problem which the French Military Mission and those at the head of the Army organization had to solve at the time when war seemed probable was a puzzling one. Out of a peace establishment of 30,000 men, which in time of war in the ordinary course, with the help of reservists, increased to 60,000 men, an army of over 200,000 men had to be created. The common soldier was the only material that was there for the purpose, and immense credit is reflected on those who succeeded in obtaining the results which they did, and it is very interesting to see how this was found possible.

The greatest difficulty which they had to face was the lack of officers, and especially infantry officers. A glance at the Greek Military Annual for 1912 shows that whereas there were 12 colonels of artillery and 9 colonels of engineers on active service, there were only 12 colonels of infantry. One's first impression is that there had been a misprint somewhere, but inquiry shows that there is no misprint: it is correct. It is easy to see that as a result of this many infantry regiments must either be commanded by artillery or engineer colonels, or else must be commanded by officers of lower rank. The explanation appears to be that the *Schole Evelpidōn* (Cadet Training College) is exclusively a training college for the artillery and the engineers. Consequently all those young men who wish to make the Army their career are prepared for one of these two branches of the Service. There is no other college which is equivalent to our Sandhurst. The few infantry officers who were raised to high rank are men who have not passed through this training college, whose cadets are called "those of good hope," or "our young hopefuls."

It will thus be seen that Greece had to take the field in this war without her proper staff of infantry officers. The infantry officers of lower rank, up to and including captains, consisted chiefly of men who had taken a special course of instruction during their two years' service and had retired

with the rank of subaltern of the reserve. The resources were spun out, by the use of all the available reserve officers, until eight divisions had been organized. This in itself was a remarkable feat; but there they gave out. These eight divisions represented 120,000 men, not more. What was to be done with the other 100,000 soldiers? Battalions were being formed in Athens without officers to lead them; some had, perhaps, one or two. The difficulty was solved by drafting the latter into existing battalions to replace the losses, and by incorporating the latter in the regiments as additional battalions, so that by January 1, 1913, some infantry regiments had as many as six battalions.

The different grades of Greek officers are a little confusing. Beginning with the non-commissioned officers there are, lance-corporal (ὑποδεκανεὺς), one narrow stripe; corporal (δεκανεὺς), one broad stripe; sergeant (λοχίας), two stripes; sergeant-major (ἐπιλοχίας), three stripes; and adjutant (ἀνθυπασπιστής), who wears a commissioned officer's uniform.

The lower officers holding commissions, captain (λοχαγός), lieutenant (ὑπολοχαγός), and sub-lieutenant (ἀνθυπολοχαγός), correspond to the equivalent grades in the British Army, except that a Greek company (λόχος) is 250 strong, and thus a captain has a more responsible position than a captain in the British Army.

A major (ταγματάρχης) commands a battalion (τάγμα), and a colonel (συνταγματάρχης), or sometimes a lieutenant-colonel (ἀντισυνταγματάρχης), commands a regiment (συνταγμα). The divisional commander (μέραρχος) is usually a major-general (ὑποστράτηγος). No army corps are constituted in the Greek Army. During the war composite columns (3,000 to 5,000 strong) acting independently, called ταξιαρχίαι, were used as flying columns; there is nothing equivalent to our brigade unless it be these columns.

The Crown Prince and General Sapundzaki were both appointed to their commands with the rank of lieutenant-general (ἀντιστράτηγος). It will be seen that when compared with the British Army the Greek Army appears to be

very much under-officered. The number of commissioned officers attached to each regiment in time of war is about half the number attached to a British regiment consisting of an equal number of battalions, and it will be remembered that its strength is between 3,000 and 3,500 men. It would appear to follow that very responsible work falls upon the non-commissioned officers, especially in these days of deploying into open line when attacking.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN

#### I

IT will be recollected that as a result of the war in 1897 the northern frontier of Greece was moved southward a short distance. This alteration was very much to the disadvantage of the Greeks, as the Turks thereby gained much stronger positions than they had before 1897. The hills which form the northern boundary of the plain of Thessaly were left practically all in their hands, although the Greeks had some high positions to the east of Meluna. The idea was prevalent outside the Balkans that the Turks would have fortified the frontier to such an extent that the garrison which they were able to leave for its defence would have had no great difficulty in keeping the Greek army at bay for the greater part of the campaign. It appears, however, that the scheme for the fortification of this frontier between Turkey and Greece, commencing at Janina in the west, had not been proceeded with very far when the war broke out; in fact, it had not got beyond Janina itself. As it was, the Turks not having fortified this frontier strongly, did not place there the whole of the forces which were available for its defence, but only about 8,000 troops. The Greeks thus had no very difficult task in forcing this frontier with the army which they had ready in and around Larissa. Their numbers so greatly exceeded those of the Turks that, by adopting a very wide front, they were able with flanking movements to envelop the forces opposed to them. Prob-



ably the Turks made a very great mistake in not placing all their available strength upon the frontier. They might easily have entrenched themselves on such naturally strong positions as the topography afforded them. Instead of doing this, they established their lines of defence at Sarandaporon, which was a still stronger position. Yet in view of the peculiar Greek temperament, it might have been easier for the Turks to defend the Meluna position than that at Sarandaporon. The Hellene's temperament is such that an initial success or failure may be critical for him. The successful attack on the frontier gave the Greeks such confidence that they were prepared to go ahead and fight in the belief that nothing could stop them. On the other hand, if they had received a serious check in their attack on the frontier their *morale* might have been destroyed to such an extent that their attacks would not have been pushed home with conviction, and the army might not have crossed the frontier by the time that the Bulgarians had arrived before the fortifications of Chatalja.

There are four ways of communication over the Græco-Turkish frontier. The chief one lies across the Meluna Pass, which runs N.W. by N. and which connects the plain of Ellassona with the plain of Larissa by the shortest route. There is a fair road over this pass, which joins the Turkish artillery road from Salonica and Veria; the highest point of the road in the pass is nearly 2,000 feet up. About twelve or fifteen miles westward there is a cart track along the winding valley of the River Xerias, which also joins the two plains together: this valley remains on the level of the plains. There is a pass through the Vale of Tempe, which turns to the north round the eastern brow of Mount Olympus along the coast. The Turks had no troops massed within twenty miles of the sea, and as it was possible to outflank their left wing by a column of Evzoni marching over the mountains, the Vale of Tempe was not utilized. The fourth way is over the Zygos Pass, which crosses the frontier about the boundary of Thessaly and Epirus. This

route, lying so far to the west, was useless for the main campaign, which had Salonica as its objective.

It is interesting to note that on the 18th of October it was officially published in Athens that the army had continued its advance on Salonica. This shows that those who were at the head of the military organization in Greece had fully foreseen that their army had a good prospect of reaching Salonica, for which not many people out of the country would have given them credit.

The plan adopted was to concentrate practically the whole of the Greek army at Larissa and make use of the ✓ Meluna and Xerias routes, which happily lay close together, leaving General Sapundzaki to conduct what was intended to be mainly a defensive campaign in Epirus. Divisions I to VI and part of the 7th Division were concentrated at Larissa during the first two weeks in October. The seven Divisions were commanded as follows: the 1st Manosjannakis, 2nd Kalares, 3rd Damianos, 4th Moschopoulos, 5th Mathiopoulos, 6th Miliotes' and 7th Kleomenes. An independent brigade, or flying column, under the command of Colonel Gennades, was ordered to advance from Trikkala and occupy Diskata, which lies some twenty-five miles west of Elassona. This column consisted of two battalions of Evzoni, and was assisted by some independent bodies of irregulars operating on its left. Another flying column, under the command of Colonel Constantinopoulos, consisted also of two battalions of Evzoni, and was placed on the extreme right.

The Crown Prince had as his chief of staff Major-General Dangles, who has been called the Greek "Bobs." His stature does not quite equal that of Lord Roberts and he is a much younger man. A brilliant artillery officer, he was known to be a man of great organizing capacity and of much military learning. The Schneider-Canet-Dangles mountain guns are named partly after him: he devised an arrangement by which a 3-inch gun could be taken to pieces, and so could be transported on mules. This greatly



GENERAL DANGLES AT EMIN AGA. MOUNT OLYTZKA  
IN BACKGROUND. (*vide p. 149.*)



CHAUFFEURS IN GARAGE AT VERIA.

To face p. 76.



increased the striking power of the units over the hills of Macedonia, upon which the field batteries could not be brought into action. The Greeks thus had a more powerful mountain gun than any other Balkan army.

A few words should be said about the previous military career of the Crown Prince Constantine. He underwent his training in Germany; by showing great aptitude for military theory and soldierly qualities of no ordinary kind, he promised to develop into an able general. In the war of 1897 he was given the supreme command of the Greek Army, when he was scarcely ripe for such a responsibility. It is true that no one who took part in that war on the Greek side was given a chance to distinguish himself, for those at the head of affairs embarked on the war under pressure of public opinion, without conviction, and while negotiating with the Great Powers for a settlement of the dispute by diplomacy. Making due allowance for this, however, the Crown Prince would no doubt himself admit that he was overweighted by his task, and did not do either it or himself justice. The war was probably as great a lesson to him as to many others, and it is said that, hoping to have an opportunity of vindicating his reputation as a general, he has worked hard at military history and science for the last fifteen years, during which time he has collected an exceptionally complete library of military works. In the *coup d'état* of Zorbas the Princes were not spared any more than others who were at the head of affairs, and the Crown Prince was obliged to resign his command and his brothers to leave the Army. A pleasing feature of the incident, however, is that the confidence of the public, or at any rate that of the Army, in the Crown Prince was not destroyed; so later he was reinstated in the service when war was expected, and Mr. Venizélos recognized that he was the man to whom the most important command should be given. While on the subject of the Crown Prince Constantine, the writer feels it incumbent upon him to refer with some asperity to certain small-minded men

who thought well to publish their views on the 1897 war and, without having knowledge of the facts, thoughtlessly address what was little better than scurrilous abuse to the Crown Prince. It is no doubt partly due to this that the foreign war correspondents were at first not very warmly welcomed as followers of the Greek campaign, though later on they were treated with the greatest kindness and cordiality.


As the Greek army's victorious march to Salonica within three weeks, disposing of some 60,000 Turks *en route*, was in many ways a remarkable feat, it will be interesting to follow the advance day by day so far as it is practicable.

Immediately after the declaration of war the Greek army was given the order to advance across the frontier. The front line at first consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions. The 1st Division was ordered to advance over the hills on the right and occupy Tsaritsane and attack Ellassona from the right. The 2nd Division, in the centre, was ordered to advance along the main road over the Meluna Pass and threaten Ellassona from the front, and the 3rd Division along the valley of the Xerias on the left bank of the river. The 4th Division was soon brought up into the front line and ordered to advance along the right bank of the River Xerias, so as to occupy the hills to the west of Ellassona above the monastery.


The Turks made no resistance on the frontier—their advance guard, amounting to about 8,000 men with two or three batteries, withdrew and established itself at Ellassona with its right wing at Diskata.

On the 18th of October the 1st Division occupied Tsaritsane, four miles east of Ellassona, the 2nd Division was at Scomba, six miles south of Ellassona, and the 3rd Division at Domenico, four miles west of Scomba. The 4th Division was at Vlacogianni, well up on the left bank of the River Xerias, supporting the 3rd Division on its left, and the 5th and 6th Divisions were supporting farther to the rear. In the meantime Gennades' flying column occupied


# JENITSA



Sifton, Praed & Co. Ltd London



# SARANDAPORON



Sifton, Praed & Co. L<sup>td</sup> London

Scale

1 ½ 0 1 2 3 4 5 10 Miles



## THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN



English Miles

John Bartholomew & Co Edin:



Tsouca, seven miles south of Diskata, and on the 19th captured Diskata after a skirmish in which they lost one captain and two privates killed and about ten wounded.

The Turks at Diskata, who were stated to exceed the Greeks in numbers, retired northward. It will thus be seen that on the morning of the 19th of October the Greek army occupied positions almost due east and west of Ellassona, and threatened the line of retreat of the Turkish forces which were there. This early movement of the army on Ellassona has been described very fully because it well illustrates the strategy adopted by the Crown Prince throughout the campaign, and for which he/has deservedly received such commendatory notices in the Press.

On the 18th the staff moved to Tyrnavo, and on the 19th it advanced to Tsaritsane, from which the main attack on Ellassona was to be delivered. The choice of Tsaritsane as the place from which to direct the operations shows the importance which was attached to flank attacks; it is a good instance of the method adopted by the Crown Prince, about which more will be said later.

An engagement at Ellassona commenced on that morning, but after a few hours' fighting and, it is said, when they had learned that a Greek force had occupied Diskata, the Turks evacuated Ellassona and retired towards Sarandaporon. That day Constantinopoulos's column engaged the left wing of the Turks near the village of Psilochori, about four miles to the north-east of Tsaritsane. On the same day the army more or less concentrated at Ellassona and the advance guard occupied all the heights to the north of the town. The following day, the 21st of October, the army advanced along the whole front, Divisions I, II, III, and IV being in the front line, and occupying the relative positions which they had occupied in the advance on Ellassona, the 2nd Division being on the main road. On the night of the 21st of October the divisions halted about three miles south of the Khani Hadji-Gogou, the 3rd Division being at Vouvala, the 4th Division to the left of it, and the 1st Division close

to Zanista. From there one can see the great semicircle of hills formed at Sarandaporon, with the wings pointing southward. On the morning of the 22nd, at 6 a.m., the order to advance was given, and at about nine o'clock the advance guard came in touch with the enemy, who were posted along the hills on the line Glykovo-Vigla. An artillery duel ensued at a range of about four miles. The Crown Prince and his staff directed the battle from the Khan, which at the commencement was within range of the enemy's shell. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Divisions engaged the enemy's front, the 1st being in the centre on the road, the 2nd to the right, and the 3rd posted opposite the village of Glycovo. This village stands on a hill projecting southward from the main line of hills. The 4th Division had orders to march to the left of the 3rd Division through Metaxa and arrive opposite the junction of the road from Diskata and the road from Elassona at Kaldades, and attack the Turks on the flank as they retreated. The 3rd Division delivered its attack also from the west, thus taking the Turkish left wing on the flank. The 5th Division was ordered to make a still wider detour to the left along the valley of the Aliakmon and support the cavalry brigade under Major-General Soutsos, who was ordered to take the same road and reach the bridge over the Aliakmon between Servia<sup>1</sup> and Kosane, so as to cut off the retreat of the Turks in a north-westerly direction. In the meantime Gennades' flying column was advancing from Diskata on the extreme left.

Early in the day torrential rain began to fall, which lasted until the small hours of the morning. The battle along the front was contested the whole of the day until nightfall. The Greek artillery succeeded in advancing from time to time, the range becoming gradually closer. The Turkish time-fuses mostly did not explode in the air, whereas the Greeks did considerable damage to the Turkish lines. Towards the end of the day the 2nd Division, which had at one time attacked before the artillery had prepared the

<sup>1</sup> Serfidje.





THE SPOILS OF SARANDAPORON.

way for them and had consequently suffered considerable losses, and also the 1st Division on the right, had come to fairly close quarters with the Turks, who had retired from their outer trenches. On the left the 10th Regiment in the 3rd Division had pressed Glykovo hard from the west. The Turks had masked their positions well along the side of the hill where their guns were posted between Glykovo and the road, and it would have taken a very long bombardment and a charge or series of charges, which would have cost a great many troops, to capture the positions from the front. The following morning at daybreak when the Greeks prepared to recommence the fight, it was seen that the Turks had evacuated their positions. It appears that they had been informed of the Greek forces which were trying to cut off their retreat on the left, and so most of them retired by the shortest path towards Serfidje, which passes to the left of the Gorge of Porta Petra. The 4th Division had succeeded, after a skirmish at Mokro on the 22nd, in occupying the Hill of Kaldades overlooking the Petra Defile. The Turkish transport, with a convoy of infantry and the artillery, were obliged to retire along the main road through the Gorge of Porta Petra, and there they were intercepted by the 4th Division, which had occupied the heights to the west of the road. The panic which ensued on the part of the Turks was indescribable, and nearly all their transport, including an immense amount of artillery ammunition, was left on the road. The whole of the guns, to the number of twenty-two, also had to be abandoned and were captured by the Greeks. These were all Krupp guns of a modern pattern. A considerable number of prisoners was made.

Constantinopoulos's flying column of Evzoni, which was ordered to make a detour to the right and harass, if not cut off, the Turks who were making their way along the right bank of the river, met with opposition at Vlacholivadon. One company either took the wrong path or else misunderstood their instructions, for they found themselves to the

right of the road in front of Serfidje at Kastania, and there met the 4th and 5th Divisions.

Part of the 7th Division, which had followed as rearguard of the Crown Prince from Larissa, was ordered to take the road to the right of Vlacholivadon, through the pass leading to Aikaterine, and occupy that town. This they succeeded in doing, after a skirmish on the 28th of October. They were there joined by the other half of the division, which was shipped by sea.

General Soutsos, in command of the cavalry, apparently failed to reach and hold the bridge over the Aliakmon in time, and then, instead of hurrying in pursuit and insuring the safety of the important Greek population of Kosane, he advanced in a leisurely manner in that direction. This town, which had already been evacuated by the main Turkish troops and was anxiously awaiting his arrival, was then reoccupied by the Turks retreating from the direction of Diskata, but these did not halt there for long. The rearguard of the main Turkish forces escaped over the river northward, but a large body escaped along the right bank of Aliakmon. The retreat was partly covered by a Turkish force which engaged the 5th Division at Lazarades, and so prevented their completely outflanking the Turks between Serfidje and the Aliakmon. The 6th Division remained in reserve throughout the battle.

Of the strategy of the Crown Prince which led up to the occupation of Serfidje it is difficult to speak too highly. Not a single movement had to be counter-ordered, and everything worked like clockwork, except some of the movements of the extreme wings which we have mentioned. His most trusted divisional commander, General Kalares, he placed in the centre, no doubt because he knew how difficult it would be to restrain the Greek junior officers from advancing hot-headedly when it was right that they should merely keep their positions, and it is conceivable that any less experienced Greek divisional commander, being in General Kalares's place, might have sacrificed a great part of his division in throwing them against the Turkish positions.



Great praise for the successful carrying out of the operation is due to the Greek gunners, who made remarkably good practice when their own guns were unmasked against the Turkish guns, which were well masked, and to the commander of the 4th Division for the way in which he carried out his instructions. The *morale* of the troops appears to have been very high indeed. The infantry of the 1st and 2nd Divisions fought with great bravery in charging against quick-firing guns, though it is questionable whether their officers did not exceed their orders in pressing forward a frontal attack with the infantry, when the intention of the Crown Prince was only to engage the enemy's front with a holding attack, in order to mask the flanking operations which were in progress. The infantry while making these attacks for the most part appear to have taken cover as they charged up the hill with great skill, and this explains the comparatively small losses incurred by the Greeks in the battle, which amounted to about 1,500.

The Crown Prince himself was at one time under fire, and he sent his eldest son, Prince George of Sparta, on to the battle-field with his regiment, as a subaltern. Such rash exposure of the heirs of the throne did not receive encouragement from Athens. The officers all advanced, upright, sword in hand, just as the Highland officers did at the Battle of Elandslaagte, and consequently the losses among them were disproportionately large. The infantry, encouraged by the Crown Prince, shouted "*Zeto*," as the shells fell near them. Luckily the Turkish fuses were badly timed, and mostly did not burst in the air; and the ground being soft from the heavy downpour, which lasted all day, they did not do much harm, after they had embedded themselves in it. One soldier, a man of grim humour, who had been wounded and was lying helpless, before he was removed to a place of safety, made faces at the shells which fell around him. An officer in the same company, who was wounded in the same battle, is the writer's authority for this. There were numberless escapes, the

most fortunate, perhaps, being that of a corporal of the 1st Infantry Regiment. He was taking aim lying prone, when a bullet flattened itself on the ramrod of his rifle; rarely can there have been more extraordinary good fortune on the battle-field.

The Turks appear not to have been well led, but they were surprised and their commanders were confused by the Greek tactics. The Commander-in-Chief, Hassan Taxim Pasha, is reported to have been in a state of collapse on the night of the battle. He sent for his apothecary, who was a Greek, and asked him for a pick-me-up. When it was brought to him he said, "I have only learnt one word of your language—that word is 'ἐμπρός'" (which means "forward"). This varied with "ἐμπρός παιδιὰ" ("forward, lads,") was what the Greeks shouted throughout their charges, so great was their eagerness to get to grips with the Turk. As a member of the French Mission told the writer: "Ils partaient plutôt à la chasse qu'à la guerre." At Glycovo, on the morning of the 23rd, five Greeks and five Turks were found transfixed with one another's bayonets.

The Crown Prince occupied Serfidje on the afternoon of the 23rd of October, and there found evidences of the horrible massacre. There is no doubt at all that some seventy Christians, including some priests, were foully murdered. The story goes that the Turkish prisoners in the prison were armed and told to kill all the Greek prisoners. Unfortunately the Greek staff were not provided with cameras, and the evidence of the massacre has not been perpetuated. It may be because they were diffident as to the way in which things would go, or that, unlike the Bulgarians, they did not value self-advertisement highly enough; but no correspondents were allowed to be present to describe the battle, and the staff had no cameras or cinematographs for the purpose of putting on record their own performances or the Turkish lapses. If Bulgarians had been victims of the Serfidje massacre the illustrated papers in all European countries would have been full of photographs of it.

The Crown Prince's treatment of what were little less than murderers is noteworthy. What he might well have done was to have ordered them all to be shot. All he did was to confine them, and threaten to shoot any soldiers who attempted to touch one of them. Perhaps he was afraid of charges of barbarity and cruelty being brought against the Greeks. An idea had been spread abroad that the Greeks ill-treat and massacre the Turks just as much as the Turks ill-treat and massacre the Greeks; that it is six of one and half a dozen of the other. The Crown Prince may have wished to show that this idea was a mistaken one and to remove all cause for any such charges during the war. No doubt he also wished to establish the severest possible discipline among untried troops by showing them that they dare not move a hand against any Turk without his orders. He therefore seized upon this instance, coming as it did after the first battle, as an opportunity to show his authority. In this he was no doubt right, but still there was more than one other occasion during the war, which will be mentioned later on, in which the Turks deserved severer treatment. A strong man like Lord Kitchener would probably have ordered the culprits at Serfidje to be shot, and the Crown Prince, apart from diplomatic considerations and with a tried, disciplined army, might have done the same.

One of the weaknesses of the Greeks is their disinclination or inability to take a strong line in certain cases where it is necessary, owing possibly to an innate tenderness of heart. Their lenient treatment of murderers before the day of M. Venizélos is an illustration of this. Thus public feeling in Greece would probably have been against the Crown Prince if he had used strong measures; this consideration, presumably, also influenced his conduct.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN (*continued*)

THE country through which the Greeks had to advance until they reached Veria, which lies at the southern edge of the Romuluk, the extensive and fertile plain which lies west of Salonica and along the western shore of its gulf south of Jenitsa and east of Vodena, is a mountainous country intersected by valleys, most of which run rather east and west than north and south. The ways of communication to the north are mostly over mountain passes; the country, therefore, generally speaking, presents a great advantage to the army which is on the defensive, and does not afford much opportunity for an attacking force employing the old straight-ahead methods of attack. The line of hills on the frontier, that at Ellassona, and to an even greater extent the one at Sarandaporon, exemplify the characteristics of the country. The chains of hills between Serfidje and Veria present an even more formidable barrier.

The Crown Prince gave the first sign of his tactical ability in the method which he adopted in overcoming these geographical obstacles. His army enjoyed numerical superiority, and he took advantage of this by spreading his forces along a much wider front than the Turks could afford to adopt. He placed the most mobile troops on the extreme left and right, so that when the attack was being made on a line of hills, instead of masses of troops being concentrated on the most vulnerable point (*e.g.* a pass), the wings advanced

across the hill-tops and delivered attacks on the flanks at the same time as the centre engaged the enemy's centre. The effect of these tactics was that the Turks, realizing the danger of their lines of communication being cut, would retire long before their centre was forced back under pressure of the frontal attack. In this way positions were captured with little loss, where the older methods of attack would have necessitated large sacrifice of life. The methods of the Bulgarians can be cited in contrast to those of the Greeks. At Kirk-Kilisse, and to a greater extent at Lule Burgas, they threw large bodies of men straight at the Turkish lines instead of taking advantage of their numerical superiority and making flank attacks. This great numerical superiority has been disputed, but it is a fact that the Bulgarians promised to place 400,000 men in the field, and it is admitted that the Turks had at most 200,000 available in Thrace up to the time when the Bulgarians arrived before the Chatalja lines. The Bulgarians detached an army corps of from 35,000 to 40,000 men from their Thracian forces in order to steal a march on Salonica, with what results can be seen in a later chapter. The use of this force might have given them the decided advantage in numbers in Thrace which they may have lacked ; at any rate, with the help of the troops which the Servians sent to assist them they should have had a numerical superiority great enough to enable them to out-manceuvre the Turkish forces by means of the methods of advance and attack employed by the Greeks.

The place where such tactics could not have been employed is Chatalja, the lines of which, running across from sea to sea as they do, are less than twenty miles in length, as the Turks had the command of the sea and so could threaten the flanks of the attacking force. It is evident that if the Bulgarians had husbanded their forces more in the earlier days of the campaign by adopting more up-to-date methods in the battle of Lule Burgas they would have been fresher when they arrived before Chatalja. With the help of their Macedonian army corps they might then without delay have delivered one

of their determined frontal attacks on the lines which no Turks could resist. Honour to whom honour is due: no one will deny the bravery with which the Bulgarian soldiers fought, but it is little less than criminal on the part of those responsible to have wasted 40,000 of their best soldiers, who were badly needed in Thrace, on a jealous side march. It is said that the Bulgarians were prevented only by the diplomatic representations of two of the Great Powers from forcing the lines of Chatalja, because the latter did not want them to occupy Constantinople, and also because they feared the results of a victorious army overrunning that city at the same time. If the Bulgarians, however, had lost no time in following up their attack at Chatalja, there might have been no time for the Powers to intervene.<sup>1</sup> The action of the Powers suggests that they doubted the ability of the Bulgarian commanders to halt their men between Chatalja and Constantinople. If the Bulgarians had only been able to storm the Chatalja lines, they would have saved Europe from the anxiety and strain which the long peace negotiations brought, as well as from further bloodshed, for the Turks would then have realized the hopelessness of their position and would have had to come to the Peace Conference as suppliants, if not of the Balkan Allies, at any rate of the Powers.

The Crown Prince and his staff moved into Serfidje on the 25th of October, and kept the whole front of the army on the march. The 5th Division was ordered to follow up the cavalry brigade which had occupied Kosane that day and advance from there to the northward. The other divisions forming the front line advanced in the direction of Veria along both sides of the Aliakmon, retaining their relative positions. The 2nd Division, which was in the centre and to the westward of the Aliakmon, met with a slight resistance on the Hill of Adilompa; the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions did not meet with any opposition. On the 26th of October the Crown Prince and his staff moved into Kosane, and on that day the 5th Division was in touch with the Turkish forces before

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* page 125.

the village of Käilar. The Turks were not in strength and the inhabitants were anxious to surrender. The white flag was raised, and a Greek advance-guard was sent forward to accept the surrender, but when they were within 300 yards of the Turkish lines they were met by a determined fire. The Greek artillery was brought into action and the village was soon captured; this was the first example of treachery on the part of the Turks. The prisoners captured at Käilar, who amounted to very nearly 1,000, were taken to Kosane and confined there. The following day, October 27th, the 5th Division advanced and engaged a larger force of Turks at Nalbankioi, about twelve miles south of Sorovitz; the Greek artillery proved too strong for the Turkish artillery, and the Turks again retired.

On the same day the 3rd Division was opposed by a force of Turkish artillery and infantry at Xirolivadon, which lies to the left of the main road about seven miles south-west of Veria; the enemy retired after a slight resistance, and that same evening the 3rd Division occupied Veria, which had been deserted by the Turks. The 1st Division, which still formed the right wing, also closed in towards that town. The Crown Prince himself entered Veria with his staff on the morning of the 30th of October.

The 7th Division was in the meantime advancing along the coast from Aikaterine in the direction of Gida and Plati, and the 3rd and 4th Divisions were advancing in a line with the 2nd and 1st Divisions to the westward of Veria, the 4th being in touch with the 5th, which was proceeding towards Sorovitz, a station on the Salonica-Monastir Railway.

It was known that the next point of great resistance would be the town of Jenitsa, which lies on the slope of the hills which end at the north of the Romuluk, about forty miles west by north-west of Salonica. The expanse of land to the east of a line drawn between Veria and Jenitsa south of the main road from Jenitsa to Salonica consists of a marsh and a lake of about two miles long and one mile wide, which lies about four miles south of Jenitsa itself. This was probably the

strongest position which the Turks could adopt, for it formed a link between the River Vardar, which had to be crossed if the operations were directed against Salonica, and the passes which had to be negotiated in an advance on Monastir. Apart from these purely military considerations there was an historical reason for the choice of Jenitsa as a point of concentration. The heroes of the Turkish armies of the fourteenth century were buried there, and so Moslem fanaticism would there be worked up to its highest pitch.

The Crown Prince without delay ordered the advance on Jenitsa; the 6th Division was brought up, and that and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Divisions all advanced to the westward of the lake. The 1st Division was still on the right wing, and it advanced through Plasna, nine miles from Jenitsa, where it arrived on the night of the 31st of October. The 2nd Division was on its left as before, and passed through Disary Vlach, about three miles north-west of Plasna. The 3rd Division was still farther to the west, and passed through Krousari, three miles to the left of the 2nd Division. The 6th Division was directed to make a flank attack, supported by the 4th Division, along the line of the Vodena-Jenitsa road. The 7th Division had the special task allotted to it of occupying the bridge at Mentetsli over the River Vardar, which would have completely cut off the retreat of the Turks towards Salonica. The 2nd Division came into touch with the enemy at midday on the 1st of November, when it arrived at the River Moglenitsa at Burgas. A strong cannon fire from Jenitsa prevented it crossing the river, which was about twenty-five yards broad. The Greek artillery was then brought up into action, and gradually the 3rd and 4th Divisions also arrived and brought their artillery to play upon the Turks from farther west, and in the meantime the guns of the 6th Division also began to shell the enemy's positions. By that evening some impression had been made upon him, and under cover of the gun-fire a detachment of the infantry of the 2nd Division crossed the river and established itself a mile and a half to the north of it, covering



the advance of the artillery over the bridge. By that time the batteries of the 2nd Division had all been posted beyond the river about two miles from the enemy's lines. The whole of the infantry of the 2nd Division and a considerable body of the 3rd Division had also crossed. The other divisions also advanced to the west and south-west, and posted their batteries within three miles of the Turkish positions.

The night was a terrible one ; there was a thunderstorm, with hail and sleet and a violent wind. The men, especially those in the front line, had probably never spent such a night in their lives ; but it speaks well of the Greek infantry that they all stuck to their posts throughout the night with their rifles aimed on the Turkish lines. After dawn the weather improved, and from six o'clock the next morning a great artillery duel raged, in which the accuracy of the Greek gunners was again noticeable. Their fire was so destructive that by shortly after nine o'clock the Turkish fire began to weaken, and then a general attack was ordered, and the Turks abandoned their trenches and retired.

It is said that the Turks retired long before they lost their positions ; their officers apparently could not agree, and many of them showed great indecision, if not cowardice, and this upset the discipline of their troops. Their only line of retreat was the road over the Vardar towards Salonica, and there the 7th Division, under Kleomenes, was to have cut off their retreat by occupying the bridge. Operating with him was Constantinopoulos's flying column of Evzoni, which had served as the extreme right wing to the main army. It appears that the Evzoni alone managed to carry out their orders to the letter, and one company reached a position from which they could have occupied the bridge. The 7th Division, however, did not appear in support, and so the Evzoni were obliged to retire to avoid being isolated and all destroyed or taken prisoners.

What happened to the 7th Division has never been made clear ; it is reported that there was a mist, and that the general decided that it would be risky to advance so near

to the river without knowing the topography of the country, and so he halted in the neighbourhood of Plati, where he came in touch with a small detachment of Turks. This action on the part of the commander of the 7th Division, if not fatal, was a gross blunder, as he allowed the whole of the Turkish forces to escape across the River Vardar. It was also merely good fortune which prevented the mistake from proving fatal: the Turkish officer whose duty it was to fire the train laid to blow up the railway bridge near Cavakli forgot to do so. This, however, did not prevent the Turks from destroying the wooden road bridge at Mentetsli.

The Turkish army at Jenitsa probably amounted to between 35,000 and 40,000 men; the bulk of these were at least 20,000 from the Serres army corps, and probably 10,000 represented the unit collected from sections of the forces which escaped from Sarandaporon. The remainder consisted of one-half of the Salonica garrison, the other half of which was kept in reserve as a last line of defence at Topsin, on the east of the River Vardar.

The losses of the Greeks were somewhat more severe in this battle than at Sarandaporon. Considering the small space within which the attack had to be concentrated owing to the marsh, it is remarkable that they did not exceed about 2,000. The plan of the Crown Prince was a brilliant one, for if the general of the 7th Division had carried out his orders, the road to Salonica would have been open to the Greek army on November 3rd, except for a small body of about 5,000 men, which could not have made any serious resistance. It can scarcely be doubted that Salonica would have been surrendered by the 4th of November if the whole plan had been successful. As it was the road bridge over the Vardar was destroyed, and so the railway bridge had to be used for the army. This bridge, though it was not blown up, had been damaged and could not be used for two or three days. As the river there varies from 150 to 300 yards in width and is not fordable, the further advance of the army had to be delayed until the bridge was repaired.



TURKISH PRISONERS.



THE RAILWAY BRIDGE OVER THE VARDAR, NEAR CAVAKLI.



Towards the end of the battle the Turks were again guilty of treachery in connection with the white flag. It appears that when the Greek infantry in the centre had advanced to within 100 yards of the Turkish trenches the white flag was raised. The Greek officer in command called upon the Turks to drop their rifles and come towards the Greek lines with their hands above their heads; they showed reluctance to do so, and merely dropped their rifles and stood up. The Greeks rather foolishly then advanced without keeping their rifles aimed on the Turks. The latter again picked up their rifles and met the Greeks with a raking fire when they were quite close up. A good number were thus outrageously killed and wounded; but at that the Greeks let themselves go with the steel, and the Turks seem to have got all that they deserved.

The training and manœuvres carried out under the supervision of the French Mission had brought the Army to a certain state of efficiency, as is known, before the outbreak of the war, but a great deal of the accessories, especially those connected with transport, had not been fully provided. In fact, the general opinion in Greece was that the Greek Army would not be ready to take the field against the Turks until the spring of 1913. When this fact is borne in mind, and the difficulty presented in the feeding and supplying of ammunition to an army along the 150 miles of road which separates Larissa from Veria realized, it must be conceded that wonders were performed. It is true that the men were on one or two occasions without food for nearly forty-eight hours, but that was only because they advanced with such speed that their transports could not keep pace with them. When the hospitals are described it will be seen that the transport showed its inadequacy most in connection with them; the minimum of transport accommodation was allowed for the hospitals, because it was all needed for the ammunition and food. A word should be said here about the motor-cars. About 100 motor-cars in all were in use in Macedonia and Epirus during the early part of the war, about 60 of which

were motor-vans, the rest being ordinary passenger cars. These, as it was, did remarkable work, but they could have done very much more if more efficient arrangements had been made for the repairing and keeping of these cars in working order. There was a lack of skilled motor engineers who knew what to do with a car in order to keep it at its best on roads which were absolutely unsuited for it, though among the chauffeurs there were two or three first-rate mechanics, one of whom was clever enough to smelt a Turkish shell-cylinder and manufacture a piece of a carburetter with it. During the march from Larissa to Salonica there were really not much more than half the motors in use at one time. It has been said that the hospitals suffered from the lack of accommodation, but what suffered even worse were the postal arrangements. There were no motors which could be set apart for postal vans, and the result was that practically not a single letter reached any one from Athens before the occupation of Salonica. Outgoing letters could only be sent at all quickly through the kindly help of some motor-driver, who would either take it and post it at Larissa, or if he himself was not going there, would hand it over to a colleague who was. As motor-cars were very often kept back and occasionally did not leave on the day on which they were expected to start, letters sent from Veria by hand often took six or seven days to reach Larissa, while through the post they rarely took less than eight days. One explanation of the fact that many motors did not keep well in working order was that the chauffeurs consisted mostly of gentlemen who had volunteered as drivers and their chauffeurs. Instead of the gentleman being given the car to which he was accustomed and his own chauffeur as assistant, master and man were in most cases divided. Great credit, however, is due to all those gentlemen who took up the work of driving the cars. It was work which no one else in Greece could have done, and any one who saw the roads and the conditions in which it had to be done would say that they did as good work and helped as much in the successful



THE OLD TRANSPORT.



THE NEW TRANSPORT.





march of the army as those who did the fighting. It appears that a large quantity of motor-vans to serve as hospital ambulances had been ordered ; these had not been delivered before the outbreak of the war. Apparently it was known that they would carry stores to the front and return with wounded, and so they were stopped as contraband of war. If the Greek Government had managed to get them taken to the front, they would have made all the difference to the transport arrangements.

The headquarters of the Greek army was at Gida on the 4th of November, its further advance being delayed for the railway bridges over the Rivers Karasmak and Vardar to be repaired, and also for planks to be laid across the lines on the latter bridge in order that it might be used by the heavy transport and artillery. In the meantime the 5th Division, under Mathiopulos, which had advanced in the direction of Sorovitz, occupied that town after practically no resistance, on the 31st of October. He advanced from there along the west side of the Lake of Ostrovo until he reached the Pass of Banitza. What happened after this is not quite clear, and will probably not be known accurately until a Greek official report, or at any rate the official documents which relate to the movements and orders given to or by the divisional commander, are published.

Some account of the events, however, can be given if it is not possible to adjudge the parts played by the various actors at their true worth. It will be seen that the position occupied by Mathiopulos was one of very great importance on November 2nd, when the rest of the Crown Prince's army was concentrating towards Salonica. Sorovitz lies on the main road from Monastir to Kosane and has direct railway communication with Monastir. Part of the Turkish Monastir army corps, which had not, so far as could be ascertained, yet been in contact with the Servian army advancing from the north, was placed in such a position that it might attack the Greek 5th Division in force, break through the Greek line, and cut off the line of communication of the Greek army between

Veria and Serfidje. Mathiopulos thus had the responsible task of keeping the Monastir army corps at bay until the main body of the Crown Prince's army captured Salonica. It may be asked why the left of the Greek line was pushed so far forward, and so weakened by having a large convexity at Sorovitz instead of following an even curve through Niaousta, Djuma, to Kosane. The answer is that after the battle of Sarandaporon the Crown Prince's plan was to advance with his whole front due northward and then be guided by military principles in his further operations. Thus he would first have to crush any of the enemy's forces concentrated between Monastir and Salonica and then occupy the chief towns. Diplomatic considerations, however, began to interfere at this point, as they frequently do, and compelled the Crown Prince to modify his strategy. His Government sent him urgent messages instructing him to occupy Salonica at all costs. He therefore evolved the plan of engaging the army, which he learnt was concentrated at Jenitza, in such a way as to place Salonica at his mercy if the operations were carried out successfully. If everything had worked smoothly one or two divisions could have entered Salonica, and four or five could have been entrained and sent to join with Mathiopulos's division in a combined advance on Monastir from the south and south-south-east. As it was, the greater part of the Turkish forces which took part in the battle of Jenitza having managed to make good their retreat over the Vardar and place the river between themselves and the Crown Prince, the latter could only afford to detach about half a division for the assistance of Mathiopulos until after the surrender of Salonica, the negotiations for which were prolonged until the afternoon of Friday, November 8th.

It is said that again on November 2nd the Crown Prince desired to postpone the occupation of Salonica until after he had made his line of retreat secure in regard to the Monastir army corps, but his instructions were "Salonique à tout prix!" Therefore it is to be presumed that Mathiopulos was instructed to occupy strong positions and await further orders, though it

is possible that he was left to the use of his discretion. The importance of the occupation of Veria cannot be over-estimated. As soon as they were there the Greeks, who had depended on a single road for their communications with their base, a distance of 150 miles, found a railway line to hand over which they could entrain troops and stores in the direction of either Monastir or Salonica. Luckily some Greek railway employees, showing great enterprise and presence of mind, had succeeded in escaping from the Turks with two engines and sufficient coaches for two trains; these they placed in the hands of the Greek army, and so the immediate use of the railway was made possible for them on October 30th, while within the next two days another engine and coaches fell into their hands at Gida. At the same time by the advance of the 7th Division northward a new oversea route of communication was opened via Eleutherochori, a small port about fourteen miles north of Aikaterine. Large quantities of bread and other stores were landed at this port, and were thence carted to the nearest point of the railway line. This greatly facilitated the revictualling of the army, who had been on extremely short rations for the last week.

Before the efficiency of the Greek transport up to the time of the opening of the fresh line of communication via Eleutherochori is judged, the conditions which the Greeks had to face should be compared with those which the Bulgarians and the Servians had. The Servians had the use of a railway-line in their advance on Monastir until after the battle of Kumanovo as far as Uskub, and the Bulgarian main army also had a railway available as far as Adrianople. The Greeks had nothing but an indifferent carriage road from the beginning of their advance from Larissa. They thus had to cope with transport difficulties far greater than any which presented themselves to their allies. When Serfidje was reached it was recognized that it was a question of choosing between regulating the pace to the speed of the transport, which could not, of course, go

at the rate at which the army had been moving, or else abandoning the transport and going ahead and trusting to the resources of the country for provisioning the army. The latter course was, in fact, adopted, and the divisional commanders received orders to the effect that for the next few days no rations could be served out from headquarters and they must live on the produce of the country.

The engagements which took place between Banitza and Sorovitz are very closely connected with the march on Monastir, which resulted in the meeting of the Servians and Greeks. Thus, though the earlier fighting during Mathiopulos's first advance as far as Banitza took place before the capture of Salonica, these operations will be more conveniently described in connection with the last phase of the Macedonian campaign.





CRETAN GENDARMES LINING APPROACH TO CATHEDRAL AT SALONICA.

## CHAPTER IX

### SALONICA

THE capture of Salonica by the Greek army was probably the greatest surprise of the whole of the Balkan War. This famous commercial port was the most obvious objective of a force operating from the south. The only possible alternative to Salonica would have been Monastir, but in view of their command of the sea it was not to be wondered at that the Greeks should have turned their attention first to a town which would allow them to profit by this naval supremacy in opening a new and much speedier line of communication with Athens. Salonica could thus replace Larissa as a base for the further operations of the Greek army in Macedonia. This is a sufficient explanation of the desire of the Greeks to occupy that city. The Bulgarians detached a force of from 35,000 to 40,000 men with orders to go and seize it; the only intelligible object of this was to forestall the Greeks. It is generally agreed that in the case of joint operations by allies the occupation of any particular town or territory does not confer the right of permanent possession on the particular ally which effects the occupation, but that the occupying ally holds it as a trustee for all the allies as a whole. Still, the action of the Bulgarians in sending an army for the purpose of occupying Salonica when they knew that the Greek army was on its way was not so stupid as it might appear to be, for in doing so they had an ulterior motive. When entering into the agreement with Greece for joint action against Turkey they refused to come to any arrange-

ment for the division of eventual conquests. They felt so confident that the Greeks would make very little, if any, progress, and that their own armies would overrun practically the whole of Macedonia, including Salonica, that they had in mind to propose, when the time came, a division on the principle of *uti possidetis*. Consequently, while they were cherishing their own selfish designs, they did not look upon the triumphant progress of the Greeks towards the great Ægean port with feelings of unmixed joy.

The circumstances of the actual occupation of Salonica make very interesting reading. It has been mentioned that the Greeks were negotiating for its capture from the 6th until the 8th of November. At three o'clock that day, by arrangement with the foreign consular representatives, the Turkish commander notified the surrender of the city to the Crown Prince, and at midnight the formal documents were completed. By the morning of the 9th of November the Greek 2nd Division had arrived due north of Salonica, and the Turkish troops which had been posted there to defend the hills against an attack from the north were concentrating on and retiring towards Salonica, preparatory to being disarmed. General Kalares then observed troops advancing from a north-easterly direction. This surprised and alarmed him, and he sent an orderly to find out who they were. To his relief, the orderly returned to say that the troops were Bulgarian. Shortly afterwards, however, the Bulgarian artillery began to fire over the heads of the Greeks in the direction of the retreating Turks, but the shells fell far short of their mark. The Greek commander sent to advise them that their firing was not only useless but ill-advised and extremely dangerous for his troops; the Bulgarians then desisted. The object of this curious performance on their part can only be explained by supposing that they were endeavouring to show that they assisted in the capture of Salonica by engaging the Turkish troops stationed to the north of the city.

For the following detailed account of the advance on and



occupation of Salonica the writer is indebted to Major Strategos, a member of the Greek General Staff. The original was written in German for perusal by an old fellow-student at Berlin. It has been translated as literally as possible :—

*November 6th.*—The bridge of Kulakja<sup>1</sup> was ready, and there crossed the Vardar on this day : (1) two battalions of Evzoni (Lieutenant-Colonel Constantinopoulos) ; (2) Cavalry Brigade ; (3) part of the infantry of Division VII.

*November 7th.*—The bulk of the army crossed the Vardar : (a) Remainder of Division VII at Kulakja ; (b) infantry and mountain artillery of Division I at Valmades ; (c) Divisions II, III, and IV, and the field artillery of Division I across the railway bridge ; (d) part of Division VII at Vardarovci ; chief forces of the Greek army in the line Tekeli-Vatiluk ; cavalry brigade at Kjorzine.

At 4 p.m. Taxim Pasha's first letter reached headquarters at Topsin and announced the dispatch of delegates to treat.

At 6 p.m. the British, French, Austrian, and German consuls arrived at headquarters, accompanied by the Turkish General, Chefik Pasha, and were immediately received by H.R.H. the Crown Prince. Taxim's proposal brought by them, which involved permission for him to withdraw his whole army, with weapons and transport, to Karaburnu, and there to fortify himself, was refused. The Crown Prince made the counter-proposal of the unconditional surrender of the town of Salonica and the whole army of Taxim as prisoners of war. He volunteered, however, to let the officers keep their swords and allow the gendarmerie, after the establishment of the Greek administration, to depart with their arms and effects. The delegates were allowed till 6 a.m. to bring a definite answer, and it was made clear to them that, failing a satisfactory reply, the Greek army

<sup>1</sup> The Vardar actually flows from the railway bridge to Paleomana (not as in the Austrian Staff Map—1:200000) ; the villages of Gumdoglar (Valmades) and Kulakja are on the right bank,

would march forward at that hour. H.R.H. also explained that their object was the destruction or putting out of action of the Turkish army, and not the occupation of the city.

*November 8th.*—At about 5 a.m. Chefik Pasha and M. Karapiperis came to the Greek headquarters as plenipotentiaries of Taxim Pasha, and treated with Lieutenant-Colonel Dusmanis and Captain Metaxas as plenipotentiaries of the Crown Prince. All the Crown Prince's proposals were accepted by Taxim's representatives with the exception of the surrender of Karaburnu and an armed force of 5,000 to 6,000 men. The Greek officers did not agree to this, and so the Turkish delegates asked for a further respite of six hours for finding Taxim Pasha and informing him. This fresh respite was not granted, and the delegates were informed that the forward march of the Greek army would continue according to the original orders.

Thereupon began the forward march of the army. At 4.30 a.m. the cavalry started from Kjorzine in the direction of Gnojna; at 6.30 the left wing of the army (Division II) from Vatiluk in the direction of Dremiglava-Baldza; the remaining divisions at 10.30 a.m. crossed the line Arapli-Sariomer-Bunardza, and moved forward to grips with the enemy's line (Lembet-Dautbali-Gradobor). The extreme right wing, consisting of two battalions of Evzoni, marched against Harmankoj-Salonica. The soft earth delayed the whole movement. At 2 p.m. the whole army was deployed and advanced in battle formation. The enemy's positions which were clearly visible did not, however, open fire, but at about 3 p.m. a second letter from Taxim Pasha reached headquarters at Samli, informing H.R.H. that Taxim Pasha was ready to accept all the conditions laid down by him.

At this time Division II, completing its flanking movement, was in the neighbourhood of Dautli and commenced its march towards Dremiglava, that is in the rear of the enemy's position.

On receipt of this letter H.R.H. commanded Colonel Dusmanis and Captain Metaxas to go to the Turkish head-

quarters and sign the Protocol for the surrender of the Turkish army, the city of Salonica, and Karaburnu.

Simultaneously he stopped the movement of the troops and ordered the cessation of hostilities.

Almost at the same moment a Greek cavalry officer arrived bringing the unexpected news that the Greek cavalry had come in contact with a mixed Servian and Bulgarian cavalry regiment at Postolari, and that a Bulgarian infantry division (as the commander of the squadron informed him) was marching some 15 kilometres in its rear. It was the first time that the Greek headquarters heard of the approach of the allied forces.

H.R.H. forthwith sent a letter to the commander of the Bulgarian division to inform him of the position and to spare him unnecessary marching and fatigue, now that the common enemy was disarmed.

On the other hand Lieutenant Stäikos (cavalry) (who was aware of the position, for he had been at headquarters the previous evening) found the Greek cavalry brigade at Tenikia, and then learnt that a Bulgarian column of all arms was marching along the Serres-Salonica road. He immediately rode to Goumentze and there met the said column halting, and at its head General Petroff and Lieutenant of the Reserve Stancioff (Bulgarian ambassador in Paris). Stäikos informed General Petroff that the Turkish army was surrounded by the Greek forces, and that negotiations for the surrender of the army had been proceeding. It is noteworthy that the Bulgarian division, though they knew that the Greek army after the Battle of Jenitsa was moving east of the Vardar,<sup>†</sup> had attempted no communication with it, and so the Greek staff imagined that the Bulgarians were still at Demir-Hissar or Serres, for their march had not up till then been distinguished by any battle or engagement of importance.

<sup>†</sup> The Greek army heard of Lule Burgas on the day of the battle of Jenitsa. The Bulgarians, having the Royal Princes with them and their aides-de-camp, must certainly have been in telegraphic communication with Sofia.

*November 9th.*—During the night the Protocol was signed. Two battalions of Evzoni entered Salonica and occupied the city. At daybreak the Turkish military and civil authorities had been replaced by Greek. The disarming of the Turkish forces was immediately begun.

During the day Division VII also entered the city. During this time on the morning of the 9th of November Division II concentrated at Dremiglava and Baldza; in spite of all, the Bulgarian division advanced from Guvezne towards the Turkish troops, which were still at Ajvatli and which were in the act of being disarmed.

The Greek divisional commander when he became aware of the movement of the Bulgarian troops, requested a Bulgarian officer who was with him to go and find his general and inform him of the surrender of the Turkish army and, as a proof, gave him a French translation of the order to cease hostilities which he had received from headquarters.

The Greek staff had not heard of these events, when the Turkish commander, then a prisoner, protested against the allies of the Greeks firing on his troops which were being disarmed. The Greeks then also learnt that the Bulgarians had proposed to Taxim Pasha that he should enter into another similar Protocol with them, and that Taxim had replied that this was impossible, as he was already prisoner of the Greeks and no longer had the right to do so.

*November 10th.*—At daybreak Division VII was at the northern exit of the city, in order to take charge of the retiring Turkish troops and supervise their disarming.

In the meantime the Bulgarian Division commenced to march from Ajvatli towards the city.

The above-mentioned events compelled the Crown Prince to send Captain Mazarakis (artillery) to complain that although H.R.H. had thrice<sup>1</sup> informed him in writing of

<sup>1</sup> Besides the two letters mentioned above, H.R.H. also sent a letter through Lieutenant Klitos (cavalry). The receipt of this letter was signed by Captain H. Tzenowitz,

the surrender of the Turkish army and the city, the Bulgarian commander had proposed to Taxim Pasha, while a prisoner, also to surrender the city to the Bulgarians, and that the Bulgarian troops had fired on the Turks. He found the Bulgarian general at Ajvatli. The Bulgarian general, Petroff, asked to be excused on the ground that he knew nothing about it, and that he treated the communication from the Greek Division II as a Turkish trick, and so had not believed it. He added that under the circumstances he was obliged to pursue the enemy and occupy the city, according to the orders which he had received ; that it was only at 4 p.m. on the 9th that it became clear to him that the enemy was really retiring, and then he became convinced that the information from Division II was correct. He then confirmed that he really had proposed to Taxim Pasha to surrender the city to him also. Captain Mazarakis expressed astonishment at General Petroff's ignorance of what had happened, for he knew well that Taxim Pasha had sent him a copy of the Protocol on the evening of the 8th. General Petroff did not reply to this observation. General Petroff repeated that he had not been notified from Greek headquarters. Captain Mazarakis replied that the Greeks had sent him information thrice, but that they could not inform the Bulgarians of their intentions sooner (*i.e.* on the 7th), for they had no idea of their approach ; and, in fact, as a Bulgarian officer named Theodoroff informed a Greek officer, an old fellow-student, the Bulgarian Division had, on the last day, covered some sixty kilometres. The same officer related that the Bulgarians had found but little resistance on the Bulgaro-Turkish frontiers and also but slight opposition at Demir-Hissar. Thus on the evening of the 7th, when the negotiations for the surrender began, the Bulgarians were at Serres: the Bulgarian general finally confessed that his intelligence service had been defective and that his letters reached him too late ; he added, however, that his troops after such hard marching could no longer remain

in the open under rain, especially as he had the Royal Princes with him. He then requested what he called "grace," namely the permission to take two battalions under cover, and he formally recognized the Protocol, which Captain Mazarakis handed him to read. At the same time a Turkish officer, who was present, handed him a letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish army, in which he informed him that it was quite impossible for him to enter into negotiations with the Bulgarians as he had been a prisoner of war since the 8th of November. This conversation lasted a full two hours. At about 10 a.m. a Bulgarian officer entered the Greek headquarters staff at Salonica (in the Konak), with the formal request to the Crown Prince for permission for two Bulgarian battalions to enter the city. The Greek staff officer who was on duty informed the Bulgarian officer that it would be more effective if the Bulgarian commander himself went to see the Crown Prince. About an hour later, and while the Crown Prince was receiving the consuls, the foreign battleship commanders and deputations in the Konak, there arrived the Bulgarian General Theorodoff, accompanied by M. Stancioff. H.R.H. received the Bulgarian general immediately, when the latter asked formal permission for the quartering of two battalions in the city.

The Crown Prince agreed to two battalions entering the city, after M. Stancioff had repeatedly declared and formally confirmed that the Bulgarians fully recognized the Greek occupation of the city, and the Greek civil and military authorities and that they did not look upon it as a condominium. He added that in case the Greek administration was unwilling to ratify the Crown Prince's permission the Bulgars were prepared to leave the city within ten hours of notice being given. Instead, however, of two battalions, a whole division entered the city, and movements of Bulgarian troops were in evidence on all sides. In reply to the Greek Chief of the Staff, who protested, General Theodoroff replied that he was also surprised to find eight of his





ST. DEMETRIUS, SALONICA.



battalions in the city without being apprised thereof. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian troops remained in the city.

After that the Bulgarians occupied many posts in the city by fraud, *e.g.* the telegraph office at the station of the Salonica-Constantinople Railway, some buildings within the city, the church of St. Sophia, and generally introduced great unrest and disorder into the city.

A more interesting question than that of prior occupation was, who was to have the right of permanent ownership of Salonica? It was undoubtedly the biggest prize of the war. Of the allies the Greeks alone had any claim to it on ethnological grounds, for they number 30,000 among its population, while both the Bulgarian and Servian colonies there are numerically insignificant. Austria-Hungary's only justification for her ambitions in that direction was the prevalence of the Jews, whom their influential confrères in Vienna had taken under their protection.

The greater part of the 80,000 Jews who inhabit Salonica are descendants of emigrants who were driven out of Spain during the sixteenth century. These were no doubt attracted to Salonica because a fairly prosperous Israelite community had existed there ever since the Jews from Palestine had made it their home in the pre-Christian era. It was through Alexander the Great, however, that Salonica first gained its importance, for he made it the capital of Macedonia, and he was a Greek. The Hellenic tongue has always been spoken there. St. Paul found that its Jewish citizens of his time were Hellenized, and most Jews and Turks of Salonica can speak Greek to-day. The churches of St. Sophia and St. Demetrius, both noble Byzantine structures which overshadow all the buildings in the city, proclaim the debt which Salonica owes to the Hellenic genius. Thus the desire of the Greeks to become masters of Salonica was justified on many grounds. The claim of the Bulgars, on the other hand, was about as preposterous a claim as could well be imagined. The only historical connection with it which they can adduce is that their Czar Simeon included it in his empire,

and they have less ground for aspiring to be its owners than the Greeks for having pretensions to Sofia, which at least has a Greek name.

It is not likely that any of these considerations entered into Taxim Pasha's head when he surrendered to the Greeks. There were other equally good reasons which would appeal to a soldier. The Turkish general could in a way look upon the Greeks as old friends, for his army had been fighting against them for the previous three weeks. Even the Serres army corps, which had been intended to oppose an invasion from the north, had been sent to reinforce the forces facing the Greeks at Jenitsa. Moreover, the Bulgarians had not appeared on the scene when the negotiations for surrender were begun, and they did not actually arrive until twelve hours after the surrender was completed. If any further reasons be needed it is that the foreign consular representatives, as well as Taxim himself, probably considered that it would be much safer to entrust a town like Salonica to the Greek troops, who had behaved so well in all the towns which they had occupied, than to half-civilized soldiers like the Bulgarians, who might run amok.

In spite of what happened, the Bulgarians still tried to prove that the town ought to have been surrendered to them, and though they asked leave of the Crown Prince and were graciously allowed to bring two battalions into the city for the purpose of recovering from their march, they abused this hospitality by introducing a whole division.

When the Greeks first entered, a very curious situation arose as regards the port. Though Votsis managed to run the gauntlet of the forts and torpedo the *Fetik Bouled*, the Greek fleet, being engaged at the Dardanelles, was unable to follow up this success and co-operate with the Greek army in the capture of the city. The reader will recollect that the harbour was equipped as one of the most modern mine fields in existence. One half of the mines were automatic and the other half were spring mines controlled from Fort Karaburnu. The foreign warships stationed in

the harbour, for what reason is not quite clear, took control of all the pilot boats, and as the French admiral was senior naval officer, the French flag was hoisted on them. For some reason which did not transpire they did not allow the pilots to go and assist the Greek ships to enter the harbour. For three days the harbour was closed and there was serious danger of supplies running short. Even the warships themselves had difficulty in obtaining provisions. The situation had its comic side, for the British admiral was clamouring for his beef and at the same time he would not assist a fleet of Greek ships full of meat, grain, and stores to enter the port. On the 11th of November the *Sphakteria* managed to waylay one of the regular pilot tugs outside the harbour, and its captain at first agreed to pilot her in. Afterwards, however, presumably remembering his obligation to the French admiral, he was trying to make off when the *Sphakteria* fired first blank and then loaded shell over his bows, and so brought him to his senses and herself into Salonica. She carried besides M. Raktivan, the Greek Civil Governor and his staff, a Greek naval contingent. Within twenty-four hours the position of the mines had been located, a new Greek pilot service had been instituted, and the Royal Yacht *Amphitrite* with Queen Olga on board and twenty-two Greek ships were in Salonica Harbour. This, in the opinion of the writer, who was in Salonica at the time, was a splendid performance, which has hardly received its due.

In the meantime the Bulgarians remained in the city and continued to make themselves a nuisance. One day it was said that there was no bread because the Bulgarian troops had taken it all. They seized churches, including St. Sophia, and used them as barracks; they walked about the streets with fixed bayonets, and generally created a feeling of anxiety. The stories of conflicts between the Bulgarians and the Greeks in the town during the first few days were grossly exaggerated. The Greeks, however, had every reason to be disgusted with their guests' behaviour, and it is no wonder if at first they did not fraternize with the Bulgarians,

when they conducted themselves so arrogantly and as though they were masters of the town. There can be little doubt that the Bulgarian soldiers were out of hand, and such difficulty as the Greeks had at first to control their own large army and establish order in the city was quadrupled by the unnecessary presence of these troops. It appears that after one-half of them had been transported by sea to Kavalla and Dedeagatch, it was left for King Ferdinand himself, during his visit to the late King George, to discover the truth about the behaviour of his soldiers in the town. Soon after his departure all except about two thousand men were removed.

Any army which has accomplished a lightning march, during which it has fought two pitched battles and several other more or less serious engagements, can be forgiven if it indulges in a little looting. This is the worst accusation brought against the Greek troops ; but considering that they had the example of their guests robbing the inhabitants wholesale and committing worse excesses, there would have been every excuse for much worse behaviour than the Greek troops were guilty of. As a matter of fact competent judges assert that their behaviour could compare favourably with that of our own troops in South Africa. Though for the last two or three years it had been the stronghold of the Young Turk movement, Salonica boasted an international far more than a Turkish character. The rule of the consular representatives of the Great Powers, most of whom were men of far greater weight than many accredited diplomatic agents, was almost despotic. These men saw the fabric of the society over which they had been supreme crumbling on the advent of the Greek army, and were apt to exaggerate any disorder which ensued after the occupation. Considering the elaborate machinery which had to be put in motion, the Greek civil administration which was established acted with great promptness. It is true that certain matters, such as the regulation of the customs, were, perhaps, not attended to as soon as they should have been but after all there was other





TURKISH REFUGEE CAMP OUTSIDE SALONICA.

more pressing work to be done in connection with the further prosecution of the war. Those who have written complaining of the Greek administration of the city during the first few days seem to forget that the town was captured in war, that the Greeks did not come there as the guests of the people of Salonica, and that there had not been a long previous preparation during which everybody's part had been fully rehearsed.

In addition to its other onerous duties the Greek administration found itself under the necessity of feeding and caring for no less than fifty thousand refugees who had fled from the districts occupied by the Bulgarians. A committee was formed to administer relief, in which M. Argyropoulos, the Prefect, took an active part, and Colonel Delmé Radcliffe, commander of the British Red Cross contingent, devoted almost his whole time to it for some weeks. The prevalence of small-pox among the refugees not unnaturally caused considerable uneasiness, but stringent sanitary precautions effectively isolated the refugee camp from the city. By degrees these Mussulmans were transported to Asia Minor, until by the end of April no more than a few hundreds remained.

The beginning of the fifth month of the occupation was disturbed by the tragic assassination of King George. He had followed the army through Macedonia, being only a day or two behind his Napoleonic son. The writer, who had the honour of being presented at Veria on the day following the victory won at Jenitsa, will never forget the pride and delight expressed by His Majesty at the success of Prince Constantine and at the bravery and endurance shown by the subjects of his adopted country, over whom, as he reminded the writer, he would shortly have reigned for fifty years. King George was a man who preserved the dignity of kingship with an affability and kindness which placed any companion fully at his ease and made him feel that he had the privilege of speaking to a cultured gentleman who happened to be King of the Hellenes. A story which was told to the

writer by a German cavalry officer is à propos. The officer in question wished one day to seat himself outside a café at a German watering-place. There was no empty table, but he espied a vacant seat at a table at which a single gentleman was sitting. Before seating himself the officer, with a "By your leave" and a bow, gave his name, "Von Ploetz"; the gentleman quietly returned the bow with the words "Von Griechenland." It was King George. During the conversation with the writer, His Majesty gave a glimpse of his astute diplomatic powers. The talk turned on the attitude of Great Britain towards Greece during the past twenty or thirty years; King George expressed personal disappointment at the lack of cordiality, or, as he put it, at the feeling almost of animosity, which had been shown by us to his country. The writer referred to the problem of the Mohammedans of India, which had ripened almost to a crisis during the last few years, and which made a friendly attitude towards Turkey as necessary for our popularity in India as the preservation of that State as a power in Europe had always been to English interests in the Near East. The King immediately pointed out that Greece had no quarrel either with the Turks as a race or with Islamism as a creed, but only with the administration of the Young Turks, compared with which he considered the regime of Abdul Hamid quite admirable, in spite of its many shortcomings. The treatment of the Sultan or dishonour of the Khalifate of which the Committee of Union and Progress were guilty showed them, as he said, to be no true friends of Islamism, and therefore useless objects of England's friendship. The fact is that shrewd observers in the Near East took the measure of the Committee long before the West of Europe had begun to discern the truth. It was the Young Turks who hastened the downfall of Turkey in Europe by their incapable policy in Macedonia, by which they forced the Greeks to side with their more bitter enemy, Bulgaria, against Turkey.

King George had taken up his residence at Salonica within three days of its surrender, and the way in which he held the








THE PROCESSION OF BISHOPS IN THE KING'S FUNERAL AT ATHENS.

fort for over four months without leaving it for so much as one day will be handed down to posterity. He is reported to have said that he would not be turned out of it until after the signing of peace, unless he were first done to death, a statement of intention which was adhered to, but, alas! only at the cost of his life. To some it seemed appropriate that the King should be interred at Salonica, but his wish was respected, which was that he should be buried in the grounds at Tatoi, his own country residence in Attica. It is at any rate satisfactory to record that the funeral, including the procession at Salonica, which was followed by a great multitude of lamenting Turkish refugees and Israelites, who thus showed their gratitude for the kindness of the Greek Royal Family, was worthy of him. While the service in the Cathedral at Athens, and the procession of bishops in their bejewelled gilt mitres and robes, brought before all who were present the glories of the Greek Byzantine Empire, the general order and arrangements, and especially the magnificent bearing of the naval contingent which dragged the hearse (trained at the new King's request by Commander Cardale on the lines adopted at King Edward's funeral), showed them that Greece was a vigorous and practical modern State, capable of a display not unworthy of a great European kingdom. Unless it be in Russia, few sights so grand can have been seen for centuries as the procession of sixty-five bishops, many of whom represented newly liberated districts. How great an effect such a procession would have caused in this country is shown by the recent epidemic of tawdry pageants, which have no true symbolic or religious significance.

Their management and administration of Salonica after they had been in occupation a few weeks, as indeed of all the other towns which they captured, showed the Greeks to have the powers of good government developed in the highest degree. To one who had entered the town with the Greek army and had left it a few days later, a subsequent visit six months afterwards was as a revelation. One could hardly believe it to be the same town. Where was the dirt and where

were the smells which one had always associated with Selanik? The streets were clean and swept and the Cretan gendarmes kept perfect order, although the town was at the moment again little more than a military camp, with some 20,000 soldiers who were being landed and were passing through on their way to take up their quarters in the environs. No little of the credit for this is due to Prince Nicholas, who showed very high qualities as military governor, and not least when he proclaimed, before he knew it, that his august father's murderer was a Greek, and so very probably saved a demonstration against, if not an attack on, the Bulgarian residents. One remarkable feature of the Greek administration of Salonica was the contentment of the enormous Jewish population, towards which the tact and friendly feeling of King George helped in no small degree. Several members of the Jewish community expressed to the writer their admiration of the fairness with which Colonel Montferratos, Head of the Police, dealt with such questions as that of the sale of unmerchutable goods. The following example was given: a local Greek tradesman reported a Jewish tradesman, with whom he could not compete successfully, as selling impure butter and other provisions, and gave as his reason that he sold them at a price at which he (the Greek) could not afford to sell his own butter, etc. Colonel Montferratos caused the provisions of both men to be tested by analysts; the results showed the goods of the Jew to be just up to the standard, but some of those of the Greek to be below the standard. Thereupon the latter was fined and ordered to undergo a short term of imprisonment, to the great delight of the aggrieved Israelite. Such fairness made a great impression on all the Jews of Salonica; but it may be said that generally under the Greeks the Jews enjoy more equality and fairer treatment than they do in any other country except England. They have understood that under Greek rule the commercial future of Salonica is far brighter than it ever promised to be under the Turks.

The situation of Salonica at the head of its gulf, protected



H.M. KING GEORGE AND H.R.H. PRINCE NICHOLAS.



from the north by hills, is almost ideal. After some years of peaceful development under good government, after worthy public buildings have been erected and modern business methods introduced, it should become the Liverpool of Greece. Its new harbour can cope with an enormous trade, and may even in the future place the Piræus in the shade.

## CHAPTER X

### THE MACEDONIAN CAMPAIGN (*continued*)

IT is now necessary to take the reader's memory back to the 1st of November, in order that the operations of the left wing of the army, consisting of the 5th Division under Colonel Mathiopulos, may be followed.

The district north of Kosane was full of Mohammedan villages. Many of the inhabitants of these villages were men who had fought in the Turkish ranks at Sarandaporon, and who, after the battle, had fled to their homes. Strong detachments had therefore to be left to occupy these villages in order to secure the line of retreat and allow an advance to be made with safety. The result of this was to reduce the fighting strength of the division to about 7,000 men, but even so the troops left to garrison the villages do not appear to have been sufficient for the purpose.

On the day that the Crown Prince, with the rest of the army, was marching on Jenitsa, Colonel Mathiopulos advanced north towards Banitsa, which lies about seven miles west of Lake Ostrovo, and about three miles north-west of the small lake of Petusko. In the defile of Kili Derben a force of Turks opposed his advance. Mathiopulos apparently did not realize how strong the enemy were at this point, and one regiment which he sent forward to attack them suffered very severe losses under the enemy's gun and rifle fire before being supported. On the 1st of November he occupied Banitsa himself with the main body, and sent one battalion of an



infantry regiment to the left to make a reconnaissance at the village of Neboliane, about two miles south of Florina. The Turks were believed to be in force at Florina, and the object of the reconnaissance was to ascertain their numbers. By bringing up forces by train to near Banitsa, however, they forestalled the Greek general, and on the night of the 2nd of November they made an attack with a force of over 12,000 men and compelled Mathiopulos to retire. During the 3rd of November Mathiopulos retreated fighting, and on the night of the 3rd he halted with his front at Sorovitz and his rear at Soter. On the 4th there was a fierce artillery duel between Sorovitz and Kili Derben, without result. There was continuous fighting during the next day, the 5th of November, and in the evening the Greeks, though hard pressed, retained their positions. They were, however, exhausted after the three days' hard fighting against odds.

It appears that the Turkish villagers south of Sorovitz had not been disarmed systematically. A large body of them had collected and massed themselves on the left flank of Mathiopulos. That night the Greek position was spied out by some of these Turkish irregulars, who found that the outposts had fallen asleep as a result of exhaustion. They informed the Turkish commander, who made a night attack, from the front at the same time as they attacked from the left. The Greeks were taken by surprise and retired in confusion, with the loss of nine guns. All except two of these guns were afterwards found at Janina and so recovered. The Greek artillery officers tried vainly to rally their men, and were left struggling alone to save the guns without assistance. Some were killed and others are said to have been captured, and at least one is reported to have shot himself in order to avoid falling into the hands of the Turks. They behaved with great gallantry, and there is more than one who would have obtained the V.C. The division managed to concentrate a few miles farther south in the afternoon of the 6th, and on the evening of the 7th it encamped in the villages just north of Kosane. Fortunately

the Turks did not press home their attack and harass the Greeks during their retreat. The Greeks were joined at Kosane by a regiment from the 1st Division, sent to them by the Crown Prince.

The adventures of the battalion which was sent towards Florina are interesting. They advanced as far as Nevoliani and encamped at Machala, a mile or more south of that. In the early morning of the 3rd of November the officers saw through their field-glasses that Banitsa was burning, and then they retired to Negobane in the direction of Sorovitz. After vainly trying to obtain instructions from the main body they retired southwards, and on the morning of the 6th saw that Sorovitz was also in flames. Finally, after a march of five days they joined the main body at Kosane. Two days before this there was fear of the Turks entering that town, but as the existence of Turkish villages between it and Serfidje made a retreat at nightfall by the Greek citizens a risky undertaking, they waited till the next morning, when the whole town was evacuated, even the wounded being removed from the hospitals and taken to Serfidje. The retreat was most orderly. Great bravery was shown by the male inhabitants of Kosane, who had armed themselves ready to defend their hearths and homes, and who acted as escort to the retreating column. The fear was that the Turks would cut their way through Mathiopoulos's force and arrive at Kosane. They did not, however, seize their opportunity. One ground for the desertion of Kosane may have been the news of wounded being massacred at Sorovitz. The irregular Turks, so far as has been ascertained, seem to have been solely responsible for this.

It is a traditional policy of the Turks never to advance without due deliberation; thus in the war of 1897 they waited three days at Tyrnavo before they advanced and occupied Larissa. If it had been the case of any other general staff than the Turkish, there would have been great danger of the rest of the Monastir Army Corps being brought up and a Turkish army of 40,000 men making a forced march and





A SERMON TO THE EVZONI.

reaching Serfidje, and so cutting the Greek line of communication from Veria. By using the Greek transport arrangements and provisions, which would have fallen into their hands, they might, if they had so wished, even have reached Larissa. This would, of course, not have altered the result of the campaign, as they would inevitably have been cut off by the Crown Prince and captured. In fact, the Turks did not advance beyond Komano, fifteen miles south of Sorovitz.

On the 10th of November the Crown Prince ordered the general advance on Monastir. The 3rd Division, the 4th Division, and part of the 6th Division set out due westward, and on the 16th of November occupied the line Techovo-Grammatikovo-Vladovo, the 3rd Division forming the right and the 6th Division the centre, and the 4th Division on the left having as its objective the south-west corner of Lake Ostrovo. At the same time Mathiopulos received orders to advance again towards Sorovitz. He was reinforced by the arrival of Gennades' flying column of Evzoni, which, as it will be remembered, formed the extreme left wing of the army in the advance northward, and which had occupied Grevenna, near the border of Epirus, about the time when the main body occupied Veria. The Turks held very strong positions at Komano and enjoyed great numerical superiority. Each of the opposing forces had two batteries. Whereas, however, the Turks could bring all their artillery into action at the same time, the Greeks were prevented by the nature of the ground from using more than half their guns at a time. The road lies between a marsh on the right and steep hills on the left. The guns could not be raised up on the hills on the left, and so had to be stationed on the road itself. The fighting began on November 16th, and the attack made by the Greeks with a force of less than 8,000 men against a body of 15,000 Turks, was one of the finest exploits of the whole campaign. Gennades' Evzoni covered themselves with glory; their advance over the hills under cover of the gun-fire was incomparable, but they failed to push their

attack home on that day. On the following day, November 17th, their charges were irresistible, and they used the bayonet with such determination that the Turks turned and fled in disorder. Two guns were captured. All the inhabitants of the Turkish villages en route joined in the flight. The panic was so great that babies were thrown into the water to the right of the road, in order that their parents might escape the quicker. Some were picked up alive by Greek soldiers.

On the 16th of November the 4th Division had a skirmish with the rear-guard of the enemy near Castranitsa, east of Lake Ostrovo, and on the 17th of November had arrived due south of the lake. In the meantime the 6th Division advanced westward and had a severe engagement at Ostrovo, while at the same time the 3rd Division met with considerable resistance at Nesia, a short distance south-west of Techovo on the way to Ostrovo. As a result of the fighting the Turks withdrew apparently in a north-westerly direction. The 6th Division occupied Ostrovo on the 18th of November, and the 3rd Division encamped at Batatsin, about three miles west of Techovo; while the 4th Division, which continued its march to the westward, encamped at Novigrad, at the south-west corner of the Lake; the 5th Division also advanced northwards as far as Nalbankioi. On the 19th of November headquarters staff, which had remained at Vodena the last two days, arrived at Ostrovo, and the 3rd and 6th Divisions continued their westward march north of the lake. The 6th Division came in touch with the enemy, who fought another rear-guard engagement at Gornitsovo on the 19th, whence they retired, leaving that place in the hands of the Greek Division. On the same day also the 4th Division, which after passing to the west of the lake had marched northward, engaged a force of the enemy at Kili Derben, forcing them to retire. The 5th Division, continuing its march as a support to the 4th Division, reached Soter the same day. On the following day—the 20th of November—all the divisions concentrated at Banitsa, and headquarters staff moved there from Ostrovo. On that day the Greek

cavalry advanced to Florina, which surrendered without resistance, though there were 3,000 Turkish troops in the town, who became prisoners of war. Twenty-two guns were also abandoned there by the Turks, as well as an immense quantity of war stores, all of which fell into the hands of the Greeks.

It will be remembered that about that time telegrams were received from Belgrade announcing that the whole of the Monastir Army Corps had surrendered to the Servian army after a desperate battle lasting three days, during which the Servian infantry had advanced through flooded fields up to their waists in water. The real facts were that the Servians defeated the Turks east of Monastir, and spent twenty-four hours in the marsh lands—which were not appreciably worse than the marshes in the neighbourhood of the Vardar, in which the Greeks fought the Battle of Jenitsa—forcing them to retreat southwards towards Florina, there being no road farther to the west. That the fighting did not reach the dimensions of a pitched battle is shown by the fact that the Servian losses did not exceed five hundred killed and wounded. The military road from Monastir to Korytsa and thence to Albania passes to the north of Lake Presba; from this road the Turks were, of course, cut off. The southern road which they were obliged to follow is a rough one, along which they could not move their big guns and heavy transport with any speed; the rear-guard which was convoying them was thus obliged to abandon them at Florina. It was probably the news of the advance of the Greeks from Salonica, and the consequent fear of their retreat being cut at Florina, which forced the Turks under Djavid Pasha to retire from Monastir before they had sustained a decisive reverse there at the hands of the Servians. The Greek cavalry pursued the Turks as far as Pisoderi, some twelve miles along the road, where, after capturing some more stores, they abandoned the chase.

At Florina the Crown Prince halted his army, which deserved a rest if ever army deserved one. The work which

it accomplished since its start from Larissa was remarkable. The centre of the army covered a distance of 190 miles in 21 days between Larissa and Salonica, and a further 90 miles in 11 days between Salonica and Florina, or in all it covered 280 miles in 32 days. The wings, of course, covered much longer distances. When it is borne in mind that a great deal of the country over which the army had to pass was either mountainous or marshy, and that the road in places, especially between Salonica and Florina, was destroyed and almost impracticable, necessitating immediate repair by the sappers before field guns could go along it, and that two pitched battles and several severe engagements were fought, in addition to a considerable amount of desultory fighting almost daily, it will be seen that the campaign up to this point was an astounding achievement.

After the retreat of Djavid's army in the direction of Albania, the Greek Macedonian army did not push into Albania as did the Servians, for they had no political object in doing so. The cavalry, however, advanced some distance in the direction of Korytsa and took up its quarters at Biglista. The 3rd Division was posted at Kastoria, the 5th Division at Kosane, and the 6th Division at Florina. The 4th Division was allotted the task of garrisoning the territory between Florina and Salonica. The 1st Division, which was relieved by the 4th Division, was sent back to Salonica to take the place of the 2nd Division, which was transported by sea to Epirus to reinforce General Sapundzaki. Two regiments had already been sent to Chios and Mytilene, but after the capture of the Turkish troops on those islands they rejoined the remainder of the division in Epirus. A force of between 30,000 and 40,000 men was then formed, consisting of the 3rd Division and the 6th Division and part of the 5th Division, and placed under the command of Major-General Damianos, the divisionnaire of the 3rd Division. His orders were to hold the Turks in check along a line drawn roughly southward from Lake Presba, but not to attack them unless they took the initiative against him.



For some three weeks the Turks did not assume the offensive and hostilities appeared to have ceased in Macedonia, but about the 15th of December the cavalry sustained an attack at Biglista and were obliged to retire to Smardessi; there they were supported by infantry and artillery, and after considerable fighting the enemy were driven back. General Damianos then advanced westward and attacked the enemy at Tsagoni on the 19th of December. The 6th Division advanced along the road with the field guns, while the 5th Division, forming the centre, advanced on Pliassa, with the 3rd Division on the left farther to the south. The plan was to cut off the retreat of the Turks along the road to Korytsa; the 3rd Division was delayed over some very rough ground and did not succeed in reaching the point of the road, which it was to occupy, in time. However, three mountain guns fell into the hands of the Greeks. General Damianos then occupied the town of Korytsa, which has subsequently become a bone of contention between Greece and the supporters of the new Albanian Kingdom. He sent a detachment to pursue the Turks as far as Kiari, but did not try to advance any farther. Thus one portion of the remnant of the Monastir Army Corps managed to penetrate into Epirus and join the defenders of Janina, while another section under Djavid found its way into Albania. When the news of the capture of Korytsa was received in Greece the public expected to hear of an advance by General Damianos on Janina from the north, and were surprised when he did not push on. The fact was that such a movement was not practicable for a fully equipped army. The road was snow-bound and almost impassable. Moreover, the revictualling of the army was not possible except from Monastir, through which the military road passed; and the Greeks were not entitled to make use of Monastir at the time for that purpose, because it was in the occupation of the Serbs, and Servia had signed the armistice. The Turkish forces in escaping into Albania and Epirus had been obliged to abandon all their heavy stores. At the end of December

the 5th Division returned to Kosane and the 6th Division to Salonica, while General Damianos was left with the 3rd Division in the neighbourhood of Florina. Later on, towards the end of February, after the rigours of the winter had somewhat subsided, and after the resumption of hostilities by the Serbs, he was able to use Monastir as a base. He then succeeded in making a demonstration under great difficulties as far as Konitsa, but apart from this the Macedonian campaign can be considered as ended before Christmas.

Nearly 40,000 prisoners were captured during this campaign, of whom 25,000 surrendered with the fall of Salonica. There a large number of valuable horses, some motor-cars, an aeroplane, and many thousand rifles (a large number of which had been thrown into the sea by the quay side in order that they might not fall into the hands of the Greeks) were found. Including the heavy artillery at Karaburnu, no less than a hundred cannon were captured.

Aeroplanes—of which the Greeks had about six—were not of great assistance during the advance on Salonica, for the country was too mountainous for suitable taking-off places to be found near enough to headquarters staff; still, one or two useful general reconnoitring flights were made. On the whole, however, the view taken of aeroplanes in warfare by the aviators who flew for the Greek army, was that it was almost impossible to obtain detailed information of the enemy's movements or to determine his approximate numbers in any particular locality by observation at a height of 3,000 to 4,000 feet, which safety dictates. Their chief effect against the Turks was a moral one; the Anatolian peasant looked upon the enormous dragon-fly which dropped explosive bombs on his head as something superhuman, to struggle against which would be resisting Kismet. Nevertheless, the undoubtedly demoralizing effect of the dropping of bombs, which fall at a different angle from shells fired by cannon and so reach infantry in trenches and gunners who would be protected by head cover from shell fire, suggested to the writer that a flight of fifty to a hundred





THE GREEK STAFF AT WORK.

From left to right, Captain Pales, Captain Metaxas, Lieutenant Steikos, Colonel Dusmanis, Captain Strategos.



INFANTRY IN CAMP : COOKING THE EVENING MEAL.

aeroplanes dropping bombs over the enemy's lines might help an infantry attack very considerably.

A word of praise is deserved by officers of the staff generally. The quiet and efficient way in which they performed their allotted tasks gave those who had learnt to believe that the Greek is all bluster and no practical use cause to think. Colonel Dusmanis, Captain Strategos, Captain Metaxas, Captain Pallis, Lieutenant Rangabes, and many others who were attached to the Crown Prince's staff, were as good types of general staff officers as one could well wish to see. Prince Andrew (a cavalry officer), Prince Christopher, Prince George of Sparta (the son of the Crown Prince Constantine), and his brother, Prince Alexander, were also all attached to His Highness's staff, though at different times one or other of them went into action with their regiment. Colonel Napoleon Sotilis, who was in charge of the transport and commissariat on the march to Salonica, was appointed divisionnaire of the 7th Division after the fall of the town, Colonel Kleomenes being transferred to a post calling for less activity.

The campaign which the Greek army had to conduct in Macedonia is difficult to compare with the Bulgarian campaign in Thrace, because the Turks concentrated their forces in Thrace, whereas in Macedonia they spread them over a large area; thus the Greeks always largely outnumbered the forces which they had to encounter. The Turks no doubt considered that it would be possible for them to retreat gradually and in good order, so that ultimately the Turkish Macedonian forces could concentrate somewhere between Salonica and Monastir, by which time they appeared to expect that the Bulgarian army would have been crushed. Their plan, doubtless, was to detain the Greeks and Servians until they could obtain reinforcements from Thrace sufficient to enable them to overpower the forces opposed to them in Macedonia. As has been shown, however, the lightning movements of the Greek army made it impossible for the Turkish southern force to retire in good order and so the

Greeks never had to meet more than 40,000 men at a time; but yet they disposed of some 70,000 troops unaided, and helped the Servians to disperse the Monastir Army Corps.

It is known that the Turks had for the last few years retained not less than 150,000 troops always mobilized in Macedonia, and these contained a large proportion of Anatolian regiments and of their better trained troops. It is known that the Konia Division and another division from Asia Minor were landed at Salonica during the mobilization. Thus it can safely be said that the total Turkish forces in the western theatre of the war were not less than 180,000 men. Of these about 15,000 regulars were at Janina and about 10,000 more were in the Sandjak of Novi Bazar.

The Greek and Servian armies decisively overwhelmed as large a force as the Bulgarians had to meet in Thrace. Further, it is known that the troops which were available for the Thracian campaign at the beginning of the war were for the most part not the best troops of the Turkish Army, because a great proportion of these had been massed at points whence they could be transhipped to Africa for the Tripoli campaign. Quite a wrong impression has been created by the fact that the Bulgarians had to meet a Turkish army of about 130,000 men at the battle of Lule Burgas. The Bulgarian first and third armies had a decisive numerical superiority, but they were considerably aided by the fact that the Turkish right wing was inadequately provisioned, and that for the last three days of the battle the men were fighting on an empty stomach; moreover, the turning-point in the battle was when their ammunition also began to fail. In spite of this the Bulgarians allowed the Turks to retreat practically unharassed to their strong lines at Chatalja, where, with the assistance of the fresh well-trained forces which had been brought up from Asia Minor in the meantime, they administered a severe defeat upon General Savoff. The reverse sustained by the Bulgarians at Chatalja will give some idea of the disaster which might have overtaken them if the Greek fleet had not prevented

these fresh Turkish forces from being landed at Dedeagatch and falling upon the right flank of the Bulgarian armies south of Adrianople. A fair conclusion is that while the Bulgarians only succeeded in driving back Nazim Pasha's force to Chatalja, the Greeks and the Servians between them completely crushed an equally large Turkish force and one that was no worse equipped. It should be remembered, too, that the Bulgarians quite failed to make any impression on the rather inferior fortifications of Adrianople until the Servians helped them with their heavy artillery.

The Greek army did all which it had to do as well as it possibly could be done. What higher praise can be given than this? In detail, perhaps the greatest merit was achieved by the artillery. It has been shown that on several occasions the Turkish artillery was quite outclassed. Competent judges who had an opportunity of seeing for themselves were of opinion that in speed in coming into action and in taking up the target, as well as in accuracy of aim, the work of the Greek gunners could scarcely have been bettered. The writer was able subsequently to verify their good marksmanship by the results achieved on the fort of Bezane outside Janina.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE EPIRUS CAMPAIGN

THE question of Epirus had been a burning one for the Greeks during the last thirty years. The northern geographical frontier is usually said to be the River Voyusa, which flows into the sea a little to the north of Avlona, but the "Berlin Line," as the frontier is called which was drawn by the Berlin Conference, began only at Santi Quaranta, and passing north of Janina joined the old frontier of Thessaly, south-east of Metsovo. This arrangement was never enforced against the Turks, and so practically the whole of Epirus had remained under the Turkish dominion.

The claim of Greece to Epirus, however, had a much earlier origin than the Berlin Conference. The earliest Greek shrine was that at Dodona, a little south of Janina. The original inhabitants of Epirus in Homeric times were almost certainly Hellenes, though they were generally considered to be a people of more warlike habits than those inhabiting the rest of Greece.<sup>1</sup> Waves of invaders at different times appeared temporarily to destroy the Greek influence, but it always continued to reassert itself. The word "Epirus" means mainland, and was so called in contradistinction to the Ionian Islands. It is, however, by no means to be inferred from the fact that its name was given to it by the islanders, that communication between Epirus and Thessaly was very rare.

In Roman times the population of Epirus suffered greatly

*Vide* Chapter XVII.







and was much reduced in numbers. The chief remaining sign of the Roman occupation is the fine ruins of Augustus's town of Nicopolis. In the Middle Ages it was colonized by people from the district of Corinth, who infused a fresh Greek strain into the population. In the thirteenth century, when Paleologus parcelled out his empire, Epirus became an independent principality.

The next important influence which reached Epirus was the Venetian influence, which spread from the islands. Some of the best houses of Preveza were built by the Venetians, and other traces of their occupation are to be seen, notably in the type of the inhabitants. It was the French who were in possession next, but they were turned out by the notorious Ali Pasha. The headquarters of this merciless tyrant were at Janina, and it is noteworthy that the language of his Court was Greek. A letter of his, written by a Greek scribe bearing his autograph signature, was shown to the writer.

The defence of Preveza by 300 Frenchmen against thousands of Ali Pasha's bravos is one of the bravest deeds in history. The fight began at Nicopolis, and these Frenchmen retired always facing their foe, fighting bravely, until the few survivors found themselves driven into the sea. They were all killed except two, of whom one swam out to a boat and the other swam across the channel, which is only about one mile wide there, and landed on the shore of Aktion. Such was the end of French influence in Epirus. The French heroes are buried at Nicopolis, but no memorial commemorates their heroic deed.

According to the best authorities, the inhabitants of Epirus who are Greek either by race or by sympathy number 350,000 out of a total population of 500,000. The rest of the population consists of Mussulman Albanians, with some Jews in the towns, and a few Turks. The Greek of Epirus claims to be the most patriotic of all the Hellenes—the Souliot women were the greatest heroines of modern Greece. We may say that Epirus is Greek of the Greek. Janina itself is historically essentially a Greek town, and its Greek popula-

tion is now double the combined Hebrew and Mussulman population.

Byron, writing in 1809, says: "Janina (where next to the Fanal<sup>1</sup> the Greek is purest), although the capital of Ali Pasha's dominion, is not in Albania but in Epirus." Ali Pasha recognized that Preveza and Arta, one of which commands and the other enjoys the security of the Ambracian Gulf, are as incomplete without Janina as Janina is incomplete without them. He used to say that Janina represented "Majesty" (Sultanat), Arta "prosperity" (Jerat), and Preveza "Rest" (Rahat), and he could dispense with none of these. It is, no doubt, on this ground that the Albanian at first claimed even Preveza and Arta.

The beauties of Epirus have been praised freely by almost all the few travellers who have ventured there since the days of Byron. The variety of the colours and shapes of her mountains is unrivalled even in Greece, and her valleys with their fine rivers<sup>1</sup> provide ideal pasture lands.

Epirus has been oppressed for centuries, and her natural resources have not been fully developed, but though many of her sons have left her to seek their fortunes in a freer country, her patriotic spirit has not yet been broken. The Greek part of Epirus has been freed, but the price paid for her freedom is a very heavy one; the miseries of war have fallen on her nearly as heavily as on Thace and Eastern Macedonia. The declaration of war was the hunting-call of the Moslem Albanians. Marauding bands overran the country from Argyrocastro as far as Philippias. They burned every Christian village which was left undefended, and where they found them they massacred women and children. The policy of the Greek Government in sending irregular troops (Andartes) to clear the country of these bands was in some ways well conceived, but the results were not altogether happy. Many of the bodies of Greek Andartes, each under an independent leader, did exceedingly good work, but

<sup>1</sup> The Fanal (usually written Phanar) is a district in Constantinople where the old Greek families live.

a few of them turned out little better than the Mussulman-Albanian bands. Later, the release of troops from Macedonia made possible the weeding out of the least satisfactory among the Andartes.

It may be of interest to note that the first village burnt by the Mussulman-Albanians after the declaration of war was the village of Loutsa, which lies close to the coast, a little south of the River Phanarios; it is the property of Comte Sdrin, the Italian vice-consul at Preveza. This action was locally ascribed to an idea on the part of the Turks that Italy was the instigator of the Balkan Allies going to war with Turkey.

Loutsa was almost the most southerly village to suffer, but destruction was general in almost every direction north of it. A district which has suffered very badly is that lying north-west of Metsovo, containing a large group of Greek villages known as the Zagorachoria, and another is the district round Delvino between Chimarra and Santi Quaranta. During the winter months Preveza provided for hundreds of refugees from villages in the Souliot district, some of whom had spent weeks hiding in the mountains until they heard that the road to Preveza had been cleared by the troops which were policing southern Epirus. The civil governor of the town and a committee provided for the women, children, and infirm, able-bodied men having to fend for themselves. The refugees were housed in the town, and the sum of 50 lepta (5d.) a day was paid to each person for maintenance. Medical attendance was provided free by local Greek doctors, and Greek ladies provided clothing and wraps for them. Similar arrangements were made at Arta and to a smaller extent at Philippias. Thousands of refugees, mostly from villages in the Delvino district, were enabled to escape by the landing towards the end of November of a battalion of Greek infantry at Santi Quaranta. These and others from the villages south of this port, and from districts west of Janina, who escaped from various ports along the coast, were all landed at Corfu. The Panhellenios Society, which was

founded after the war of 1897 for the purpose of providing relief for the resulting distress, and which has several hundred members, succeeded in collecting a considerable sum for the benefit of the refugees generally. A committee of this Society was appointed to undertake the care and maintenance of the refugees at Corfu, on a scheme similar to that adopted at Preveza.

Such arrangements provided merely a temporary alleviation of the trouble. They were suitable so long as the country was in a state of disturbance. The restitution to these people of their homes and their livelihood is a great problem—how great can only be understood after an idea has been gained of the actual losses which they have sustained. A Commission, under the presidency of the civil governor of Preveza, was directed to inquire into and report the losses sustained by three villages, Glyci, Choica, and Potamia, situated in the valley and close to the mouth of the River Phanarios. It should be noted that these villages occupy an exceptionally fertile tract of land, and consequently have more than the average wealth. The report shows that the population of the three villages consists of 140 families, averaging seven persons per family. Though the walls are of brick, the cottages have been so badly burnt that they require rebuilding. A talk with a member of the Commission and a priest of one of these villages convinced the writer that at least four pounds should be estimated as the loss on each cottage, and a further four pounds as the loss on its contents. The total loss under this head would be £1,120. Good school buildings and the churches have also been destroyed; they could not be rebuilt for less than £500. All the farm beasts, including horses and oxen, to the number of 1,500, have been lost: most of them appear to have been commandeered for the use of the Turkish army. If they are valued at £6 per beast, there is a loss on them of £9,000; 3,500 sheep, valued at £3,000, have also been lost. Then the whole of the crops which the villagers had in hand have also been destroyed or stolen. These consisted of 400,000 lb. of

rice, valued at £2,000 ; 400,000 lb. of Indian and other corn, valued at £1,700 ; 300,000 lb. of beans and other crops, valued at £2,000 ; and oil, olives, cheese, and butter of the value of about £1,000. The fact that many of these crops had been mortgaged in advance to obtain money for the expenses of cultivation does not simplify the position of the poor villagers. There must further be taken into consideration the crop of 1913, which has been almost completely lost. The deficit on this is estimated at about £8,000. The loss sustained by these three villages would, it was estimated, not fall far short of £30,000. On the other hand, the owner of the village of Loutsas, which lies on a hillside, did not value his losses at more than £1,500. At least 150 villages have been destroyed. One of the most prominent citizens of Janina, a large landed proprietor in the Zagori district, assured the writer that the damage done by the Moslem Albanians in Epirus would, in his opinion, not be covered by two million pounds.

Some extremely valuable volunteer work in connection with the refugees was done by four ladies, two Greek and two English, namely, Mrs. Natalie Melas, widow of the hero Paul Melas ; Miss Irene Noel, daughter of Mr. Noel, of Achmet Aga, in the Island of Eubœa, whose family have been settled in Greece for two or three generations ; Miss Tennant, niece of Mr. Asquith ; and Miss Pallis, daughter of Mr. Alexander Pallis, of Liverpool, an accepted authority on Ancient Greek, who, however, at one time was the cause of the famous riots in the University of Athens through his translation of the New Testament into the vernacular. The four ladies for more than three months conducted a refugee camp at Philippias, at which they maintained several hundred of the poorer refugees from outlying villages. These poor folk, most of whom were children, were housed in caves in a small valley north of Philippias. The ladies cooked a hot meal for them every day, provided them with the necessary clothing, and even equipped and looked after a hospital for the sick among them. Miss Pallis caused

considerable amusement locally by donning the male attire of riding breeches and puttees.

There was a prophet known as Father Kosmas who lived in Epirus a hundred years ago, who, in talking of its liberation, said that Epirus would not be freed until men and nations were joined together by wires, thus anticipating telegraphs and telephones. Moreover, he also said that the delivery of Janina would be very different from that of Preveza: in the case of the one the inhabitants would wake up one morning and find that it was free, and in the case of the other τὸ μοσχάρι θὰ πλέυσῃ εἰς τὸ αἷμα, which means that "the calf would swim in blood," and so it proved. The writer was told of this prophecy before the Greek army had begun the siege of Janina.

In the war of 1897 the campaign in Epirus was the only enterprise in which the Greeks were at all successful, and then they reached Pente Pigadia. General Sapundzaki, who was chief of staff to the Crown Prince Constantine in that war, was on the outbreak of the Balkan War entrusted with the Epirus command. He was probably the oldest officer serving in the Greek army during the war. He was recognized as a man of great theoretical knowledge, who had done his early training in this country, and had studied German methods thoroughly. In 1897 the Greeks conducted an offensive campaign in Epirus and a defensive one in Thessaly. On this occasion the policy was completely reversed, and General Sapundzaki received orders only to advance if he found that to be the most profitable plan: he could certainly be relied upon to adopt a cautious policy. The small amount of troops which the Government were able to place at his disposal necessitated this. He was originally given the 15th Foot Regiment of Missolonghi (Reserves), containing 3,500 men, and the 3rd and 7th battalions of Evzoni, each 1,600 strong. A Cretan infantry regiment, 2,500 strong, and also the 10th battalion of Evzoni, 1,600 strong, were sent out to him within a day or two of the commencement of hostilities. Besides these there were about 3,000 irregulars,







M. PSACOFF WITH HIS AEROPLANE.



CRETAN IRREGULARS.

of whom one-half were Cretans and the other half were made up of natives of Epirus and of other parts of Greece and of the Garibaldians.

The Cretan irregular riflemen are probably the most picturesque of all the Greek soldiers. They wear smart black top-boots, which would not be put to shame by those of a Life Guards officer; above these their knees are bare and they wear black pleated shorts, which are so full that they look almost like a divided skirt. Their costume is completed by a light shirt with a beautifully embroidered sleeveless tunic, like that of the Evzoni, a peasant's sheepskin cloak and a black turban on their heads. Their finest characteristic is their proud gait and the magnificent carriage of their head upon their shoulders. Some of them are rather rough featured, but many have a beautifully moulded face with most refined lines. These are probably some of the most pure-blooded Greeks in existence. They all look and talk like gentlemen, have most soft and pleasant voices, and never seem to lose their neatness and smartness. The writer will not forget a contingent of some dozen Cretans whom he met at Preveza, and who had walked there from Kondovraki. They had not shaved for a month or two, but their beards had grown so beautifully and regularly that they looked as though they had just been trimmed. In this guise they exhibited a marked resemblance to Bengalese Lancers.

The Cretan irregulars were not altogether satisfactory as soldiers. They showed great *élan*, and bravery in attacking, but were not to be relied upon to hold a position under difficulties.

A thousand of these Cretans were a body of men who had been collected by Constantine Manos. This man was one of the most interesting personalities to be seen in Greece during the war. He came of a Phanariot family from Constantinople, and his father, a retired general, had been in command of the Greek-Epirus army in the war of 1897. Constantine Manos himself matriculated at Oxford University, where he took his degree, and after that, on his return

to Greece, he devoted himself to the Cretan cause. He purchased an estate in Crete and lived there for the greater part of the year, and organized a body of troops who took part in all the Cretan insurrections. It is noteworthy that his Cretans were the only irregulars whose conduct was good during the war, and when King Constantine ordered the disbandment of the irregulars who were with General Sapundzaki's army, he made a special exception in the case of Manos's Cretans.

After the fall of Janina and after all the fighting was over, Constantine Manos lost his life as a victim to aviation. His love of everything new and enterprising made him share an experimental flight over the Lake of Langaza outside Salonica, in which both the aviator, Lieutenant Argyropoulos, a brilliant young engineer, and his passenger were dashed to the ground and killed instantaneously. Greece, unlike big countries, could ill afford to lose two such valuable lives, especially after so much good blood had been spilt on the battle-field. The following poem, published shortly after the accident, is an interesting example of modern Greek poetry:—

Ο Αετός καὶ τὸ Γεράκι.  
 Ἐνα γεράκι τοῦ Ξουννοῦ  
 κ' ἕνας αετός τοῦ ἀγέρα  
 Ἀδερφωμένα ἐσμίζανε  
 τὰ σπαθωτὰ πτερά τους.  
 Ποῦ πᾶς γεράκι τοῦ Ξουννοῦ;  
 Ποῦ πᾶς αετός τοῦ ἀγέρα;  
 Σώπα τῆς γῆς τὸ σερπετὸ,  
 Τῆς ἀμμουδιάς τό φύκι·  
 Γιὰ τὸ γεράκι τοῦ Ξουννοῦ,  
 Γιὰ τὸν αετὸ τοῦ ἀγέρα,  
 Καὶ τὸ Ξουννὸ χαμόκορφο,  
 καὶ χαμηλὸς ὁ ἀγέρας,  
 Καὶ ταπεινὸ κὶ ἀνάλαφρο  
 τοῦ κυνηγοῦ τὸ ἔσολι.



PRINCESS ANDREW AT EMIN AGA, READY FOR THE TRIUMPHANT  
ENTRY INTO JANINA ON MARCH 7, 1913.



CONSTANTINE MANOS AT PHILIPPIOS.



Τὰ σύννεφα παλάτι μας  
 χρυσὸ λυχνάρι ὁ ἥλιος,  
 Κὶ ὁ κυνηγὸς μας πειδὸ φηλὰ  
 κὶ ἀπ' τ' οὐρανοῦ τ' ἀστέρια.  
 Τὸ λόγῳ δὲν ἀπόσωσαν  
 κί ὁ κυνηγὸς προξάλλει.  
 Γειά σου γεράκι τοῦ Ξουνοῦ  
 καὶ γειά σου ἀητὲ τοῦ ἀγέρα.  
 Ἰωάννης Πολέμης.

## THE EAGLE AND THE HAWK.

A mountain hawk and an air eagle  
 As brothers mingled their spreading wings.  
 Whither goest, hawk of the mount,  
 Whither, eagle of the air  
 "Silence, worm of the earth,  
 Weed of the ocean.  
 For the hawk of the mountain  
 And the eagle of the air  
 Both the mountain peak is low  
 And the air too;  
 And the huntsman's shaft is mean  
 And goes not through.  
 The clouds are our palace,  
 The sun a golden lamp,  
 And our hunter higher much  
 Than heaven's stars."  
 They had scarce spoken,  
 The hunter interrupts:  
 "Welcome, hawk of the mount,  
 Welcome, eagle of the air."

IOANNES POLEMES.

General Sapundzaki operated from Arta as his base, and advanced with his front facing a north-westerly direction. On the 19th of October he occupied the heights of Grimbovo, about four miles north of Arta, and two days later the heights of Xerovouni were seized by a force which crossed the River Arta some miles higher up, after surprising the Turks, who retired from the bridge. Their plan was gradually to fall back on Janina, and at first they did not oppose

his advance. On the 23rd, however, they made a night attack on the Greek positions. They climbed up the steep northern slopes in the dark, and were among the outposts before the latter realized that mischief was afoot. The Greek troops, however, behaved splendidly and stood their ground. After some desperate fighting, which lasted throughout the night, the Turks were repulsed, leaving the Greeks definitely in possession of the heights. The Greek losses amounted to only four killed, including one officer, and forty-one wounded; while the Turks left more than one hundred corpses on the battle-field. By the end of the month the Greeks had occupied positions which, so soon as Preveza could be seized, would be favourable for the capture of Pente Pigadia, the point at which the Turks were expected to make a stand before retiring into their forts outside Janina.

The Turkish forces under the command of Essad Pasha probably did not exceed 15,000 regulars and about 5,000 irregulars during the first phase of the campaign. With such numbers it is obvious that he could not defend both Janina and Preveza and hold the line between them. He therefore practically abandoned Preveza by leaving it with a garrison of only 500 regulars and an equal number of irregulars. It is difficult to know what had been the intention of the Turkish Government as regards this port. Its situation as a fortress and its coast defences made it practically impregnable, at any rate to the Greeks, but its land defences were absolutely negligible. One or two forts across the neck of Nicopolis would have made it a second Port Arthur, but this side was left practically open. The coast defences consisted of the forts of Hagios Georgios, situated far out to sea and equipped with 10-inch guns; Pantokrator, situated between Preveza and Hagios Georgios, facing the Greek coast; and two other forts at the east end of the Gulf of Preveza. The guns of these forts were all, however, useless against a land attack.

The left wing of the Greek army advanced inland to







A STUDY IN CONTRASTS AT PREVEZA.

A Greek soldier, an aged Turk, and a Greek sailor.



STORES OF THE DUTCH RED CROSS BEING LANDED AT PREVEZA.

Dr. Bierens de Hahn in charge.

Louros, and there turned southward along the main road and attacked Preveza from the north after a sharp engagement at Nicópolis, in which such guns as the Turks had at their disposal were no match for the Greek field guns. The Greeks advanced south as far as the outskirts of the ancient olive grove which separates Nicópolis from Preveza, and shot one shell into the castle of Preveza. The honours of this attack were shared between the Evzoni and Manos's Cretans. The Foreign Consuls, knowing that further resistance was useless, then succeeded in obtaining the surrender of the town. They pointed out to the Turkish commander that it was impossible for him to defend the town from a land attack; and they were supported by some of the leading inhabitants, both Greek and Mussulman, who presented an address to the same effect. The Turkish commander agreed to surrender if the following three conditions would be guaranteed: (1) That only regulars, and not irregulars, should be allowed to enter the town; (2) that the Turkish officers and their families should be respected; and (3) that the self-respect of the Turkish officials should not be offended by the behaviour of the Greek army. The Greek commander accepted these conditions, and so the town was surrendered on the 3rd of November.

General Sapundzaki by the capture of Preveza not only made his left wing secure from a flank attack, but obtained the control of the excellent coaching road from Preveza to Janina. Preveza being directly connected with Janina by so good a road, provided a far more suitable base than Arta for the advance on Ali Pasha's capital. Moreover, it was far more accessible from Athens, for transports could land troops there from the Piræus within twenty-four hours, without intermediate changes.

General Sapundzaki here, however, made his first mistake. He did not realize the advantage which the coaching road to Janina afforded him. The Turkish positions at Pente Pigadia lay across the older and more easterly road which goes across the hills and joins the main road about

ten miles south of Janina. This road is now little better than a mule track, and at Pente Pigadia is distant about five miles from the main road. If the general had brought his main forces along the coaching road he could have taken Pente Pigadia in the rear. Instead of this he made a frontal attack over the hills and sacrificed a thousand troops quite gratuitously, and then succeeded in turning the enemy's left wing under difficulties.

The Turks retired from Pente Pigadia on the 9th of November and halted at Pesta, about five miles farther north. Towards the end of that month the greater part of the 2nd Division, under General Kalares, arrived as reinforcements, and were marched to the west of the main road. The remainder of the 2nd Division troops arrived from Chios after the surrender of the Turkish garrison there. A column of 4,000 men with 12 guns advanced along the Pente Pigadia road and the rest of the forces were on the main road. The Commander-in-Chief had his quarters at Philippias, about thirty miles to the rear, but he gave orders to his Chief of Staff, Colonel Joannou, for the three columns to advance simultaneously to the attack and drive the Turks out of Pesta. Colonel Joannou put himself at the head of the most easterly column, and drove the Turks out at the point of the bayonet on the 11th of December. As they retired they shouted "*Au revoir, à Bezane.*" That appeared to be the moment for the retreat of the Turks to be turned into a rout; but the general had not yet arrived in his motor-car, and when he arrived he felt too undecided to order an advance. On the following day he did not arrive until 11 o'clock, and then he sent the 2nd Division forward. Unfortunately the movement was betrayed to the enemy by premature and injudicious firing on the part of an officer in charge of a mountain battery, who drew the concentrated gun-fire of the Turks upon the division, which was thus obliged to retire. This was General Sapundzaki's second mistake. It appears that the Turks were ignorant of the arrival of the 2nd Division, and that if the dashing

attack of Colonel Joannou had been followed up by an immediate pursuit, the Turks would have been caught on the run and would probably have been too demoralized to rally within their ring of forts. In this way the one chance of capturing Janina without great suffering and bloodshed was allowed to slip by.

It was then that General Sapundzaki made his third mistake, which was to underrate the strength of the positions round Janina. By the middle of December the garrison had been reinforced by contingents from the Monastir army which had escaped from Macedonia, so that Essad Pasha had probably not less than 25,000 regulars and 5,000 irregulars at his disposal. It will be seen that the force defending Janina considerably outnumbered the Greek troops in Epirus after the engagement at Pesta. In the meantime the Turks had had ample time in which to rally within their forts. A description of the topography and of the preparations which they had made for a siege will show how rash it was to venture on an attack with a force numerically inferior to that of the defenders, as General Sapundzaki did in December.

Janina is cut off from direct communication with the district lying to the north-east by its lake and by Mount Mitsikele, which is not less than 4,000 feet high. The lake and the plain of Janina are closed in by a semicircle of hills on the south. The only directions from which operations can be conducted against it are from the north-west by the roads from Korytsa and Santi Quaranta, which unite near Delvinaki, and from the south by the roads from Preveza and Arta which unite at Philippias. Moreover in winter the road from Korytsa is scarcely practicable owing to the heavy snowfalls. It is just possible also for a flying column to approach from Metsovo by a bridle-path over the Pindus Mountains. The topography is extraordinarily favourable for a defending force. Kastritza, a small precipitous oblong hill at the south-east corner of the lake, faces Drisko ; Bezane, a larger and higher oblong hill running north and south, lies

south of the lake ; it is divided into the Greater Bezane and the Lesser Bezane. A high-lying valley separates Bezane from a range of hills lying south-west of it, known as Aetorrache (the Eagle's Back). The south-western extremity of Aetorrache is at Caneta, where the road from Preveza reaches its highest point in the pass of that name, about four miles south of the south-west corner of Bezane. Another range of hills, which runs from Caneta in a north-westerly direction, reaches its greatest height at Tsouca, which lies due west of the most northerly point of Bezane and the most southerly point of Kastritza. A lower range of hills runs parallel to it between it and Janina, and extends some miles north-west of the town. These natural defences had been utilized as follows: There were five forts with permanent batteries, namely (1) Kastritza, (2) Bezane, (3) Dourouti, (4) Sado-vitza, and (5) Gardiki, the last three being all on the lower range of hills to the west. Gardiki commanded the road from Santi Quaranta. There were entrenched batteries on the higher and more westerly range of hills at Tsouca, Saba, and St. Nicholas. Naturally in addition to their siege guns the Turks had a number of field batteries, which they could, of course, place in any position and train in any direction, so that a complete system of cross-firing was possible between the various positions. The Turks had in all about 150 guns, of which not less than 60 were disposed in the batteries of Bezane. Moreover, the approaches to Bezane from the south and east were protected with barbed-wire entanglements.

After the battle of Pesta, General Sapundzaki continued, for about a week to make half-hearted attacks almost daily, with the result that he was sacrificing some two or three hundred men per diem. Finally, the week before Christmas, after excellent practice had been made by four Krupp 47 siege-guns which had been brought from Larissa and which shelled the outer positions of Bezane with good effect, the Greek troops for the first time came to grips with the forts. Thinking they had silenced the fire of Bezane, they pushed



BEZANE IN BACKGROUND, AVGO IN FOREGROUND, FROM GREEK  
ARTILLERY OBSERVATORY.



GREEK SIEGE GUNS AT CANETA.





forward, and the 2nd Division with great gallantry stormed the hill of Manoliassa. There, however, they were exposed to the concentrated fire of the batteries of Bezane and San Nicholas, and they had to retire somewhat precipitately after having sustained considerable losses. To support the main attack from the south the Garibaldians were ordered to reach a point some ten miles to the east of the lake and deliver an attack in the direction of Drisko. The Cretan irregulars were at the same time to support the Garibaldians on their left by advancing in the direction of Kontovraki. These attacks appear to have been intended as a feint and had the object of turning the attention of the Turks from the operations in the south. The Cretans, however, after showing great dash in attack, got out of hand. Instead of holding the positions which they captured and leading the Turks to believe that they were only the advance-guard of a strong force, they advanced too far, drew the fire of the batteries of Kastritza, and were obliged to retreat precipitately. The Garibaldians suffered from the ill-considered movement of the Cretans and were obliged to retire as well. Thus the assistance which both these bodies of troops rendered to General Sapundzaki was negligible. The Garibaldians were not long afterwards recalled, as were the Cretans, of whom, as has been mentioned, only Manos's force was retained.

It then began to dawn on the General that Janina was a real fortress which could not be captured by a mere demonstration. So far as one can judge, the Greek Government had expected to come to the first Peace Conference in London with Janina already captured, and General Sapundzaki had no doubt wrongly led them to believe that he could accomplish its downfall with some 20,000 men. After the arrival of the 2nd Division, instead of requesting the dispatch of large additional reinforcements, he had merely asked for two or three reserve battalions, each of which, as it arrived, was only sufficient to replace the loss just incurred by his ill-considered daily operations.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE EPIRUS CAMPAIGN (*continued*)

AFTER the failure of the attack just before Christmas, General Sapundzaki realized that a much larger force was needed, and by the beginning of January the 4th and 6th Divisions, under the command of General Moschopulos and Colonel Miliotes respectively, had been brought over sea via Salonica and Preveza. The original Epirus army was then reconstituted as the 8th Division, under the command of Colonel Mathiopulos. Eight more siege-guns were also brought, consisting of two 4·7 and six 6-inch, all of Krupp manufacture. After considerable difficulty these were mounted at the top of the pass at Caneta on either side of the road, in positions which were not visible from any of the Turkish batteries or points of observation. On January 4th a heavy bombardment of Bezane and St Nicholas was kept up throughout the day, with a view to covering the movement of the infantry, who were thus able to occupy more advanced positions. The 4th Division was placed on the left wing opposite Manoliassa. The 2nd Division being moved somewhat to the right formed the left centre on and around the main road. The 8th Division constituted the right centre, and the 6th Division was placed on the extreme right. It is estimated that in January the garrison of Janina amounted to a total strength of 40,000 men.

The General's plan was to turn the left of the Turks by capturing Kastritza. A heavy bombardment was kept up



ON BEZANE. SHOWING GUN DESTROYED BY GREEK SHELL FIRE.



throughout the 4th of January, and under its cover the Greek right wing was pushed forward. Aetorrache was occupied and the outposts of the 2nd Division established themselves under the small hill of Avgos, which lies to the right of the road at the foot of Bezane. No infantry attack was, however, delivered on the forts.

Shortly after this the Crown Prince Constantine was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the whole of the Greek field-forces, but, probably in order not to hurt the feelings of his old colleague, he did not immediately assume the direction of the operations against Janina. On January 19th General Sapundzaki delivered an attack in force. The outposts of the 6th and 8th Divisions reached the foot of Bezane, and a force of Evzoni on the extreme right won to the plain between Bezane and Kastritza. On the second day of the attack there was heavy rain, which fell for over twelve hours without ceasing, and was followed on the third day by a dense mist. The Greek regiment and battalion leaders found it impossible to keep in touch with one another, and the Evzoni, who had advanced far on the extreme right towards Kotsilio and Goritsa, lost their bearings. A halt was therefore sounded, but it was decided to hold the positions reached at the foot of Bezane, which were screened from the fire of the Turkish batteries and less than 300 yards from the Turkish outposts, and to wait for a more favourable opportunity for the delivery of the decisive assault. It was afterwards learnt that the attack had been so successful that the Turks had actually vacated Bezane, but when they found that the Greeks did not occupy it they returned to their positions. It was certainly extremely bad luck at any rate for General Sapundzaki, who was thus robbed of an opportunity of retrieving his earlier mistakes.

It appears that during the bombardments on January 4th and the one which covered the attack of the 20th and following days, some forty Turkish guns were put out of action. The Turkish infantry must have suffered very

heavily in the general attack, as the Greeks a few days later buried 1,200 of their dead on the east of Bezane. During the fighting the 8th regiment of infantry, which occupied the hill of Manoliassa for some hours and became exposed to the fire of the batteries of Bezane and St. Nicholas, sustained heavy losses.

On the 25th of January the Crown Prince Constantine arrived and assumed supreme command, leaving General Sapundzaki in general command of the right, including the 6th and 8th Divisions. General Dangles and the other officers who had served on his staff in Macedonia, followed him to Epirus, and the gallant Colonel Joannou was transferred to the command of the Evzoni, who held the advanced positions to the east of Bezane, a post much better suited to his vigorous and fearless temperament. As against the 110 remaining guns of the Turks, the Greeks had 12 siege guns, 11 quick-firing Creusot field batteries and 6 quick-firing Schneider-Canet-Dangles mountain batteries, in all 80 guns. At that time they had only about 150 rounds per gun, but by steady work this number was within one month raised to 600, and ample provisions were stored at Emin-Aga, about five miles south of Caneta.

In addition to the four divisions already mentioned, the Greeks had a force of about 3,000 rifles with a mountain battery under Colonel Ipites in the west of Epirus, preventing about an equal number of Turks from descending south of Paramythia. Moreover a mixed brigade about 4,000 strong, consisting of the 4th Infantry Regiment and some Marines and Territorials, was advancing from Metsovo in the direction of Drisko as a flying column, in the face of great difficulties, caused by the mountain path being deep in snow.

The town of Metsovo lies but a short distance to the west of the old Thessalian border and about twenty miles north-east of Janina. It was seized by some Greek independent forces soon after the declaration of war.

Thereupon a great number of Greek families left Janina and made their way across the hills to Metsovo for safety. On the representation of these people Major Mitsas, who had been in command of the heavy artillery at Larissa, was sent to take command at Metsovo. He was only given two companies of regular infantry of the line and an equal number of Territorials. Meanwhile the notorious Bekir-Aga and his Albanians were laying waste the district lying to the north and west of Metsovo and Janina, known as Zagori, and Metsovo was threatened with being left to the tender mercies of some 3,000 of these savages. Major Mitsas was nominally supported by some hundreds of Greek irregulars also, but the temper of these men was more inclined towards sharing any loot which might fall to the lot of the regular troops, than towards taking part in any serious fighting that there might be. For two months, from December to January, Major Mitsas husbanded his forces so cleverly that they were able to beat off the attacks delivered by Bekir-Aga. Finally a senior officer arrived with the 4th Regiment of Infantry and some Marines, with instructions to operate upon Janina from the east. This forced Bekir-Aga's Albanians to move to the north, and relieved the inhabitants of Metsovo and their guests from Janina from prolonged anxiety.

In his main army the Crown Prince had in all 28,000 rifles available, who, as has been shown, were all massed on the right and in the centre, the original plan having been to storm the fort from the east. The Turks, expecting an attack from that quarter, had withdrawn men and guns from the westerly forts to strengthen Bezane, and were preparing several new entrenchments in front of Kotsilio and Goritza. To confirm the Turks in this view, the Greeks moved two of their 4·7 guns from Caneta to a position near Losetzi, the operation taking fifteen days. The difficulty of the task will be understood when it is said that each of the field guns, which were taken along the same road, which was constructed by the corps of engineers, had to be roped and dragged by

100 men. If the Turks had any doubts as to the attack in force coming from the east, these were finally removed by the news of the advance of the 3rd Division from Korytsa and the bombardment of Santi Quaranta by a cruiser and the landing of the 3rd Division there from twenty transports. In fact, only one regiment of the 1st Division was landed in these transports, which in turn landed it and re-embarked it during three days. Both these movements were demonstrations intended to make the Turks remove forces from the neighbourhood of Janina. In any case they confirmed them in the belief that the Greeks did not consider that it would be possible to operate against the western defences of Janina with the army which had marched up from the south, owing to the difficulties presented by the *terrain* for the movement of troops on that side.

On the 1st of March a strict cordon was drawn around the Greek positions, passing south of Emin-Aga, which no one of any kind, except officers having service, was allowed to cross, and under cover of this twenty-three infantry battalions (or 19,000 rifles) were, during the 1st and 2nd of March, concentrated to the west of Caneta in a severe snow-storm and bitterly cold weather. The operation involved the removal of fourteen battalions from the 2nd, 6th, and 8th Divisions, leaving 9,000 rifles on the right and the right centre; and it was essential that it should be carried out in secret so that the Turks should not be put on their guard and alter the disposition of their forces.

The divisional and battalion commanders concerned received bare orders for the battalions to march without knowing the objective of the march. Major-General Moschopoulos, commander of the 4th Division, under whose command these twenty-three battalions were placed, did not receive his orders until the morning of the 3rd of March, by which time the movement was complete. They were to the effect that as, according to information received, the east and west fronts were defended by the principal forces of the enemy, the greater part of his forces, both infantry and artillery having been withdrawn







SERVING A FIELD GUN NEAR CANETA.



SIEGE GUN FIRING ON BEZANE. KING CONSTANTINE IN FOREGROUND.

from the west front, the idea was to surprise him by an attack on the west on the 5th of the month, after a bombardment of his batteries by the artillery on the 4th; that he (General Moschopoulos) was to take command of a force acting in three columns for the purpose; the first or right column of six battalions was to attack St. Nicholas from the south, the second or centre column of eight battalions was to attack it from the west, and the 3rd or left column of nine battalions was to attack Tsonca and Saba from the west and later to march on Dourouti and Sadovista, each column being provided with two mountain batteries. The first and second columns were successfully concentrated on the night of the 4th south of the hill of Manoliassa and at the entrance of the ravine of Manoliassa respectively, in spite of the fact that the snow was hard frozen on the surface and did not allow any foothold to be obtained in climbing. The third column's point of concentration was Bogatsous, west of Saba, and it was necessary that they should march to the west of Mount Olytzka in order to escape the observation of the enemy. Colonel Delagrammatica, who had led the forces employed at Chios, was entrusted with the important command of this column. Some thirty-five miles were traversed between the morning of the 3rd and the afternoon of the 4th, over footpaths covered with snow which was in places more than a foot deep. With the help of peasant guides Bogatsous was successfully reached, after three halts, at about 4 p.m. After a reconnaissance by the staff, the march on Tsonca was commenced at 7 p.m., the men only having had three hours' rest after their arduous march.

General Sapundzaki, being in command of the right, including the force marching on Drisko, was instructed to keep up a sharp fire, varied with short reconnoitring charges, throughout the 4th, thus leading the enemy to expect an infantry attack from that quarter. On the morning of the 4th the infantry opened fire, and there followed a heavy bombardment, chiefly on Goritsa and Kotsilio, which lasted the whole of the day and the night. The Greek field batteries

were posted at the places marked **X** on the map, and the heavy batteries at the places marked **⊙**. The Turkish batteries fired intermittently during the day; they began strongly in the morning, then stopped for a time, but resumed again in the afternoon. Being unable to find the Greek batteries, which were well screened, the Turkish gunners fired mostly on the Greek infantry. During the night the 3rd column of the Greek western force, which had set forth from Bogatsous at 7 p.m., completed its march. Its main body took Tsonca at 7 a.m. by complete surprise, having spent the previous twelve hours in covering a considerable distance over extremely rough ground. The Turks did not perceive the approach of the Greeks until they were within 100 metres, and though they were prompt in taking positions in their trenches, they failed to make any material resistance. Four guns and eight mitrailleuses were captured, as well as some prisoners. At the same time part of the 3rd column surprised Saba and then marched on St. Nicholas, which it captured with 10 guns at 10 a.m. after slight resistance, supported by the 2nd column from the west. In the meantime the 1st column, after being checked by Maxim fire and being at one time exposed to shells from the guns of Bezane and St. Nicholas, stormed the heights of Manoliassa, capturing six guns and taking the greater part of a battalion prisoners. The 1st column then attacked the point marked "750" on the Manoliassa Hill, and captured it after meeting with considerable resistance. The main body of the 3rd column had advanced from Tsonca and captured the fort of Dourouti, after meeting with slight opposition, at 11 o'clock. By this time the Turks were retreating down the valleys of Manoliassa and St. Nicholas to the plain, and an attempt by them to concentrate at Rapsista was checked by the Greek artillery, which inflicted severe losses on them. A second attempt by the Turks to rally east of Dourouti was thwarted by the fire of the mountain guns of the 3rd column with deadly effect. The Greek artillery fire continued the whole of the second day (5th of March), and was answered by the guns of





ON BEZANE. SHOWING ENTRANCE TO UNDERGROUND PASSAGE AND DESTRUCTION  
CAUSED BY GREEK GUN FIRE.



ON BEZANE. THE SEARCHLIGHT, SHOWING HOLE MADE BY SHELL.


Bezane feebly. By the evening the Greek left occupied the line Dourouti-Rapsista-Vodivista and the plain north of Manoliassa Hill, and a company of Evzoni had advanced and cut the lines of communication between Janina and Bezane and Kastritza. Orders were, however, given that no entry should be made into Janina. That night Essad Pasha, commander of the forces, and Behip Pasha, his brother, commander of the fort of Janina, decided to surrender, and at 2.30 a.m. a deputation made the formal surrender to the Crown Prince.

The surrender of Bezane was inevitable. The Greek artillery fire had been so deadly that where it had not actually destroyed or damaged the guns it had put practically all the gunners out of action. The writer spent a whole day on Bezane and found traces of every size of shell in all except two batteries at the north-east of the Greater Bezane facing Kastritza. There were no less than six guns which had been actually struck by shells, and the centre of the lens of the searchlight had been pierced by a 3-inch shell, a shot which was more the result of good shooting than good fortune, for one gun had actually been trained on it. The shooting of the Greek artillery was beyond praise: Essad Pasha himself in speaking of it to the writer termed it "merveilleux," but possibly the best description is that it was "revolver practice with big guns." It was in great measure due to the deadliness of the artillery fire that the attack was carried out with the loss of only about 500 men *hors de combat*. It was this as well as the precision and order with which the three columns moved on the left that was responsible for the surrender of Bezane, and not the lack of ammunition or the danger of starvation, as the writer himself verified. There was ample ammunition, except perhaps in the case of the mountain guns, and on the day of the entry of the Crown Prince the writer and three other correspondents of British newspapers had no difficulty in obtaining an excellent meal of roast lamb, omelet, black bread and local wine for the moderate price of two drachmas a head, at an inn in the town.

The brilliance of the Crown Prince's plan was only equalled by the thoroughness with which it was carried out, and all precautions were taken for ensuring its success. Not the least noteworthy among these was the care which he took of his men. As soon as he arrived on the scene he made a thorough inspection of all the lines, repeated this frequently, and immediately gave sick leave to all the men who were ill or run down from exposure and replaced them by fresh men from the reserve battalions. The men were all provided with woollen undergarments and socks of good material. A committee of Athens gentlemen, presided over by M. Benaki, attended to the distribution of the clothing, and some of its members spent their time travelling to and from the front, handing out fresh sets of garments to each battalion in turn. Hot tea grog was served out every morning, and one hot meal a day was provided regularly, except for those who were on outpost duty, which averaged twenty-four out of every seventy-two hours for the regiments in the first line.

The result of such prudent measures was that the fighting force of the army, in spite of months of exposure to the snow and rains, with as often as not no fire at nights, remained unimpaired for the final attack. Thus the men in Colonel Delagrammatica's column were able to accomplish the arduous march round Mount Olytzka without undue suffering. The nearness of the two opposing lines south-east of Bezane made the lot of the troops there (mostly Evzoni), while doing outpost duty, no sinecure. During the day they could barely move with safety; they were relieved at night, for going from the main lines to the outposts involved the crossing of the fire zone of Bezane. They suffered intensely from the cold, except when, on the understanding that there was to be no night attack, fires were by agreement lit by both armies. On such occasions there was a good deal of talk between the Greeks and the Turks, and it was during one of these conversations that Fonat Bey, the commander of the Fort of Bezane, learnt of the assassina-





EVZONI IN FRONT OF GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AT JANINA.



tion of Nazim Pasha. The cases of sick and wounded averaged during the last six weeks thirty men per day out of a force of 60,000 men, a remarkably low proportion considering the unfavourable conditions. This was doubtless due to the excellent way which the men were looked after. Some of the casualties were caused by the fetching of water at night, which necessitated visiting springs near the Turkish lines. During the earlier period of the siege and before the arrival of the Crown Prince there had been some hundreds of cases of frost-bite, but with care the proportion of fresh cases was much reduced during the last six weeks.

The artificial defences of Bezane were not so elaborate as was generally believed, but any deficiency in these was amply compensated for by its natural defences. The entanglements were not of very thick wire, though they were six yards wide in places and well protected by mitrailleuse. The batteries were not of the most modern kind, there being no head cover for the gunners, though the guns of each battery were interconnected with tunnels, as were most of the infantry trenches. The Turks had no modern siege guns of larger bore than 5.25-inch, though they had some 6-inch guns of a far older pattern than the Greek 6-inch Krupps. The failure of the Turkish guns to hold those of the Greeks was, however, probably due less to any inferiority in their own weapons than to the superiority of their opponents' marksmanship, and to the fact that the Turkish batteries were all placed on the face of the hill and exposed to accurate fire, while the Greek batteries were posted behind the hills. The Greek Schneider-Canet-Dangles mountain guns proved invaluable, and the writer was informed by Greek artillery officers that the results achieved with the shells of Messrs. Armstrong, Whitworth, & Co. were unsurpassed. The Greek guns averaged up to 350 rounds during the two days of the final bombardment. The range at which the heavy guns were fired varied from about 6,000 to 8,000 yards, while the field guns were

employed at from 2,000 to 4,000 yards. An inspection of the Turkish batteries on Bezane showed that they must have been infernos under the Greek gun-fire, and the behaviour of the gunners can only have been heroic, for they appear to have gone on serving their guns until they were all killed or wounded.

The capture of so strong a fortress as Janina by attack without serious loss was certainly a triumph for the Greek army and its General. It is true that Essad Pasha informed the writer that he needed 80,000 men, but with that force he might have kept out half a million men. It showed that the Crown Prince must be ranked very high as a general for his masterly strategy and his cool and decisive way of acting at the proper moment. The army when it entered Janina was in magnificent condition. The men had supreme confidence in their General and were ready to go anywhere at his command.

The reception accorded to the Greek troops at Janina completely eclipsed that of Salonica. The Mussulmans, most of whom were of Greek stock and whose forefathers had been Islamized in the days of Ali Pasha, vied with the Christians in enthusiasm. Not to be put to shame by the *Te Deum* held in the Greek Metropolis, they celebrated an open-air thanksgiving service in Turkish in which they welcomed the arrival of "their deliverer, the Crown Prince Constantine," at the head of the "victorious Greek army," and finished with cries of "Zeto"! No doubt these Mussulmans were thankful that they had been rescued from the tender mercies of Albanian rule, of which they had already had a taste. During the triumphal entry of the Crown Prince into Janina Lieutenant Adamides, a native of that city, made a picturesque exhibition of spiral flying right over the Municipal Square and thus symbolized the victory of Hellene over Turk as a victory of mind over matter. A visit to the ghastly Turkish prison in Ali Pasha's fort, in which numbers of the most worthy Greek citizens had been interned under the regime of the Albanian governor appointed



READY FOR THE MOHAMMEDAN SERVICE AT JANINA TO CELEBRATE THE SUCCESS OF THE GREEK ARMY.

Observe the absence of cross on the Greek flags.



by the Young Turks, made one realize what freedom meant to the people of Janina. The 5th of March, 1913, and the following days were gala days for that city.

Several thousands of the prisoners for whom Essad Pasha signed did not give themselves up, but fled in a north-westerly direction, some going towards Santi Quaranta and others towards Argyrocastro, but two days after the capture of Janina the Turkish forces which had opposed Colonel Ipites in the west also surrendered.

The Crown Prince, as he had done throughout the campaign, immediately followed up his success by sending forward one division and part of another division in pursuit of the Turks who had escaped from Janina, and these troops also had instructions to occupy the district in the north which was populated chiefly by Greeks. It will be remembered that at one time Greece had laid claim to Avlona, but when the Powers formulated their scheme for a separate kingdom of Albania and insisted upon the inclusion of that town as its chief port Greece was obliged to curtail her demands. The Greek Government then worked out a line stretching from a point about midway between Avlona and Chimarra on the coast and passing North of Argyrocastro and Tepelene to Lake Ochrida and submitted it as the essential minimum to which it was willing to confine its demands. This line, though it leaves out a considerable number of Greeks along the coast and in one or two other centres such as Berate, Tirana, and Elbasan includes all the districts in which there is a pronounced Greek-speaking and thinking majority.

The Crown Prince accordingly proceeded to establish a military occupation over all the territory which the Government claimed as Greek on the principle of nationality, and within barely more than one week after the fall of Janina Delvino, Santi Quaranta, Argyrocastro, Premete, and Tepelene were successively occupied.

There was only one incident of particular interest so far as the military side is concerned, and that was the capture

of about fifty Turks by about half a dozen Greek cavalrymen under the command of Lieutenant Vouros. However, the lightning speed with which the military occupation was completed was most characteristic of the method of the Crown Prince. The revictualling of the troops north of Janina was carried out almost entirely through motor transport, which provided not only for the troops who marched northward, but also for the 3rd Division, which had to find its way southward through Korytsa as far as Konitsa.

Before the end of March the Greek operations against the Turks had been brought to a brilliant close. The prisoners made since the beginning of the war amounted to not less than 80,000 and the spoils included over two hundred guns and more than 100,000 rifles.

Among the victims of the campaign in Epirus should be mentioned the following: Lukianos, a professor at Athens University who had fought with distinction and been promoted to the rank of sergeant in the war of 1897 and had later acted as generalissimo of the insurgent students who barricaded themselves in Athens in protest against the translation of the Bible into the vernacular by Mr. Pallis. Another victim was young Rosetti, whose mother was a member of the Rangabe family, which through the Skene family has many kinsmen in this country. During the siege of Janina Greek-speaking Albanians were frequently employed for the purpose of making surprise attacks and deceiving the Greeks by the use of the Greek tongue. It was during one of these attacks that young Rosetti, one of the most brilliant young cadets, lost his life after displaying the greatest gallantry in saving his section from destruction. Another victim was a son of General Kalares. The attitude of the General in his bereavement is reminiscent of an ancient Spartan. He telegraphed to his wife in some such words as the following: "Our one son is dead, having done his duty; do not lament, but let us rejoice in the other."

The only suitable aviation-ground was at Nikopolis, four miles north of Preveza. There several aeroplanes were fitted







THE LAKE OF JANINA. MOUNT MITSIKELE IN BACKGROUND.



KING CONSTANTINE ENTERING JANINA.

up, of which the most reliable were found to betwo Maurice Farman biplanes. Lieutenant Moutoussis made some useful flights in December, and a few days before the final attack and capture of Janina M. Psacoff, a Russian of Greek origin, son of the Greek Consul at Moscow, made one or two brilliant flights. On one occasion he passed only 2,000 feet above the trenches of Bezane and brought back some valuable information to headquarters, but many bullets passed through his planes and he had to thank his good fortune for returning home unscathed. One of the field guns on Bezane was found pointing heavenwards and had evidently been trained on his aeroplane.

The Crown Prince himself stayed in Janina until he was hastily recalled to Athens and Salonica by the news of his father's assassination. He left General Dangles in command of the troops in Epirus, but headquarters staff was removed to Athens. Order was by then restored in Epirus, and so the 2nd, 4th, and 6th Divisions were embarked at Preveza and taken by sea to Salonica, the 4th Division officiating as guard of honour at the King's funeral in Athens *en route*.

The Greek concentration of troops at Salonica was necessitated by the aggressiveness of the Bulgars, who not only failed to remove their troops from Salonica but continually attempted to encroach upon the territory occupied by the Greeks in its neighbourhood. For the benefit of those who are not acquainted with the country round Serres and Salonica it is advisable to explain that there is a natural boundary provided by a range of mountains running from west to east, north of Lake Doiran, and of the railway line to Constantinople. If in the partition of territory the Greeks were not allowed to have this frontier line, they would be obliged to keep a standing army always ready in the neighbourhood of Salonica, in order that they might be in a position to defend it against an attack by the Bulgars.

Doubtless if matters had not looked so alarming in Macedonia the Greek Government would have kept at least four divisions in Epirus to support her claims against Italy.

It was said that the Italians would have to drive the Greek army out of North Epirus, for the troops would refuse to obey if ordered to retire before them. Naturally this was only the usual diplomatic excuse, and the correct interpretation of the Greek Government's attitude was that it was ready to support its claims by fighting if necessary. The Greek has now neither respect for nor fear of the Italian: he considers that the latter is only fit for theatrical display and not for the real business of war. Two Greek divisions well entrenched in almost impregnable positions north of Tepelene would be able to account for some 100,000 banditti from across the Adriatic, and would give the modern Machiavellis a good deal to think about if they attempted to interfere in Epirus.

No description of the Greek campaign would be complete without mention of the bard of the army—Spiro Matsoukas. It was he who raised the fund to pay for the destroyer *Nea Genea* and also for a field-battery in America. While there the Greeks of America presented to him a cross surmounted by two Byzantine eagles, bearing on the reverse the inscription: Τῷ Εθναποστόλῳ Σ. ΜΑΤΣΟΥΚΑ Η. ΕΔΔ ΠΑΡΟΙΚΙΑ. Newark, N.J., U.S.A., ΣΕΠΤ., 1909. ("To the National Apostle S. Matsoukas, the Greek Colony, Newark, N.J., U.S.A.") During the war he was the heart and soul of the Greek army. His manner was theatrical, but he was a consummate actor who knew just how to play to his audience. The result was that wherever he went he filled the Evzoni with enthusiasm by declaiming his national poetry to them. He was the idol of the Evzoni, just as he himself idolized them. He described them to the writer as being the "folk song" (δημοτικὸ τραγούδι) of Hellas, which has lived to make her sing again. He told of one Evzon who was wounded severely in his right arm shortly before the fall of Janina, who when Matsoukas condoled with him said: "I do not mind losing my arm, but I do mind not having seen Janina." And he showed the writer a ring which he was wearing, which had been handed to him



EVZONI FIGHTING NEAR BEZANE.



EVZONI IN CAMP.



by an Evzon who was mortally wounded, with the figure of Vengeance and the words "Vengeance is help" (NEMESIS BOHΘEIA) engraved upon it. The following is an example of the way in which he inspired the soldiers to deeds of valour. After seeing a gun which had been put out of action by Turkish shell-fire he improvised a poem which he recited to the men, describing how he had seen this wounded canon and asked it what it wanted. "Only vengeance," replied the canon; and thus he taught the men that even modern instruments of war can do little unless assisted by the personal valour of the soldier. The following are some words which he wrote in the writer's note-book: *Δύο μαζί Ἕλληνες εἰλικρινεῖς φτάνουν τῷ Θεῷ—ὅλοι μας μαρὶ τῷ Θεῷ καὶ τῇ νίκῃ . . . ἔ τότε Ζαλπιστὴ σήμανε ἔφοδον . . . τίποτε πλέον.* ("Two whole-hearted Greeks together reach to God—all of us together to God and victory. . . . Then trumpeter sound the attack—nothing more.") He told the writer that the proudest moment of his life was when he fired the first shot at the Battle of Sarandoporon. One cannot help comparing him with a Homeric bard.

There were other lesser but no less entertaining lights in the Greek army, among whom may be mentioned an actor from Paris, who was frequently called upon to recite Racine's classics in camp.

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE HOSPITALS

ALL who went to Greece in 1897 spoke very badly of the hospital arrangements made for the soldiers during the unfortunate war of that year. The improvement in the hospital provision for this war has been even greater than that in the organization of the Army. It will, however, be remembered that Greece had wished to postpone the outbreak of war until the spring, because she had not brought most of her auxiliary services to the requisite state of readiness, and this was especially the case with her medical arrangements. The early opening of hostilities affected the organization of the hospitals even more than that of other military departments. The number of hospitals, including the existing military hospitals and those provided by the various Greek societies and foreign Red Cross societies and also those supplied by the magnanimity of the princesses, was more than sufficient to deal with all the cases, but their centralization and management required a great deal of thought which no one had had any time to give. The result was that at first the best use was not made of all the available material, but before showing in what way the organization was deficient it would be well to give an account of the various hospitals in Athens, at the front, and elsewhere in Greece. In Athens itself there are two regular military hospitals: the more important is the one at Ambelokapos, which can provide for 500 beds and which during the war had the services of Dr. Geroulanos, the most distinguished surgeon in Athens. Apart from him, the



medical staff during the war consisted of retired army medical officers. This is known as the 2nd Military Hospital. The other military hospital (known as the 1st Military Hospital) is at Makrijani on the road to Phaliron, and has over 200 beds. The treatment of the wounded at these two hospitals was on the whole satisfactory, though there was rather a deficiency of nurses at the smaller one, and the men there did not find such personal comfort as was provided at the other hospitals in Athens. At the larger one the nursing staff was assisted by the members of the Yellow Cross Society. The members of this organization are midwives in time of peace, but they willingly devoted their time to nursing the wounded during the war. At the large military hospital the comfort of the patients is also studied in small ways; for instance, a gardener is kept specially for the purpose of looking after a flower-garden, from which flowers are provided which make the rooms cheerful. These two hospitals had several annexes, which furnished when required as many as a thousand beds between them.

The experiment was at first tried at these hospitals of treating those who had light wounds as out-patients, but it was found to be unsatisfactory, for the men were not careful about keeping their wounds clean when left to their own resources and complications ensued through mere carelessness. Considering the very large proportion of light wounds, mostly in the hands and arms, found in this war, a great deal of hospital space would have been saved if the patients could have been relied upon to look after themselves when away from the hospitals. Fortunately there was in all so large a provision of beds in Greece that this only caused difficulty at the army bases, such as Salonica and Preveza. Of the other military hospitals the Aretæon, also situated at Ambelokepos, has pleasant buildings and a nice garden: it contained about 200 beds. An English lady, Miss Morris, acted as matron at this hospital, which was admirably managed. Its patients seemed well contented. In addition to the regular Naval Hospital at the Piræus, the Grand Hotel Phaliron was fitted

up as a hospital for the casualties expected from the naval engagements: Mrs. Cardale, wife of Commander Cardale, assisted in its management. As well as these, various civil hospitals in Athens were partly or wholly given over to the wounded and sick from the war. The most striking is the Politikon, the new municipal hospital which occupies a splendid site near Ambelokapos with uninterrupted views over Mounts Hymettus and Pentelicon. It consists of eight large wards, each containing thirty-six beds, and constructed on the most modern principles with windows on both sides. This hospital was placed under the care of the Greek Red Cross Society. After the Politikon the most important hospital for general cases was the Evangelismos, which is also on the road between Athens and Ambelokapos. From the purely medical point of view the most efficient and up-to-date hospital in Greece is the Zyngros Hospital, also at Ambelokapos, where 200 beds were devoted to soldiers suffering from infectious diseases. Undoubtedly, however, the hospitals at which the greatest homely comfort was found were those which the Crown Princess equipped, partly at her own expense and partly from voluntary contributions, in connection with which a collection of some £50,000 was made through the energy and enthusiasm of Mr. Solon Vlastos, the proprietor of *The Atlantis*, a Greek newspaper published in America. The buildings placed at Her Royal Highness's disposal were the Maraslion, or Teachers' College, the Chimion (chemical laboratory of the University), and the German Archæological School. The last was used as an officers' home. The management of these was entrusted to ladies, and the nurses were mostly brought from England and Germany. Miss Dolan, an Irish-American lady who had had great experience in hospital work in New York, was placed in charge of the Maraslion and later, assisted by a few English nurses, she undertook the management of the large Turkish hospital at Preveza. By her energy and high organizing capacity she rendered great services to Greece. The Evelpides Cadet School was also used as a hospital; Princess



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CONVALESCENT SOLDIERS AT PREVEZA CHEERING THE CAPTURE OF JANINA.



DUTCH NURSE MAKING A STRAW MATTRESS.

Marie took a great interest in this, and it was through her influence that the "Dames aux Secours des Blessés Militaires," headed by Mme. Panas, widow of a distinguished Græco-French doctor, the "Dames de France," and the French Red Cross Society were after a time installed there.

There were various other smaller hospitals and surgeries in Athens which were partly devoted to the wounded and sick soldiers, among which the Polyclinique was managed by Athens ladies of the Blue Cross Society, under the presidency of Princess Helen, wife of Prince Nicholas, third son of the King. Red Cross units were also sent out from Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Russia, Italy, Holland, Denmark, and England; and in addition a complete hospital was equipped and placed at the disposal of the Greek Government by the Greeks of Alexandria: this was known as the Alexandrian Hospital. Also other Greeks in Egypt, headed by Mr. D. Casdagli, provided a small field hospital.

The divisions of the army of course had their medical contingents, but these were inadequate, as is always the case, to do the work of the division in any important battle. The Foreign Red Cross Societies and Mr. Casdagli's field hospital were suitable to help the Army Medical Corps at the front, but they were all kept far away from the actual fighting. All the contingents of the Red Cross Societies from abroad and some of the Greek Red and Blue Cross Societies and of other organizations were moved from place to place as they were needed, and installed in buildings which were adapted as temporary hospitals. On the outbreak of the war the buildings at Larissa given over to hospital work were not sufficient, but temporary buildings were quickly erected, and all the wounded who were not well enough to be moved to Athens were taken in there. The Larissa hospitals were put to a severe strain after the Battle of Sarandaporon, but they were equal to the occasion, for the hospital train, to be mentioned hereafter, relieved them of the cases which could travel. Many of the wounded suffered,

however, during their journey from Ellassona to Larissa, which had to be made in ordinary transport carts, when they were scarcely in a condition to ride in carriages provided with proper springs. The British Red Cross and the Field Hospital of Mr. Casdagli did not arrive in time for the Battle of Sarandaporon, and there was a great lack of ambulances on the field of battle. Very noble work was done by some of the gentlemen chauffeurs, who took their motors over the rough ground and spent the whole night of the 22nd of October in moving the wounded to positions of safety. Units of the various Red Cross and other societies were established all along the line in buildings at Ellassona, Serfidje, Kosane, Sorovitz, and Veria, and at Kosane in particular the medical corps were fortunate in finding an ideal modern hospital, fully equipped, and situated in the most healthy part of the town. The Crown Princess, in addition to her hospitals in Athens, equipped two field hospitals, one at Salonica and the other at Arta, which were afterwards transferred to Preveza and Philippias.

As was explained in the description of the transport, the means of locomotion up towards the front in Macedonia were very scarce, and it was in that field of the operations during the first three weeks of the war that the medical arrangements underwent the greatest strain. The hospital units could not be moved after the army quickly enough, and at Veria the accommodation was hopelessly insufficient. On the 1st of November, the day of the Battle of Jenitza, only the municipal school buildings, of which Princess Alice, wife of Prince Andrew, took over the control, and one other building which was occupied by the Alexandrian Hospital, were ready to receive casualties. When it is remembered that the Kosane hospital was forty miles back along the road, it will be seen that the provision was altogether inadequate to cope with the wounded from that battle.

After the battle a surgery was fitted up at Jenitsa itself, but this was so small as to be almost negligible. Within two days the wounded began to pour in from the fighting in



the district of Sorovitz, being brought by train to Veria Station. The state of the chief hospital became pitiable, and numbers of men were to be seen lying in the corridors waiting to be attended to. It is hard to blame any one for this state of things, because the circumstances were peculiar. All that can be said is that as the Greeks, owing to the unexpectedly early outbreak of the war, had not been able to obtain the means of transport which they required, they ought to have informed the foreign organizations before they left that it was of paramount importance that they should provide their own motor transport, and rather send a small unit with transport than a large unit without it.

The work done by Princess Alice is described in another part of this book, but her labours at this stage deserve special mention. She arrived at Kosane and took charge of the hospital at seven o'clock one evening, and it is said that she worked until midnight and then lay down on the floor and passed the night with only a rug. As soon as she had established the hospital there she was obliged to go and take over the hospital at Veria. There she worked without sparing herself, and on more than one occasion she was seen assisting doctors to dress wounds or perform operations by handing them dressings and instruments with one hand whilst stirring drinks with the other. An amusing anecdote is told anent Princess Alice and a wounded soldier in the hospital at Veria. The soldier, who had been brought in from the battle, wished to be relieved of his boots and his socks, and seeing the Princess standing near him, and being unaware of her identity, requested her to remove them for him, which she promptly did. A comrade who had watched this little scene asked him whether he knew who the kind lady was, and on learning that he did not, enlightened him. The poor soldier was covered with shame, and afterwards whenever the Princess entered the room he hid under the bed-clothes. After a time Princess Alice noticed this, and inquired the reason of his curious behaviour. She then spoke a few words to the simple

soldier, telling him that he had done nothing to be ashamed of, and so restored to him his self-respect.

When the army entered Salonica there was plenty of accommodation for the various hospitals, and the hospital staffs, including the British Red Cross, were transported thither by sea. At that time one-half of the hospital space was occupied by medical cases. Most of these were cases of slight dysentery caused by exposure in the marshes between Veria and Salonica; there were a few cases of enteric fever, but practically none proved fatal. The British Red Cross were installed in one-half of the old Turkish hospital high up on the side of the hills to the north of the town, in which they had more medical than surgical cases. Why they were placed there it is difficult to say, for the unit, which was forty strong, consisted of five surgeons, physicians, dressers, and orderlies, under the command of Colonel A. H. Delmé Radcliffe, formerly British military attaché at Rome, and was capable of undertaking field hospital work. The orderlies were a rough lot, who had been selected neither with care nor with discretion. They might have done useful work under the discipline which prevailed at the front, but they were not suitable for employment in a hospital in a town. The work provided for them was not sufficient to keep them occupied, and some of them got out of hand and had to be dismissed for disorderly conduct in Salonica. After some weeks the British Red Cross Society were moved to Florina, but soon after they had gone there the bulk of the army was sent to Epirus, and so they were instructed to establish themselves at the new base, Preveza. They had not been in Epirus very long, however, before they were recalled somewhat suddenly, owing to the funds originally provided having come to an end and no further money having been sent out.

The wounded who had to be moved from Larissa to Athens in the early part of the war enjoyed great comfort and even luxury, for they travelled in two hospital trains, each containing eight ambulance coaches, which were

supplied by the Athens and Piræus Railway Company, and for which Princess Helen had furnished the personnel and the equipment. Each coach contained sixteen beds, fitted as removable stretchers, so that the men could be taken in and out of the train without discomfort. The coaches, which were painted white, were so constructed that the shaking over curves was reduced to a minimum, each bed resting on a mechanical arrangement which worked free from the motion of the train. The Princess herself spent two or three weeks accompanying the wounded on this train between Larissa and Athens, and was assisted by ladies of the Blue Cross Society.

Mention is made elsewhere of Princess Marie's hospital ship *Albania*. Not much use, of course, could be made of this in the early part of the campaign, but after the occupation of Salonica it proved invaluable in bringing the men direct from the Salonica hospitals to the Athens hospitals, when they were not well enough to be shipped on board ordinary transports; and later during the operations in Epirus the *Albania* was continually going to and fro bringing wounded to Ægion, Athens, and elsewhere. Princess Marie herself made a great many journeys in it, and her work throughout the war deserves scarcely less praise than that of Princess Alice.

Queen Olga, though she did not herself take an active part in hospital work, showed the keenest interest in it. She constantly visited the hospital in Athens, and with her usual generosity was continually helping with food, clothing, or money. After the Battle of Sarandoporon she motored up as far as Ellassona, visiting all the hospitals *en route*, and after the capture of Salonica joined King George there and spent much of her time over the hospitals. In March she went to Epirus, and after inspecting the hospitals at Preveza and Philippias was waiting for the King to join her before going to Janina, when the tragic news of his assassination reached her.

In Epirus the hospital arrangements worked much more

satisfactorily than had been the case in Macedonia. This was brought about partly by experience, but conditions generally were much more favourable there. The distance from Preveza to Emin Aga, the headquarters of the army, was only about half as long as the distance from Larissa to Veria. Further, the road between Janina, Philippias, and Preveza was much better than any road in Macedonia, and also by that time there were many large motor-vans which had been fitted up as ambulances, and so the men who were not too seriously wounded were taken direct to Preveza, which could be reached in under three hours. Much more regard could be had for the care of the wounded than was the case in Macedonia, and the fact that for the final attack on Janina 7,000 beds had been made ready in Epirus alone will show that in the later stages of the war the hospital accommodation was ample.

A feature of the Greek Medical Service which has not been recognized sufficiently was the large number of qualified surgeons attached to the Army. For the last sixty years young Greeks, the greater number of whom were natives of the districts hitherto excluded from the Hellenic kingdom, have studied at the great medical schools of London, Paris, Brussels, Berlin, and Vienna. Among these students have arisen many distinguished doctors and surgeons, among whom may be mentioned Dr. Panas of Paris, Dr. Kavafi of St. George's, Zambaco Pasha, physician to the Sultan of Turkey. Although during the last twenty years Athens has provided first-class medical training, the tendency of Greeks to study in the great centres has continued. When mobilization was decreed, some of the young doctors scattered throughout Europe had to obey the summons as conscripts, and many others volunteered their services to the Greek Army. All the qualified medical men who thus volunteered, as well as those who were called upon to serve as conscripts, were installed as surgeons, with the rank of officers, either with the different divisions of the Army or else in the military hospitals. In this way in addition to a number of able surgeons who

had been trained at Athens, there were first-class men from almost every capital acting as military surgeons. In one large field hospital the medical officers' tent, in which the writer recollects passing some delightful evenings, sheltered ten surgeons, of whom no less than six had qualified in Paris and London, and at an artillery officers' mess the writer met a lecturer of Vienna University who was attached to them as their doctor. As a medical friend who volunteered and helped the Greeks in the war said to the writer, "There are really too many Greek doctors for our services to be required"; all that was really needed by Greece was a large staff of trained nurses and orderlies, and perhaps a few medical men of experience to organize the hospital work. There were a few surgeons of the highest attainments who had also had wide experience of organization, such as Dr. Arnaud of the French Military Mission, Dr. Psaltoff of Smyrna, and Dr. Geroulanos of Athens. Most of the young Greek surgeons, however, lacked practical organizing experience, and failed to display the common sense requisite for managing a somewhat inexperienced hospital staff. The orderlies were for the most part not specially trained and were not up to their work. Many of the young surgeons failed to keep the orderlies up to the mark, and so in some hospitals a decided lack of discipline was discernible.

A little should be said about the nature of the wounds received in the war. The bullet of the Mauser rifle employed by the Turks, though not having quite so small a diameter (7.69 mm.) as the Männlicher used by the Greeks (6.9 mm.), made a very clean wound. Thus, generally speaking, the wounds were either mortal when the bullet passed through a vital portion of the body such as the heart or the brain, or else the bullet cut so clean that it frequently pierced two or three men standing in line. The only troublesome wounds were those where the bullet came in contact with a large bone. In Epirus, however, some ghastly wounds were inflicted by so-called Dum-Dum bullets, some of which the writer had the opportunity of seeing. The bullets in these

cases had been filed across the top so that they presented jagged edges, and it was said that grease was inserted in the notch. The Turkish regulars were not, however, accused of this barbarous practice, which was ascribed to the Albanian irregulars. The writer recollects one leg wound in particular which was shown to him in a hospital at Preveza. The wound was in the calf of the leg, the bullet having entered sideways from inside the knee; the hole on that side was about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inches in diameter. At the outer side of the leg where the bullet had passed out the size of the wound was  $9\frac{1}{2}$  inches long by about 3 to 4 inches wide, and at each end the flesh was protruding. The theory of the surgeon who attended the case was that a bullet whose point was made jagged would, on meeting with resistance, probably assume a rotatory movement instead of cutting straight through the fleshy substance, and this would explain the horrible nature of the wound. A very large proportion of the bullet wounds were in the head and arms or hands, the rest of the body being usually under cover. Left-arm and hand wounds, as was to be expected, were more frequently found than right-arm ones. The shrapnel wounds were usually serious, but the Greeks did not suffer very much from them, as the Turks usually failed to time the bursting of their shrapnel, and so a great deal of it was wasted in the ground. Many of those who were close to the point of explosion of a percussion shell succumbed from the effects of the fumes of the explosive. There was danger of gangrene supervening from wounds caused by pieces of shell, but where this was avoided the wounds were usually not so serious as those caused by shrapnel.

What, however, is perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Greek soldiers is their splendid health, due to their extreme sobriety. This was the subject of remark during the war of 1897, when the quickness with which the wounds healed astounded the foreign surgeons. In the present war this attribute of the Greek soldier was no less noticeable, and complications rarely occurred in cases in which proper care and attention had been bestowed.

The supply of warm woollen underclothing for the troops was a matter in which very many people interested themselves. A great deal of money was subscribed for the purpose, and many ladies and their friends knitted socks and other garments for the soldiers. In connection with this Princess Alice issued the following appeal, which met with warm support:—

“ROYAL PALACE, ATHENS.

“September 24 (O.S.), 1912.

“FOR OUR SOLDIERS.

“I should like to furnish every soldier whom the country has called to arms at this critical period in the nation's fortunes with the indispensable clothes for the present season of the year.

“In order to accomplish this I appeal to the patriotism of every Greek, that he may be pleased to assist me with his mite. I shall receive the poor man's penny as gratefully as the rich man's pound.

“Every Greek woman who is inclined to help me in the sewing of these clothes will find me ready to provide the materials, and I beg that she will apply to the office in H.M.'s Palace, from the 26th inst., every day from 3 to 5 p.m.

“I feel confident that there will not be a Greek man or woman that will refuse the assistance for which I ask on behalf of our beloved country's sons.

“ALICE.”

The object in view was to provide every man who was at the front with one fresh lot of underclothing, so that cases of death or illness from exposure to the cold should be avoided as much as possible. Great difficulty was, however, experienced in carrying out this intention. The following example will show how it is almost impossible under certain circumstances to see that all those who should be provided with clothes get them. There would be, say, two battalions of Evzoni containing each three companies of 500 men, in all 3,000 strong, in the front line; 2,000 lots of clothing would be sent out for distribution amongst these 3,000, the intention being that every man in those companies which were most exposed should be provided for before those who were acting as supports. Supposing that there were two companies right

at the front, the directions would be that 1,000 of the 2,000 sets of clothing should be given to those two companies, and then that the remaining 1,000 sets should be distributed among the remaining 2,000 men, four companies, to those who needed them most. What usually happened in practice was that the clothing would be distributed equally among the six companies, so that each lot of 500 men would get about 300 to 350 sets. The men who would get the clothing would not be the men who needed it most—the men who had been most exposed in the outposts—but those nearest at hand. This explains how it was that the great proportion of the wounded soldiers, or those who were brought back suffering from exposure, were found to have their underclothing in rags. In the later stages of the Epirus campaign, however, the Athens gentlemen who undertook the distribution of the clothing visited the lines and handed it to each soldier personally. It was of course impossible to provide enough for every single man, but what was accomplished was remarkable, considering the small population and the large army concerned. There again at first, owing to the lack of transport and persons of organizing capacity, there was a great deal of waste of the material provided. It was said that at one time there were barns full of warm vests, socks, etc., locked up at Preveza, which lack of means of locomotion prevented being taken up to Philippias and the front. Besides, a certain amount of material sent out by charitable but thoughtless persons, was not at all suitable for the purpose for which it was needed.

An example of thorough mismanagement is furnished by the last scene in connection with the British Red Cross at Athens. This was the auction of all the large stores with which they were provided, in order, as was stated, to pay the fares of the men home. Among these stores were said to be goods which had been sent out by friends in this country of people in Athens and intended for particular hospitals, but which were consigned through the Red Cross as being the simplest way to get them out. Moreover, practically all the







TYPE OF GREEK OFFICER IN THE CROWN PRINCESS'S HOSPITAL AT ATHENS.



INTERIOR OF DOUBLE HOSPITAL TENT.

money subscribed for the maintenance and payment of the expenses of the British Red Cross unit in Greece was given by Greeks or people of Greek origin residing in England. It may be that one of the rules of the Red Cross Society is that whenever funds or materials are brought out by a Red Cross unit they can only be spent and disposed of through them. However that may be, the fact is that the whole of the stores, including many blankets, were sold to Athens tradespeople, who no doubt resold them at a profit to other hospitals. Considering the origin of these funds and the purpose for which they and also the materials which were sent out were intended, it was little short of a scandal that those who were responsible for the unit did not hand these stores and goods to other hospitals, if not as gifts, at any rate at suitable prices, before publicly offering them to the highest bidder.

A few words should be said about the double-canvas hospital tents which were so largely employed during the last three months of the war, especially in Epirus, and found to be most satisfactory. These tents were provided with windows, which were so arranged that there was plenty of light, and the ventilation could be regulated according to the temperature and other requirements; the floors were boarded. During the last few weeks of the siege of Janina there were numbers of these tents at Emin Aga, all heated with stoves and lighted with gas. Thus equipped, these tents provided far greater comfort and warmth than the ramshackle houses which served as hospital premises in most of the towns of Macedonia and Epirus, in which the *mangani* (brasier filled with glowing cinders) unsuccessfully strove to counteract the blasts of icily cold wind which pierced the numerous cracks and holes in roofs, walls, and windows.

In spite of her unpreparedness during the first month of the war and of certain shortcomings in the organization of her resources, Greece's medical and hygienic arrangements were remarkably good, especially in the later stages of the war, and in any case appear to have been very far in advance of

those made by Servia, and still more so of those made by Bulgaria.

Before concluding this chapter it will be instructive to mention a few facts about the Turkish medical arrangements which came to the writer's knowledge. At Kosane there was a truly admirable new municipal hospital building which the Greeks, on entering the town, found stocked with a large store of the newest Turkish drugs. It is questionable to what extent the Turks were cognizant of the use of most of them.

At Janina, the only town which remained any length of time in the occupation of the Turkish forces who were opposed to the Greeks, an idea could be formed of the Turk's manner of treating his sick and wounded, though it would not be fair, perhaps, to draw any general conclusion from this. It should not be forgotten that food was not plentiful, but it appeared that most of it was given to the men who were still in the fighting line, for thousands of emaciated wrecks of soldiers were found and seen by the writer squatting and lying almost in heaps in the yards and squares outside the Konak and other municipal buildings in the centre of the town, under conditions of the most indescribable filth. In the hospitals in the town some, such as that in which Mme. Billinski, the wife of the Austrian Consul-General, interested herself, were comparatively well managed, but others were in the most appalling condition. In one a roomful of corpses was found, which inquiry showed to have been carried thither by their comrades in an adjoining ward who had a few sparks of life in them, in order that they might not have the prospect of death brought more forcibly before them by the presence of their dead colleagues. The Turkish surgeons were said to pass their time sitting in cafés, leaving their patients neglected. The chief Turkish surgeon in the town, a charming but it would seem not very competent old gentleman, who after the capture of the town requested to be transferred from the Red Crescent Society to the Red Cross Society, tried to dissuade the writer from entering a hospital

for medical cases in the fort of Ali Pasha on the ground that it was too foul-smelling to be approachable—he was not far wrong! Thousands of these prisoners, who were in the last stages of decay, were handed over to the Greeks, who did their best for them, but it is not surprising that thousands died during their confinement. The wonder is that so many of them were saved. Unfortunately infectious diseases were spread by many of them in various parts of the Peloponnesus, which brought additional worry on the heads of the already over-worked Greek authorities; and it was only the truly admirable sanitary precautions taken by them which stopped alarming epidemics.

## CHAPTER XIV

### ATHENS DURING THE WAR

BY "LASCARIS"

ANY one having previously spent a winter in Athens, and been accustomed to the animated appearance presented by that bright little capital, would have been surprised at the complete transformation presented by it during the war.

In the first place he would have missed the numerous carriages waiting for hire at the station with their fussy drivers, all anxious to make the best bargain and all willing to take him to his hotel for next to nothing rather than lose a customer. Long before the commencement of hostilities horses, cars, and carts had been taken to the frontier. What remained now were a few consumptive or lame beasts that would never have reached the front. With grave doubts as to his ever reaching his hotel, the traveller might have entered a carriage on the understanding that he was to pay two or three times the usual price for this drive. "War price" was the name given to these exorbitant fares. The drive from Piræus to Athens was a revelation in itself. Formerly the Phaliron Esplanade had been thronged with loungers, even in winter, weather permitting, but now the sun might vainly do his best to attract the visitors of yore.

Whereas the chairs and little tables before the fashionable cafés of Athens were wont to extend from the pavement to the street, threatening to interfere with the traffic there; now there were only a few old men at these tables. They looked grave enough as they pored over their papers, and





RECRUITS FROM AMERICA BEING DRILLED ON THE SITE OF THE OLYMPEIUM  
AT ATHENS.



EVZONI DANCING BEFORE LEAVING ATHENS FOR THE FRONT.



merely nodded to their acquaintances. The streets, which had been full of gaily-dressed ladies, trotting from milliner to dressmaker, were not deserted, but the prettily dressed ladies had vanished. If one did occasionally meet a lady she was very simply dressed, and seemed in a hurry, for she had no time to look at the shop windows. Often she carried a huge parcel, the bare suggestion of which a few months ago would have made people hold up their hands in horror; and when she met her acquaintances she gave them a hasty nod, where she had been in the habit of stopping to have a chat with them. No! the streets were certainly not deserted, for it was impossible to go out without meeting those who had come from abroad, or from the provinces, to serve in the Army. Sometimes they were being marched through the streets, at others they were on their way to receive their uniforms or to take the oath. There were the Evzoni with their snow-white kilts, braided boleros, and long hanging sleeves, and the Garibaldians in their red shirts. There were the Greeks of America in their characteristic American clothes and peg-top trousers before they could get their uniforms, drilling by the columns of the temple of Olympian Zeus, and speaking with the Yankee twang; but by far the finest men were the Cretans, striding along in their top-boots and flowing dark-blue pantaloons, looking so grand that it seemed a pity there was not a regiment of Cretans in their picturesque dress. But, disguise him as you may, a Cretan will always be recognized by his proud gait and lordly manner.

There were also the peasant wives and mothers of the soldiers, and their fancifully embroidered dresses and long hanging plaits added to the picturesque appearance of the streets.

In passing before the barracks one could see the French officers walking up and down in civilian clothes, superintending everything, and anxious that all should be done as well as possible.

Perhaps the most unwonted sight was that of young men, who had always led a sedentary life behind desks or type-

writers, painfully scaling Mount Lycabettus, which is about as steep as Box Hill, at the double, and spending the night there in the cold like common soldiers, with whom they were now associating on a footing of equality.

Some of us found interest in going to the Larissa Station at night to watch the trains arrive with their load of sick and wounded. It was a sight to make one think better of humanity to watch those delicately nurtured ladies at the end of a long railway journey, during which they had been in constant attendance, carefully superintending the carrying of the men from the train to specially prepared tram-cars on which was a large red cross, and not leaving the men till they had been carefully and comfortably placed in a hospital bed. This generally took place during the quiet hours of the night. Occasionally the calm reigning then was interrupted by one of the rare cars left in Athens dashing along frantically at a pace that would not have been allowed by any police regulations. The occupant was a minister or a staff officer.

How quaint the fashionable hotels looked in those days! The well-known "Grande Bretagne" was full of personalities seldom seen in Athens, for they came from recently freed parts of Greece, and their appearance was no less different from that of the habitual Athenian than were their ways of thinking.

There was the Actaeon Hotel, too, at New Phaliron, where fashionable ladies and gentlemen had been wont to meet at tea, and to spend the afternoon in dancing, and where now resided the Turkish officers that had been left there on *parole*. They remained in the "Actaeon," till they attempted to escape, some of them even arranging to dress in women's clothes. Upon this they were transferred to Cephalonia and other equally secure places of repose.

While a few pampered Athenian youths of good families strutted about in elegant uniforms made by their private tailors, and endeavoured to get appointed to posts in the capital, for they thought it could not spare such "nuts"—

the Greeks gave them the name of *kourabiedes* (Greek for bun)—others from English public schools or from the Paris Boulevards now came to Greece, determined to make themselves useful. They cheerfully undertook the roughest and most repulsive work in and out of the hospitals, some of them earning distinction as chauffeurs, in fact not refusing any work calculated to bring ease to the wounded or help to the Army.

When the weather was fine—for Athens boasts summer days even in winter—people would greet each other in the streets with the words, "Fine weather for our lads out there!" or if a cold wind were blowing, they would pity "the poor fellows fighting up there!" Every one seemed to have the war on the brain, and, as every one could not be on the spot, the next best thing was being near the soldiers who had come from the front, and hearing all about the war from their lips. Everything made way for the wounded, who were petted and caressed by everybody.

Even the Crown Princess, when she paid her first visit to the wounded officers in the German Archæological School, kindly placed at her disposal for them, told them how sorry she was not to have room to ask them all to her house. "But," she added, "I hope you will consider yourselves my guests, and make yourselves quite at home here, not hesitating to ask for anything you want."

Many Greek schools were turned into hospitals, and everywhere the wounded expressed their gratitude for the kindness received. The Turkish wounded prisoners expressed themselves with equal gratitude, and it is greatly to the credit of the Greeks that they did not make any distinction, either on the field of battle or at the hospitals, between them and their own wounded. Indeed, the manager of the military hospital always said that the strangers were to be attended to before the Greeks. Visitors never arrived there empty-handed. Some took chocolates, others cigarettes, others again took illustrated post-cards. Among these, those with M. Venizélos's portrait were eagerly sought for and thank-

fully received. Every one seemed to think they could not do enough for the soldiers, and, indeed, all ordinary patients sank into insignificance before Tommy Atkins.

Many that did not enlist displayed their patriotism admirably and unostentatiously. Shopkeepers in Greece generally lost heavily through the war. Winter is the season for balls and dinner-parties. Where were now the ladies who had been in the habit of spending their morning at Hermes Street, ordering dresses and hats by the dozen? Even mourning materials were lying unsold everywhere, for the ladies took to having their dresses dyed. No one could spare money for dress, when so much was wanted for the soldiers' families, and for the poor dear soldiers too! It was better to send them cigarettes and even *loukoums* than to spend the money on one's self. The very shoemakers discovered that ladies no longer ordered boots except when theirs were badly worn, and they added that even those were very simple. They thought it quite natural that a lady whose husband was fighting should not feel inclined to order fancy boots.

Some shopkeepers, however, made a good deal by the war. There was a great demand for blankets, sheeting, and other things for the soldiers. But whether they made or lost, no one complained. So great was the enthusiasm everywhere that boys too young to serve would not be left out. They became "boy scouts" and carried messages for the War Office. This gave them an unwonted appearance of manliness.

The sale of the newspapers increased tenfold during the war, for they sold second and third and even fourth editions, some of them consisting only of little slips of paper, often no larger than a sheet of notepaper. These were afterwards suppressed by the Prime Minister. The sale of the *Hesperine*, the most sensational of the evening papers, whose third edition contained more foreign telegrams than all the other papers put together, or any other in the world, went up as if by magic. Even the most sceptical among the Athenians

bought the paper for the sake of the excitement which it afforded. As the boys went through the streets shouting the names of their papers, people rushed out of their houses, halfpence in hand, and eagerly bought them up, though they contained little enough of war news, for M. Venizélos followed a policy in every respect the contrary of his predecessor's during the war of 1897, when we had incompetent brag and flagrant unpreparedness. Now we had wise measures taken in such silence and secrecy that soldiers writing home were not allowed to give the name of the place from which they wrote. Martial law was strictly enforced everywhere. During the last war men would assemble, loudly discussing the doings of the army and the Government. False reports were constantly set afloat and it was said that more men had been killed at Zacharato's fashionable café than on the battlefield. But now a feeling of general security and confidence in the Prime Minister prevailed everywhere. It was felt an honour as well as a duty to serve in the Army, and all were sure of victory.

In the evening of the 8th of November there was great excitement, that is, as Greeks understand it, for nothing is more remarkable than the sobriety of public excitement here. It was about six in the evening when we received the news to which every human being in Greece had been looking forward as the great event of the war, the surrender of Salonica! It was a situation closely parallel to that in London on receipt of the tidings of the Battle of Waterloo. Greeks are well-behaved in public places, I admit, but this seemed a time for frantic enthusiasm if ever there was such a time. A telegram had actually come announcing the capture of Salonica and the mayor had ordered illuminations everywhere. I had lived in Greece upwards of twenty years and thought I knew Greeks, but even I expected to see a more spontaneous outburst. I rushed to the balcony overlooking Stadium Street and saw the streets densely packed with a sober and phlegmatic crowd, displaying about as much enthusiasm as a crowd

leaving the Oval at the end of an England *v.* Australia cricket match, where the former had been victorious. A well-known Britisher was heard to say, "This is a poor attempt at Mafficking!"

All this time the church bells were tolling rather than ringing a peal of triumph. Such is a public display of joy in this part of the world. No! there is one thing I have forgotten. In Omonia Square a group of Cretans commenced to enthuse after their wont and to fire off their rifles and revolvers into the air with a sublime indifference as to the mark eventually reached by their bullets. Of the hundred and eighty odd thousand inhabitants of Athens one man alone was so unfortunate as to come in contact with a descending bullet. Next morning the scene was changed. Deep gloom and silence prevailed everywhere. Gradually it oozed out that the telegram had not been official, therefore the news of the capture of Salonica had been, at best, premature. Every one waited in breathless anxiety as hour after hour went by without bringing any news. At length an official telegram, signed by the Crown Prince, arrived. This time Salonica was really Greek! It *was* true that the town had surrendered! It *was* true that the Crown Prince and his army had entered Salonica in triumph, as all hoped, never to give it up!

Again all the church bells summoned the Athenians to a thanksgiving service, again the town was illuminated, and again people laughed and wept as they embraced each other in mild and sober delight. It may be noted here that these rejoicings were so decorous that they never once approached rowdiness and there was not a single drunken man to be seen. As soon as the Te Deum was ended and congratulations had been exchanged, every one went home and the ladies betook themselves to their sewing-machines with renewed ardour, for there was so much to be done—the brave soldiers fighting for their country must be provided with warm hoods and those in the hospitals were in need of comforting dressing-gowns when they were convalescent.

All dainty fancy work had been laid aside long ago. Ladies were now struggling with coarse wool or unwieldy sheets, to the detriment of their little fingers. In the old days it was impossible to pass before a house in Athens or Phaliron without hearing the sound of one or more pianos. Now a Greek lady would have been ashamed of sitting at a piano. As for singing, they would have been more shocked at it than a puritanical old lady by the playing of a waltz on the Sabbath. This feeling was carried so far that a lady who gave singing lessons at once gave up doing so, though she wanted the money greatly for the relief work to which she was devoting herself. She merely said that "the present was not a time for singing."

Soon the Royal Family, including the Princess Sophie and the Princess Alice, migrated to Salonica. Then the Prime Minister left for London and all was very quiet in the capital. The monotony was only broken now and then by the arrival of a fresh batch of soldiers. The newspapers had been silent for many days. We only knew that the army was before the impregnable Janina and was determined to take it *coûte que coûte*. It was a herculean task, but they could not fail. They were advancing gradually. After all what glory was there in an easy victory? As the cold increased we thought more and more of those men surrounded by snow; we remembered Napoleon at Moscow, and we wondered what his men were made of. It was so bitterly cold in Athens, what must it have been in the mountains of Epirus!

Still the Greeks from abroad continued their liberal donations. The Society of Succour was receiving contributions in kind as well as in money every day. Foreigners, too, contributed their liberal donations, and foremost among them was Madame Juliette Adam, formerly the editress of the *Nouvelle Revue*, and well known for her strong sympathy with Greece. The Comtesse de Riancourt, who has adopted Greece as her country, and who had already given proofs of her desire to help "in other ways than words," now came

forward with the utmost liberality, even placing a pavilion in her garden at the disposal of the Greek Ladies' League Hospital. The expenses of the relief work increased every day as those who had come with money and were too proud to ask for help saw their savings gradually dwindle away, and as fresh soldiers came.

After the New Year a few horses came from abroad, and gradually motors were seen in the town, while the cab ranks began to assume their former appearance again.

The only dissipation was the cinematograph. A few desultory attempts at benefit performances were made, but the wind did not sit in that quarter, and even actresses took to nursing as a matter of course.

And then we often met men who were going home on sick leave. Those who were not hopelessly maimed looked forward to serving again as soon as they had recovered. This feeling was so general that the doctors were constantly worried by the men to make them well soon and send them back to the battle-field. Some added that it was exasperating to lie there, on a hospital bed, while their brethren were fighting. When asked if they had suffered from cold and hunger, they admitted that they had occasionally, but they said: "You can't expect to go to the war and not suffer any discomforts." Discomforts was a mild term to apply to wading up to the waist in almost frozen rivers. The wounded who had been the only patients at the beginning were now almost outnumbered by the cases of pneumonia, pleurisy, and other troubles resulting from the cold, while many lost their toes and fingers from frost-bite. Now and then an officer died in the hospital. His comrades who were able to follow came up, giving the military salute. The band played a most impressive funeral march, and the soldiers followed with reversed arms. At first there was no long file of carriages, but the horses drawing the hearse and the two or three wretched beasts that slowly dragged the mourners' carriages seemed quite in keeping with the melancholy occasion as they went along with bowed heads



and measured steps. When the carriages became more numerous and funerals assumed their old style they seemed less sad, for they did not bring the horrors of war so palpably before our eyes.

Meanwhile the cold increased, and all those who had belongings fighting at Janina grew more and more anxious as day followed day without bringing any news.

We knew that at the Post Office bags full of letters from Epirus were lying unopened. Now and then we heard that men were suffering from frost-bite, and that many had been found dead at their posts in the morning. People tried to be philosophical, and said that everything could not go on for ever in favour of the Greeks. Still no news came. Then some began abusing the Prime Minister, but the general feeling in his favour continued, and the confidence in the man who had done so much for Greece remained unshaken.

The Crown Prince, who had remained in Salonica ever since its capture, now started for Janina, and all felt hopeful. Fresh and vigorous soldiers were dispatched to him, and this enabled him to grant sick leave to all those whom the cold and fatigue had exhausted.

Then, after the total absence of war news, Athens was all at once electrified by the official telegram announcing the fall of Janina. Not content with illuminations this time, the schools and guilds organized processions through Athens, and many said that, far from this being the end of the war, it was but an introduction to the taking of Constantinople, the liberating of the territory in Asia Minor, and other wonderful feats. The weather was more favourable to public excitement than it had been at the time of the capture of Salonica, and Greeks did seem to "come up to the scratch" on this occasion. There had hardly been time fully to rejoice over this event before Athens was plunged into consternation by the news of the King's assassination at Salonica by a madman. That very afternoon he had been for a walk, accompanied by a Dane who was writing his biography

(Mr. Christmas), and the King had jestingly remarked that he was bullet-proof.

"*Le roi est mort. Vive le roi!*" On the 20th of March the House of Parliament was decorated within and without, and the Crown Prince took the oath, as King of Greece. The arrangements for this ceremony did not reflect great credit on those who had organized it. Whereas the House can only hold three hundred persons, seven hundred tickets of admission had been distributed. Besides this, a whole regiment of street-arabs entered through the windows while men were keeping out the holders of tickets at the point of the bayonet. The consequence was that many of the most prominent persons of Athens were absent from that ceremony. Every balcony was thronged, and the cheering that greeted the Prime Minister was even more enthusiastic than that which the new King met with, though that was warm enough.

In striking contrast to the scene of wild confusion in Parliament on that day was the arrival from Salonica of the funeral cortège. At the first news of the assassination the Queen-Mother had repaired to Salonica with all speed. She now returned accompanied by her family. Piræus had been very appropriately decorated with violets for the melancholy occasion. As the Royal Party proceeded from the port to the station they were followed by all the ministers and the diplomatic corps, as well as the Greek bishops from all parts of Greece, including those which had been newly liberated. The band played the funeral march and the National Anthem with due solemnity, while the sailors drawing the gun-carriage which bore the bier moved along in such perfect order that they seemed as one man. The inhabitants of Athens declared that they had never witnessed anything so orderly or so impressive since the days of King Otho.

Though King George was a Protestant, permission was obtained from the Patriarch to lay him out in the Metropolis. There the decorations were all violet, but these soon



THE 4TH DIVISION (JUST RETURNED FROM JANINA) ACTING AS  
GUARD OF HONOUR AT THE KING'S FUNERAL.



NAVAL DETACHMENT DRAWING THE GUN-CARRIAGE BEARING  
THE ROYAL HEARSE.



disappeared beneath the flowers that arrived every minute.

The burial was conducted with great order and solemnity. After accompanying the hearse to the Larissa station every one retired except the Royal Family. The remains of the King were interred at Tatoi (the Royal Family's country residence), and the service was performed by the Protestant Court chaplain. The tomb is now covered with laurel-leaves and flowers.

## CHAPTER XV

### GREEK WOMEN DURING THE WAR

BY "LASCARIS"

FOR many years it has been customary to cry down Athenian ladies and to accuse them of an amount of frivolity calculated to make their revered grandmothers turn in their graves.

Old people would shake their heads sadly and ask if these empty-headed dolls could possibly belong to the same country as the grand Souliot women who had danced in a circle on the edge of a precipice, with their children in their arms, and every time one of them had reached the brink she had leapt into it boldly to escape falling into the hands of the Turks? Others would tell of the heroine Bouboulina who, after sending her sons to fight by land and herself besieging Tripolitsa, had fitted out the vessels in which her dead husband had traded, taking command of one of them. *There* was a woman! No wonder she was created an admiral, for there was not a chieftain among them who could listen to her fiery speeches without feeling his heart beat faster. And they would follow her advice too, for it was worth following!

Then they would sneeringly point to the dainty little ladies passing before them and add: "Who could believe that those things had happened in the year 1821, not a century ago, and that Greek women had degenerated into these empty-headed butterflies? Why, they would scream and faint at the sight of a wound! and as for facing an enemy, they'd fly long before he was in sight, only stopping to see that their dresses did not make ungraceful folds!" A less

superficial observer might have argued that girls who will study and master the difficulties of ancient Greek, to say nothing of those of chemistry, mathematics, music, as well as two or three foreign languages, could not be hopelessly frivolous.

The fact is that we who laugh at Dr. Johnson for his contempt of ancient Greeks because they read little, are just as apt to judge others by our own standard. To judge Greek women fairly one should recollect the conditions under which they had lived even as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Previous to the revolution of 1821 women kept close within doors, for they were afraid of attracting the attention of their Turkish oppressors. They were never married without bringing with them several large chests containing their trousseau, which included an ample provision of house-linen, and these trousseaux lasted a lifetime, for fashions never altered. Expensive as were those velvet boleros, all glittering with gold embroidery, they cost less money and above all far less thought than the ever-changing, gossamer dresses of the present day. The master of the house bought in all the provisions, and on the rare occasions when anything requiring selection was wanted, shopkeepers sent their goods to the house to be inspected.

Families led a patriarchal life. All were subject to the head of the household, who provided for his sons and employed them in his business without ever thinking of giving them a salary. At his death the elder son continued the family traditions, and the whole family looked up to him for orders and protection. Thus a brother never thought of marrying till he had found suitable husbands for his sisters and provided them with a dowry. To do this he often made great sacrifices, and no one admired him for doing what was looked upon as an imperative duty. Women looked up to their husbands with such submission that they addressed them in the plural, while the husband spoke to his wife in the singular. No matter what the husband's short-comings,

there was the same stereotyped answer on the part of the girl's parents : " He is your husband ; Such was your fate ! " Though the Patriarch had the power to grant a divorce, there is hardly a case on record of a woman having sued for and obtained one.

Men led very correct lives and seem to have thought only of providing for their families, while women prided themselves on managing their homes with order and prudence. The household generally included several poor relations, and the chief business of the women was the preparing of the daughters' trousseaux. Where means were ample the sons were often sent to study abroad, but even in Asia Minor Greeks had excellent schools for boys. Learning was considered indispensable for them. Not so with the girls, who were brought up with the idea that marriage was their lot and that to be good housewives should be their aim in life. The ladies of the wealthiest families occasionally indulged in the dissipation of spending an afternoon at each other's houses, where embroidery alternated with the handing round of sweetmeats, and sometimes they would form a party for going to the Turkish bath. Needless to say that these afternoons were strictly confined to the ladies, and that men were as much apart from women as in the olden times in Greece. Even in church the women had a gallery set apart for them, where they attended divine service behind a trellis-work. Very aristocratic houses had their windows protected by trellis-work. Women grew almost to like and be proud of this subjection and confinement, which came to be looked upon as a sign of distinction.

From the paternal to the conjugal home there was little change. Before marriage the woman obeyed her father and mother, after marriage she obeyed her husband and his parents. Though distinctly the master of the household, the husband was gentle, and there were never any scenes of violence and much less of brutality.

Greek women had been living in this state of subjection without dreaming that, at a short distance from them, there



were girls who travelled alone, earning their own living, and were answerable to no one for their actions. In their most ardent yearnings for liberty, Greek women had never imagined that this word could possibly mean anything beyond emancipation from the Turkish yoke. So deeply were these ideas rooted in them that Greek women living in Asia Minor, and even in remote provinces of Greece proper, have not yet realized that it is possible for women to be on a level with men. They still consult their husbands on points which it is usual for women to decide alone, and, though few absolutely wait on them, it is usual for the heads of the households to be served first.

Uneducated though they were, Greek women had exhibited rare bravery and steadfastness of purpose during their period of bondage. All this seemed to have vanished with the advent of liberty, which went to their heads like wine, and their sterling qualities seemed to have been left behind with their discarded old-fashioned gowns which had been superseded by the tailor-made dresses of the day. As soon as Athenian women began having intercourse with the women of other countries, the state of affairs existing there was a revelation to them, and as converts are said to be *plus catholiques que le pape*, these women rushed to the opposite extreme as soon as they had shaken off their fetters with passionate delight. Then came a servile imitation of foreigners, who were worshipped as superior beings. Even the great Kanaris, whose picturesque, flowing garments had been sung by Victor Hugo, made himself ridiculous by donning a coat and trousers, because he thought the dignity of a member of Parliament demanded it of him. This imitation was not limited to dress, but it soon became the fashion to interlard the rich and harmonious language of Greece with foreign expressions, while many preferred speaking French altogether. Unfortunately the spirit of imitation did not stop there. It entered into the very core of their lives and soon transformed the women from the matrons of old to the frivolous creatures before alluded to.

Besides the novelty of liberty and the desire of imitation, it was natural that, in a country where sky and mountains invited them to enjoy the surrounding scenery, women (and men too), unless they were nuns or monks, should feel little inclination to sit at home poring over a stiff book. Those who live in the midst of fog and rain have not much temptation to leave their comfortable firesides, and when they do it is because they are compelled to go to shops or attend a meeting, or to pay a call, where they sit in a well-warmed room. In Athens people go out for the sake of *being out* and enjoying the bright and glorious sunshine. They sit round the small tables with which the pavement in front of the cafés is studded, and friends join them there instead of paying formal calls at their houses. People often read newspapers at these cafés, but they would be thought absurd if they held heavy books in their hands. The conversation there generally turns on politics, and gossip is not excluded from it. But how often do our drawing-rooms taboo gossip?

Another reason why Greek women appear so frivolous is their fear of ridicule. To be thought a blue-stocking here would be dreadful, and there is not the least reason to fear that suffragettes will ever make their appearance in a country where Aristophanes covered strong-minded women with such ridicule! After living in Athens for more than twenty years and receiving much kindness and hospitality from her inhabitants, I hope I may be pardoned if I venture to set down my impression of them, or rather of her women, without endeavouring to conceal or gloss over anything.

Less fascinating than Polish or Hungarian women, less business-like than Frenchwomen, with less grasp than Russian and less depth than Englishwomen, Greek women appear to combine a little of all these attributes. That they possess great charm no one that has known them intimately will deny.

Marriage they look upon as the most important business of their lives; and though runaway marriages have sometimes taken place here it is usual for a young lady quietly to sub-

mit to her parents' wishes in these matters, especially when she is made to understand the pecuniary advantages she will reap from the proposed marriage. If a girl ventured to object that she could not love the man in question, she would probably be taxed with selfishness, as her remaining unmarried would prevent her younger sisters from getting settled in life, and that would be the greatest misfortune that could possibly happen to them.

Many girls have been sought for in marriage by men who had only seen them at a ball or during a walk. The young ladies have never raised any objections to these marriages; of course, after the father had made the necessary inquiries. The strange part is that girls thus married make most devoted mothers. They are horrified at Frenchwomen who put their children out to nurse. The most worldly Greek woman will find time, between her parties and milliners, to spend several hours with her children. Indeed, the youngsters are often allowed to dine with their parents when they would be better in bed.

Despite their great interest in their children and their love of pleasure, some of these ladies are active enough to be on the committees of hospitals, schools, and other institutions. Some visit prisons, others preside over societies for teaching dressmaking, cookery, etc.

Such was Athens and such were her ladies before the war with Turkey broke out. The moment war was declared the Athenian ladies were transformed. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that those prettily-dressed dolls suddenly developed into heroines. Then people remembered how the League of Greek Women, who doubtless longed for universal peace quite as ardently as their sisters in happier countries, had refused to pass a resolution similar to that passed by the sister associations in Great Britain, the United States of America, and elsewhere, denouncing war. Their motive was explained to the delegate of an association who visited Athens with the words, "We cannot conscientiously pass this resolution so long as our sisters remain beneath the

Turkish yoke." And they proved that these were no empty words. It reminded one of the old Spartan days to see sisters without a tear in their eyes when taking leave of their brothers who were starting for the front, and mothers smiling while wishing their sons success and a happy return. Every one allows that Greek men fought bravely, but it is equally undeniable that they have received valuable assistance and encouragement from their women-folk.

Sad, nay horrible, as war is, all must agree with the Russian writer who says that it brings out some of the finest qualities in human nature. The Balkan War has certainly done so in the case of Athenian women. One and all, they have cheerfully given up time as well as money and every amusement to devote themselves, heart and soul, to the relief of the families the soldiers had left behind; while others, in following the army and nursing the wounded, have endured hardships from which a Spartan might have shrunk.

Those who have visited Athens and been surprised at the number of her philanthropical institutions, may not be aware that they are almost all due to the initiative of women, from the orphanage for girls, which was founded by the late Queen Amalia and bears her name, to the Evangelismos Hospital founded by the Queen Olga, and so greatly improved by Mme. Syngros at her expense.

If space permitted I would recall all that women have done in establishing a large building for spinning and weaving the native hand-made silks and for making pillow-lace, Oriental carpets, and, in short, everything that can be made by hand, thereby providing work for women from every part of Greece; in founding hospitals for incurables, orphanages, and many useful societies, such as the one for disinfecting the houses of the poor, but I must limit myself strictly to the work done by the ladies of Athens during the war. This is why I cannot deal with the League of Greek Women in all its branches, admirable as it is. One section of it, however, is closely connected with the war. It is the "National Section." This

section has provided fifty beds furnished with bedclothes and mattresses for the hospital managed by the League of Greek Women, of which they do all the nursing.

The ladies of this League rendered most valuable help to the Society for Relief. This Society has undertaken to look after the families of the soldiers. In every parish there were two and sometimes three ladies of the League who inquire into the circumstances of every family and write out orders for food, medical assistance, and even clothes and bedding. In the case of infants and invalids the ladies give orders for milk. Besides the soup kitchens, at which a hundred and fifty ladies worked daily, cutting up loaves and ladling out food, the ladies of the League superintended a crèche, where reservists' wives could leave their children up to the age of six, from morning till night, being free to take in sewing or go out to work. Though a governess was engaged to superintend the children and teach the elder ones reading and writing, two or three of the ladies of the League were in daily attendance and saw that the children were properly cared for. The rosy cheeks of the little boys and girls were a proof of the goodness of the fare provided for them.

Besides the kitchens, at which a hundred and fifty soldiers' families were relieved daily, a few ladies set up private kitchens at their own houses, where they undertook to provide food for some two hundred mouths daily.

A gentleman having kindly placed his house at the disposal of the Society, they installed a temporary hospital there for receiving members of soldiers' families that required nursing or operations. There, too, the ladies of the League undertook the whole of the nursing and acquitted themselves to the entire satisfaction of the doctors. Considering how little previous experience these ladies had had, the power of organization they displayed was really marvellous.

I must not forget the Lyceum Club, which was founded with the modest object of cultivating Greek customs and dances and encouraging Greek industries. The furniture in this modest little club was designed by the ladies themselves

from ancient pottery and sculpture. The rooms are everywhere decorated with handsome embroidery made in the country. This club has already given several entertainments, at which the dances peculiar to certain islands and provinces of Greece were performed with great success. As soon as the war began to be talked of, the leaders of the Lyceum Club, with Mme. Parren, a compatriot of M. Venizélos, at their head, showed that they were "made of sterner stuff." The first thing they did was to organize ambulance lectures, with the result that when the time came they were able to send three hundred nurses to the various hospitals which were started in and out of Athens for the sick and wounded soldiers. These ladies had been allowed to get practice at the cliniques of the doctors whose lectures they had attended. The good work they did during the war proves how much they had profited by their training.

Seeing how many posts had been left vacant by the men who had gone to the front, the ladies of the Lyceum Club exerted themselves to obtain work for the wives and sisters of the soldiers by recommending them as bank clerks and saleswomen in shops. They also asked the Ministry to give all the soldiers' uniforms and underclothing to be sewn by the families of those who had gone to the war. Thanks to all these measures, the families of the soldiers were saved from want and the State was spared a heavy expense which it could ill-afford.

The Athenian ladies who did not become ambulance nurses betook themselves to their sewing-machines, at which they worked incessantly. They gave up everything to stitch from morning till night at sheets, pillow-cases, and clothing for the wounded; while others sewed warm under-waistcoats and knitted hoods for the soldiers.

The Royal Palace, as well as the Princesses' residences and several private mansions in Athens, soon assumed the appearance of warehouses, from the bales of blankets, linen, flannel, and provisions of every kind that poured in daily from all quarters. Everywhere ladies were busy cutting out things,





H.M. QUEEN OLGA AND THE BISHOP OF TSARITSANE AT  
ELASSONA, ON OCTOBER 30, 1912.



PRINCESS MARIE, FOLLOWED BY PRINCE ALEXANDER, SPYING OUT THE LAND  
NEAR CANETA DURING THE SIEGE OF JANINA.



which other ladies called for every day and dispatched with wonderful rapidity.

I cannot conclude without touching on the hospitals, in which Greek women have worked so admirably under the leadership of the foreign-born princesses of the Royal Family of Greece. The *Atlantis*, a Greek paper published in America, made an appeal to the women of America on behalf of the Greeks. This appeal was so liberally responded to by Greeks and Americans that the *Atlantis* was able to send £40,000 to the Crown Princess Sophie. At the same time the German Archæological School placed its premises at her disposal. Consequently, after handing over part of this sum to already established hospitals, the Crown Princess, who is known for her powers of organization, established three hospitals, one for officers and two for soldiers. Till she went to Salonica, Princess Sophie visited these hospitals daily and was most kind to the patients there.

Princess Marie, the wife of Prince George, gave a hundred thousand francs for fitting up a floating hospital in which the wounded might be transported to Athens. This hospital was a model of up-to-date comfort. It was placed under an able French doctor. Princess Marie often travelled with the wounded and really looked after them, assisted by her staff of Greek lady nurses of the Blue Cross. These ladies took it in turns to go and fetch the wounded. When they remained in Athens they worked at a hospital near Omonia Square.

Princess Marie was not content with the admirable floating hospital, but also worked at the hospital in the Military School, visiting it daily when in Athens and spending lavishly on providing comforts and delicacies for the patients. Besides this she gave a daily allowance of three francs per head for every officer there, that they might be provided with more choice food than the regulation diet. Princess Marie was ably seconded by Mme. Pana, the widow of a distinguished Greek doctor in Paris. This lady came over

as soon as the war began and worked ably and unremittingly till the end.

Princess Helen, the wife of Prince Nicholas, had railway carriages fitted with stretchers which rendered it easy to carry the wounded to Athens in comfort. On reaching Athens they were placed in special trams, which conveyed them to various hospitals. There, too, a princess travelled with them and really looked after the wounded, and the Greek lady nurses rendered valuable assistance, still continuing to work in the hospitals when not actually travelling backwards and forwards.

Princess Alice, a great-granddaughter of Queen Victoria and the wife of Prince Andrew, followed the army from the very beginning of the war in her motor-car, and undertook the superintendence of the hospital nearest the front at each stage of the advance. With her staff of Greek lady nurses the Princess established a hospital in every town which she visited. So hard did these ladies work that they rarely found time to sit down to a meal. Many a time they suffered from discomforts that would have frightened their maids. It is well known that Princess Alice herself spent a night on the bare boards and that she went without food for more than twenty-four hours. So thoroughly did she enter into the work she had undertaken that she was more than once mistaken for a nurse as she moved about among the wounded in her cap and apron.

A few ladies, among whom was the sister of the hero Paul Melas, went to the battle-field before the ambulance men could reach it with their stretchers. These ladies carried brandy to the wounded and staunched their wounds in haste to prevent loss of blood till they could be properly treated. After making their way through the dead to assist the living, and often lifting the dead from off them, these ladies did not leave the battle-field till they had prepared the dead for burial. Long after the others had left the spot these brave women might have been seen at their self-imposed melancholy work, endeavouring to ascertain the names of the dead and

inscribing them on the rude cross they set above the men's graves that their friends might be enabled to identify the place later on.

A few months hence, when these same ladies will be seen dancing gracefully in a ball-room, who will believe that they displayed such courage and abnegation only a short time before?

Women who are capable of such truly heroic conduct without losing any of their charm or gentleness can afford to scorn the criticism of those who think that strength of purpose is inseparable from large feet, ill-fitting garments, and an expensive dexterity in the use of the suffragette's hammer.

## CHAPTER XVI

### FINANCE AND THE WAR

CONSIDERABLE surprise has been expressed among those who have not closely followed the recent developments of economic conditions in Greece at the apparent ease with which that country has sustained the financial strain to which the mobilization of her Army and the recent campaign necessarily subjected her. After the war of 1897 the country was practically without resources; national bankruptcy had been declared in 1893, and her credit was at a very low ebb. Greece, nevertheless, was able to embark on her recent war against Turkey with ample funds in hand. To understand this seeming paradox and obtain a clear conception of her economic condition, it is advisable to go back to her early days and briefly to review her financial history from that time down to the present.

During the War of Independence all the Greeks who were then struggling to throw off the Turkish yoke and gain their liberty were able to borrow in Western Europe, but for the money which they raised they were subjected to usurious conditions, the 5 per cent. Loan of Independence for £2,800,000 having to be issued in 1824 and 1825 at the unprecedentedly low prices of 50 and 56½. When independence was finally declared the Great Powers committed not only a great political blunder but a crime against civilization, for instead of granting independence to all the Greeks who had risen against Turkey and had contracted the above-mentioned loan they limited the new Greek State to such a

small tract of territory that only a few hundred thousands out of the eight or ten millions of Greeks who inhabited the Turkish Empire obtained the boon of freedom. Moreover besides the restricted area of the land, its nature was such that the country was not self-supporting. Is it then to be wondered at that the people of free Greece, on whose shoulders the whole of that loan was saddled, should have been unable to continue to pay the interest on it after two years ?

After the accession of Otho of Bavaria to the Greek throne in 1833 the young State was able to negotiate a 5 per cent. loan of (£2,400,000) 60,000,000 francs at the price of about 70, by the assistance of France, Great Britain, and Russia, who guaranteed the principal and interest. Under his able rule, in the face of incredible difficulties, the country slowly progressed until in the eyes of the Western Powers the Hellenic element in the East began to look dangerous to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, to preserve which at all costs was their policy. By their intrigues and wire-pulling they induced the inexperienced Greeks to depose King Otho on the 22nd of October, 1862.

In April, 1863, the late King George, then Prince Wilhelm of Sonderburg-Glücksburg, was elected to the vacant throne with the title of King of the Hellenes. He was very young at the time, totally inexperienced in statecraft, and scarcely fitted to govern such an impulsive and unruly race as the Greeks then were ; moreover, he was handicapped by a constitution which relegated the sovereign to the position of a mere figure-head. Great Britain, under the government of Mr. Gladstone, who was an ardent Philhellene, by ceding the Ionian Islands to Greece, gave the country a fresh start with an accession of territory and population ; but progress was slow, for though demagogues were numerous, no statesmen of ability arose, and ministry succeeded ministry in rapid rotation with no apparent object beyond that of providing posts for their respective supporters. The change of monarchs had thrown Greece back for years, and the almost

continual state of insurrection in Crete threw a severe strain upon the little kingdom, which not unnaturally did all in its power to assist its most persecuted countrymen. Thus for many years little or nothing was done to develop the country; moreover, material growth of public and private wealth was impossible so long as the country could not produce sufficient of the staff of life to feed its own population. This was only partially remedied after the annexation of Thessaly in 1881. Meanwhile, in 1879, M. J. Gennadius, now Greek Minister in London, then acting as *Chargé d'Affaires*, succeeded by his untiring efforts and able diplomacy after long negotiations in coming to an agreement with Greece's old bond-holders by which the bonds of the 1824-5 loan were converted into new 5 per cent. bonds on favourable terms. For this purpose a new loan of £1,200,000 was issued, most of this being absorbed by the conversion; but the money markets being no longer closed against her, Greece was also able to borrow a further (£2,400,000) 60,000,000 francs at 6 per cent., the loan being issued at the price of 82½ in Paris.

In 1881 M. Tricoupis came into power with a working majority, and he not failing to recognize that it was only by the development of her natural resources, her commerce and industries, that Greece could make any material progress towards national prosperity, immediately gave his attention to reorganizing the country's finances. His policy soon succeeded in establishing confidence at home and abroad, and thus capital, so necessary for the development of the country, was obtained on favourable terms. He drew up a comprehensive programme for the construction of roads and railways, for drainage and irrigation, and for the provision of an adequate fleet, for he fully believed in the realization of a Greater Greece to be formed by the liberation of the Hellenic provinces and islands of the Ottoman Empire. But he made the fatal error of trying to bite off more than he could chew; he borrowed too fast, paid the interest on old loans out of the proceeds of new ones, and in

one instance diverted the proceeds of the Railway Loan of 1890 to other uses, a very questionable proceeding. His intentions and motives were, however, good, and it is quite possible, nay, it is even probable, that had he remained in power continuously from 1881 till 1893 he would have succeeded in making both ends meet, for progress was marked and the increasing revenues would soon have sufficed to meet the charges on all the new loans. Unhappily for Greece the Government of M. Delijannis alternated with that of M. Tricoupis, and during his terms of office that demagogue did his best to undo the good wrought by his opponent, and even went so far as to abolish new taxes imposed by M. Tricoupis in order to court ephemeral popularity. M. Tricoupis was in power from 1881 till April, 1885, from the summer of 1886 till October, 1890, and from May, 1892, till the late spring of 1893, and finally from December, 1893, till December, 1894. M. Delijannis was Premier during the intervals except for a few months in 1892 and in 1893, when Messrs. Constantopoulos and Rhally respectively formed short-lived ministries. Greece, under M. Tricoupis, borrowed £4,800,000 at 5 per cent. in 1881, issued at 74; £6,200,000 at 5 per cent. in 1884, issued at 68½; £5,400,000 at 4 per cent. in 1887 on the special security of monopolies upon cigarette-paper, playing-cards, tobacco, matches, petroleum, and salt, administered by an independent company specially charged to remit out of these revenues the annual sums required for the service of the 1887 loan, which, on the basis of such an exceptional guarantee, was issued at the high price of 78½; in 1889, the national credit having further improved, £6,200,000 of 4 per cent. Rentes were issued in two portions, at 72 and 77½ respectively; and finally in 1890 the Piræus-Larissa Railway 5 per cent. loan for £3,595,000 was issued in two portions, at 93 and 86 respectively; this loan was raised for the construction of the above-named railway, but as before mentioned, M. Tricoupis diverted its proceeds to the general expenses of the administration. The construction of that sorely-needed trunk line was in consequence

delayed for many years. In all, therefore, during the ten years from 1881 to 1890 Greece, under the various ministries of M. Tricoupis, borrowed more than £25,000,000; but owing to all these loans having to be issued at various prices under par, the total sum received by the public treasury did not exceed £18,000,000. Greece has but little to show in return for such a large increase of indebtedness. In the spring of 1893 Greece had practically contracted a large loan on very favourable terms on the security of revenues to be administered by an international commission. The principle of this was definitely accepted by M. Tricoupis, but at the last moment, mortified by factious opposition at home, which was fostered by the Court, he, in spite of commanding a majority in the *Boule* or Chamber, suddenly handed in his resignation, leaving the national finances in a disastrous state of confusion.

M. Rhally, who succeeded him, had to meet all the July coupons within a few weeks with an empty treasury and practically no credits abroad. Under these circumstances the coupons on the specially secured Monopoly Loan of 1887 were paid in full out of the funds in the hands of the Monopoly Company, and the coupons of the other loans were paid in scrip of a new 5 per cent. Funding Loan, which, with the guarantees which it was to have, would have been readily saleable, but M. Tricoupis, then in opposition, immediately started a violent agitation against this arrangement. Having come into power again at the end of the year he at once proceeded to an act of national and, as many consider, quite unjustifiable bankruptcy, for he confiscated the revenues which were in the hands of the Monopoly Company, abrogated the special guarantees of the 1887 loan, threw all the loans, including the newly-created Funding Loan, into the melting-pot, and, refusing even to consult the bondholders, arbitrarily cut down the interest on all the loans to 30 per cent. of the original rate. When representatives of the bondholders in Athens urged him to consent to the bondholders, at any rate, being permitted to participate proportionally



in any future increase of the public revenues, he curtly and definitely declined to accede to this moderate request. M. Tricoupis did not remain in power long, for he resigned in December, 1894, and never again assumed office. He died at Cannes in April, 1896, but his last act when in power not only permanently damaged his own reputation, but totally alienated from Greece the sympathies of European financiers. It was evident that one disaster would lead to another, for the economic chaos in which he left the country was the chief cause of the *débâcle* in 1897, when M. Delijannis, who had been in power since December, 1894, plunged Greece into the unfortunate war against Turkey and actually compelled the King to dismiss him, this being the only time he exercised this prerogative during his long reign.

Yet of M. Tricoupis it must be remembered that he was the only Greek statesman who worked to any purpose for the industrial progress of the country, and if it were not for him Greece would scarcely have been in a position to embark upon the Balkan War with sufficient material resources at her disposal.

It has been shown that the bankruptcy of Greece dated from 1893 and not from the 1897 war. That disaster, however, much aggravated the deplorable financial straits of the country. In 1898 England, France, and Russia came to Greece's assistance by guaranteeing a  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. loan of (£6,000,000) 150,000,000 francs, issued at par, out of which the war indemnity to Turkey was paid. At the same time Greece was compelled to accept an international financial commission, increase the rate on the 1887 loan, and grant to all classes of its bondholders a participation in any improvement of the revenues assigned to the service of the public debt, their administration being placed in the hands of the foreign commission. The amount yielded by these revenues was more than sufficient for the payment of the interest at the minimum rates then agreed upon, an annual sinking fund, and the service of the new loans; and so it was arranged that out of the surplus remaining in the hands of

the Control at the end of each year certain percentages should be allotted towards (a) the increase of the rate of interest on the old loans, (b) the increase of the sinking fund for debt redemption, (c) the Government.

It should here be pointed out that the Control thus established did no more than supervise; thus the revenues assigned to the service of the public debt, which, besides the monopolies, consisted of the Naxos emery receipts, dues on stamps and tobacco, and the Piræus Customs duties, were not collected by the International Commission but by the Government, which paid them to the National Bank of Greece to the credit of the Commission. Moreover, the surplus over the minimum rate stipulated was so large that the Commission did not trouble to use its influence for steps to be taken towards an increase of the yield of the assigned revenues. All that was done, notably for increasing the production of emery, was entirely due to the initiative of the Government.

It must be borne in mind that Greece actually encashed less than three-quarters of the nominal amounts which she borrowed from 1881 to 1890, and an examination of the Budgets from 1881 to 1898 shows that at least one-third of the amount received was absorbed by the extraordinary expenses forced upon her by the incoherent policy of Europe in regard to Crete and the continual state of insurrection, combined with the inevitable acts of repression, in which that island remained. Lastly, the finances, commerce, and industries of the kingdom were further handicapped by the depreciation of the currency and the high rate of foreign exchange, the results of the forced paper currency, which had been abolished by M. Tricoupis in 1881, being again imposed upon the country by M. Delijannis in September, 1885. All these causes combined to produce a series of deficits in the Budgets till 1898.

That year was, however, the turning point in the financial affairs of the country. An agreement having been reached with her foreign bondholders, Greece, besides the  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.

Guaranteed Loan, raised an Internal Unified Loan of (£3,014,000) 75,350,000 drachmas, bearing 5 per cent. interest, issued at par; this loan was absolutely necessary to cover the above-mentioned deficits and to liquidate the outstanding war and other extraordinary expenses.

After that unfortunate war Greece was governed, or misgoverned, by more or less incompetent Ministries till 1909, when the Military League drove them all from power and, by the appointment to the Premiership of M. Stephen Dragoumis in January, 1910, led up to the advent to office of that great statesman, the regenerator of Greece, M. Eleutherios Venizélos, who was entrusted with the formation of a Ministry in September of that year.

During the years 1899-1909 recovery from the depression caused by the war was at first very slow, but in 1900 a further internal loan of (£470,000) 11,750,000 drachmas, bearing 5 per cent. interest, was issued at 93, with the proceeds of which the urgently-needed Pyrgos-Meligala (Peloponnesian) Railway was constructed. In 1902, with the restoration of confidence owing to the satisfactory results of international supervision, Greece was able to negotiate a foreign railway loan for (£2,205,000) 56,250,000 drachmas at 4 per cent. interest, secured on the percentage of the surplus revenues in the hands of the control which reverted to the Government. This amounted to several million francs, and provided a very ample security for the service of the new loan, which was consequently issued at 75. With this amount work was resumed on the long delayed railway from Piræus to Larissa, and its construction was completed in 1907-8. Before this the rate of foreign exchange had risen to the high-water mark of 165 drachmas for 100 francs, and remained round about that figure till 1903.

In the meantime the prices of all imported articles had risen very greatly, causing a proportionate rise in the cost of living. Relief came from a quite unexpected quarter. Towards the end of 1903 the rate of exchange began falling, and it was noticed that remittances were reaching the country from

Greek emigrants in America, who had rapidly made money there and began sending their savings home. By 1905 these remittances reached high figures, and continued to increase until 1910, when they actually amounted to more than £1,500,000. At the same time other causes were at work. Several good harvests increased the home production of cereals, thus diminishing the importation of wheat and flour; the accumulation of private wealth increased and large sums were invested in foreign securities, the interest on which flowed into the country. Cash deposits in the banks were rising, industries were expanding, and above all, there was a marked and continual increase in the number of steamships owned by Greeks, which being economically worked by these unmatched sailors, brought large profits into the country. All these factors were turning the trade balance in favour of Greece, and their combined effect was a continual fall in the rate of exchange till it reached par in the year 1909, since when it has remained nearly stationary with a downward tendency. This is a phenomenon which is probably unique in the financial history of the world, for the paper currency of the country was all the time inconvertible.

By 1909 the financial, agricultural, commercial, and industrial progress of the country was much accelerated. In that year an equilibrium in the Budget was established for the first time in its history, and in 1910, when Greece was able to obtain an advance of (£1,600,000) 40,000,000 drachmas at par at 5 per cent. interest, she finished the year with a surplus of (£297,510) 7,437,763 drachmas in the ordinary Budget, and an unspent balance out of the (£1,600,000) 40,000,000 drachmas advance of (£1,070,553) 26,763,845 drachmas. In 1911 the credit of the nation had improved to such an extent that the Government was able to issue (£4,400,000) 110,000,000 drachmas of the loan for (£6,000,000) 150,000,000 drachmas authorized in 1910 at the rate of 4 per cent. interest at  $87\frac{1}{2}$ ; it thus encashed (£3,681,600) 92,400,000 drachmas, and after repaying the last year's advance of (£1,600,000) 40,000,000 drachmas and (£225,216) 5,630,400 drachmas for the expenses

of the loan and for the cost of establishing refugees from Turkey in Thessaly, it carried over to 1912 a Budget surplus of (£475,242) 11,881,164 drachmas, and an unspent balance out of the loan of (£4,400,000) 110,000,000 drachmas of (£1,870,962) 46,774,064 drachmas. Adding to these two amounts the credit balances from 1910, the Government found itself with a cash balance in hand of no less than (£3,714,270) 92,856,768 drachmas, which it preserved intact till the mobilization commenced in October of that year. Thus Greece was able to enter upon the war against Turkey with a cash balance at her disposal of nearly £4,000,000 sterling.

An admirable exposé of Greek finance is given in the masterly speech delivered to the Boule, the Greek Chamber of Deputies, on the 5th of March last, by the Minister of Finances, M. Diomedes, when he introduced the Provisional Budget for 1913. The précis with quotations of that speech which now follows will give the reader a full understanding of the present economic condition of the Hellenic Kingdom.

M. Diomedes began by explaining that this Budget is provisional because it deals only with the section of Greece hitherto free, whereas the glorious events of the last months will in due course necessitate important alterations in the Budget to meet the wants of the Greater Greece of tomorrow. He then proceeded to review the financial results of the years 1911 and 1912. The estimates for 1911 of his predecessor, M. Coromilas, were :

				Drachmas.
Ordinary revenue...	...	...	...	138,730,503
Ordinary expenses	...	...	...	137,863,300
Surplus	...	...	...	867,203

These estimates have been criticized as far too optimistic; but in spite of extra unforeseen but fully justifiable expenses amounting to 4,889,822 drachmas, the year ended with an actual realized surplus of 11,881,064 drachmas.

But besides the Ordinary Budget there were in 1911 extraordinary receipts and expenses as follows :

# RECEIPTS.

	Drachmas.	Drachmas.
The issue of 110 million francs out of the External Loan of 150 million francs authorized in 1910 realized ... ..		92,400,000

# EXPENSES.

Repayment of advance of 40 million drachmas received in 1910 ... ..	40,000,000	
Expenses of loan and of settling Greek refugees from Turkey in Thessaly ... ..	<u>5,630,400</u>	45,630,400
Surplus of Extraordinary Budget in 1911 ... ..		<u>46,769,600</u>

Consequently the credit balances brought forward from 1911 were :

Ordinary surplus ... ..	11,881,064	
Extraordinary surplus ... ..	<u>46,774,096</u>	58,655,160

To this must be added the credit balances from 1910 :

Ordinary surplus ... ..	7,437,763	
Extraordinary surplus ... ..	<u>26,763,845</u>	34,201,608
Total credit balance from 1910 and 1911 ... ..		<u>92,856,768</u>

He continued : " These figures seem somewhat staggering to us who are not accustomed to such easy conditions of the public treasury. Nevertheless the figures are real, and the Greek Government actually had these amounts at its disposal, as was proved by the published monthly statements of deposits by the banks in Greece and abroad. . . . These were the final results of the financial administration of 1911. To an unbiassed observer they represent a picture of energetic and careful management of the public funds ; they furnish, moreover, clear indications of the economical prosperity of the country."

He then went on to review the fiscal results of the year 1912. He pointed out that during the normal period of this year before the war the yield of the various taxes voted showed a substantial increase, although the duty on sugar had been lowered to about one-half its former high rate, and the cereal crops were abundant, thus causing a substantial decrease of imports; the results of the whole year, in spite of the unsettlement caused by the war, were beyond question satisfactory.

## COMPARISON OF YIELD OF TAXATION IN 1911 AND 1912.

*First 8 months from January to August.*

				Treasury Receipts.	Customs Receipts.	Total.
1911	...	...	...	38,834,000	32,322,000	71,156,000
1912	...	...	...	44,304,000	30,913,000	75,217,000
Difference				...	5,470,000	1,409,000
						4,061,000

a difference in favour of 1912 of over four million drachmas, and this result was obtained in face of a diminution of 2,657,000 drachmas in sugar duties owing to the decreased rate.

## LAST FOUR MONTHS FROM SEPTEMBER TO THE END OF THE YEAR.

				1911.	1912.	Decrease 1912.
September receipts	...			11,083,000	9,598,000	1,485,000
October	"	...		13,298,000	9,008,000	4,290,000
November	"	...		11,673,000	8,638,000	3,035,000
December	"	...		12,157,000	9,932,000	2,225,000
Total	...	...		48,211,000	37,176,000	11,035,000

These figures show that in spite of the war and the restriction in activity which it caused in all branches of business and professions in general, the economic life of the country has suffered but little, having at most somewhat slackened the rapidity of its progress. For the whole year the receipts only fall short of those of 1911 by 6,973,000 drachmas.

A closer analysis of the receipts shows that the decreases

were practically confined to taxes derived from transactions which were almost brought to a standstill by the war, the Courts of Law, for instance, such decreases being far smaller than were to be expected. Some of the direct taxes, such as those on tobacco, alcohol, monopolies, posts, and telegraphs, even show a slight increase on the estimates, thus giving clear indications of the progressive productiveness of the country and the growing capacity of consumption of the population even during the unsettled conditions which obtained.

The customs receipts also show most encouraging results, the actual amount collected only falling short of the 40,000,000 drachmas, estimated by 702,303 drachmas.

A few details about the sugar duties are very instructive. In 1911, in which year the revenue of the country reached its highest mark, the importation of sugar recorded was 9,553,813 kilos, yielding 7,000,079 drachmas, a quantity so small for the population that obviously the balance consumed was smuggled. In 1912, when the reduced duty was in force for ten months and ten days, M. Coromilas had budgeted for an importation of 10,000,000 kilos, yielding only 5,000,000 drachmas, but the actual importation was 12,515,150 kilos, yielding 5,990,349 drachmas, or an increase on the estimates of 999,349 drachmas, in spite of the crisis before and during the war, and the fact that the Government imported large quantities of sugar free of duty for the use of the Army, Navy, and the refugees and other destitute families. These figures, which it was only expected to reach after several years, were attained within one year. This result is most satisfactory, and not only because it shows what a vast diminution there has been in smuggling, but because it affords valuable data of the benefits that can accrue to the Treasury from lower import duties.

The import duties on cereals show a reduction on the last year's of 4,444,000 drachmas, partly owing to the better home harvests and partly owing to the free importation of food stuffs for the use of the Army. Other revenues show but





we may reckon that the deficit of the Ordinary Budget of 1912 will not exceed 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 drachmas, a deficit absolutely justifiable in such abnormal circumstances.

Introducing the Budget for 1913, he pointed out that this in the main is a replica of its predecessor. It embodies no new economic principles, nor does it foreshadow the financial measures which the Government intend to introduce; it can only assume its definite shape later on when it will be possible to announce the financial policy of the Ministry and to estimate with accuracy whether it will show a deficit or not.

The Budget shows the figures for 1913 as they work out on the basis of the existing fiscal laws, modified by the abnormal conditions caused by the war. Important changes or additions will be referred to in greater detail.

The Ordinary Budget for 1913 shows the following figures:

	Drachmas.	Drachmas.
Receipts ... ..		141,161,025
Expenses ... ..		149,006,552
Extraordinary receipts from loan and interest	50,001,100	
Receipts from territories occupied ... ..	10,000,000	
	<hr/>	60,001,100
Extra expenses War Ministry ... ..	80,000,000	
"      "      Ministry of Marine ... ..	11,000,000	
Expenses of administration of occupied territories ... ..	3,000,000	
Grants to the Treasury of National Defence and the Fleet ... ..	10,000,000	
Ministry of the Interior for increase of salaries of gendarmerie and maintenance of refugees ... ..	950,000	
	<hr/>	104,950,000

The estimated expenses of the Provisional Ordinary Budget for 1913 show an increase of 8,080,000 drachmas over the corresponding figures for 1912. But, as already mentioned, in 1912 supplementary credits of 7,296,869 drachmas were found necessary from unavoidable causes; "we have therefore tried, in the new Budget, to include all credits

which past experience has taught us as necessary, to avoid new demands later on, to the disturbance of the entire economy of the Budget." The extra expenses arise chiefly from the following sources :

	Drachmas.	Drachmas.
Service of National Debt increase ... ..	1,024,666	
Increase of pensions ... ..	815,414	
Ministry of Finance, increase for administration of occupied country and grant to Treasury of National Defence and of the National Fleet...	12,345,463	
Ministry of the Exterior, decrease ... ..		150,000
Ministry of Interior, increase for gendarmerie, refugees, posts and telegraphs, and road con- struction ... ..	2,501,874	
Ministry of Public Instruction, increase ...	525,845	
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, increase for new territories ... ..	468,036	
Ministry of Marine, increase ... ..	3,000,000	
Ministry of Justice, „ ... ..	184,245	

But besides the increased expenses in the Ordinary Budget which arise out of the war conditions the receipts will be also affected by the same causes in inverse ratio and are estimated by the Government as likely not to exceed 141,161,025, a decrease of 556,519 drachmas on the estimated receipts for 1912. Moreover, in order to be on the safe side these receipts have been estimated below their probable yield ; the direct taxes, for instance, in spite of the certain increase which will be contributed by the tax on the profits of limited liability companies, have been estimated at two million drachmas below the 1912 estimates ; further, as the new tax on cultivated land cannot be imposed this year, the old tax on ploughing teams must be collected in its place.

The indirect taxes will also show an increase on 1912, in spite of the war, as appears from the increased consumption of alcohol and sugar, and unfortunately also from the probable larger imports of cereals, owing to the expected shortage of home products. An increase of posts and telegraph receipts is also confidently expected, and these anticipated increases

will together diminish the decrease on the receipts of 1912 to approximately three million drachmas.

These receipts of the Ordinary Budget will not of course suffice for the payment of the extraordinary expenses of the current year, which total 104,950,000 drachmas as detailed above. These expenses will be met by a loan, which in the opinion of the Government need not exceed fifty million drachmas. Should a larger sum be necessary, the authority of the Chamber will be asked for. There is also a further sum available from the revenues of the occupied territories estimated at ten million drachmas.

Such are the main features of the Budget now submitted to the Chamber, which, from the nature of existing circumstances is emphatically a provisional one.

Reviewing the extraordinary expenses of the war during 1912, the greater part of which have been liquidated, it will be seen that the

	Drachmas.	Drachmas.
Ministry of War outgoings were ... ..		83,200,000
Ministry of Marine „ „ ... ..		11,518,638
Ministry of the Exterior extra expenses were ...		1,600,000
Ministry of the Interior „ „ ... ..		820,000
Ministry of the Finances for service of the National Debt ... ..		1,780,863
Total ... ..		<u>98,419,501</u>

To this must be added the extra credits voted  
for the Treasuries of—

Public Defence ... ..	28,504,654
and of the Navy... ..	11,000,000
„ additional credit ... ..	16,700,000
	<u>27,700,000</u>
A total war expenditure of ... ..	154,624,155

To meet such great expenses the Government could not, of course, expect that the ordinary revenues of the year would suffice, but it congratulates itself on its foresight in having set aside an important sum for this purpose consisting of the ordinary and extraordinary surpluses of the

years 1910 and 1911, amounting, as set out above, in all to 92,856,768 drachmas.

He continued: "This sum was not a mere book-keeping entry, but was a realized asset, because during these years the public revenue flowed regularly into the Treasury and automatically increased, which permitted the regular administration of the national finances, without in any way encroaching on the above reserve fund."

This reserve fund alone did not, of course, suffice to meet all the expenses of the war, and further capital had to be procured. The Government avoided any recourse to a further issue of paper currency, which is the method usually adopted by other countries in similar emergencies to make both ends meet, and thus averted the evils of depreciated currency and of a rise in the prices of commodities, but as it had repaid in 1911 the bulk of the floating debt, it had no difficulty in issuing Treasury bills for 9,000,000 drachmas and in obtaining on very favourable terms an advance of 40,000,000 drachmas against an external loan to be issued in normal times—a striking proof of how highly Greek credit is held in the international money markets. In so easily obtaining such a substantial advance the Government was much helped by the economic strength of the National Bank, which gave its assistance without in any way diminishing the capital which it holds for the convenience of the community in general. Thus the Government was able to add to its war fund the further sum of 49,000,000 drachmas, making a total of 141,856,768 drachmas, without increasing the National Debt beyond these 49 millions since the beginning of the war. Out of these funds it has met in cash all the expenses of the war up to the present time, the end of the second month of 1913.

The robust economic strength of the country is clearly depicted by the ease with which all obligations, large and unforeseen as they were, have been met without any public inconvenience. During the course of the war there has been but little falling off of the ordinary revenue; for instance, during January, 1913, the total receipts were 8,526,000 drachmas,

against 10,093,000 in 1912. Thus the Government were able to meet without delay all administrative expenses and further to set aside a sum of 2,500,000 drachmas to meet the service of the 1910 foreign loan, which is not in the hands of the International Control, and further to assist the community by a payment of 10,000,000 drachmas for the animals and vehicles which it had requisitioned—an assistance not considered necessary by other nations in similar circumstances.

There can be no doubt that during the last few years Greece has made vast strides along the path of economic development. In 1912 her progress towards great public and private prosperity was increasing in rapidity till the last four months, when the relations with Turkey reached a critical stage and culminated in war, but even these disturbing influences had little effect beyond temporarily retarding the pace of that progress. A conspicuous proof of this growing prosperity is afforded by the remarkable fact that Greece was able to stand the strain and to bear the burden of the heavy sacrifices in blood and treasure which the war entailed without any shock to public confidence and with so little inconvenience to the public and private life of the nation.

Further indications of the increase of national wealth are furnished by a cursory examination of the available statistics from which M. Diomedes proceeds to quote figures, striking examples of which are here set out :

	1909 Drachmas.	1910 Drachmas.	1911 Drachmas.	1912 Drachmas.
Overdue taxes collected ...	789,000	360,000	1,203,000	1,350,000

The affluent condition of the community is clearly shown by the ease with which taxes on articles of daily consumption, such as alcohol, salt, gunpowder, import duties (cereals excepted), and stamp duties were collected and the continued increases in their yield, which indicate the economic strength of the taxpayers ; this is fully confirmed by the actual results of the financial administration of 1912. Such

increases in the yield of these taxes are a sure proof that there is a corresponding increase in the wealth of the people. This increase is most marked in articles not of primary necessity ; what was considered a luxury only five years back has gradually become an article of common use, thus the consumption per head of the population of such articles as sugar, coffee, rice, more expensive articles of clothing, etc., has grown continuously, which is a clear indication that the people, being able to spend more freely, are more affluent.

For many years Greece suffered from an adverse trade balance, causing inflation of prices, but now there are ample data for the conclusion that this unfortunate condition is passing away, and that the balance is turning in her favour. A comparison of the figures of foreign trade between the years 1902 and 1911 shows a marked increase :

			Imports. Drachmas.	Exports. Drachmas.	Total Trade. <sup>1</sup> Drachmas.
1902	...	...	137,000,000	80,000,000	216,000,000
1911	...	...	173,000,000	158,000,000	331,000,000

and these figures are far beneath the reality, as the statistics of exports are very incomplete, but they amply suffice to show greater activity in trade and increased capital employed in productive undertakings.

A closer examination of the export statistics reveals the opening up of new markets for her products and new fields for the development of her commerce. In spite of this, however, the adverse trade balance is not yet entirely wiped out ; efforts must therefore be made to achieve that desirable result.

Fortunately the country has other resources which escape the statistics, but nevertheless augment the floating wealth of the community. Thus the large emigration, harmful as it is, has had its redeeming features, for the emigrants re-mitted large sums home which amounted to no less than

<sup>1</sup> These figures, which do not quite tally, are taken direct from the report of the Budget speech.

thirty-eight million drachmas in 1910 and thirty millions in 1911, which of course has vastly increased the circulating wealth of the country.

Perhaps a still greater factor which conduced to the financial equilibrium has been the vast and rapid expansion of the Greek Mercantile Navy, which has carried the Hellenic flag and her commerce to distant shores, bringing in new profits which add to the nation's wealth. Since 1909 this fleet has been increased by no less than eighty-eight large passenger and freight steamships. The fatherland has benefited not only by the importation of gold through its agency, but by credits thus created abroad to meet the payment for goods which are not produced at home.

The receipts from railways (without any increase of mileage, also show satisfactory expansion as follows :

		1909. Drachmas.	1910. Drachmas.	1911. Drachmas.	1912. Drachmas.
Receipts	...	11,004,000	11,986,000	14,303,000	16,500,000

Revenue from taxes on receipts of railways and steamships :

		1909. Drachmas.	1910. Drachmas.	1911. Drachmas.	1912. Drachmas.
Revenue	...	1,321,000	1,470,000	1,442,000	1,600,000

The 1912 figures are in no way due to extra receipts from the movement of troops and military stores, because they are still following the same upward course in the first months of the new year.

The same tale is told by the yearly increasing number of limited liability companies, the growth of their capital and rise on 'Change of the prices of their shares ; the few exceptions only prove the rule, as they are all due to events which happened before the war.

Perhaps the most striking proof of the economic strength of the country is the continued fall in the rate of exchange from its high-water mark of 60 per cent. at premium in 1904 to par in 1909, since when it has remained stationary, with minor fluctuations, and, if anything, a downward tendency.



This phenomenon in face of the forced currency, which is still existent in Greece, is probably unique ; all the more so when one bears in mind that the events of the war have been powerless to affect it, so that the Government is entitled to consider this forced currency as *de facto* non-existent.

A further graphic illustration of the increasing wealth of the people is afforded by the constant growth of the deposits in the savings-banks, which show the following results : 45,349,000 drachmas in 1911, and 50,708,000 drachmas in 1912. This increase in face of war, when, as a general rule, deposits are withdrawn and hoarded at home, clearly shows that the population had ample means and that public confidence remained unshaken.

The satisfactory aspect of financial affairs at home has had its reflex abroad, for it is a remarkable fact that the prices of Greek stocks on the Bourses of Western Europe, instead of falling, as has been the case with the funds of nearly all other countries, have actually risen, the prices being about three points higher at the end of 1912 than they were at the end of 1911. And this tendency has continued down to the end of February 1913, in spite of the fact that the extra dividends to be distributed on the old loans are lower than last year.

He concludes : " The above is an unadorned picture of facts which are clearly depicted by the actual figures, a picture which inspires courage and confidence in the economic strength of the country and in the robust financial resources of the nation. The Government, therefore, has every justification for its firm conviction that the progress of our national economic prosperity will continue and serve as a sound basis for the erection of a healthy financial policy.

"The Greater Greece now being created by Hellenic arms and by Hellenic genius will thus be able to grapple with financial problems, which the hitherto existing limitation of our economic horizon had rendered inapproachable. We shall now be able to erect our system of taxation on truer foundations, and it is our duty to do so. Necessity in the

past has compelled us to disregard the principles which science and experience of political economy have shown to be the only salutary ones. Our indifference and contempt for those axioms which nations older and more advanced than ourselves respect have not been without effect. . . . Now at last we shall be able to revise our tariff, that offspring of chance, of arbitrary and short-sighted policy, and to fix our duties on a basis in harmony with the real interest of our national economy and our public treasury.

"The Hellenic State, in harmonious unanimity with the whole Hellenic race in thoughts and feelings, has wrought great deeds in this bloody strife; and proud in her new titles, created by the patriotism and self-denial of her children, advances firm in resolve, and high in spirit, for the peaceful creation of new titles to further national glory and honour."

From a perusal of the above facts and figures, three conclusions may be safely drawn: (1) That when the war against Turkey broke out Greece was advancing rapidly on the highway to great national prosperity; (2) that the only injurious effect that the war has had upon the country, beyond the loss of many valuable lives and the unproductive employment of much capital, has been a slackening in the rapidity of that advance; (3) that as soon as demobilization can be effected and normal conditions re-established, the advance on the road to ever-increasing national prosperity will be resumed with even greater rapidity.

No tabulation of the various loans which make up the Public Debt of Greece is given in this chapter, nor any calculations as to the annual charge per head of population which they entail; in the first place because this subject has been recently fully treated by Mr. Percy Martin in his book "*Greece of the XXth Century*," and secondly, because events and developments are taking place so rapidly that were any such tables and calculations to be made to-day, they would be obsolete before this chapter appears in print. For it must be borne in mind that the population of Greece has been nearly doubled since last October, and even if she

obtains a substantial indemnity from Turkey, it will be found that she has largely added to her indebtedness ; moreover, she will have to borrow several more million pounds for the purpose of developing her new rich provinces and fertile lands, but the increased productive employment of capital will ultimately greatly increase her revenues. Lastly, in the opinion of the writer, there will before long take place a conversion and unification of her old loans. Such conversion will be beneficial to Greece herself, and even more so to her bondholders, to whom she is now in a position to offer most favourable conditions with corresponding advantages to herself.

POSTSCRIPTUM, 27TH OF AUGUST, 1913.

The above was written after the conclusion of the Treaty of London, but since then the rapacious demands of Bulgaria prevented immediate demobilization.

The retention of 250,000 men under arms for a further period of more than three months and the necessities of the sanguinary one month's war have probably cost Greece several million pounds. The dramatic *dénouement* has, however, furnished another conclusive proof of how high her credit stands, for after the outbreak of this unprovoked war she had no difficulty in obtaining through the National Bank of Greece an advance of £3,000,000 on the easy terms, in such circumstances, of 6 per cent. interest and 2 per cent. commission. What is more important, however, is that it has resulted in the incorporation in Greek territory of additional tracts of very fertile land, including by far the greater part of the districts which produce the finest qualities of Turkish tobacco, a fact which cannot fail to effect a further material expansion of her public and private wealth and prosperity. Moreover, the equitable settlement concluded at Bucharest will, with the blessings of peace and good government, undoubtedly greatly further the financial and commercial prosperity of the whole Balkan Peninsula.

## CHAPTER XVII

### GREECE AND THE ALBANIAN QUESTION

THERE are many thinking people who believe that the creation of a new State, to be called Albania, out of the half-civilized mountain tribes who inhabit the east coast of the Adriatic and a considerable part of its hinterland between Montenegro and Epirus is a political blunder. That after many years of international control a successful autonomous State may be constructed is possible, but that the Shkipetars will of themselves form one which can be so called in anything but in name is obviously the musing of a dreamer. The claims of the Albanians to form an independent State are based on race, but they are divided into tribes which differ widely from one another in many characteristics, and at present there is no national consciousness in them, taken as a whole, which may work as a source of inspiration to its future legislators and administrators. There is a wide divergence in their religious beliefs, for while most of the Malissori in the north are Roman Catholics and the rest of the Christians are Greek Orthodox, the majority of the population are Mohammedans. Such religious differences might not constitute any considerable obstacle against their living together in mutual toleration if not in harmony, were it not that the Albanians are the most turbulent and warlike of all the inhabitants of Eastern Europe, for they surpass even the Cretans in this respect. Another difficulty is presented by the question of

language. The Albanian dialects are a branch of the Indo-European, but they differ considerably from any of their present neighbours. They have not remained pure, as they have absorbed many Greek, Slav, and Turkish words. Moreover, they have no recognized form of notation, and different tribes or individuals in writing them choose Latin, Greek, Slavonic or Turkish characters, according to their religious or political propensities. This is due to the fact that these dialects have survived merely in speech preserved by tradition and not through any literature. Further their use is by no means universal even in Northern Albania, for Turkish has hitherto been the official language, and the employment of Greek is prevalent for commercial purposes.

When the Balkan Allies joined together a year ago for the purpose of evicting the Turk, the Albanians, instead of taking advantage of a splendid opportunity to throw in their lot with the Greeks and their allies and demand recognition of their own independence, took up arms (rather spasmodically indeed) on the side of the Turk. It is thus not easy to sympathize with them in their present aims, and those who love them best may well feel anxious as to the success of the experiment which it is proposed to try on them. One difficulty will be the choosing of a Prince. The desire of the Albanians appears to be to have some European Prince who will be established under the protection and the guidance of the Great Powers. The most patriotic would like to see Allado Guini Castrioti, the well-known Spanish diplomatist, elected. He, though it is stated that he never proved it, claims to be a descendant of Skanderberg, Prince of Albania. His ancestor is supposed to have settled in Spain in the fifteenth century, and his family has always remained in touch with Albania. There are other candidates like Prince Ghika, whose aspirations are said to have no historical basis. Turkey wishes to see a member of the Turkish Royal Family placed on a throne which would remain under the suzerainty of the Porte, but although it is probable that the State will have a Mohammedan character it is almost ridiculous to suggest that Turkey, whose

possessions in Europe are now confined to Eastern Thrace, should have rights bordering on the Adriatic. The solution which it appears the most practical of the Albanians desire would lie in the election of a Protestant Prince, but it is difficult to see who would care to oppose an Austro-Italian nominee, who would presumably be a Roman Catholic. When this point has been made clear those who were anxious for the welfare of Albania will realize how little security she will then enjoy from the propaganda of her two powerful neighbours. The insincerity of Austria in the Near Eastern question has become a byword. Now that she sees her dream of Salonica ended, she turns her attention to the only conquest of the allies which they were not allowed to retain by the European Concert. Italy too bids fair to rival Austria in Machiavellian diplomacy.

It is frankly an experiment to which the Powers have committed themselves at the instigation of Austria backed up by Italy. That there should be any accession of population to such an experimental State beyond what is purely Albanian would be clearly unjustifiable and contrary to the principle of ethnical distribution which has been recognized as the basis of the Balkan settlement. It is evident from the allocation to Servia and Montenegro of most of the mixed districts that the Powers have adopted this view in the delimitation of the northern frontier. The inclusion of Scutari was considered necessary as being the natural capital of an autonomous Albania, and can be justified on the ground that the Slav element in the city is very small. The thoughtless declaration that the Balkan *status quo* would not be altered was soon nullified by the dictum that the victors would not be despoiled of the fruits of their victories ; and on this the allies founded their expectations. It is now seriously suggested that a large part of Northern Epirus, to which Albania has far less claims than she has to the districts round Djakova and Prisrend, shall be included in the experimental State. It is the object of the writer to show that if this suggestion is acted upon it will be an outrage on civilization which is quite indefensible,

either on grounds of abstract justice or on counsels of expediency.

Two arguments are used to substantiate the proposed annexation of Northern Epirus to Albania, one political and the other ethnological. The former concerns Greece and Italy, the latter Greece and Albania.

Italy's policy in the Adriatic is to attempt to exclude from its sea-board any third independent Power—*i.e.* other than Austria or herself. The direct access which Turkey had to the Adriatic was of no consequence to Italy because Turkey was not to be feared: presumably in the eyes of the Italians Albania is no more dangerous than Turkey, whereas Greece is an independent Power which can look after its own interests.

On abstract principles Italy has no more right to the exclusion of Greece from the Adriatic on the ground that it is reserved to Austria, herself, and Turkey, or Albania, than Greece has to the exclusion of Bulgaria from the *Ægean* on the plea that that sea is reserved to Turkey, herself, and some eventual ally. Only, unfortunately, on the occasion of the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece by Great Britain, a stipulation was inserted in the treaty regulating the transfer that Corfu should be neutralized. This concession by Great Britain was short-sighted and has been proved to be an inexcusable error, because it may have placed her in the position of conferring a naval privilege on a member of the Triple Alliance, and has at any rate given Italy an excuse for putting forward an otherwise preposterous claim: Great Britain herself held Corfu under no such restriction. Even if Italy has a right to claim that Greece shall not fortify the coast of Epirus anywhere north of a point opposite to the southern extremity of the island of Corfu, Greece's willingness to neutralize this coast in the same way as that island should satisfy her. Under these conditions it would clearly be immaterial how far north Greece held the littoral, for she could not thereby be a source of danger to Italy nor in any way interfere with the condominium over the Adriatic

aspired to by the two members of the Triple Alliance. Italy's refusal to be satisfied with Greece's offer shows that fear of Greece is not the true explanation of her policy. She really wishes Albania to be as large as possible, and she desires this for her own purposes. There is the possibility of an ultimate partitioning of Albania as there was of Turkey in Europe. So far as Austria and Italy are concerned the creation of an autonomous Albania is nothing more or less than the preservation of a piece of Turkey from what to their eyes appear as the ravages of the Balkan Allies. The delimitation of spheres of influence, followed by the proposal for the retention of the Sultan's suzerainty with a Moslem Prince lays the whole scheme bare. The Albanian Christians in the north and south would place themselves under the protection of Austria and Italy respectively, and the step from this to a joint military occupation would be a short one. A *raison d'être* for this would easily be found in an expedition to punish some massacre of the Christian population by the fanatic Moslem Albanians. The "unsettled state of the country" would prevent the prompt recall of the troops, and thenceforth Albania would remain under military occupation. Austria and Italy have come to look upon it as their preserve: Servia and Montenegro were warned off in the north, and now an attempt is made to prevent Greece from advancing to the extent of her legitimate interests in the south.

It should, however, be made clear that Italy as well as Austria has followed this policy on the assumption that their scheme for the constitution of Albania will meet with the approval of the European Concert. The gist of this proposal of course is that the ruler of the new State shall not be subjected to the supervision of an international commission, but that he should be merely under the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan and really under the protection of Italy and Austria, who would, when necessary, assume the functions of an international commission. It is the duty of the Powers to see that so selfish a scheme as this shall not be



carried into effect, for in time it would nullify all that is now being done in the interests of the Albanians. Let the Powers insist on the appointment of an international council which will guide the new State until it can make its own way alone. If they do so, the solicitude of both Austria and Italy for Albania may be very considerably diminished thenceforth.

The general idea among those who oppose Greece's claim to Northern Epirus is that Italy's political contention should not be treated seriously so long as Greece does not refuse to neutralize the coast line, but that it should nevertheless be supported because it would promote a territorial distribution in accordance with the principle of nationalities. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to showing that this argument, which has helped Italy to find so much support for her case, is not well founded.

Great stress has been laid widely on the antiquity of the Albanian race, which is frequently said to represent the "Urvölker" of the Balkan Peninsula. From this it is argued that the Albanians have more right to their fair share of the peninsula's territory than any of the other present dwellers therein. It is also asserted that the forerunners of the Albanians occupied the whole of Epirus as well as the whole of Albania. It is doubtful how much is to be gained from an inquiry into early ethnical conditions, but it is as well to give a *résumé* of what is known about the inhabitants of Epirus past and present, when racial considerations are adduced in support of the inclusion of North Epirus in Albania. All writers agree that the present Albanians are naturally divisible into Gheks in the north and Toscs in the south, and that this division rests upon a racial distinction. Both are clearly of Aryan descent, and it is supposed that they are to be traced from some of the earliest Aryan immigrants. So great an authority as Hahn holds that the Illyrians and the Epirots were respectively the progenitors of the Gheks and the Toscs. He further holds that the Macedonians and Epirots, who were akin to one another,

came from the "Pre-Hellene-Tyrrhene-Pelasgian" population, or, in other words, the earliest people who were associated with Greek civilization, while the Illyrians can only be called descendants of the Pelasgians in a wider sense. The term "Pelasgians" in this sense was used by the Greek authors to describe any of the peoples dwelling in the Balkan Peninsula who are first mentioned in history.

Professor K. J. Beloch, who curiously enough now fills a chair at Rome University, in his Greek History published recently, is more definite in asserting that both the Epirots and the Macedonians were Greeks, and he advances various arguments in support of his view, which have a very strong cumulative effect. The following are some of the facts from which he infers that the Epirots were Greeks in Homeric times and remained so until Attic times. Dodona was known to be a Greek centre in the earliest times, for Homer refers to the Selli or Helli who carried out the duties of priests at its shrine; and it remained so in Herodotus's day, for he states categorically that Greek was then its spoken language. The tribe of Molossi who are mentioned as the ancient inhabitants of the district are certainly Greeks, for Herodotus describes Molossian Alkon as one of the most distinguished of the suitors who presented themselves for the hand of Agariste. The fact that Herodotus elsewhere says that Dodona was Thesprotian only shows that he considered the Thesprotians Greeks. The inaccessibility of Epirus to invasion is a good explanation of its never having lost its Greek character during the pre-Christian era. Various authors, such as Strabo and Hecataeus, state that the littoral and hinterland of the Ionian Sea to the north of Corcyra constituted a single national entity as regards language and custom. The origin of the designation of the Epirots as Illyrians he ascribes to a misconstruction of the references to their language found in ancient Greek authors and to the application of unscientific philology to its *Orts-Namen* and the proper names of its people. When Thucydides described the Aetolians of Eurytania as being *ἀγνωστότατοι*

γλῶσσαν (Bk. III, ch. 94) he did not mean that they spoke a foreign language, but that their dialect was very difficult to understand: if he had meant to say that their speech was foreign he would have said ἄγνωστοι (unknown).<sup>1</sup> The Eurytians were the chief of the Aetolian tribes, of whom there can be no question that they were all Greek. Commentators having misconstrued this passage, have then argued that the Epirots living farther north than the Eurytians are still less likely to have been Greeks. Most names such as Βαίῳρη—Αργιθέα—Τύμφη which have been cited as showing Illyrian origin are essentially Greek, and those which may be Illyrian are not proportionately more numerous than the foreign names found in the Peloponnese and the mainland of Greece. The names of the various tribes of Epirus, namely the Amphilocheians, the Athamanians, the Tymphæans, the Paroraeanes, the Paranaeanes, the Cassiopæans, are clearly Greek, and it is significant that most of these tribes were settled in Northern Epirus. The Epirot confederacy of the close of the fifth century B.C. makes it unlikely that any of the Epirus tribes were not Greek. These tribes probably ended with the Chaonians, who may or may not have been of Illyrian origin, but, if so, were Hellenized at an early date, as they are closely connected with the Chones, who are said to be an Iapygian race, but acknowledged to be the first Greek settlers in Italy. Thus in early times the population of Epirus appears to have been Greek, at least as far north as any place now under Greek military occupation. Professor Beloch then adduces several striking proofs of the fact that the Macedonians were Greeks, and by this means supports his contention that the Epirots were all Greeks, for the kinship of the Macedonians and the Epirots cannot be seriously disputed. The term "Hellas," he says, is responsible for some incorrect inferences, for it was commonly used to repre-

<sup>1</sup> In the same passage Thucydides describes them as being ὠμόφαγοι (eaters of raw flesh)—it is curious that the present natives of Acarnania and Aetolia, from whom the Evzoni have been largely drawn in the past, are raw flesh eaters.

sent a much smaller area than that which was inhabited by Greek-speaking peoples, and even excluded Thessaly. The coincidence of a Greek-speaking district in ancient times with the Greek-speaking Epirus which is now claimed by Greece is a phenomenon which seems to have been lost sight of by most of the advocates of a large Albania. The phenomenon would appear much less remarkable to them if they realized that the truth is that this territory has always remained Greek-speaking, in spite of various foreign incursions. The retention of the Greek tongue there is no more remarkable than its retention in the rest of Greece. Professor Lambros, of Athens University, the chief Greek authority, has pointed out that the coast and many of the towns exhibited their Greek character in the Middle Ages far farther north than Greece now claims. He cites as examples Avlona, which was known as a Greek centre even in Roman times, Berate (the ancient Antipatria) which retained considerable importance in Byzantine times under the name of Belegrada, and especially Dyrrachium (Durazzo), the ancient Epidamnus, which was a colony of Corinth and Corcyra and played a conspicuous rôle in the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, and which retained its strong Greek character throughout its occupation by various invaders. Professor Lambros draws attention to the fact that the Illyrian kings placed Greek inscriptions upon their coins. From all the above facts it is a fair inference that Greek has been the language of the stable population from the earliest times, and this is not seriously challenged by the presence of a certain number of Albanian settlers in the north.

It has been shown that from the point of view of pure racial considerations there is not much ground for the claim put forward that the inhabitants of Northern Epirus are Albanian and not Greek. However, a distinction between two subdivisions of one branch of the Aryan race such as this claim involves will now be acknowledged to be of very little importance. There is no more mixed race than our own ; and the Greeks, who have retained their language in a





EPIROT PEASANTS.



AT ARGYROCASTRO. GREEK PEASANT WOMEN DANCING.

form which differs scarcely at all from New Testament Greek and only slightly from Attic Greek, have assimilated and Hellenized a succession of immigrating races. It is nationality which is the important test, and this is determined chiefly by religion, language, sentiments, and political tendencies. If we analyse the language and the religion, the sentiments and the political tendencies of the present inhabitants of Northern Epirus, there can be but one result, and that to show that they are Greek.

The recent testimonies of visitors to that country completely support this view. M. Jean Leune, the special correspondent of *L'Illustration*, contributed a striking article to *La Grande Revue* (May), in which he pointed out that the attitude of even the Albanians in this district is in favour of Greece, and not for incorporation in Albania; and he further points out that Albanians proper are only met with in the neighbourhood of Argyrocastro and farther north. Signor Magrini, the special correspondent of the Italian newspaper *Il Messaggero*, fully agreed with M. Leune in some most interesting dispatches written by him on the occasion of the Greek Crown Prince's tour through this disputed district, and it should be noted that he was sent out to advocate Italian interests. M. Charles Vellay, the author of a book recently published in France under the title of "*L'Irredentisme Hellenique*," and several other French writers hold the same view.<sup>1</sup> When one compares the testimony of these gentlemen with what is known of the history of the district, which shows how it has preserved its Greek character throughout, one can only infer that the Albanian-speaking people south of Argyrocastro, who also speak Greek, are rather Albanized Hellenes than Hellenized Albanians. M. Leune, in his article, explains the origin of the attribution of Albanian character to the inhabitants of this district. He brings much evidence to light, which shows that Austrian emissaries, at the head of whom was

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Murray, C.B., in his recent articles in *The World*, also strongly holds this view.

M. Billinski, the Austrian Consul-General at Janina, organized and manufactured an artificial Albanian movement by means of their propaganda. The Austrians did not, as M. Leune shows, stop short of providing the Turkish troops and their Albanian auxiliaries with large quantities of rifles and ammunition in the hope of checking the Greek advance northward. The Austrian postal service established at Janina was freely used for these purposes. It is inexplicable how any independent inquirers, who have previously travelled in these districts, have suggested that the bulk of the inhabitants are Albanians or Hellenized Toscs. One can only suppose that they set out with the idea that racial descent was the true test, and that their appreciation of the racial character of the inhabitants may have been unduly influenced by a fallacious theory of the history of Epirus.

Northern Epirus, now under Greek occupation, contains some 250 Greek schools, with a total of about 12,000 pupils.<sup>1</sup> The whole population of this district does not exceed 25,000. "The prevalence of Greek education, taken alone, is not a conclusive test of nationality," state those who argue that the population is really Albanian: "the Albanians," they say, "have been obliged to use the Greek schools because they are the best, and in many cases the only ones available." When, however, it is shown that the proportion of Orthodox Greeks to Moslems in the neighbourhood is three to two, and that in this Moslem minority are comprised all the Turkish officials, it will be seen that the Greek character of the population cannot be denied. Even those who claim the disputed district as Albanian admit that many of the Moslem inhabitants of Southern Epirus, from Janina downwards, are Islamized Greeks. M. J. Leune observes that even Premete and its district appear more Greek than Albanian in character.

<sup>1</sup> It should be observed that these schools were established and are maintained, not by the Greek Government, but by the contributions of the inhabitants themselves, and also from large endowments made by wealthy natives of the district. Thus to hand these schools over to the Albanians would be what a lawyer would describe as *conversion of trust funds*.



Of all the territory now occupied by Greece, only the districts of Argyrogastro, Premete, and Tepelene are in any way debatable. All these are at most mixed districts, and as against this Greece will lose a large population, spread over Central and Southern Albania, which can boast of 2 bishoprics, 8 monasteries, 151 churches, and 84 schools, with 116 masters and 2,900 pupils.

Korytsa lies in a position of great importance, as it is situated on the borderland of Epirus and Macedonia. It commands the road from Janina to the east, and though geographically it lies in Macedonia it is in a way a prong of Epirus. It is in this district that there is the chief conflict between Albanian and Greek interests. Of the town of Korytsa itself, however, there can be no two opinions: 20,000 of the 25,000 inhabitants are either pure Greeks or else have Greek sympathies, and the rest, who are Mussulmans, live in peace and amity with them. There was recently a great mass meeting held at Korytsa, at which many Mohammedans were present, and which passed a unanimous vote of confidence in the Greek Government and a resolution to do everything possible to secure their union with Greece. The patriotism of the Greek residents of Korytsa is so strong that every bequest to the municipality, involving as a condition the teaching of the Albanian tongue, has been refused. The Greek schools there, as well as the mansions of the wealthy Greeks, many of whom made their fortunes in Egypt, are the finest Greek mansions found in greater Greece, and they have made Korytsa into the beautiful city which it undoubtedly is. Recently when a new boys' school was required one single Greek native of Korytsa sent a cheque for £3,000 towards its establishment. It is inconceivable that a city like this should be excluded from the territory which is to be annexed to Greece: its geographical and strategical position render it invaluable to her and its acquisition essential, while its value to Albania would not be so great now that Janina will undoubtedly remain Greek. Santi Quaranta is indispensable as an outlet for the com-

merce of the more northern territories which Greece will have. It is the only port for the hinterland and the natural port for merchandise from Janina destined for Italy and Austria.

The Janiots have long had the reputation of speaking a very pure form of Greek: Byron drew attention to this nearly one hundred years ago. The writer has recently verified the purity of the language spoken there, and found that a fair acquaintance with ancient Greek and a moderate knowledge of modern Greek enable one to converse far more easily with the Greeks of Janina than with their kinsmen at Athens or elsewhere. This in itself is almost a sufficient proof that the Greek character of Epirus lies deeply rooted, and cannot be ascribed to mere Hellenizing influences, such as supporters of a large Albania allege. It would be surprising that an important Greek centre like Janina should, nevertheless, have what are really Albanian districts anywhere within fifty miles of it, and this is what the opposite contention implies.

Such Vlach element as there is in Epirus, north and south, is now as Greek as the Greeks themselves. The Roumanians long ago gave up their attempt to reclaim it. The large number of Vlach benefactors of whom Greece can be proud, pre-eminent among them being the late George Averoff, to whom her Navy is indebted for the ironclad, which has played such an historic rôle in the recent war, is almost enough to show that these Vlachs need no longer be distinguished from the Greeks. Their trade of sheep-farmers leads them to trek down south into Greece in the winter in search of pasture lands; and so, even if their love of Greece were not a real one, their material interests would force them to keep up friendly relations with her. The suggestion of the Conference of Ambassadors that the district north of Metsovo, which is largely populated by Vlachs, may be included in Albania is startling, even if it is not so ridiculous as it appears to the writer to be.

When Albanian autonomy was proclaimed, Greece said

that, provided that she obtained the territory which was hers by right, she would be happy to see the Albanians established in a State of their own, as she always favoured racial freedom. Her policy with regard to Northern Epirus shows that the Greeks really believe in their right to the districts which they have occupied. The great enthusiasm which was everywhere shown by the population of Northern Epirus, when they welcomed the Crown Prince of Greece during his recent tour, showed the spirit with which the people are informed. They are fired with the same determination as that which made the Epirots act with such heroism in the Greek War of Independence. Chimarra has not forgotten that she was one of the pillars of the Greek cause in the Revolution, and soon after the war began, under the leadership of Major Spiromilios, a gendarmerie officer (a native-born Chimarriot), she declared her independence from Turkey and annexation to Greece. The following documents illustrate the attitude of the Greeks of Northern Epirus. The first is addressed by the Provisional Government of Albania to the Chimarriots:

Inhabitants of Chimarra, once more we remind you of the friendship which has always united us. Once more we recall your families to your minds. Reflect—the Bulgarians and the Servians and the Montenegrins have signed an armistice with Turkey. At the present moment Austria, Italy, Roumania, and Turkey have acknowledged the Albanian flag and the Kingdom of Albania from Scutari to Tsamouries, from Pristina to Konitsa. Brengo is Albanian. Those who lead you to believe that Spiromilios will remain after the war is ended are deceiving you. He will depart and you will be lost.

Reflect on this. Any one acknowledging our authority will be treasured in future and for ever as a brother, as has been the case in the past.

Inhabitants of Chimarra, reflect once more, for the seven villages of Chimarra must become Albanian, otherwise they will all be destroyed as enemies of our race. You cannot continue to live beside Albania. On the contrary, come and fight beside us against an infidel enemy. We give you three days wherein to make up your minds. Reflect. Life with us, or death with the Greeks,

After that period cannons and Martinis will speak.

As for you, you shall remember this letter.

ESEREM, BEY OF VALONA.

SEFKET GIOLEKAS.

CHIMARRA, *December 12, 1912.*

We have a letter, the one you addressed to the villages of Piliouri and Candessi. We cannot help admiring your logic, for from the very beginning of the letter you speak of enemies of these villages who have destroyed our usages and customs. Who is this enemy of whom you speak? Whether it is Spiromilios, who is a native of this country, or Greece, which has always been its brother, both have the ties not only of language but of religion also. And then you speak of friendship! What is this friendship? Is it the friendship we have shown you at all times and even now when we might have hanged you and refrained from doing so? Is it the friendship we showed during our life as inhabitants of Chimarra, as did the Greeks in Greece where you took refuge and asked for help and protection whenever occasion arose?

You speak of the Ottoman Empire. Where is this empire situated? Is it the empire held by the Bulgarians—Greeks—Servians—Montenegrians at their feet before the gates of Constantinople?

You say that Italy and Austria will set up an Albanian principality: we are awaiting its erection and we shall rejoice at such an event, for even in that case we shall prove ourselves brothers towards that principality, for our noble sentiments are ever the same and will not alter, for we shall not forget that you are brothers who have severed yourselves from us by denying your religion. Is it really necessary to remind the inhabitants of Koutzi that ninety years ago they were still Christians and that they have relatives among the inhabitants of Chimarra? The very name of Giolekas shows the religion to which Sefket Bey's ancestors belonged.

Leave Eserem Bey to busy himself with his own affairs at Avlona. You know how every man has served his country.

As for you, inhabitants of Koutzi, follow the example of those of Burgos and Callesi who have declared their submission to the King of Greece, in writing.

Do not allow yourselves to be deceived by the armistice and other false statements: know only that the Servian army is marching on Berat and that three Greek divisions are marching on Konitsa,<sup>1</sup> which Eserem Bey aspires to make an Albanian town.

As for your threats, I hope they are meant neither for Spiromilios nor for the inhabitants of Chimarra, for even the children of Giolekas know that we are as much used to the Martini and Mauser rifles as they are. It is another who threatens while concealing himself behind Giolekas, but that other has never fought himself, nor have his ancestors.

I give the inhabitants of Koutzi three days to submit. After that

<sup>1</sup> That was the intention, but the bad roads and the heavy snowfall rendered the attempt impracticable.

delay I shall consider myself free from all engagements. As to the advice given from Avlona, let those who send it look to their villages alone, for Korytsa belongs to Chimarra.

The inhabitants of Piliouri and Kanolessi and with them

SPIROMILIOS."

In illustration of Major Spiromilios's reference to Sefket Giolekas's ancestor can be cited the step which was taken so long ago as 1847 by the Albanian Beys to demand the annexation of their country to the Kingdom of Greece. The following is a translation of the petition then made by them to the Greek Government, among the signatures to which will be found that of Tennel Giolekas :

Most illustrious Presidents and Notables of His Majesty Otho, King of Greece, in Athens of the land of Greece, we embrace you fraternally and bring the following to your notice :

We who salute you prostrate ourselves to the earth as we prefer our plaint to you out of the miseries which we, the undersigned *kazas* have suffered, in a dry and rocky country, without any learning but devoted to arms. Since Constantinople fell into the power of the actual sultans we have been subjected to the despots of the country, the viziers, the pashas, the kaimakams, thirty-three sultans. During nearly four hundred years we have shed our blood over all their pothers like people who have neither king nor faith. Our ancient customs have disappeared and new ones have been established which are unbearable in our country, a dozen have been introduced into each *kaza* and the law has been administered with partiality and injustice, not by the love of God and of our Prophet, but by force and oppression and not like the kings of the universe speak. It is for this reason that we have given up our King whom we considered as the representative and father of all the Mussulmans and that we have complained so often as suppliants and in tears ; but we have not gained a hearing. In case the Throne (the King of the Hellenes) should take pity on us unfortunate men, we specially send some of our own folk to confer by word of mouth with your Excellency, if His Majesty of the Throne accepts us as subjects, with the capitulations which he will give to us and we will give to him. For the love of God, have pity on us, creatures of the Almighty, who are born and shall die naked. If there is no pity for us from the Almighty, we shall die by the sword of man, since God so wishes,

We beseech you, we the undersigned *kazas*, Avlona, Delvino, Ménahié, Kouverliessi, Malakastra, Upper and Lower Berat, and Tébelén and Dionisse, five *kazas* in all, beseech your Throne to have

pity on us. If there be no love for us and if God has said that we must die, we do not wish to live any longer on this earth. If the Throne loves us, tell us so that we may form the provinces of our own free will and with guarantees according to the command of the Throne. The bearer will explain to you verbally and you will answer us. Thus be it done and according to the will of God.

Your dear presidents saibis of the five kazas affix our signs manual.

[47 seals of Beys and Agas follow.]

Examine well the above seals and saibis of our country, and we will answer to you with guarantees for your assurance.

The 15th of August, 1847. Kaza of Kourveliessi.

DELVINO SANDJAK [Signed] TENNEL GIOLEKAS, Djelil Aga.

[Forty signatures of Beys and Agas follow.]

AVLONA SANDJAK [Signed] F. BEKIR, Beliss Kanina.

[Eighty signatures follow besides the signatures of the Beys and Agas of the other kazas.]

Moreover, what further proof is needed of the non-Albanian character of the population of Northern Epirus than the wholesale burning and pillaging of their villages by the Albanian bands. Of the one hundred and fifty villages in Epirus which have been destroyed, forty-five lie in the disputed district of Delvino alone. It is unnecessary to allude to the contrast between the gentle, peace-loving nature of the Greeks and the barbarous and unsettled character of the Albanians. All the refinement and culture which the disputed district can show is a direct outcome of Greek civilization. The proposal to make this district Albanian is a negation of the good of civilizing influences and an attempt to throw back into the arms of the only European race who have not yet been civilized thousands of enlightened and industrious people.

A writer in the *Fortnightly Review* (May), who has evidently had great experience of Albania, at the close of an interesting article on its future, says: "The natural and easiest line for the new principality to take is an understanding or alliance with Greece." He supports his views

by saying that the two races are kindred and have a common hatred of the Slav, and that to both of them the Slav peril is an equally great danger. This is very true ; but the only way of establishing amicable relations between Greece and Albania is the avoidance of friction over their boundary. This can only be ensured if Greece is allowed to keep Northern Epirus. The Albanian Provisional Government will show itself possessed of moderate and statesmanlike qualities if it recognizes this fact, and will at the same time, by measuring its present demands, pave the way for a solidification of Albanian interests. Otherwise, if the contrary be attempted, this district will become a seething volcano which, like Crete, will sap the energy of Greece and Albania for years and subject them to a strain which the latter may not be able to stand, and which may ultimately lead to her downfall.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### THE SPIRIT OF HELLENISM

BY "LASCARIS"

#### I

It would be curious to imagine an Oxford don or a French nobleman reduced to serve under a Fiji Islander. Though the captive might be forced to fetch water or carry wood for his master, the superiority of the cultivated man would soon pierce through his trammels. If the educated man cured an illness which the natives had thought mortal till then, or showed them how to produce fire from a piece of glass, his value would be so much enhanced in his master's eyes that it would be thought a pity to waste such powers on menial work which others could do as well, and better. Though in a less degree, something of this kind happened with respect to the Greeks after the fall of Constantinople.

The dominant race was a wild horde, very brave in battle, but of little use in times of peace. The subject race, on the contrary, possessed all the subtlety required for delicate political negotiations. They had spent their lives in poring over books or in the punctilious observances of Court etiquette. It was therefore natural that transactions requiring knowledge and delicacy of treatment should fall to the Greeks. Those Greeks with whom liberty weighed above everything left. But those who were not free to shape their lives according to their inclination, remained there, and it was not long before all the posts calling for knowledge and delicacy of touch were in the hands of the Greeks.



It was difficult to feel sure of a Turk's favour ; for they not infrequently ordered a man to be put to death a moment after having overwhelmed him with favours. On the other hand, men often gained the good graces of an agha or a pasha by a *bon mot* or even a practical joke. It is well known that a man who had been dismissed in disgrace from a Governor's presence appeared before him on the very morrow, without intercessors, by the simple golden key of a bakshish.

The indignant Governor asked the fellow how he had entered the presence after being dismissed. The man promptly replied, "Your Excellency sent me out by the door! I entered by the window!" The Governor merely laughed, and the man was restored to favour. Such manners must have clashed sadly with those of the men who had been educated at the Court of the super-refined porphyrogenitii. But the Greeks were wise enough not to express their disgust at anything. Thus they contrived to maintain their posts by their conciliating manners and outward humility.

Turks have an Oriental love of ostentation, and like to be treated with exaggerated respect. To ingratiate themselves with their masters the Greeks were obliged, therefore, to bow and scrape, for there was no middle course between servile respect and coarse buffoonery.

Undoubtedly the attitude of the Greeks of Constantinople was not calculated to increase their sincerity, for to acquiesce in all that their masters said, and even to carry out instructions which they did not approve of was the only price at which they could retain their posts, or even their heads.

As in the case of the beautiful Greek wife of Ali Pasha, who saved many of her countrymen by her kind intercession, the Greeks no doubt reconciled their insincere conduct to their consciences by the thought of the good they were often able to do their fellow-countrymen. In their hearts the Greeks of Constantinople yearned for liberty and

only awaited an opportunity for shaking off an odious yoke.

Many Greeks had been compelled to embrace Islamism, but, except in the case of very young children, this conversion was merely outward. It is curious that the Greeks of Constantinople are more attached to the orthodox religion and more scrupulous in their observance of its rites than those of Greece proper.

And now comes the crucial point. Even Lord Byron, who fought and died for Greece, was compelled to admit that Greeks were not truthful. It would be interesting to know if his ancestors the Saxons were as straightforward under their Norman conquerors as the freeborn Englishmen of his day. One of the saddest effects of subjection is the checking of men's honesty. When an unfortunate Greek was meditating over plans of emancipation for his country, if a Turk had offered him the proverbial penny for his thoughts, the Greek would have been naïf indeed if he had replied, "I was thinking whether it would be best to attack you first by land or by sea." Though stealing was taught in Sparta, the proverb "All's fair in love and war" has not originated in Greece, and there is little doubt that other nations thus oppressed would have behaved in like manner. Though this may excuse it does not do away with the fact that Greeks are not remarkable for their truthfulness.

The telling of a falsehood by which no one will be injured is seldom thought wrong. If a man were told that he forfeits his self-respect by not speaking the truth he would probably laugh and set down the speaker as an "eccentric foreigner." This is very painful when seen in children. If they play clever tricks the family often laughs and applauds. When a Greek wishes to be believed he often says: "Surely you know I would not tell an untruth on such a day" (it being an important saint's day), or: "I swear to you on my children!" or sometimes they will say: "If I am not speaking the truth may I be struck with blindness," or: "May I kiss my mother in death!" (the mother being alive). It would be interesting

to ascertain the particular oath that may be implicitly relied upon. The strange part is that Greeks are quite as honest in money matters as more truthful people. In fact, their scrupulous accuracy in this respect is sometimes quite surprising, as is also their disinterestedness in cases where least expected. Though Greek servants often pilfer, they never rob wholesale or conspire with burglars. There are unwritten laws by which a Greek would not allow a man whose bread he had eaten to be robbed.

One explanation of this want of truthfulness may perhaps be furnished by the climate of Greece. Men living among such exquisite scenery, and almost able to subsist on nothing, are seldom if ever brought face to face with the hard and repulsive realities of life. They do not like to have these forced upon them, and try to spare others the hearing of painful news or the necessity of dealing with hard facts. As in the case of the ancients, who spoke of the Black Sea as the Εὔξεινος Πόντος (Hospitable Sea), and called the Furies the Eumenides, Greeks are fond of euphemisms. They call vinegar γλυκάδι (sweet), and often speak of a stench as "a perfume." When compelled to be the bearers of evil tidings they always add something to remove the unpleasant impression caused thereby. For instance, no one would announce a death without a preliminary "life to you!" or an illness without the words, "far be it from you!" His Satanic Majesty is talked of as "the away from here"—ὁ ἔξω ἀπ' ἐδῶ.

In every country bluntness is a sign of ill-breeding and suavity is enjoined. But this is particularly the case in Greece, where a refusal is always softened by such words as "Not to-day," or, "We must see if it can be managed." In the same manner that Greeks cannot bring themselves to drown a kitten, and will leave it on the pavement in the hope that some one will take compassion on it, they hope that something may turn up to enable them to grant the favour in question. To refuse point-blank seems to them so brutal that they often recommend men for posts for which they

know the applicant does not possess the necessary qualifications. This is in part accountable, too, for the jobbery, which was the greatest curse of Greece before the days of the present Prime Minister. A man had only to know a Minister or his secretary to be sure of exemption from punishment and often from the payment of taxes. Of course the root of this evil lay far deeper. It was the desire to secure as many votes as possible. To attain this object everything was sacrificed, and though the Prime Ministers of Greece before M. Venizélos were honest in money matters—for they all died poor—yet not one of them was able to appoint the fittest men to the posts best suited to them. Gharilaus Tricoupis was undoubtedly the greatest patriot among her statesmen. He came to power with clean hands and fully determined to steer clear of these ways; but after many years' hard struggle he was compelled to yield also finding it impossible to swim against the tide any longer. Those who know the difficulties with which he had to contend will admire him for having yielded so little to the prevailing custom. Whereas others no sooner came to office than they dismissed men wholesale, simply because the posts were wanted for rewarding their partisans who had helped in the elections; unless a man did something to deserve dismissal, Tricoupis always let him remain in his post, even though knowing him to be his political opponent. By this means there were not enough posts vacant to satisfy his partisans, and they often left him and joined the opposite party for no other cause.

Many years ago Lord Rosebery compared Greece with her narrow boundaries to a ship whose engine was three or four times too large for her size. It was so indeed. To be a political man was the ambition of every Greek, young or old, rich or poor. This ambition has ruined more families in Greece than gambling or betting. Greeks were ever a fickle people, and it takes very little to make them fall from their leader and discover every virtue in the opposite one.

A society was once formed for the prevention of cruelty to animals. This society was unable to do anything, for the deputies knew that the mere suggestion of a penalty for overworking or overloading horses would make them lose every cabman's vote at the next elections. Few candidates would have been bold enough to give their support to such a measure. I had not been long in Greece before I accidentally had an insight into these things. Wherever it was possible Mademoiselle Sophie Tricoupis saved her brother the trouble of interviewing tiresome folk. On one occasion the wife of the Chief of the Police had been soliciting a post for her nephew. Mademoiselle Tricoupis explained that the post was not vacant. She did this gently and kindly, but the lady rose and took leave with tears in her eyes, and it was not long before her husband joined the opposite party. On another occasion a butcher called to complain that he had been fined for selling meat under weight. Mademoiselle Tricoupis replied : " How can we help you since by your own admission the meat was under weight ? " The man rose with great dignity, saying he had expected to find redress, but things being so he had no alternative but to absent himself, with his sons, at the next elections.

Unfortunately such examples might be multiplied *ad infinitum*. And yet these very men who expect everything to give way to their selfish and narrow interests are most devoted patriots, as was proved by the recent war, when they forsook their business in distant countries, often selling for a mere trifle shops and connections which it had cost them years of patient and unremitting labour to establish, only to get the money wanted for returning to their beloved country, for which they were ready to sacrifice their lives. Among other examples may be cited that of four struggling Greeks settled in China, who, scorning the slow route by sea, hurried to Greece by the overland route at an expense altogether out of proportion to their slender means, only that they might reach the battle-field a little earlier !

## II

To a Greek the word "patriotism" does not convey merely the love of his fatherland. In his mind it is so closely allied to Christianity that Greeks may be said to be as much attached to their faith from a national as from a religious standpoint.

In their eyes to alter one particle in the ceremonial, and still more in the creed, of the Eastern Orthodox Church as established by the Byzantine Fathers of the Church would be a sin. They are not a little proud to think that, whereas other religions alter and become divided and sub-divided, their religion alone has subsisted unaltered for ages. Orthodoxy is the same in every part of Greece, and all over the Continent. A Greek looks upon it with an affection easy to understand, since no matter how far from his country, that is the Church in which he was baptized and to which he has always turned for guidance and consolation.

The Greek Church holds this unique position among Churches, that it alone possesses the power of fastening or loosening the marriage knot, for the legality of a marriage does not depend upon the civil portion of it (which is a modern introduction), but upon the sanction of the patriarch or bishop. In all marriages between a member of the Orthodox Church and one who professes another religion permission is only granted by the Greek Church on the understanding that the children arising from the marriage shall be baptized and brought up in the Orthodox Church. Every Greek hopes that when he breathes his last he will receive the holy sacrament from his priest with the same rites that have subsisted unchanged for centuries. This may be why religion seems to have a more active part in a man's life here, and why there are hardly any atheists in Greece.

Although perfectly tolerant of other religions, Greeks cling to their own jealously, and both Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries have had but poor success in Greece.

Though convinced of the correctness of their own religion, Greeks have not the least desire to proselytize, and, indeed, raise difficulties when a convert seeks to enter their ranks, for they hold it every man's duty to live in the faith in which he was born. This, of course, applies to Christians. Mohammedanism they hardly look upon as a religion, but rather as a racial fanaticism and a pretext for brutal outrage in times of war and contemptuous voluptuousness in times of peace; and this is hardly to be wondered at, for while their own religion inculcates gentleness, their experience teaches them that the Mussulmans are cruel and ever ready to break out into massacres and violence of every kind.

The Greek religion, and in a great measure the language too, has been preserved through ages of servitude mostly owing to the efforts of the clergy. They would gather the Greek children around them, teaching them to read and write, and alternating Bible stories with accounts of the heroic deeds of their ancestors. Those simple priests had hardly enough learning to study the Koran. They would probably have been much amazed to hear that it enjoins charity quite as strongly as does the Gospel. Although the priests taught those children the Decalogue, had *they* had the framing of the commandments it is more than likely that they would have placed a commandment somewhat after this fashion at the head of them: "Love thy country and be ready to die for it." To take up arms against the Turks was not merely to fight for their country, but for the Cross as opposed to the Crescent. Even during the Balkan War we have Admiral Countouriotis' exhortation to the Fleet, wherein he speaks of being victorious not merely against the enemy, but against "the enemy of our race." It must be confessed that the Mussulmans did all they could to foster this feeling.

After the conquest of Byzantium many Greeks spread over Europe, thereby benefiting the cause of learning. The Medici library was indebted to Lascaris for his judicious choice of rare manuscripts, and his pupil Musurus, together with

Vlastos and Kalliergis, all three Cretans, set up a printing-press, first in Venice then in Rome, where the works of many of the Greek poets were printed for the first time. It would be too long to enumerate the refugees from Byzantium who filled chairs on the Continent with distinction.

Those who contend that the Greeks of to-day are not descended from the ancient Greeks must be at some pains to account for their similarity of tastes and aptitudes. Besides the love of learning so markedly displayed by many, they also possess remarkable aptitude for commerce, as is evinced by such firms as that of Ralli Brothers, which is known all over the world. Many lived far from their country, but no matter where they were, they all retained a warm and almost passionate love of Greece and an unswerving belief in her regeneration.

One of the finest numismatic collections in the Greek Academy was made by three brothers living in Russia in the eighteenth century. They all three remained unmarried in order to devote their fortune to their dearly loved country. The collection was bequeathed to Greece, "*when she becomes free!*"

There is something very touching in a Greek's love for his country. He will make any sacrifices that a foreigner may bear away a good impression of it. Long before the last war an Austrian from Salonica came to Athens and asked a small boy to be his guide to the spots he wished to visit. At parting the gentleman held out a drachma, which the child refused. Thinking he had offered too little the gentleman produced a 5-drachma piece. Again the child refused. "Then you must tell me what you'd like me to buy for you," said the gentleman. But the boy said he did not want anything. "What is there I can do for you?" asked the gentleman. The small boy replied, "When you return to Salonica, if you hear people talking against the Greeks, say a good word for them!"

During the war of 1897 it became known that the German Emperor was against Greece. The very next morning the



little shoeblacks outside the Grande Bretagne Hotel refused to black the shoes of all Germans, including a secretary of the German Legation, and some barbers refused to shave all Germans.

In his clever skit on modern Greece, Edmond About says Greeks are so fond of money that they will divest themselves of their shoes in the market-place, provided they are offered a good price for them. To make rather than to accumulate money is a characteristic of the Greek, but he never refuses to spend it on a needy member of his family, and often bequeaths the greater portion of his fortune to his native town or island. The leaving of money which cannot be carried out of this world by the testator is, however, less a proof of generosity than the large sums sent during their lifetime for founding hospitals and schools. The army poet Matsoukas, alluded to elsewhere, has the following lines on the subject :

ποιὸς πλούσιος, ἀπέθανε καὶ πῆρε βγιό μαζί του  
παρὰ τρεῖς πήχεις σάβανο ν' ἀντίσῃ τὸ κορμί του;

"What man of wealth has died and taken his riches with him, except the few feet of earth which covers his corpse?"

The handsome contributions from wealthy Greeks abroad in aid of the war and for the society for the relief of soldiers' families, are not so remarkable as the offerings of those of smaller means. Every manager of a company and every merchant and shopkeeper has made it a rule to continue paying his clerk's salary to the members of that clerk's family wherever the clerk has been enrolled. This rule has been adhered to by Greeks out of Greece also. Many generous English firms reversed the prevalent practice with regard to the territorial army, and took this opportunity of indirectly expressing their sympathy with the cause of liberty by following this fine example.

To fight against "the unspeakable Turk" and to free his

fellow-countrymen is so much a part of a Greek's religion that no sacrifices seem too great for this. We are sometimes reminded of the ancient Spartan spirit by the way in which this devotion to their country shows itself, as when a mother was seen at the station a short time ago taking leave of her only son, who was starting for the front. "Go, my son," she said; "remember, you have to avenge the blood of your father, murdered by our Mussulman oppressors. Take no thought of me." Then, pointing to her little grandson whom she held by the hand, she added, "*He* will look after me." During one of the Cretan insurrections a gentleman was surprised at seeing a real rifle in the hands of a tiny boy whom we should hardly think old enough for a large toy gun. He asked if it was safe to entrust the little fellow with a real fire-arm. The mother replied very quietly, "I am here to guide his hand."

As in the Homeric days when they had a bard to encourage them, Matsouka, the Greek improvisatore, after collecting large sums in America for his fellow-countrymen, returned to Greece and followed the army to Macedonia, stirring the men by his patriotic improvisations. While there he knocked at the door of a Turkish house. A voice from inside inquired who had come. Matsouka replied, "Liberty!"

It is said that Socialism cannot make any progress in Greece because men's minds are too intent on delivering their brethren from subjection to feel much interested in social problems, or, indeed, in anything outside this question. A wounded soldier had been transported to the hospital in Athens. There he held forth to a visitor, saying: "Our lads are not like the soldiers of 1897. Since then we have studied ancient history deeply. We know the noble deeds of our ancestors, and we are inspired by seeing all these grand monuments, and we are determined never to lay down our arms till all Greece is free!" These men seem unconsciously to compare themselves to the heroes of the Persian wars and to try and emulate them. The few exceptions to

this universal spirit received short shrift. A short time since a soldier fled from the battle-field and ran back to his native village in the outskirts of Lamia. As soon as the inhabitants caught sight of him they all ran out of their houses and stoned him to death.

Certain qualities appear to be indigenous to the Greek, such as wonderful sobriety and thriftiness in his personal expenses, together with a readiness to help the members of his family. This is neither a matter of emotion nor of individual inclination, but a traditional duty accepted without question or repining. Thus it is common to see brothers remaining unmarried till their sisters are settled in life, and fathers opening their houses to their widowed daughters and the children of these as a matter of course. In this manner the anomalies so often seen elsewhere of one wealthy and several poor relations in the same family are very seldom to be met with here. When a man has prospered in America or elsewhere the first thing he does is to send money home to release the paternal house or land on which money has been borrowed and for which a heavy rate of interest is being paid. The next thing is to send a dowry for his sisters. Then if he does not return he will send money for improving the village school.

Cook's tours are doing their best to destroy individuality everywhere and to make all countries alike, but those who have visited the districts or islands of Greece not overrun with tourists have been surprised at the open-handed hospitality of her inhabitants. In some parts as soon as they see a stranger arriving they will go to the shore, offering to put him up at their house, and even quarrelling over who shall give him hospitality. To offer them money for this would be to offend them mortally; and the strange part is that Greek courtesy will overcome Greek inquisitiveness so far that, unless the stranger offers information, he is never even asked his name. In his book on the Greek Islands Theodore Bent remarks on the annoying pride of their inhabitants, who can never receive a present without imme-

diately offering one on their side. They seem afraid to put themselves under an obligation.

In some parts of Greece the system of *pourboires* is still unknown, and a shop-boy bringing something to the hotel will be mightily offended if offered coppers for his pains. Indeed, one boy put by the proffered money with a lordly gesture, and on the giver insisting he said, almost sobbing, "I can excuse foreigners, but I did not expect this from a Greek!" After paying a week-end visit at a Greek house I have, as a matter of course, handed a *douceur* to the maid. She replied with great dignity, "We don't do such things here!" I felt very small as I returned the money to my pocket. Next time I tried offering a ribbon or a handkerchief, and I had no difficulty.

Whether an inhabitant of city or mountain, the Greek is free from the vice of drink. This may suffice, perhaps, to account for a certain native refinement or absence of brutality which is so remarked not only in their general bearing, but in their countenances. We never see here those low types so frequently to be met with in certain parts of London and in some rural districts, where some men seem little removed from the beasts from which we are said to be descended.

Their superstition in some parts could only be rivalled by ours in the Middle Ages. Though there are not any witches burned in Greece, yet there would not be anything very startling or out of keeping with the spirit of the people in such a proceeding. As late as the year 1909 the province of Phthiotis was overrun with locusts. The Greek Government supplied petroleum gratis to the peasants for burning the young locusts before they could fly. The peasants refused to go to town to fetch it, and when we paid them for carrying it to the fields which they were cultivating on share with us they refused to help in the burning of the locusts, saying it was a waste of time, for as soon as the locusts were big enough to fly all we had to do was to get the village priest to go into the fields, preceded by some

one carrying the Virgin's image, and at the end of the liturgy the locusts would all fly to the sea and be drowned. And when this was done and the locusts remained, the faith of the peasants in their remedy was in nowise shaken. Some said we had not sent for the right image, others said it was not a proper liturgy, since all had not put on their Sunday clothes before following the priest. And so the tobacco was all eaten by the locusts and the whole province was ruined !

In many cases the saints have replaced the gods of mythology. St. Nicholas is the patron saint of seamen and holds very much the same position as Neptune. A sea captain had the image of St. Nicholas in his sailing-boat and burned a little lamp before it on ordinary occasions. However, when the wind was unfavourable this lamp was not lighted, and if a contrary wind persisted the image of the saint was turned with its face to the wall. In times of public calamity or private illness tapers were lighted and services performed in honour of the particular saint whose province it is to deal with the illness or calamity from which they are suffering. So deep-rooted are these beliefs that in the old days of brigands, when sharing their booty the brigands would lay aside the portion of their patron saint.

Thus it will be seen that both in good and bad qualities the Greeks differ from most Europeans of our days.

The very tenacity with which they have preserved many of the customs and superstitions of their ancestors is a proof, if any were needed, that, in spite of much intermarriage and blending with foreigners, they are descended from the Greeks of yore.

## CHAPTER XIX

### THE FUTURE OF GREATER GREECE

ONE result of the war has been to make the position of Greece secure as a nation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Hitherto it may be said that Greece depended for her existence upon the goodwill of the Great Powers; now she is, if not actually, at any rate potentially herself a Power to be reckoned with. Her newly acquired territories are very nearly as extensive as those which she had before the war, but what is more important than mere extent is their nature. The whole of the Greece of last year, with the exception of some of the upper parts of Thessaly, was a Southern country; its climatic conditions were such that none of the characteristics of the more Northern races of Europe could be encouraged and fostered. The *dolce far niente* of the Southerner seemed inseparable from the Southern Greek so long as he remained in his native land. The acquisition of a large part of Macedonia and Epirus will introduce into the Greek nation a population who, by their habits and temperament, can be differentiated from the Greeks of Old Greece as a more active and energetic community. Of the islands, Crete has a unique climate and its natives are perhaps the only people who combine the grace of the Southerner with the energy of the Northerner. Numbers of Cretans, headed by the Prime Minister, have been appointed to important administrative and other posts in the country, and by their hard work and energy have already begun to infuse a more methodical and business-like system into public and official life.

In the future there will be two influences working on the Greeks, making them more efficient in everything except commerce, for which their ability has always been recognized as pre-eminent. The first influence will be the competition of the Cretan and the Greek from the new Northern districts the second will be the effect on them of the climate of Macedonia and Epirus. The Thessalians, at any rate the natives of Mount Pelion, with whom the writer is specially acquainted and from one of whom he is descended, for the last hundred years, at all events, have shown themselves to be a much more vigorous and energetic people than the Greeks of more Southern Greece ; curiously enough, they have exhibited commercial ability as well as aptitude for sport and physical pursuits.

The Greek when he migrates into foreign countries, especially England and America, develops in a very short time qualities which he conspicuously lacked as long as he remained in Greece. The chief of these qualities are physical energy and resource, or common sense. Remarkable opportunities were afforded in the recent war of observing and comparing Greeks from America with indigenous Greeks. Most of the former had only been in America ten or fifteen years, and yet they had all assimilated the strenuous attitude towards life of the American. It is true that the Greeks who go to America are in many cases naturally the most enterprising, otherwise they would not leave their country and seek their fortunes in a distant land. Nevertheless, among those who did emigrate to America there were a great many whose business did not prosper or who had failed to get on in Greece. Nothing but praise has been showered upon the American Greek soldiers during the war ; they were practically all in infantry regiments, and they showed themselves admirable types of infantrymen. They were the most disciplined and cheerful, and managed to make the best of difficulties during the campaign ; it was said that whenever there was an American Greek in a section it was he who would cook the dinners and manage to devise

little arrangements for comfort which the others would never have thought of or else did not trouble to try and get. To take an example from a more limited class, the sons of Greeks who have had an English Public School education and others who have come in contact with the higher class of English Civil servants and officers in Egypt, have frequently acquired the more solid outlook on life which is the heritage of the Northerner. Just as in England the north-countrymen, the Yorkshireman and the Lancastrian, have taken the lead not only in manufacture and commerce but also in the administrative and judicial walks of life, so it is in the ordinary course of things that the Macedonians and Epirots, as well as the Cretans, should take the lead in Greece. It is possible that the Greeks, who may find no place in the future in Southern Greece owing to the competition introduced by the appearance of the new element from Greater Greece, may try and find a sphere for their activities in the Macedonian or other new Hellenic territories. In their new homes they will come under the second of the influences mentioned above, and so be hardened and braced by living in a more rigorous climate.

These influences must be helped by the conscious efforts of the Greeks themselves. The Greek must make up his mind to become a disciplined man; the slipshod and casual ways, which did not perhaps greatly matter in a small country such as Greece was, would hinder the progress of Greater Greece. That the Greek with proper training is amenable to discipline has been shown by the remarkable results achieved by the French and British Missions in the Army and Navy respectively. The start which has been made with the Army and Navy must be followed up in every branch of life. That it is good education in the broadest sense that the Greek needs, and that it is the lack of this which is at the root of any indifferent qualities which he has, would seem to be also shown by the results obtained in Greeks who are educated in England and America.

Throughout the Dark Ages, which in Greece can be said



to have lasted until the end of the eighteenth century, the Greeks kept their love of learning alive by means of their schools. So convinced were they of the benefits of learning (*γράμματα*) that they used to ask schoolmasters to inflict corporal punishment on their children if they did not work hard at their lessons. A father accompanying his son to school for the first time would say to the schoolmaster, "I bring you flesh and expect you to return me bones." The children themselves were admonished by such proverbs as, "A man without learning is an unhewn block of wood," and lectured on the necessity of proving that they were unlike "those despicable Turks," since they were the descendants of writers to whom all Europe bows in admiration. Although it is undeniable that they acquired a certain amount of solid knowledge, the boys, other than those who had a particular love of learning, crammed that they might the sooner pass their exams. and say good-bye to their books. After their course of education came to an end, those who did not become priests or professors went into business, commerce being looked upon as an aristocratic profession, or became doctors or lawyers. No matter what the profession chosen, they all loved politics passionately, and to discuss these at full length they met at the cafés. Many men who might have done good work ran to seed in this manner. One of the results was that Greece had a few professors and bishops of great learning, able to tell the date of every battle and the number of lines in every canto, as well as the derivation of every word, but few or no writers either of originality or of a broad outlook. It never occurred to those who planned this system that a regime of unrelieved cramming was the most effective way to crush a child's imagination and make him take a dislike to his books.

The modern Greek system of education, which is a development of this old education, is purely directed to the intellect and yet is not exactly intellectual in the highest sense. The schools are now actually modelled mostly on the German schools, but they do not base their teaching on

the German standpoint in which Welt-Anschauung plays such a prominent part. The Greek method of teaching being a narrow one, the boys are stuffed with facts and figures, the connection of which with one another or with life generally is not taught them. Probably an even more fundamental fault of Greek education, both at home and at school, is its failure to teach boys to be trustworthy and self-reliant. A system of supervision, which no high spirits can survive, is responsible for this. The wisest men in England have judged it best to place absolute trust in the honour of their pupils. Greek educationalists have gone to the opposite extreme and have relied on their own vigilance instead, not seeing that it tended to encourage a lack of frankness. The encouragement given by Greek parents to their children to foster what they call their *φιλότιμον* (something between ambition and self-respect) tends to develop selfishness and mental vanity. The introduction of the study of Plato's "Republic" from a broad standpoint would help to correct this. The attitude of the Greek man towards marriage, which encourages the sale of his manhood for an adequate dowry, is probably due in great part to the lack of self-reliance for which his education is answerable.

One hears a great deal said in Greece, especially by British visitors and residents, about the over-education of the Greek. This criticism gives a false impression, for those responsible for it use the word "education" in the narrow sense of learning. What they mean is that too many arts and sciences and languages are taught to people whom such knowledge unfits for their own lives. In other words, they are only disapproving of what is a ground of complaint now at home, but which they find more prevalent in Greece than they do at home. The attitude of the cook's daughter who would in the ordinary course become a housemaid, but whose accomplishments, such as reading French novels and playing the "Eternal waltz" on the piano, make her think that domestic service would lower her socially, is almost universal among the Greek lower classes. It is still more

noticeable among the men than among the women in Greece. Every Greek, unless he be a Government servant of some kind, or unless he be employed in some commercial business where a prospect of rapid advancement appears to be before him, frets until he can himself be an employer of labour. They all want to be masters. Even those who have themselves known the happiness of agricultural life wish to see their sons engaged in something, as they say, better than agriculture. It is an axiom that one cannot be a good master unless one knows how to be a good servant. Scarcely any of the Greeks know how to be good masters because they have never learnt the meaning of being good servants. However, they are beginning to realize this themselves. Thus the writer was much interested in being told by an hotel waiter, a man of more than ordinary intelligence, but one who had never left his country, that he had never had a chance of learning to become respectful to the hotel guests. "Our superiors," he said, "do not know how to treat us; they shout at us and abuse us before satisfying themselves that we have done anything wrong, and so how is it possible for us to respect them?" The writer's own observation fully bears out the waiter's statement; his experiences with Piræus boatmen illustrate it. These boatmen are generally looked upon as a thieving gang of dishonest rascals. A boatman will, for instance, ask three drachmas for landing travellers from their steamer to the quay when the most he should get is 1.50. The average Greek begins to abuse the boatman, calls him a thief, and finally, in order to be rid of him, will pay him two drachmas under protest. This encourages the boatman to go on trying to extort more than proper payment out of his customers, on the principle that the more you ask the more you will get. The writer on one occasion was landed by a young boatman from a steamer which was not more than sixty to eighty yards away from the quay, the boatman subsequently carrying his bag to the station, about one-third of a mile away. He offered the boatman two drachmas. The latter said, "That is the fare for the boat, and I want

something for carrying the bag." The writer pointed out that one drachma was intended as the fare for the boat and the other drachma for carrying the bag. The boatman still demurred to the boat fare, so the writer asked him whether he really considered one drachma insufficient payment for landing him from so short a distance away, as nothing was further from his mind than to underpay him. The boatman thereupon turned away with a sickly look upon his face and the two francs in his pocket. Angry abuse means nothing in Greece, but in cases like this it confuses the moral issues and does not allow the recipients of it to learn frank and honest ways.

The lack of games is a great failing in Greek schools; the stolid German can perhaps thrive on a regime of "all work and no play," but the Greek, with his lighter and quicker intelligence, needs recreation in order to prevent staleness. The Greek boy has a love of games akin to that of the English boy; a great aptitude for them too. A sight of Athens schoolboys playing about with a football on the open space inside Hadrian's Arch is enough to show this. Any additional proof required can be obtained from the success of Anglo-Greek boys in games at our Public Schools. A very high proportion of those among them who are of Greek (*not* Levantine) origin have shown proficiency at football and even cricket, which requires special coaching.

Much has been said of late about the ineffectiveness at the present time of the British Public-School system, which was at its prime in the days of Arnold's Rugby. Before that time it is questionable how great a part the Public School played in making England's great pioneers. Since the days of Arnold the rough and tumble has decreased, but the quality of unselfishness and the importance of working, whether in games or in other things, for the benefit of the whole and not the individual is taught as well as ever. The intellectual education of the Public School may not in many cases effect the desired result, and

it is over this that the controversy is raging at the present time. Of the physical and moral education there can be no two opinions; it is the physical and moral education of the Public School that the Greek needs. This can be introduced into Greece by only a small alteration of the existing scheme of intellectual education which will enhance rather than detract from its effectiveness. Perhaps the most urgent need to which future public benefactors, in which Greece has proved so fortunate hitherto, can direct their attention is the establishment of public boarding-schools for the better classes. The late Mr. Marino Corgialeagno, of London, though he himself only came to England when he was grown up, saw enough of Public-School men (among them Anglo-Greeks) to understand what an important part the Public-School system can play in forming men of judgment. He left a sum of money for the foundation of a school on the lines of Eton, for which he expressed the wish that the Greek Government would provide the site. He, however, had so many schemes and visions for the advancement of Greece, some of which he adopted, as he himself said, from his friend, the late distinguished poet and man of letters, Mr. Demetrius Bikelas, that the sum which he was able to provide for the endowment of a Public School was scarcely large enough to establish a school of the dimensions which are indispensable for its success. It is to be hoped, therefore, that others will contribute to the scheme, so that the endowment of this school, when it is established, may be worthy of the task which it will have to fulfil.

Boy Scouts are an institution of much more recent growth than our Public Schools, but a start has already been made in Greece with a society of "Scout Boys," as they are called. The members were originally recruited from boys of the better families in Athens between the ages of twelve and eighteen. They go out for excursions and camp out in tents in the same way as our own Scouts, but the conditions are somewhat different, as they have hitherto been drawn from a different class to that from which they are drawn here.

The general aims and purposes for which the society was formed are almost identical with those at home. It may be said, however, that the Greek "*Scout Boys*" are so far a sort of officers' training corps for boys who will in the future be able to teach the boys of the lower classes the Scout Law. The Greek Scout Law, which is practically a replica of our own, is almost ideal for educating the Greek. The rules should be written up as texts in every Greek house in which there are growing boys, especially Nos. 5, 6, 11, and 12, which are worth quoting. They are as follows :

*Rule 5.*—The Scout Boy must be polite to everybody, and especially women, children, and the aged and sick, and he must never be paid for anything that he does.

*Rule 6.*—The Scout Boy must be kind to all animals.

*Rule 11.*—The Scout Boy must be high-minded. He must never think of his personal ends when the interests of others are at stake, and he must always get things done not by begging but by character.

*Rule 12.*—The Scout Boy must be cleanly ; that is, his body and his attire must correspond to his inner moral development.

The war has given splendid opportunities for Scout Boys to put the rules into practice. They were employed as messengers by almost all the public institutions to replace men who had been called to the front. Ministers had them attached to their offices and entrusted them with the carrying of important dispatches, and they were also given other tasks involving considerable responsibility, such as the distribution of money and the collection of parcels from the Customs. They called forth universal praise for the way in which they carried out the work that was given them. The business-like, manly, energetic, and quiet way in which they went about their business strikes a contrast with the methods of other Athens people. Their personal neatness and the pride of their bearing is also distinguishable. Perhaps not unnaturally, this is visible not only when they are in their Scout Boy kit, but also when they are in civilian clothes.





BOY SCOUTS.



COMMANDER CARDALE, R.N., DRILLING A NAVAL DETACHMENT.

To face p. 265.



The fact is that the Scout Boys, even if they are only young boys of fourteen and fifteen, are more manly than a good many of their grown-up fellow-citizens. In the important army manœuvres which took place in the summer of 1912 the Scout Boys took part, and in the great march past they were given the position of honour following the band. They, the Evzoni, and the Naval Brigade received the greatest applause from the crowd on that occasion, and they were greeted with cries of "Long live our future Army!" It is to be hoped that the boys from families of good position who have now learned the benefits to be derived from joining the Society will help to organize local branches all over Greece, at any rate in the districts of the towns, such as Salonica, Serres, Larissa, Volo, Kosane, Janina, Patras, Sparta, Canea, Corfu, Chios, etc., and so prepare the boys of the country for playing their part like men in the face of the stern realities of life, and incidentally to make them good soldiers and sailors. If the movement meets with support and spreads throughout Greece, the townsmen of the new generation will have the manly qualities and steadfast characters of the Evzoni in addition to greater intelligence.

If Greece is to make quick progress and exploit her opportunities to the best advantage, education in the highest sense must be an object of her most pressing attention. In saying this the writer feels that he is liable to offend many who have played no small part in keeping the flag of learning aloft among the Greek subjects of Turkey in a way that perhaps has never been equalled by any race which remained subjected to alien rule. It is hoped, however, the reader will perceive that the observations contained in this chapter as to the need of better education in Greater Greece are not in any way intended to belittle the work done by those workers in the cause, and are directed to quite a different aspect of the problem, namely, that of educating men who are to do for modern Greece what Lycurgus and Pericles did for ancient Greece and what Raleigh and Bacon did for England.

It is the introduction of physical and moral education in the widest sense which is advocated, and which, it is submitted, would quickly develop sides of the Greek character which have hitherto not been prominent except under conditions of training and life not usually found in Greece. It is true that in some of the more modern scholastic institutions, and also some of the older ones in which the teaching of new subjects has been introduced recently, a great improvement is noticeable. In these rather a curious contrast is to be found between the modern and the old school of teaching. Thus Mlle. Vanuxaki, the directress of the Arsakion, the enormous girls' school at Athens which contains some two thousand pupils, has instituted physical training on the Swedish lines, and also the teaching of many subjects, such as modern languages and drawing, in such a way as to encourage the pupil's own interest in the subject and give her free scope for using her own imagination and common sense. At the same time the ancient Greek authors and other old subjects are taught in the crabbed and cramping method by which the master tries to drive his own knowledge into his pupils' brains, and does not allow them to form their own ideas or, in fact, to have any conception about an author like Euripides except in the ideas, and even in the actual words, of their master. A comparison between these two methods of teaching in several lessons in the same institution in one morning convinced the writer of the need for wider reform in the Greek scholastic system.

To turn to the more material side, the two branches of industry to which Greece will have to give her attention in the near future are agriculture and manufacture. A whole chapter is devoted to the treatment of the former, as it is impossible to deal with the various questions connected with it intelligibly in a few lines. Manufacture is still at a very elementary stage in Greece. The chief industrial centre is the Piræus, but unfortunately capital has not yet begun to flow into its manufacturing concerns ; one reason is possibly that although

it is almost within a stone's-throw of Athens, it is as much separated from it as Glasgow is from Edinburgh. Thus the great bank managers and capitalists who live in Athens are not in touch with the young and energetic pioneers who are struggling to create great industries. Almost all the existing factories are the property of private partnerships. Most of the men who are at the head of them have worked up their own way in the world, and many of them having studied the technical problems of their particular branch of industry in England, and having seen the great cotton factories of Manchester and the great engineering shops of Birmingham and Sheffield, realize that unless capitalists interest themselves and give an impetus to their undertakings it will be many years before these can take an important place among the economic forces of the country.

Mining prospects should be very bright, though hitherto lack of capital and want of enterprise have retarded to an unexpected degree the development and exploitation of the mineral wealth, of which in her new territories Greece will have a large accession. The mountains of Epirus and Macedonia contain a great variety of valuable ores, which in some parts show through bare precipitous rocks, and the island of Thasos is believed to be a storehouse of copper ore. If these mines are to be developed to any practical extent large amounts of foreign capital will be needed, and the Greek Government must bring the attractions of Macedonia forcibly before capitalists in our country if it is to succeed in inducing them to turn their attention to Greek undertakings. Advertising is still comparatively unknown in Greece, and scientific advertising is an indispensable step towards diverting capital in the required direction in these competitive times. Probably large land development companies, conducted on the lines of the British South Africa Company, will be the best means of assuring speedy progress, especially in a sparsely populated and almost virgin country like Macedonia. The production of iron ore and other metals will naturally lead to the encouragement of manufactures on a large scale, and it is

possible that new and large manufacturing centres may be established at Veria, Serfidje, or the mouth of the Aliakmon. The scarcity of artisan labour in Greece, which has also contributed in some degree to the slow progress in the industrial development of the country, will be much less prominent under the new conditions. Though Macedonia and Epirus are thinly populated, the large numbers of Greek and Mussulman refugees who have deserted their old homes in Bulgarian territory will form an element of some importance which will help to solve the question of artisan no less than that of agricultural labour. It is possible that these numbers will be largely increased by Greek refugees from old Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia who may think it worth their while to change their homes now that prospects in Greece are so much brighter than hitherto. To what extent the Piræus will in the future be outstripped by the manufacturing centres of Macedonia it is not possible to foretell, but it is likely that it will harbour a greater variety of manufactures and be responsible for a larger total output than any other town in Greece, in the same way that London in these respects still keeps ahead of the great northern industrial towns.

Just as the Piræus misses the co-operation of its Athenian neighbours, so Athens, though she perhaps does not realize it, misses the influence of the citizens of the Piræus. Any one who goes to Athens with his mind full of the ideal of a revival of its ancient glories will probably feel a curious shock at the contrast between what is left of the ancient city, such as the Akropolis, and the buildings of the modern town. The ancient structures, though ruins, convey, in addition to the consummate culture of their architects, a force of vitality which proves that they are the products of a race in the fullness of its vigour. The modern buildings, on the other hand, with the exception of a few in University Street and some mansions along the Kephissia Road, lack dignity and artistic design. It is not, of course, fair to compare these buildings with the Parthenon, which is perhaps the

greatest building in the world, but a comparison of Athens houses with the houses of a town like Syra shows that the former do not suffer merely by comparison with the Parthenon. The houses at Syra present the idea of solid comfort, whereas Athens houses look characterless in comparison with them. The population of Athens consists of the following: the Royal Family, without an aristocracy to support it and build it up on a solid edifice; officers of both branches of the Service and their families; Government officials, including members of Parliament, University professors, school teachers, professional men, such as lawyers, doctors, etc., bankers, employees of business houses, tradesmen, and a very large proportion of people of private means, most of whom are retired members of the Services and professions and Government offices. Besides these there are, of course, the foreign diplomatic and consular representatives, members of the foreign archæological schools and foreign missions, and a certain number of foreign residents. Athens society lacks the vigorous personalities of great entrepreneurs and industrial leaders, and one feels a certain stagnation and lack of colour and interest in the life of the place. The mental attitude of all classes whom one meets in society produces an impression akin to that which is experienced in a town like Cheltenham. Art flourishes by the side of industry. In Athens there is no stimulus to the creation of an artistic atmosphere; there is nothing to stir the imagination of the artist except the antiquities and the scenery, which is dominated by the sky and the Parthenon. A Dickens and a Turgenieff would starve for want of mental food. The joining of Athens and the Piræus might perhaps create a city in the true sense. The reaction of the citizens of the Piræus and the citizens of Athens upon one another might bring into existence what is wanting in both. This could easily happen if Athens and the Piræus spread towards one another, a tendency which would be greatly encouraged by judicious draining of the intervening land and the more hygienic surroundings which would thereby be obtained.

The writers, painters, poets, and composers of Athens could then draw their experiences from the more vital life of the Piræus, which would itself be enriched by an intimate association with Athens.

So much for the artistic side of Athens. Other indications as to her future are very favourable. She is a most up-to-date city, with good hotels, clubs, and electric trams. Her streets are clean and well paved, mostly with asphalt. This greatly mitigates the ground of Mr. Gladstone's complaint when he said that "his throat was irritated by Attic dust." The present scarcity of water prevents a complete laying of this dust, but it is hoped that within a very short time this failing will be remedied. There are two schemes for a water supply, one from the River Melas, in Northern Bœotia, and the other from Lake Stymphalia. Either of these alternative schemes, the cost of which is estimated at about £2,000,000, would provide Athens with a plentiful supply. Abundance of water would greatly further the increase of vegetation in the neighbourhood of Athens, which is at present too bare and parched. The planting of the city squares with grass would also become possible without great expense being incurred.

The joining of Athens by a direct railway route through Larissa, Papapuli, Aikaterine, with Salonica and with Belgrade, Budapest, and Vienna should make it possible for travellers from England to arrive within three days. The shortening of the sea passage between Brindisi and Patras by the institution of a direct line of fast steamers would allow of the journey from London to Athens being completed in as short a time by that route, but there is a large class of travellers who shun the sea and yet do not mind luxurious railway travelling. These have hitherto confined their wanderings to Italy and Central Europe, but may in the future be attracted to Greece, as their favourite means of locomotion will be at their disposal. Also many travellers to Egypt who dislike a long sea voyage may take the opportunity of going through Athens, and even some passengers

to India and Australia may avail themselves of the occasion to visit Greece, either going or returning, by joining or leaving their steamer at Alexandria or Port Said. A fast service of steamers between the Piræus, and Alexandria, running in connection with the Vienna-Belgrade-Athens Railway, might effect a saving of twenty-four hours in the journey from London to Alexandria, and in that case this route would almost certainly be used for the Indian mail. The length of line which must be constructed before the existing Greek railway can be linked up with the Macedonian Railway to Salonica does not exceed sixty miles. It is a comparatively simple undertaking involving no difficult engineering work. Papapuli, the present northernmost point of the Greek Railway, lies at the entrance to the historic Vale of Tempe. From there the railway will pass round the eastern slopes of Lower Olympus and between Mount Olympus itself and the sea, and will then go north along the narrow stretch of plain which lies between the mountainous tract of country over which the Greek army marched to Salonica and the Saronic Gulf. It will then, after crossing the River Aliakmon, join the Monastir-Salonica Railway at a point between Gida and Plati, so as to make use of the existing railway bridges over the rivers Karasmak and Vardar, and to the east of the Vardar a loop will connect it with the Salonica-Uskub-Belgrade line. The traveller to Greece will, after crossing the Aliakmon, enjoy the most glorious scenery of mountain on his right and sea on his left, the whole dominated by Mount Olympus, until he reaches the old Greek frontier. It will be remembered that Greece has for several years wished this railway to be completed, but that the Porte for military reasons stipulated that the line should pass inland, so that the cost would have been nearly quadrupled. There seems little doubt, therefore, that the Papapuli-Gida line will be the first work of railway construction which the Greek Government will carry out, but there are several lines which, if events allow, will be undertaken within the next few years. Among the earliest will probably be a continuation of the

narrow-gauge Missolonghi-Agrinion Railway to Arta, and from there to Janina, with a loop running from the intermediate station of Philippias to Preveza. From Janina a line of the same gauge will probably be carried to Metsovo, and from Metsovo to Grevenna. The existing narrow-gauge railway from Volo to Trikkala and Kalabaka will probably also be extended northward to Grevenna and from there through Kosane to Sorowitz, which is a station on the Monastir-Salonica Railway. There would thus be a complete circuit of narrow gauge railways through Thessaly and round via Grevenna to Epirus, and direct communication between Monastir and Thessaly. The lines between Kalabaka and Grevenna and Grevenna-Metsovo-Janina will present considerable engineering difficulties. The building of a direct line between Metsovo and Kalabaka would be too expensive to be justifiable, at any rate at present. It is possible also that a connecting line to Kosane might be carried south through Serfidje, past Ellassona, along the valley of the Xerias to Larissa, but the construction of this line, too, involves a very large outlay which would not appear to be justified by the present requirements of the country. The timber of Mount Olympus and its district will be transported either by sea or by the Coast Railway, and the district to the west of this which surrounds Serfidje and Ellassona is scarcely productive enough to make such a through railway necessary. It is quite likely, however, that the Athens-Larissa Railway will be extended as far as Ellassona through the Xerias Valley, which is practically level as far as the plain of Damasi.

The new railways which are outlined here are those which a cautious and economical policy would admit as practically essential, but they are far from making up a complete scheme of Greek railways for the future. Hitherto the tourist traffic has been worth £400,000 a year to the country, but Greece will now potentially be just as attractive a tourist resort as Switzerland, the Tyrol, or Italy, without taking into consideration its antiquities which other mountainous countries







SALONICA HARBOUR IN THE EVENING



SERVIDJE.

do not possess. Tourist traffic is worth £12,000,000 a year to Switzerland, and this figure gives some idea of the possibilities which lie before Greece if she takes measures to provide the accommodation and facilities which tourists require. The engineering feats which will be involved in making a railway direct from Monastir to Larissa will be child's play compared to the feats of construction of the great railways through Switzerland.

It is possible that the railway from Papapuli to Plati will be completed and ready for passenger traffic before the spring of 1915, but the other new railways will scarcely be ready within less than four or five years. In the meantime the existing roads might well be used for motor traffic. A motor-car service has already been established along the chief routes of Epirus between Santi Quaranta, Janina, and Preveza, and a great deal could be done during the next few years in popularizing Macedonia and Epirus by a systematic scheme of motor-car tours. Olympus's eastern slopes, Kosane, Janina, and Vodená, are all places at which recreation of mind and body requires no artificial aid beyond clean and comfortable lodgings. Olympus has its forests, not to mention its gods, Vodená its cascades, Kosane its exquisite site where mountain and plain join, and Janina its silvery lake, and there are many other spots in new Hellas which have charms little, if any, less alluring. One well-known literary man has suggested the founding of a literary monastery on Mount Olympus. This mountain has remained unexplored and almost unknown since classical times. Perhaps it is "the gods," as a distinguished Macedonian friend suggested to the writer, who "have kept it so in order that they might restore it to its rightful owners, the Greeks, in its virgin state." However that may be, such a house of learning as is proposed, which would welcome men of letters from all over the world, would help worthily to keep up the ancient traditions of Greek mythology.

## CHAPTER XX

### THE FUTURE OF GREATER GREECE (*continued*)

#### *Agriculture.*

THE idea of the many that Greece, within the limits to which it has been confined, consists almost entirely of mountains, intersected by dried-up and arid plains, and that agriculture cannot be an important factor of her life, is far removed from the truth. On the contrary, there are few countries that possess such a variety of soil and climate as she does, consequently every branch of agricultural industry can be successfully practised in her territory.

For the present purpose agricultural land in old Greece may be conveniently classified under three large sections as follows :

1. Thessaly, Acarnania, Pthiotis, and the north of Bœotia.
2. South Bœotia, Attica, and the Peloponnesus.
3. The islands of the Ægean and Ionian Archipelagos.

1. *Thessaly* possesses the most fertile soil in Greece ; her principal products are cereals, cotton, and tobacco ; in some districts there are fine pasture lands where live-stock rearing and some cheese industry are carried on. Mount Pelion has extensive olive groves and some vineyards ; it is also the principal orchard of Greece, as cherries, apples, pears, peaches, and all kinds of fruit of excellent quality thrive on its slopes in great profusion.

*Acarnania* is principally a mountainous district with some fine oak forests, but its valleys contain arable and pasture lands, whose chief products are a few cereals, tobacco, cattle, and sheep. Unfortunately the fertile plain near Lessini has

been flooded by the River Acheloos and is now but a marsh.

*Pthiotis and the north of Bæotia* greatly resemble Thessaly on a smaller scale, both in the nature of their soil and in their products. On the slopes of Mount Parnassus some of the best cheese in Greece is produced, and there is excellent grazing. Vines and olive-trees also cover a considerable portion of these slopes.

2. The greater part of *Attica* and *Southern Bæotia* is planted with vines and olive-trees; cereals are produced on a small scale, and but little live stock is reared. However, the southern slopes of Mount Hymettus and the adjoining fields produce a small quantity of what is probably the most delicious honey in the world, which has been renowned from ancient times under the name of Hymettus honey. The soil of Attica round Athens is somewhat arid and stony, owing probably to the lack of trees; scientific afforestation would in the course of time restore it to its former fertility. Steps are now being taken to develop the honey industry on a larger scale.

The *Peloponnesus* is the principal vine-growing district of Greece, the greater part of it being covered with currant vines, of which the Corinthian is the finest. Unfortunately, the whole of this district has suffered much from over-production, which led to the currant crisis and consequent emigration described below, and we now find large tracts of land uncultivated owing to the shortage of labour. Cereals, cotton, and tobacco are grown on a small scale, and the inhabitants are now seriously applying themselves to the increase of the cultivation of cotton and to live-stock breeding.

In certain parts of this district are the finest olive groves in Greece, which produce oil of excellent quality and olives for table use.

3. Both the Ionian and the *Ægean Islands* grow vines, olive, and fruit-trees, especially oranges and lemons, in great profusion; these last form the chief produce of the smaller islands.

The total cultivated area of old Greece is about 13,136,300 acres, of which in an average year about 5,136,300 acres are productive, made up as follows:

	Acres.					
Cereals ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	1,112,000
Fallow land ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	1,200,000
Forests ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	2,025,000
Currant vines ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	665,300
Grape vines... ..	...	...	...	...	...	300,000
Olive-trees ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	250,000
Tobacco ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	40,000
Cotton ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	19,000
Figs, mulberry, orange, lemon, and other fruit-trees and vegetable gardens ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	125,000
Total ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	5,136,300

Pastures occupy 5,000,000 acres and fallow land 3,000,000.

It is to be noticed that olive-trees and vines are grown in all the districts described above. Both are mostly found on the slopes of mountains, the hill-sides, and on the sea-shore. The cereals cultivated are principally wheat, barley, oats, rye, maize, maslin, beans, lentils, and sesame.

There are in Greece about 100,000 horses, 360,000 head of cattle, and nearly 3,000,000 sheep. The breed of all this live stock is very inferior, and there is much need of the importation of good stock in order that the native breeds may be gradually improved.

There are still wild tracts of undrained marsh lands in Greece, which harbour anophiles mosquitoes: these insects cause the malarial fever which is so prevalent, and which is answerable for much mortality in the country. The reclamation of these marshes, as has been done by an English company in the case of Lake Copais, would not only decrease the death rate, but greatly increase the area of fertile land.

**LAND TENURE.**—There are in Greece four classes of proprietors of land: (*a*) great landowners, (*b*) peasant proprietors, (*c*) monasteries, and (*d*) the Government.

(*a*) *The Great Landowners* are proprietors of one or more villages with the adjoining land. The peasants cultivate the fields, often with teams belonging to the landlords, to

whom at harvest-time they have to give one-half, or in some districts a third, of the produce. Most of these large estates are in Thessaly, Bœotia, and Acarnania. In passing through these provinces it is easy to pick out the villages which belong to the great landowners, for most of them are in a deplorable condition: the cottages are mere mud huts; the peasants, who are poor and generally in debt, are in a state of such apathy that they do not even try to better their condition. The area of these large estates varies from 2,000 to 15,000 acres.

(b) *Peasant Proprietors* are those who own from 25 to 150 acres apiece. Many of the small townships and villages are inhabited by this class; each owner has a cottage and land which may be vineyards, olive groves, or arable fields, and which he cultivates to the best of his ability. In many cases he also rents fields, and is considered to be a hard worker, prepared to adopt any proposals which will improve his land. The small owner is to be found all over Greece and in the Peloponnesus and the Ægean Islands, almost to the exclusion of any other.

(c) The land owned by the *Monasteries* is farmed by the monks, and where they are numerous it is well cultivated. On the other hand, many fine estates which are the property of monasteries where the monks are too few to work them are sadly neglected.

(d) *The Government Lands* are mostly uncultivated, and consist chiefly of forests, marshes, and mountain pastures. Besides these, estates have been given or left by wealthy patriots to the Government, which has distributed them amongst the rural population.

The methods of cultivation practised in Greece are still somewhat primitive; in fact, one may still see peasants tilling the ground in the way described by Xenophon in 300 B.C. Until a few years ago they used the old Homeric wooden ploughs exclusively, but gradually more modern tilling implements have been introduced, and to-day iron ploughs are used all over Greece, while in Thessaly many reaping and threshing machines are doing excellent work.

A few years ago several large landowners began cultivating their estates in a scientific manner, using up-to-date implements and machinery, but with few exceptions they failed, because they attempted to replace existing conditions too rapidly ; moreover, they were hampered by the scarcity of roads and the insecure state of the country. Their failure discouraged others, and of late the large landed proprietors have taken but little interest in their estates.

One of the causes which has interfered with agriculture in Greece was a serious currant crisis which occurred some years back. Owing to the ravages of the *Phylloxera*, many of the vineyards in the South of France were totally destroyed, and to replace the shortage of grapes the French imported cheap currants from Greece, from which they manufactured wine. The result of this was that Greece largely increased her output of the commoner varieties, in the belief that the French demand would be permanent. However, the French replaced their vines with American stock, which is immune against *Phylloxera*, and as these became productive ceased to import Greek currants for wine-making. In consequence there was such a fall in the price of the common qualities of currants that it did not repay the expenses of cultivation. Great distress ensued. The problem was only solved by the formation of a Currant Trust, to which the Greek Government granted a concession, the Trust being obliged to purchase all the surplus produce at a price agreed upon. These are converted into various products, such as spirits of wine, jams, pulp for cattle-feeding, etc., for all of which there is a ready sale. At the same time the Government has encouraged the peasants to destroy the vines which produced the common currants, and cultivate cotton and tobacco in their place. The crisis did not affect better quality fruit, for which there has always been a constant demand at remunerative prices.

The development of agriculture has also been checked by the agrarian question connected with land tenure, which arose in Thessaly and some of the Ionian Islands in 1909.



The peasants living on the estates of the great landowners began to look with envious eyes at the other class of peasants who owned land themselves. As previously stated, the landowners seldom visit their estates, which they leave in the care of factors who are mostly ignorant, and who oppress the peasants and charge them 20 to 30 per cent. on the money of their employers, which they lend when there are bad crops; consequently the peasants are so weighed down by debt, that even when there are good crops the interest which they have to pay absorbs nearly all their profits. Appeals to the landowners were always referred back to the factors, who did little or nothing to better the peasant's lot. Subsequently, after much agitation and rioting, they appealed to the Government for assistance, and proposed a land-purchase scheme similar to that embodied in the Irish Land Purchase Act. There were great difficulties in introducing this into Greece, not only financial but legal, as the landowners generally refused to sell except at their own price, which the Government was not willing to pay, while they had no powers for compulsory purchase.

The question is still in abeyance, but the establishment of an Agricultural Bank will eventually be able to solve the question in a manner satisfactory to all parties.

AGRICULTURAL EDUCATION.—There are two colleges for this purpose in Greece. One is on the estate of Aïdin, which was presented to the nation by Mr. Alexander Cassavetti, of London, in 1884, on condition that the Government should establish and maintain an Agricultural College on it. He had previously tried to introduce modern systems of cultivation and machinery with indifferent success, which he attributed partly to reasons of health which necessitated the withdrawal of his personal supervision. Unfortunately this school as organized gives no real practical teaching for farmers' sons, but provides a semi-scientific course which is neither practical nor beneficial. Another college, endowed by the late George Averoff, has lately been established at Larissa, but this also is run on exclusively scientific lines and

is even less practical than the former. Unfortunately but few of the large landed proprietors are prepared to adopt scientific methods of farming. The result of this is that many of the qualified students of both these colleges, being unable to obtain remunerative berths as land-agents, prefer to emigrate and try their fortunes in America.

Agriculture in Greece has certainly been sadly neglected by past Governments, for no encouragement or help was given by these to the rural population, many of whom emigrated to earn a better living. Consequently there are now large tracts of fertile land uncultivated. The only official institutions connected with agriculture were a small department in the Ministry of the Interior and a few experimental stations in different parts of the country, but these also were conducted on theoretical and unpractical lines, so that the peasants looked with distrust on the managers of these stations and had no faith in their farming capacity. Until four or five years ago the country was unsafe; cattle-thieves used to cross the Turkish frontier, steal the live stock and dispose of them in Turkey. The great landowners were often threatened by these gentry, and they seldom dared to visit their estates. The peasants became disheartened: those who could afford it, sent their sons to Athens to study law or medicine or to get Government posts if they were lucky; others scraped together twenty or thirty pounds to send their sons to America.

Emigration continued to increase until 1907, when 90,000 left the country for America, and this at last roused the authorities to action. A Commission was formed to investigate the question, when it was discovered that in the last twenty years over 200,000 had emigrated to the U.S.A., and measures have lately been passed which it is hoped will greatly diminish the tide of emigration.

Means of communication are still very insufficient, and in some districts there are no roads. Thus, on Mount Pelion apples and other fruit literally rot under the trees, there being no means of sending them to market, except by pack-mules in very small quantities.

The Ministry of M. Venizélos has been the first to realize that agriculture is the foundation of a nation's prosperity. He created a new Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, which is slowly but surely grappling with the question. The first efforts were directed towards introducing a feeling of security among the people, and was so successful that for the last three years safety has been established in all districts.

Expert agriculturists have been engaged from Austria, France, and Italy to report and advise the Government as to the measures to be taken for the improvement of agriculture. A Government stud has been established and stallions imported to improve the breed of horses. The growth of Egyptian cotton has been encouraged by the Ministry, which provides seed and instruction to the peasants free of charge, and the results of the experiment have been very satisfactory, for the product commands prices as high as the best Egyptian cotton. A yearly grant has been voted towards the draining of marshes. There is very much yet to be done, but a good beginning has been made, and if the Ministry continue to act in the same practical manner there is no doubt that within a few years agriculture in Greece will have made great progress.

The following are the latest available figures of the annual agricultural products in old Greece :

					Kilogrammes.
Wheat	...	...	...	...	350,000,000
Barley	...	...	...	...	50,000,000
Oats	...	...	...	...	50,000,000
Maize	...	...	...	...	35,000,000
Oil...	...	...	...	...	45,000,000
Tobacco	...	...	...	...	9,000,000
Cotton	...	...	...	...	5,000,000
Figs	...	...	...	...	26,000,000
Currants	...	...	...	...	170,000 to 180,000 tons.

(1,000 kilogrammes equal one ton approximately.)

The above produce represents a value of 315,000,000 drachmas (£12,600,000).

The annual value of the exports is approximately £3,507,000, made up as on the following page.

				£	
Agricultural produce	...	...	...	2,260,000	(approximately)
Wine, etc.	...	...	...	375,000	"
Oil, etc.	...	...	...	560,000	"
Animal products	...	...	...	224,000	"
Forest products...	...	...	...	88,000	"
				<hr/>	
				£3,507,000	

Of the above products, Great Britain imports approximately £1,416,300 worth made up of—

						£
Currants	...	...	...	...	...	1,300,000
Raisins	...	...	...	...	...	50,000
Olive Oil	...	...	...	...	...	60,000
Valonia (acorns)	...	...	...	...	...	6,300
						<hr/>
						£1,416,300

NEW GREECE.—By her victories against the Turks, Greece acquired a great increase of territory which comprises much fertile land. This may be classified under three large sections or groups, viz.—

1. Southern Macedonia.
2. Epirus.
3. Crete and the Ægean Islands hitherto under Turkish dominion.

1. *Southern Macedonia*, the greater part of which was occupied in the first war, comprises some of the most fertile soil in Europe, which will even bear favourable comparison with that of Egypt. This may be divided into three sub-sections, viz.—

- (a) The districts of Ellassona and Aikaterine (Caterina).
- (b) The district of Veria.
- (c) The district of Salonica and the Chalkidike Peninsula.

(a) The districts of Ellassona and Aikaterine are mountainous, but comprise the very sheltered Plain of Ellassona and the valleys in which are situated the towns of Kosane and Serfidje. The Aikaterine District contains land which consists of rich black alluvial soil, partly on the lower slopes

of Mount Olympus and partly on the plain which lies between that mountain and the sea and is watered by numerous streams flowing from the heights. On this eastern side of Mount Olympus there are also magnificent oak forests, from which valuable timber can be obtained without denuding the slopes if the rules of forestry are properly observed. This district is admirably adapted by nature for dairy-farming on a large scale, as its soil, situation, topography, climate, and aspect are all ideal for the establishment of such an industry. Its cattle is probably as good as any in the Balkans except the Servian: the cows are good stock with which to make a beginning and can be rapidly improved by the importation of British, Swiss, or even Servian bulls; the cross-breeds thus produced would furnish excellent milch cows if proper care were taken in selecting the strain of the imported stock. Lastly, the whole length of this area will soon be traversed by the new railway, which will unite the existing main line of the Hellenic Railway Company with the European network of railways, and will afford cheap and rapid transport for this district's rather perishable but valuable products to Salonica in the north, which is within 50 miles, and Athens in the south, which is about 300 miles distant, both cities of over 200,000 inhabitants, where milk, butter, and cheese are scarce and command very high prices.

Both the districts of Elassona and Aikaterine produce cereals and other crops. Mulberry-trees also thrive, and silk culture is practised in all the villages.

(*b*) The district of Veria is perhaps the most fertile and productive in Macedonia; it comprises the plain of the Romuluk, which lies north-east of Veria and extends as far as the River Gallikos, about eight miles from Salonica. It is traversed from north to south by the River Axios (Vardar) and by the River Aliakmon (Vistritza) in the south. Its soil is of the finest quality and possibly equals the best of the Nile Valley. The principal products of this plain are cereals of all descriptions and cotton, and on its rich pasture-lands large herds of cattle are to be seen. The soil is so fertile

that the peasants do not take the trouble to plough the fields, but sow barley and oats on the previous year's stubble and then plough the seed in with their antiquated wooden ploughs. In spite of such primitive cultivation the plants thrive and often produce very fine crops. In certain parts of this plain, owing to its extraordinary fertility, the peasants allow their cattle and sheep to feed on the growing crops of wheat and barley, as otherwise the growth would be so rapid and rank that they would be laid low or uprooted before maturity. Generally in the East, as land is not very high in value, the yield per acre is not reckoned, but the fertility of the soil is gauged by the number of times the seed sown is reproduced; in most districts six or seven times the seed is considered a fair yield, but on the Romuluk the peasants usually obtain from twenty to twenty-five times the seed. The rivers on the plain often overflow their banks and have created many marshes, which can be easily drained and reclaimed, thus considerably increasing the area of the most fertile lands. As above mentioned, cotton is also grown here, and its cultivation on a larger scale has a great future, as the soil is most suitable, and either contains sufficient moisture or else can be easily irrigated, for water is plentiful.

To the north-west of Veria lies the district of Niaousta, which is a hilly one, and is covered with forests and vines. Its wine is mostly of a mellow light Burgundy type, and deservedly has a wide reputation; valuable timber is also produced; cereals are grown on a smaller scale, but there is much good pasture.

(c) The districts of Salónica and Chalkidike, which commence from the River Gallikos and extend up north of Salónica to the town of Langaza and east of the township of Nigrita, contain several very fertile plains of small dimensions. That of Langaza is considered by some to be the most fertile in Macedonia; the slopes and the hills are all cultivated and comprise many of the best tobacco fields. There again the principal products are cereals, cotton, and

live stock, but a large quantity of fairly good quality tobacco is also grown. In Chalkidike vines and olive-trees thrive and plenty of cereals are also produced; mulberry-trees abound over both districts and silk culture is prevalent.

No reference has yet been made to the district which lies between Florina and Korytza, as there is no reliable information as to its agricultural importance; it is, however, a mountainous area where live stock find plenty of good grazing.

The methods of farming practised in Macedonia are primitive in the extreme, even more so than in old Greece. The unsettled state of the country due to bad government, Turkish oppression, and racial feuds, has handicapped farmers and peasants during the last fifteen years. The population has been emigrating by thousands to America, especially since the Young Turks enforced compulsory military service on their Christian subjects.

The conditions of land tenure are the same as those obtaining in the Kingdom of Greece. In the district of Veria there are many large estates belonging to wealthy Mussulman landlords. In the Chalkidike Peninsula most of the land is the property of the monasteries of Mount Athos, from whom the peasants of the district rent and cultivate the fields. In the remaining districts the peasants themselves own most of the land.

2. *Epirus* may be divided into two sub-sections—

(a) The district of Janina.

(b) The district of Preveza.

(a) The district of Janina, with the exception of the plains of Janina and Argyrocastro, has very little level ground. The products of these two plains are chiefly maize and rice, as, owing to the lakes and the mountain streams that feed them, large areas are flooded in the autumn, so that it is only possible to cultivate wheat and barley on a small scale. There are, however, fine pastures on the hills and mountain-sides, and here live stock are bred and reared.

(b) The district of Preveza, which lies south of Janina, is

more fertile: the plain, which commences from Philippias and stretches southward to Arta and Preveza, is especially so; it is watered by the River Louros, which flows through it and empties itself into the Ambracian Gulf. The principal products are cereals, of which maize is the most cultivated. On the outskirts of Arta and Preveza there are some very fine orange, lemon, and olive groves which produce a great quantity of very choice fruit. In this district, too, the rearing of live stock plays a very important part; the pastures are of the very best, and thousands of sheep graze on them; a large quantity of cheese is also made, most of which is exported to America. The native breeds are good in themselves, and with a judicious admixture of foreign blood can be easily improved with profitable results. It is much to be regretted that the whole of Epirus is very thinly populated, as during the last 150 years a large proportion of the Christian inhabitants have been forced to leave their homes, owing to the persecution of the Turks. It is to be hoped that now their country has been liberated from that baneful dominion the many thousands of Epirots who are scattered all over the Levant and foreign countries will return to their native land where there is so much to be done.

3. *Crete* is so large that it calls for separate treatment. It contains much fertile and productive land capable of maintaining a large population, for in ancient and mediæval times its inhabitants exceeded one million in number; but after its conquest by the Turks during the fifteenth century the population gradually diminished until the nineteenth century, when, after the Greek War of Independence, the depopulation was much accelerated. Owing to the unsettled state of the country, caused by continuous insurrection and the harsh measures of retaliation and oppression taken by the Turks in their fruitless efforts to subdue the rebels, this process continued till it culminated in the exodus, practically *en masse*, of all the Cretan Mohammedans in 1898 when the Turks were compelled to grant autonomy to the island.



The most productive land in Crete is the large plain of Messara, which is situated on a plateau in the interior of the island about sixty miles from Heraklion (Candia). At present, owing to the total absence of cheap transport, it is but little cultivated, but it is most fertile, the yield of wheat being from fifteen to twenty times the seed, or even more. When a narrow-gauge railway, the surveys, plans, and estimates for which have already been made, is constructed and opened to Heraklion, this district alone will be capable of feeding the whole population of the island and of exporting a considerable quantity of wheat besides, whereas at present almost all the flour consumed in the island has to be imported. When the projected railway has been built this district will lend itself most advantageously to mechanical cultivation on a large scale. It should be mentioned here that it is intended to extend this railway from Heraklion for about 120 miles farther, so as to provide intercommunication between that place and the other three principal towns on the island. In addition to this extensive plain there are several smaller ones, all of which are suitable for the production of cereals and cotton. The pastures throughout Crete are of the finest quality and maintain really good breeds of horses and sheep; much of the best cheese consumed in Athens is brought from Crete. Her oranges are famed for their size, exquisite flavour, and thin skins. Finally, she produces an abundance of olive oil, wine, and fruit of all descriptions.

The islands of the *Ægean*, occupied during the war and those seized by Italy, which on ethnographical principles must be incorporated in the Hellenic Kingdom, are all fertile, and the larger ones are very productive. Chios produces oranges and lemons, for which it is famous, as well as other fruit; a considerable quantity of cereals are also grown, and live stock reared. Lesbos (Mytilene) in addition to vines, olive and fruit trees, possesses some very fine forests from which a considerable quantity of timber is exported. Incidentally it may be mentioned that it is a great shipping centre

owning 240 steamers, which, before the Greeks occupied the island, used to fly flags of various nationalities, amongst which were very few Greek ones. Samos, Rhodes, and Kos enter into the same category as these two islands as regards their agricultural products. Vines, olive, orange, and lemon groves flourish on all the islands; on the larger ones quantities of cereals are grown, but on some of the small ones sufficient cereals for the wants of the inhabitants are not produced and flour has to be imported. Samos and Rhodes are especially famed for their wines, olives, and olive-oil. Finally, it should be stated that all the islands of the *Ægean Archipelago* are really well cultivated in comparison with Macedonia and Epirus. Landed property is mostly owned by peasants or small proprietors, but in some of the islands the monasteries of Mount Athos have some very important possessions; other large landowners are not met with except in rare cases in Crete and some of the larger islands.

By the Peace of Bucharest two or more large sections or groups of fertile agricultural lands have been added to the Greek dominions, (*a*) the Serres section, and (*b*) the Kavalla section. The former contains large fertile plains which are watered by the River Strymon, its tributaries and other rivers and streams. It is capable of producing large quantities of cereals, cotton, and other crops; large amounts of tobacco are also grown in this district, particulars of which are given below.

The Kavalla section comprises the districts of Drama, Kavalla, and a large portion of that of Xanthe. The Drama district also has fertile plains which are well watered, extensive, and very productive; the tobacco produced in it especially that grown on the hills and lower slopes of the mountains, is of better quality than that of Serres, but the finest grades are produced in the Xanthe and Kavalla districts. The greater part of the former lies within the new boundaries of Greece, although the town of Xanthe itself is situated a few miles to the east of the frontier in Bul-

garian territory. Both of these districts are hilly with no plains of large area, except the one near the sea-shore east of Kavalla and west of the River Nestos, but the value of the tobacco produced in the valleys, on the hills, and the slopes of the mountains makes these districts a veritable gold-mine, as shown by the figures given below.

In both of these large sections there is plenty of excellent pasture-land, admirably adapted to the profitable breeding of horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, goats, and poultry on a large scale.

The following figures taken from the reports of the Régie Imperiale Ottomane des Tabacs show the quantity of tobacco produced in the districts of Eastern Macedonia, the amounts exported and their approximate value.

Kavalla Section Districts.				Kilogrammes produced.	
Kavalla	...	...	...	539,275	
Pravion	...	...	...	1,524,130	
Doxato...	...	...	...	938,430	
Drama ...	...	...	...	1,921,385	
Zichne ...	...	...	...	1,479,940	
				<hr/>	6,403,160
Serres Section Districts.					
Serres ...	...	...	...	2,006,220	
Demir-Hissar ...	...	...	...	727,066	
				<hr/>	2,733,286
Total of both sections				...	9,136,446

The above are the figures actually declared to the Régie for the crop of 1911, but such returns are invariably at least 20 to 25 per cent. below the actual amounts produced, for a large percentage is smuggled away and other amounts are consumed locally and evade declaration. It is therefore well within the mark to estimate that the actual amount of this crop, which was warehoused at Kavalla, exceeded 11,000,000 kilogrammes.

The average value per kilogramme may be conservatively estimated at four francs, this being based on the average prices paid to the growers during the past thirty years; thus

prime cost of this quantity was 44,000,000 francs; to this must be added the duty collected by the Régie,  $11\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the amounts and values declared, which, being always understated, amounted to about 4,500,000 francs.

Most of the tobacco from the above districts is warehoused and manipulated at Kavalla; the quantity exported from that town during the twelve months from March 1, 1911, to February 29, 1912 (the last complete year for which statistics are available), exceeded 12,000,000 kilogrammes: taking, therefore, four francs per kilogramme as the prime cost—

	Francs.
12,000,000 kilogrammes cost ... ..	48,000,000
Add for duties $11\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. ... ..	5,520,000
Add $1\frac{1}{2}$ francs per kilogramme for cost of carriage, warehousing, manipulation, etc. (a very low estimate) ... ..	18,000,000
	<hr/>
	71,520,000
Add 12 per cent. for merchants' profit, which is a percentage far below the average ... ..	8,582,400
	<hr/>
Therefore the total value of the tobacco exported from Kavalla in the year 1911-12 exceeded ...	80,102,400
As, however, about 2,000,000 kilogrammes of the tobacco which has hitherto been manipulated at Kavalla will in the future be produced on Bulgarian soil, the quantity Greece may con- fidently expect to export from the Kavalla dis- trict on the above basis will be 10,000,000 kilogrammes per annum, of a minimum value of ... ..	66,752,000

The table on page 291 shows the amounts of tobacco produced and exported from other districts during the same period and the value of the exports; these figures are also taken from the reports of the Régie.

With regard to the Xanthe district, although the town itself and the eastern part of the Sandjak fall within the new Bulgarian territory, its inhabitants have emigrated *en masse* into Greece, and the greater part of the land which produces the renowned Xanthe tobacco is situated within the new

boundaries of Greece. It is therefore safe to estimate that at least 2,000,000 kilogrammes of that tobacco will in future be warehoused and manipulated on Greek territory and exported from Kavalla.

District.	Kilos Produced.	Kilos Exported.	Price per Kilo (Prime Cost).	Prime Cost in Francs.
Salonica ...	1,746,863	—	—	—
Kosane ...	157,136	—	—	—
Monastir ...	478,439	—	—	—
Total ...	2,382,438	2,000,000	3 francs	6,000,000
Xanthe ...	3,166,000	3,000,000	15 „	45,000,000

With regard to the other districts, Monastir itself falls to Servia, but part of that district lies within the Greek boundaries, as do also other fields which form part of districts now allotted to Servia, therefore the amount above given as produced in the Monastir district may safely be considered as attributable to Greece in the future.

In conclusion, taking the above-mentioned figures as a basis, the minimum exports from the new provinces of Greece per annum may be estimated as follows :

District.	Kilos Exported.	Export Price per Kilo.	Value of Exports in Francs.
Kavalla ... ..	10,000,000	6.67 francs	66,700,000
Xanthe ... ..	2,000,000	20.30 <sup>1</sup> „	40,600,000
Salonica, etc. ...	2,000,000	5.43 „	10,860,000
Total ... ..	14,000,000	—	118,160,000

<sup>1</sup> Allowing 5.30 francs for duty, cost of manipulation, etc., and merchants' profit.

or a total of more than £4,720,000 from the exportation of tobacco per annum based on the actual figures of the 1911 crop.

The Turkish Government derived a revenue of at least 10,000,000 francs per annum from the above-named tobacco, and good judges believe that with assured security and with good government the production of tobacco in these districts will in a few years be doubled. In Greece, moreover, the tax on the tobacco consumed in the country is at the rate of eight drachmas per oka, or 6.25 francs per kilogramme, the duties collected in 1912 amounting to 9,220,426 drachmas. It is safe, therefore, to estimate that an equal amount will be collected in future from tobacco consumed in New Greece, the population of which is at least equal to that of the old kingdom, and adding this to the 20,000,000 francs which may be confidently expected from the tax on the tobacco produced at the old Turkish rate, there is no exaggeration in anticipating that Greece will in the near future draw a revenue of at least 30,000,000 drachmas or £1,200,000 per annum from tobacco produced in her new dominions.

In the future agriculture in Macedonia, Epirus, and Crete will be conducted on a much larger scale than it has hitherto been in the Hellenic State. The new neighbours of Greece, the Servians, are considerably advanced in modern farming, having produced very fine breeds of horses, cattle, and pigs. This proximity and friendly intercourse between the nations will no doubt greatly assist the agricultural population of New Greece, and it is sincerely to be hoped that this good influence will gradually spread itself over the whole country.

Generally speaking, the prospects from an agricultural point of view which lie before the Hellenic kingdom are brilliant, for although the methods of agriculture practised till quite recently are primitive in the extreme, it is an undeniable fact that the soil, especially that in the new territories, is very fertile, and it may be considered as certain that any agricultural enterprises now undertaken on modern, practical, and scientific lines and carried out in a systematic manner

will produce good financial results. The Greek peasant is intelligent and hard-working, and although he, like all rural populations, has a great distrust of anything new which he has not seen as a working success, he readily adapts himself to innovations when he has had ocular and practical proofs of their efficacy and of the better results obtained by their employment.

## CHAPTER XXI

### GREAT BRITAIN AND HELLAS

MR. GLADSTONE conceived the idea of establishing Greece as a bulwark against Slav influence in the Balkan Peninsula. He was an idealist, who with his mind full of the glories of ancient Hellas, perhaps saw in the Hellenes of his day greater possibilities than they were *then* capable of. It was certainly unfortunate for the Greeks that he was not in office in 1877. There is no doubt that they themselves made many blunders in their foreign policy during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, for they lacked any far-seeing statesman, unless it were M. Tricoupis, who, if possible, erred in the opposite direction. When Russia made war upon Turkey, there was a time when she found herself in difficulties and was obliged to accept the assistance of Roumania. At that time the Czar, Alexander II, prevailed on Sir Peter Brailas, who was then Greek Minister in St. Petersburg, to go on a private mission to Athens and request the Greek Government to make a diversion in Thessaly and Epirus. M. Tricoupis, who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs in the coalition Cabinet of Admiral Kanaris, answered that Slav interests were incompatible with those of his country, with the result that when Russia made peace with Turkey by the Treaty of San Stephano she left Greece out in the cold. M. Tricoupis acted on the advice of the British Foreign Office, which assured him that Greece would gain more by remaining quiet at the moment. Consequently as Greece refrained from accepting Russia's aid because of the assurances received from Great Britain, Great Britain has remained under a moral obligation to her ever since. The Treaty of San Stephano



was radically altered by the Congress of Berlin in 1878, at which Greece was represented among others by M. Gennadius, the present Greek Minister in London, then in the early stages of his distinguished diplomatic career. Only, unfortunately, the Powers who opposed Russia (chiefly Great Britain and Austria) and whose views prevailed, although they greatly reduced the area of Bulgaria as defined at San Stephano by creating the autonomous province of Eastern Roumelia, did nothing further for the Greeks, who had to rest content with Lord Beaconsfield's dictum that they must be patient as they had a future.

A few years later, in 1881, Mr. Gladstone, who had in the meantime come into power, caused a conference to be called at Berlin, at which he introduced his policy of assisting Greece and succeeded in getting Thessaly and a large part of Epirus allotted to her; but the Turks as usual would only yield to *force majeure*, and M. Koumoundouros's Government, instead of following the hint which Mr. Gladstone gave them, viz., "What has been lost by the sword must be regained by the sword," compromised with Turkey by agreeing to accept in settlement Thessaly and of Epirus only the small district of Arta. This second error of judgment on the part of the Greeks in failing to help themselves, in contrast to little Montenegro in the case of Dulcigno, did at that time no doubt make Mr. Gladstone lose his confidence in them, and disillusioned him. The succeeding Government of Lord Salisbury did not feel called upon to do anything further for Greece; but strangely enough he conceived the idea that Bulgaria might be made a buffer State against Russia, and did more than connive at Stambouloff's *coup* of 1885-6 when he tore up one of the most important clauses of the Berlin Treaty and annexed Eastern Roumelia. Thus a great injury was done to Hellenic interests, for this province contained a large Greek population, whose life in Bulgaria became impossible unless they renounced their nationality. During the succeeding twenty-five years nothing further was done for Greece by Great Britain.

The result of all this is that the dream of Mr. Gladstone and the Delphic utterance of Lord Beaconsfield have only just come true. A Liberal Government is in power now, and when the war between the four allies and Turkey broke out some of its most distinguished members expressed themselves as openly in favour of the Balkan States. After the Turkish debacle in Macedonia and Thrace *The Times*, which in such matters echoes the official view, declared that it was time for the Turks to return to the land of their fathers. Should there be a change of Government it is more than possible that the Conservatives will not reverse the policy of the Liberal Government in regard to Near Eastern politics. British foreign policy is now far less subject to the vagaries of party politics than it was in the nineteenth century.

One of the most striking features of the war was the part which her naval superiority enabled Greece to play. This shows that the history of the Near East will in the future be greatly influenced by sea power. If Great Britain is to safeguard her interests in Egypt and elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean she needs a powerful fleet there. There are great calls upon her Navy now nearer home, and these calls will increase year by year. Only lately she withdrew the effective portion of her Mediterranean Squadron and replaced it with what may, without exaggeration, be described as obsolete ships. How could a squadron like this protect her interests in the neighbourhood of Egypt and Constantinople? Great Britain must either re-establish her Mediterranean Fleet, or else be able to rely on the help of an allied fleet in these waters. France is in no better position than England for policing the Eastern Mediterranean and the Ægean, for she has two members of the Triple Alliance, Italy and Austria, to the eastward of her, and so would be incapable of decisive or effective action. The third member of the Triple Entente, Russia, has no access to the Ægean, and it seems unlikely that there will be such a reversal of foreign policy in this

direction that the Dardanelles will be opened to her in the future. Turkey has shown that her sailors at sea, with few exceptions, are as helpless as fish out of water, so that even if her friendship were desired it would be no good building any hopes on her maritime resources. Apart from Greece, Bulgaria is the only other nation which has access to the *Ægean*, but at present she has a navy of no importance, though one of her torpedo-boats managed to do considerable temporary damage to the Turkish cruiser *Hamidieh*. It is said that Bulgaria intends to build a strong navy in the future. It is, however, an open secret that most of the Bulgarian ships are manned by Greeks, mostly from the Greek villages on the shores of the Black Sea, as the Bulgarian has absolutely no talent or vocation for the sea. In fact, the Bulgarians dislike the sea so much that their villages along the east coast of Thrace, instead of being built on the shore, are a mile or two inland out of sight of the sea. As they themselves frequently admit, they regard the sea as an unpleasant place which produces a dismal feeling in the pit of their stomachs. It does not therefore appear likely that Bulgaria will succeed in establishing a very effective fleet. But there is a further reason against any reliance being placed on her. The Bulgarians, though not of Slavonic origin, have been slavicized, and so British interests would not be best served by encouraging a State which at any time may, through force of circumstances, become nothing more than an outpost of Russia.

There remains Greece. There is no conflict between British and Hellenic interests. The only valid objection to an understanding with Greece would be that though she certainly had a fleet strong enough to dominate the course of the Balkan War, yet of her ships only one armoured cruiser and a few destroyers would be of any use in a first-class navy. It is true that Greece has not a well-equipped fleet now, but she intends to have one in the future. What has been said in the chapters dealing with the Greek Navy goes some way to show that, with the help

of so admirable a staff of instructors as Admiral Kerr and his colleagues, this is merely a matter of time and finance. The Greek, next the Briton, is the best natural seaman in the world. A small acquaintance with her merchant-sailors convinces every one of the truth of this. The quiet and efficient way in which they do their work is up to the best British standards, and the sang-froid with which a Greek boatman will run his boat ashore and put off under difficulties would call forth praise from any experienced mariner. If her Administration acts wisely Greece should not have any difficulty in providing in time a supply for a fleet of at least six battle cruisers, six armoured cruisers, and a proportionate number of ships for her light fleet. In the immediate future, if the large outlays involved in the purchase of Dreadnoughts be not considered justifiable, she will at any rate be able to maintain a large and efficient light flotilla.

There is a further reason which indicates Greece as the natural ally for Great Britain in the Near East. The position of the former in Eastern Europe corresponds to that occupied by the latter in Western Europe. Greece, having a northern frontier, will be obliged to keep up a standing army capable of defending it; but she, as much as England, is dependent for her existence on a strong navy. About one-quarter of her territory, excluding the Peloponnesus, will be contained in islands, and her coast-line will actually be larger than that of the British Isles.

The suggestion of an alliance with a country whose interests have in the past conflicted with those of Turkey might raise the question of India. The doctrine has been preached for years that England, out of loyalty to her Mohammedan subjects, must always support the Turks. This doctrine attaches an undue value to the Mohammedan element in India and disregards the fact that the larger Indian interests are best served by preserving Great Britain's trade routes to her Eastern possessions intact. Great Britain's interests in Egypt, which commands this trade

route, are as vital to her as her interests in India. British and Hellenic interests in Egypt march hand in hand, for British rule and Greek industry in commerce are equally important factors in promoting the prosperity of that country.<sup>1</sup> The relations of the Greeks with the English in Egypt have always been most cordial. Few of the inhabitants, except Greeks, consort with British civil servants and Army officers in the Cairo and Alexandria clubs. The Greeks of Khartoum were faithful to Gordon, who had gained their respect and admiration, and, as they failed to persuade him to abandon his post and escape with them they stayed and shared his fate. This augurs well for the future friendship of Britain and Hellene, but, unfortunately, the character and aspirations of the Greeks to-day are scarcely known or understood in England. The writer has been frequently amazed at the extraordinary ignorance that he has met with amongst all classes of English people on this subject, and this has been the experience also of other descendants of Greeks who have settled here. Frequently when the writer mentions that his family is a Greek family surprise is expressed, not merely jokingly but seriously, and a remark not unusual is, "We thought the Greeks were a semi-Oriental people." This idea is probably to be ascribed to the record of the Levantine Greeks (not true Greeks but Hellenized Levantines), who perhaps for two centuries have been known in the west of Europe as sharp and sometimes not altogether honest traders. The Levantine Greek cannot be taken in any way as representative of the Hellene of to-day. He has characteristics which are quite foreign to the Hellenic character, as any one will discover who cares to visit Greece and tries to understand something of her people. Few, on the other hand, recognize that friends and acquaintances with foreign names, many of whom have attained to positions of eminence and have gained the respect and confidence of all around them, are Greeks or have the remotest connection with Greece. And yet these persons are often pure Greeks who have much

<sup>1</sup> *Vide* Lord Cromer's recent work, "Modern Egypt."

more right to the name than the Levantines above referred to.

One reason why the Greek point of view is not understood here is that the case of Greece has rarely been stated with authority in the Press, particularly in *The Times*, which, however much it may have lost of its old prestige, still plays a considerable part in forming public opinion, especially on foreign affairs. Mr. Bouchier, the correspondent of *The Times* in the Balkan Peninsula, is a man of great experience of the Near East and of wide sympathies. It is greatly due to him that the case of the allies received a favourable hearing in this country and that the prejudice in favour of Turkey was broken through, and for this Hellas has good cause to be grateful to him. Mr. Bouchier, however, though he is a personal friend of M. Venizélos, and through this took no small part in bringing together such inveterate enemies as Greece and Bulgaria for the purpose of making common cause against Turkey, has always associated himself more with Bulgaria than with any other of the Balkan States. He has made Sofia his headquarters, and therefore was throughout the recent crisis in close touch with the men who controlled the destinies of that country ; as a result, however impartially he may have tried to view the various questions at issue between the allies, he was unconsciously influenced by his surroundings. Whenever the attitude of the Bulgarian Government had to be interpreted by him, it was stated with the vast authority and importance and with the lucid and convincing power of expression of which he is master among foreign correspondents. Further, *The Times*, knowing and appreciating his long experience of the Balkans, still further added to the importance given by him to the Bulgarian point of view by placing his communications in prominent positions and frequently drawing attention to them in its editorial notes and leading articles. In the meantime the Greek point of view has been usually enunciated only by a deputy of Mr. Bouchier's, not a member of *The Times* staff. As a result his communications are

not expected and, in fact, are not allowed to be at all long, for they are not treated as having the same weight and authority as are those of a member of the staff of *The Times*, who has been brought up in its great school and is, therefore, an expert at his work. Thus the Greek point of view was never expressed in that great journal during critical times unless a political leading article, possibly inspired from the Foreign Office, did justice to the aims and performance of Hellenic public policy. The result of Mr. Bouchier's devoting the greater part of his time to one of the four allies had more far-reaching results than any one would suspect. Thus the writer was surprised to read in the *Eton Chronicle* an account of a lecture delivered to the Eton boys by Mr. Bouchier during the peace negotiations of last January, which indeed gave a most illuminating insight into Balkan affairs, but in which it was stated that the Bulgarians had shown magnificent fighting qualities during the war, no mention being made of the fighting qualities of the Greeks, Servians, or Montenegrins, who will be admitted by any impartial judge to have fought just as bravely and effectively as the Bulgarians. Possibly the greatest bravery during the whole war was shown by the Greek sailors in the first naval engagement. The result of that lecture may be that a whole generation of Eton boys, except those who take enough interest to pursue an independent study of the Balkans, will grow up with the idea that it was the Bulgarians alone who showed themselves good fighters in the Balkan War.

During the past year there have been many occasions upon which simultaneous reports from Bulgarian and Greek sources have been completely contradictory, and upon which the Bulgarian version has received the imprint of Mr. Bouchier. On some of these occasions the cause and interests of Greece have been greatly prejudiced by this, and to illustrate what is here stated some examples are given.

When the Greeks occupied Salonica in November and the Bulgarian forces which were in the neighbourhood, as will be

remembered, dishonestly entered the city, although permission had been previously granted by the Greeks for only two battalions to enter, Sofia at the same time took steps to publish to the world that the city was under the occupation of the three allies, and that a joint administration on the part of the three was being set up. A telegram to this effect was published in *The Times* from their "Correspondent in the Balkan Peninsula," while no telegrams from the other side giving the correct account, which described the Greek occupation and administration of the city, were published.

The following are two striking illustrations of misrepresentations of questions at issue between Bulgarians and Greeks by Mr. Bouchier during the anxious period which followed the conclusion of the Treaty of London; both of them relate to frontier incidents. As an explanation of these incidents a telegram of his from Sofia stated that the Bulgarians, when they first occupied certain districts of southern Macedonia last November, omitted in many instances to leave garrisons in places through which they had passed, and that the Greeks had subsequently placed garrisons in these places and claimed to have been the first to occupy them. Whether there was any truth or not in this does not matter for the present purpose, but as examples of places in which this was done Mr. Bouchier cited Jenize-Vardar (Jenitza), Kukush (Kilkis), and Doiran. As the reader will remember, Jenitza was occupied by the Greeks, after a two-days' battle, on the 2nd of November, at a time when the Bulgarians were not less than 100 miles to the north of Salonica. The Greeks had not been near Kukush or Doiran on the day on which the telegram was sent, and did not occupy them until they drove the Bulgarians out of them at the point of the bayonet in the new war.

The other occasion arose out of the frontier engagement in the Panghæon district. The Bulgarians claimed to have captured eight guns from the Greeks, and a telegram published in *The Times* of June 2nd from Mr. Bouchier stated: "The Greek field guns captured . . . arrived here yesterday."



The statement that any gun had been captured from the Greeks was promptly contradicted by the Greek Minister in London, and a few weeks later an account was published in the papers of how a French officer who had examined the guns at Sofia had recognized them as guns which had been supplied to the Bulgarians. Being Creusot guns, they were of similar type to those of the Greeks, but he was able to prove his discovery of the fraud by referring to certain private marks of the Creusot firm.

During the Græco-Bulgarian War, when Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, Austrians, Russians, and Italians with their own eyes saw the traces of the indescribable atrocities committed by the Bulgarians in the towns of Serres, Demir-Hissar, Doxato, Nigrita, and elsewhere, Mr. Bouchier was telegraphing from Sofia—without any caution as to the reports being accepted with reserve—that the Greeks were behaving just as badly as the Bulgarians. The ordinary reader probably does not go into the question of whether the reporter was on the spot or not and capable of guaranteeing the accuracy of his information, and treated his statements as being as credible as those of the witnesses who were at the front with the Greeks. The examples given of the inaccuracy of his reports of the frontier incidents are sufficient to show how much reliance can be placed on his reports of the behaviour of the Greek troops. At the same time he was reporting great Bulgarian victories over the Greeks, which he could not help contradicting from day to day, for the Greeks continually advanced and occupied positions previously held by the Bulgarians, and engaged the enemy nearer and nearer to the Bulgarian frontier. However, a redeeming feature of it all is that the Greeks treated his accounts as a joke, and some exceedingly entertaining caricatures were published in the Greek papers about him during last summer. What is perhaps the most humorous incident in connection with Mr. Bouchier's relations with the Greeks was the sending to him of a telegram by a high personage in Greece in the following words: "I congratulate you on the accuracy of your informa-

tion." The sarcasm was lost on the venerable *Times* correspondent in the Balkan Peninsula, and only succeeded in extracting a pompous reply to the effect that he sincerely thanked the sender for the kind congratulations and appreciation of his work! It will be seen that as a result, before the large and influential class whom *The Times* numbers amongst its readers, Hellas was during the crises of last year in the position of a prisoner who has only a country attorney to defend him when his accuser commands the services of an eminent K.C.

An experienced and respected journalist of Mr. Bouchier's qualifications has the opportunity of creating a *rapprochement* between nations which, though they have no conflict of interests, have never established close relations with one another. He obtains a grasp of the national character and tendencies of young countries like Greece and Bulgaria, and can then interpret them to his own countrymen. Hitherto not only has Greece lacked an advocate of this kind, but her isolation and her want of a protector, such as Russia was to Bulgaria, have retarded her political growth; and then journalists have represented her to the British public as being a nation of less promise than Bulgaria. The connection of her railway system to the great European railroads will, in the future, bring her into direct touch with the great Continental nations, and put an end to her isolation.

The Greeks were practically the only foreign people who championed our cause in the South African War, at a time when our Little Englanders actually showed admiration of the Boers. This Greek sympathy was shown in deed as well as in word, for "bands" were organized and fought by the side of our soldiers in South Africa. They have consequently felt a little sore at the lack of cordiality shown to them by Britons in their recent troubles. The writer can assure them that this is due to lack of knowledge on our part for which the failure of the Greeks to advertise themselves here sufficiently is to a great extent responsible. Englishmen who take an interest in Greece can be divided into three

classes: (1) Scholars and students of ancient Greece, (2) tourists, (3) persons who number Greeks among their personal friends. Those in the first class are limited in number and half of them know nothing of modern Greece. Those in the second are also comparatively few in number, owing to the fact that hitherto the journey to Greece has occupied so long, and they see little of the Greeks of to-day other than the guide who accompanies them in their rush round the antiquities, who is probably a poor representative of his race. The third class also is not large enough to effect the general trend of public opinion in regard to the Greeks.

As a distinguished Greek who has recently visited England has pointed out, English life approximates more to that of the ancient Greeks than that of any other people in history. As instances illustrating this observation he cited the importance attached to sports and games and the prominence and wide influence of club-life. He said: "You have copied many things from us, and it is now we who should adopt many of your customs." There is no doubt that the Hellene and the Briton have much in common; in many respects a similar regime suits them both. A curious instance of this is the attitude of both the Greek and the English towards gambling. Greece is one of the few countries where gambling is illegal, as it is here. The Greek Government has refused most enticing offers for the building of Casinos, which would have brought an influx of foreigners and undoubtedly added considerably to the country's material wealth. On many questions the Greek adopts a certain moral standpoint, which may not be identical with but yet is germane to that of the Briton, whereas the German, the Frenchman, and the Italian take a totally different view. The Greek is by nature a cool and practical though poetical man. The excitable coffee-house politician, whom visitors to Greece may have come to look upon as a representative Hellene, is a by-product due to unfavourable environment, a type which rarely recurs in the younger generation. At

the same time there is a heartiness and capacity for genuine good-fellowship in the Hellene which makes him a far more natural companion for the Briton than is the Frenchman. Temperamentally the Evzonos, with his manliness and his jolly but courteous ways, is the counterpart of the Public School boy.

In order to be understood in Britain, Hellas needs journalists who will describe her tendencies and aspirations and writers who will explain the character and temperament of her people. Much, however, can be done by Greeks in England, many of whose families have been resident here for as much as three generations and occupy good positions and enjoy the respect and esteem of their neighbours and acquaintances. Foremost among the Greek names in England must be mentioned that of Ralli; several members of this family are well-known now in this country, not only as having been exceptionally able men of commerce, but as landowners, and the family has established matrimonial connections with several distinguished English families. When it is remembered that among the general cultured public the most ardent Philhellenes are those who have numbered Greeks among their friends, it will be seen how much the Greeks who have recognized positions in this country could do. Their patriotism is far-famed: it is sufficient to refer to the generous and beneficent bequests made by the late Panaghi Vagliano, who left a trust fund of half a million pounds for the benefit of his native island of Cephalonia, and the late Marino Corgialeagno, who bequeathed practically the whole of his fortune for various charitable and public objects in Greece. A tendency on the part of the leading Greeks in this country to identify themselves with the Hellenic movement, which has already roused the interest of English people, cannot fail very greatly to aid the Hellenic cause in Great Britain. One of the many ways in which they could take part in this movement would be for them to purchase estates in the highlands of Thessaly, Macedonia, or Epirus. Very soon these would be within



A GROUP OF EVZONI.



three days' journey from London. First-rate land in the centre of good sporting and agricultural country can be obtained for about £2 an acre : a comfortable house could be built and provided with such modern luxuries as electricity and central heating (which is particularly needful in the highlands of Greece where the cold is very keen in winter) and the grounds laid out for from £7,000 to £10,000. Thus, an estate of, say, 5,000 acres would entail an outlay of at most £20,000. There is not the least doubt that the really keen English sportsman would appreciate nothing better than an invitation for two or three weeks' shooting in Greece from one of his Anglo-Greek friends in this country. He knows that he would not take part in a holocaust of driven birds ; but most really keen sportsmen, except those who look upon shooting as a science rather than as a sport, prefer to have to work for their bag, especially in a new country.

The writer would suggest that the purchase of such an estate should be looked upon by each purchaser as a patriotic act capable of doing greater service to the land of their fathers than a monetary bequest by will ; but in fact it would not be an unprofitable investment. The purchase price of land in Greece is, generally speaking, ten times its annual income, and the estate, even including the cost of the house and grounds, would bring in, even in its undeveloped state, about 5 per cent. on the invested capital, and a larger income if developed and farmed on scientific and practical lines. Except in so far as they were actually used, the up-keep of the house and grounds would be very small compared with the cost of maintaining a similar-sized property in this country. A first-rate agent or factor would be required, but there will be no difficulty in finding such in England if not in Greece. Moreover, the good done by a few landowners establishing residential estates in Greece is shown by the example of Mr. Noel, of Achmet Aga, in the island of Eubœa, a kinsman of Lord Byron. The existence of such an estate in an outlying district of Macedonia, where the peasants are so much more wretched and poor, would have

even more conspicuously good effects than in the older provinces of Greece. Further, when native Greek landowners discover the charm of making a home in the country they would be almost certain to follow the example set them. The writer has met many Greek gentlemen who are real lovers of the country, but have hitherto been obliged to look upon their visits there as excursions which will mean roughing it. In any case, if the writer may be allowed to make a suggestion, a visit to Greece, especially its new northern territories, would well repay the trouble, and every English Greek who undertakes it will be in a position to become an interpreter of the new Hellenic movement to the English.

The institution of a Chair of Modern Greek at London University is one of the most practical suggestions that has been made for furthering the Hellenic cause in this country. An endowment of £10,000 is the utmost that would be required to provide a salary of from £300 to £400, with which the services of one of the most brilliant young Hellenists can be obtained. It is hoped that the Greeks and people of Greek origin settled in this country will take the opportunity of responding to British scholars who have expressed a desire to see the introduction of the study of modern Greek among other modern languages at a great university by taking an interest in the carrying out of the scheme and the collection of the required fund.

The field which is open to British enterprise in Greece's new territories should encourage greatly the association of English and Greek men of business, and the co-operation of the British Naval Mission in Greece is a still stronger link between the two countries which should contribute largely to the establishment of close friendship between Briton and Hellene.



## CHAPTER XXII

### THE BURSTING OF THE BULGARIAN BUBBLE

*Causes of the One Month's War. Quem Deus Vult  
Perdere Prius Dementat.*

By the middle of May, when the writer returned from the Balkans, it was fairly obvious to everybody in those regions that a Græco-Bulgarian war would take place, if not immediately, at any rate within the next two or three years. So far back as the days following the capture of Salonica Bulgarian officers quartered there said openly that if that city were under the partition of territory awarded to the Greeks, they would drive them out of it at the point of the bayonet within two years. In Greek circles the view generally taken was: "War is bound to come: better now while we are in a state of warlike preparedness and before normal lives and occupations are resumed than in a year or two's time when we shall have to begin, as it were, all over again."

The hatred between Greek and Bulgar is almost as old as the appearance of the Bulgar in Europe. It was the Bulgarians who were to a great extent responsible for the collapse of the Byzantine Empire before the onslaught of the Turks. They had so weakened it with their incessant attacks that it was unable to offer any determined resistance to the forward march of the invading hordes. During the Dark Ages the Bulgars disappeared while the Greeks always continued to represent the cultivated and enlightened element in the Turkish Empire. This was no doubt partly due to the fact that the Patriarch was Greek and the

whole of the Orthodox Church in the Turkish Empire had a Hellenic character. There was, however, another reason also, namely, that the Bulgars were a race of peasants, of whom few ever emerged as striking personalities, political, literary, or artistic. The Bulgarian revivalist movement which made itself felt at the time of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 was indeed a true expression of the wishes of the people, and when a Principality was formed in accordance with the arrangement made at the Berlin Conference, the great majority of the Bulgars obtained their freedom and were incorporated in it. The Treaty of San Stephano, as Lord Salisbury at the time declared, had, however, been a flagrant contravention of the principle of nationalities, for between one and two million Greeks would have passed under Bulgarian rule. Fortunately for Greece Bulgaria at that time was looked upon merely as the child of Russia, and therefore British policy in the Near East could not brook the admission of Bulgaria to the shores of the *Ægean*. The annexation of Eastern Roumelia a few years later was not a result of a movement on the part of the united population, but an arbitrary political coup on the part of the anti-Russian party in Bulgaria. Several hundred thousand Greeks were thereby against their will made Bulgarian subjects and subsequently suffered cruel oppression. This was the lot of all those who retained their Greek sympathies and refused to become Bulgarized. An idea of what the Greeks of Anchialos and other towns of Eastern Roumelia underwent can be obtained from reading Mr. Allen Upward's "*East End of Europe*."

It is often forgotten, too, that in Bulgaria itself, especially along the coasts of the Black Sea, there were numbers of Greeks, not a few among whom became prominent in Bulgarian politics; among these may be mentioned the late Prime Minister, M. Gueschoff, who is remembered as a student in Berlin as having been an enthusiastic Bulgarian Nationalist, but as speaking Greek in his own family circle at Manchester; and Dr. Genadieff, the present Foreign Minister,

In fact, the Greeks say that the chief intellects in Bulgaria are people either of Greek descent or else pure Slavs. It is true that many people do look upon the Bulgar peasants as Slavs, and Russia does if, and when, Bulgaria is obedient—but though they speak a Slavonic dialect, the types of physiognomy observable in the soldiers of a Bulgarian regiment show them to be far more Avar, or Tartar, or Mongol, than Slavonic by race. The deep-set eyes, high cheekbones, and broad noses are fairly conclusive evidence of this; among the officers these characteristics are less frequently to be seen. Being a race of lower civilization the Bulgars have become Slavized, at any rate in speech, but they have retained their savage and primitive instincts, so repulsive to the mind and feelings of the average Hellene. It will therefore be seen how awful the prospect of being subjected to Bulgarian rule is to a Greek generally speaking.

The Balkan War was, at any rate so far as the Servians and the Greeks are concerned, a war of liberation and not a war of territorial grab. Accordingly the first principle to be observed on a partition of territory conquered by the joint efforts of the allies would be the wishes of the populations dwelling in the liberated provinces, though political and strategical considerations might interfere slightly with the strict application of this principle. Let us apply it to the territory ceded to the allies under the Treaty of London. Servians and Montenegrins are so similar in race and sympathies that for the present purpose it will simplify matters if they are treated as one. About the time of the Bulgarian revivalist movement the Greek Patriarchate looked with disfavour on the Bulgarian secessionists (who established a Church at the head of which was placed an Exarch) and went so far as to excommunicate the followers of the new Church. In doing so the Patriarchate did great harm to the Greek cause and stirred up a rivalry between exarchist and patriarchist which the Bulgarians promptly exploited as a political weapon. The Patriarchate in taking a narrow religious view lost sight of national interests,

It may be said that of the whole population of Central Macedonia, other than the Servian districts, people of Greek sympathies out-number Bulgaria's supporters by more than two to one. The Macedonians so-called are admitted to be a mixed race in which the Slav and Greek strains largely preponderate, but in addition there are a large number of pure Greeks, among whom are most of the prominent citizens of the towns. The Macedonian peasants have shown themselves to be people who are ready to accept the predominant influence of the moment, but at the time of the Bulgarian revivalist movement more than two-thirds had Greek predilections. Sir Valentine Chirol, in a letter written to *The Times* shortly after the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest upholding the settlement arrived at as being no contravention of the principle of nationalities, said that when he visited the Monastir district some thirty years ago the Bulgarians themselves only claimed one-third of the population and that that was, anyhow, an excessive claim. The Bulgarians, as has been stated in the first chapter of this book, succeeded to a great extent, by promises of favours or else by force, in winning over a great many of the Macedonian peasants to the Bulgarian cause, and they tried to extend their sphere of influence almost as far as the old Greek frontier. Their object in commencing operations in Macedonia was no doubt to isolate Thrace from Greece, in order that it might fall an easy prey to them in the future. Throughout the district, however, which they have terrorized for the last fifteen years, even in those villages in which they appeared to have succeeded in winning over the peasants to their cause, the Bulgarian sympathies of most of the inhabitants did not take deep root, and so Central Macedonia is even now Greek rather than Bulgarian.<sup>1</sup>

The population with Servian sympathies is found in Old Servia, the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, and Northern Macedonia

<sup>1</sup> Under the agreement as to representation in the Turkish Parliament entered into some time before the war, 17 Greek and 6 Bulgarian deputies were appointed for the Vilayets of Salonica, Monastir and Adrianople on the basis of the respective numbers of the populations.

nearly as far south as Monastir. Monastir itself is rather Græcophil than Bulgarophil, a good number of the inhabitants being of Vlach origin. The true Bulgarian interests lie north of Demir-Hissar, Doiran, and Monastir, though there is a wedge-shaped enclave of Bulgarian villages round Kilkis. This is evidently the result of a colonizing movement which had Salonica as its ultimate objective. In Thrace, Bulgarians are found north of Adrianople and Kirk-Kilisse and in some of the districts just over the old Bulgarian border farther west. South of Monastir, Doiran, Demir-Hissar, Adrianople, and Kirk-Kilisse the Greek influence predominates, and between the old Greek frontier and Kastoria and Veria all along the coast and in most of the towns there is a large pure Greek population. It should, however, be pointed out that, generally speaking, the populations of Western and Central Macedonia north and east of Monastir are racially and naturally Servian rather than Bulgarian in character. In this most of the greatest authorities agree, though several English writers and journalists who have visited the districts under Bulgarian auspices, such as Messrs. Bouchier and Brailsford, have gone so far as to state that "in heart and sympathy it is Bulgarian to the core."

The division of the territory conquered from the Turks and ceded by the Treaty of London would naturally, if it were partitioned according to the views of the inhabitants and apart from strategical reasons, have been made as follows: The Græco-Bulgarian frontier would start south of Diavolo on the Black Sea, the point at which the old Bulgaro-Turkish border commenced, from thence it would go due south until some miles beyond Tirnavo it would turn to the west, pass just north of Kirk-Kilisse and Adrianople, and bend down to a point north of Dimotika. From there it would go due west until it reached Strumnitza, with a little northern bend so as to include the historic Greek town of Meleniko in Greek territory, finishing at Monastir. The Servo-Bulgarian frontier would pass

over Ovche Polye, leaving Veles to Servia, and would join the Græco-Bulgarian frontier at a short distance west of Strumnitza. As between Servia and Greece, Monastir, which even *The Times* has described as being a stronghold of Greek influence, would naturally fall to the latter.

With this ideal partition in view it is interesting to note what Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece claimed respectively after the conclusion of the Treaty of London.

There was a secret Treaty in existence between Servia and Bulgaria which, so far as its provisions are known, appears to have provided for a division of Macedonia between the two countries in the event of a successful war being waged against Turkey. It has been stated that under the Treaty a certain district was reserved for partition later, and that in case of disagreement between the two parties the matter should be settled by reference to the arbitration of the Czar. This Treaty mentioned only Macedonia and Albania and did not refer at all to Thrace. The Servians having been deprived of their share of Albania, whereas the Bulgarians had obtained the greater part of Thrace, maintained that the subject-matter of the contract had been altered, so that the Treaty was not applicable under the circumstances; moreover, Servia had lent Bulgaria 50,000 men for the siege of Adrianople and had also sent men to Bulair in the second phase of the campaign. Bulgaria, in reply to the Servian contention, argued that the strict letter of the Treaty ought to be adhered to.

The negotiations between Bulgaria and Greece were of a totally different nature, for there was no sort of previous arrangement between them as to a partition of the conquered territory. Greece so far from demanding all her rights in accordance with ethnological principles, which as has been shown would have included everything south of a line drawn roughly from Monastir to Adrianople and ending at the point at which the old Turco-Bulgarian border reached the Black Sea, merely asked for the territory which she had occupied and a sufficient hinterland north







of Salonica reaching to Doiran and to north of Demir-Hissar to give her a sound strategical frontier, with the River Nestos as the eastern boundary. Thus Greece in her demands generously abandoned the whole of Thrace to Bulgaria. Later, when the attitude of the Bulgarians was shown to be uncompromising, she further reduced these demands, and it appeared that she would have been satisfied with the River Strymon as her eastern boundary. It is instructive to see how Bulgaria met these moderate demands, on the part of Greece. At first, not satisfied with the whole of Thrace and the north-east of Macedonia, she actually claimed Salonica and a frontier passing just north of Veria and the Lake of Kastoria. About that time, or earlier, she had a map printed of the Czardom of Bulgaria, which was circulated throughout the territories which she occupied and of which a facsimile is published in this book. In this map Bulgaria practically reaches the lines of Chatalja in the east. It leaves out the peninsula of Gallipoli, but includes the whole of Chalkidike and reaches to within a few miles of the old Græco-Turkish frontier, the tract left between the new Bulgarian frontier and this frontier being awarded to Albania! At the end of May it appeared that Bulgaria had somewhat moderated her demands, and it was even stated that M. Gueschoff, while he was Prime Minister, was willing to waive his claims on Salonica.

In the meantime the Bulgaro-Servian relations were becoming strained, as the two parties failed to arrive at points of view in any way compatible with one another, M. Venizélos made the proposal that all the questions at issue between the allies, should be settled at a meeting of the representative delegates of the four allies at Salonica. M. Pasitch and M. Martinovitch (for Montenegro) willingly accepted this proposal, but Bulgaria declined. M. Pasitch and M. Venizélos then both proposed that the four allies should refer the whole question of the division of territory to the arbitration of the Czar. The Bulgarians at first pressed

for the arbitration of the Czar merely on the disputed zone between Bulgaria and Servia, referred to in the secret Treaty. Later, after the Czar had appealed to the kings of both countries not to embark upon a fratricidal war, the Bulgarians professed to be willing to repair to St. Petersburg, but never made it clear that they were ready to refer all questions at issue to the arbitration of the Czar. At this moment M. Gueschoff resigned office and was replaced by M. Daneff, who was known as the leader of the Russophil party. For the next few days M. Venizélos and M. Pasitch were awaiting the summons to St. Petersburg, but no definite information could be obtained as to what Dr. Daneff proposed to do.

Since the beginning of April there had been various frontier incidents between the Greeks and the Bulgars, among the earlier and most serious being the fight at Nigrita, in which several hundred men were engaged on each side and the casualties were considerable. Shortly after this one or two other skirmishes, not of a very serious nature, took place, and then a neutral zone was agreed upon between Bulgarian and Greek officers appointed for the purpose. Towards the end of May, however, very serious fighting occurred in what is known as the Panghæon district to the east of the River Strymon. The Bulgarians pushed large bodies of troops forward with the evident intention of driving the Greek forces back to the sea, presumably so that there could be no fear of their cutting the railway from Serres to Drama in the event of a Græco-Bulgarian war. It is evident, from an examination of the accounts which were published at the time by the light of the Austrian staff map, that all these frontier incidents (with the exception of one at Anghista) were provoked by the Bulgarians advancing. In the case of the latter, which occurred during the course of several days' fighting in the Panghæon district, a Greek lieutenant apparently took the initiative contrary to the orders of his superior officer with the object of recovering certain positions which had been seized by the Bulgarians. After the fighting was over in this district a fresh neutral zone was defined, under

which the Bulgarians were allowed to reap the advantage of positions which they had gained. However, on no less than three occasions did they advance their outposts, so that by the end of June these were within a few miles of Salonica at one point. The Bulgarians at the beginning of June had outrageously fired on the *Georgios Averoff*, which was cruising along the coast towards Salonica, and had also provoked the Greeks in a most insulting manner by driving some prisoners whom they took at Panghæon through the streets of Serres, jeering at them, when the Greeks who had previously captured a considerable number of prisoners at Nigrita, had promptly delivered them up to the Bulgarians so soon as an agreement was come to fixing a neutral zone. Their oppressive treatment of the Greeks in many of the towns and districts which they had captured also began to rouse Greek public feeling, and it culminated with the finding of the mutilated bodies of five or six Greeks, among them a well-known schoolmaster which was washed up from the River Strymon.

At the Peace Conference of St. James's, the Bulgarians had shown a most selfish attitude, for though they had insisted upon the cession to them of Adrianople before it had been captured, and received their allies' support in this, they did not show any inclination to back up Greece and Servia over their claims in Epirus, and for access to the Adriatic respectively. This attitude on the part of the Bulgarians put M. Venizélos and M. Pasitch on their guard, and during the few weeks after the former's return to Greece pourparlers were begun with a view to an understanding between Greeks and Servians in the event of difficulties arising with Bulgaria over the partition of territory. These pourparlers, as was soon to be known, resulted in the conclusion of a ten years' offensive and defensive alliance between the two countries, and the course of the Græco-Servian frontier was definitely settled. Prince Nicholas conducted the earlier negotiations as representative of Greece at Belgrade, and the alliance was finally concluded at Athens soon after King George's death, the Crown Prince Alexander being the Servian plenipotentiary.

Monastir, which had been the subject of considerable discussion, was allotted to Servia. It may be said that this was the first Greek centre that had been finally abandoned by Hellenism. In the middle of June, when M. Venizélos was in Salonica, the existence of this alliance was an open secret, and Hellene and Serb felt that henceforth they could snap their fingers at Bulgar. The Bulgarians, however, under the leadership of the tactless and bourgeois Dr. Daneff, went on their way in crass ignorance, preparing themselves, as was afterwards proved, for the crushing (as they fondly imagined) of their two allies whom they affected to despise, while their armies persisted in drawing their ring tighter round Salonica and their agents within the town were making their preparations with a view to acting in concert with the troops outside. Numbers of the most notorious Komitadjes gathered within the town and brought in large quantities of gunpowder, dynamite, bombs, and rifles secretly. The Greek authorities discovered vegetable carts entering the city in which a very thin upper stratum of vegetable was found to cover supplies of a very different kind. From that moment they took their measures quietly but surely, and found an enormous quantity of everything that could possibly be required for producing a thorough uproar and disturbance in the city. These they confiscated, and at the same time they arrested all the individuals in whose possession they found these compromising materials or who were otherwise suspected of being accessories. These discoveries were conclusive evidence of an elaborate plot which had been hatched with the evident knowledge and approval of the Bulgarian General in Salonica, as certain facts which are stated below will show.

Nevertheless, on the morning of the 29th of June, both the Servian and Greek military headquarters believed that war had been averted, and that the conference would take place at St. Petersburg under the auspices of the Czar. So late as the night of Sunday, June 29th, an acquaintance of the writer was assured by the Greek Chief of Staff at Salonica that war, in his opinion, had been avoided. Also the writer

has first-hand knowledge that the General in command of the Servian troops at Uskub had the same belief so late as the following morning, that is to say, Monday, June 30th. This, however, was merely the lull which comes before the storm, for on the night of the 29th of June the Bulgarians made an attack along the whole length of the Servian and Greek lines. Their attack on the Servian outposts appears to have been nothing less than a brutal, cold-blooded, premeditated murder, as Dr. Dillon states in his article on Foreign Affairs published in the *Contemporary Review* for last August. It is one of the most disgraceful incidents in the whole of history. At the very moment when the Bulgarians had led the Servians and the Greeks to believe that they were willing to refer their differences to arbitration and were averse to going to war, they deliberately planned and executed a night attack in force. The *Mir* of Sofia, the organ of the Russophil party, has recently published two Bulgarian headquarters telegraphic orders, which constitute the most crushing proof that the night attack against the Greeks and the Servians on the 29th of June was coldly premeditated. They are as follows :

HEADQUARTERS, SOFIA,  
15/28 June, 8 p.m.,  
*In cipher, very urgent.*

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 4TH ARMY,  
RADOVISTA.

In order that our failure to reply to the attacks of the Servians should not react upon the *morale* of our troops, and in order that the enemy should not be further encouraged, I command you to attack the enemy most vigorously along the whole front, without unmasking all your forces and without allowing yourself to be drawn into a continuous engagement. At the same time you will make the most strenuous effort to establish yourself in force at Krivolak, on the right bank of the River Bregalnitz, on the height 350 of Bogoslav, on the height 550 of the village of Sahad (Ovche Polye), and near the village of Dobrevo.

Open fire for choice in the evening, and during the night under cover of the darkness deliver a violent attack along the whole front.

This operation must be effected to-morrow the 16th (*i.e.* 29th) June in the evening. No. 5,597.

*The Deputy Commander-in-Chief,*  
GENERAL SAVOFF.

The second document is dated the very day of the attack.

HEADQUARTERS, SOFIA,  
16/29 June, 3.15 p.m.  
*In cipher, very urgent.*

TO THE ARMY COMMANDERS.

By a previous order I have commanded the 4th Army to continue its forward march and the 2nd Army, after completing its operations against Tsagesi, to concentrate on the line fixed for attacking Salonica.

The Army Commanders must bear in mind that our operations against the Hellenes and the Servians are taking place *without any official declaration of war*, and that they have been dictated to us by the following important considerations :

1. To raise as much as possible the *morale* of our troops, and to make them consider our ex-allies as enemies.
2. By the threat of a declaration of war between the allies to force Russian policy to hasten the solution of the question, a course which will save us from delays.
3. By the violent blows which we shall deliver on our allies to compel them to be more conciliatory.
4. As we claim the territories which *de facto* they hold, to succeed by force of arms in occupying new territories which we shall be able to continue to do until the intervention of the Powers brings our military operations to a standstill. And as such intervention may take place at any moment, it is imperative that you should act promptly and energetically.

The 4th Army must make an effort to occupy Vélès at all costs, the capture of which will be of great importance from the political point of view. It follows as a matter of course that it will be necessary to occupy previously the line Saltou-Tepe-Kratovo and Klisseli.

The 2nd Army, when it has completed its concentration, will, if the operations of the 4th Army permit it, receive orders to attack Salonica. In that case it will be reinforced by two or three brigades.

If the Krivolak-Gevgeli and the Gevgeli sections of the railway line are occupied by our troops, entrenchments will be constructed forthwith, which will be guarded by strong columns. In this way the occupation of both banks of the Vardar will be secured. No. 5,647.

*The Deputy Commander-in-Chief,*  
GENERAL SAVOFF.

Further comment on these cynical documents is needless.

The Greek outposts had had strict orders to fall back on their main forces on any attempt being made by the Bulgarians to advance, and this they succeeded in doing without serious loss. In Salonica, at ten o'clock next morning, rumours were circulating to the effect that fighting had taken place at Panghæon, and also that the train going northwards had returned, not having been able to go beyond Goumentze. These rumours were soon afterwards confirmed, and the additional news published that the Bulgarians had attacked and occupied Gevgeli. It was at this point that the Servian and Greek zones joined, and thus the Bulgarians' object was to cause the Servian right wing and the Greek left wing to lose touch with one another. Moreover, Gevgeli lay on the way to Monastir, which was the centre of the district which was claimed from Servia. A little later the news was received that the Bulgarians had crossed the River Strymon, and had attacked the whole Servian front from above Gevgeli as far as the old Servian frontier.

There had remained in Salonica about 1,300 Bulgarian soldiers, under the command of General Hassapsieff, who also acted as the Bulgarian plenipotentiary there. On receipt of the news of the attack by the Bulgarian armies, the Greeks decided to disarm all the Bulgarian troops in Salonica, and send them off to the nearest outposts. General Hassapsieff was allowed to leave immediately, on the ground that he was a diplomatic agent. On his departure, however, as became generally known in Salonica, he left orders with his officers to hold out and refuse to surrender at all costs, as he would himself be back in the town within twenty-four hours with a whole Bulgarian division! General Kalares, the Commander of the 2nd Division, which was then quartered in the town, sent an ultimatum to the Bulgarians early in the afternoon, summoning them to hand over their arms, and he allowed them until six o'clock to comply with his request. The Bulgarians, in accordance with the orders which they

had received, barricaded themselves in various buildings which they had seized in different quarters of the town, including the church of St. Sophia, and refused to give themselves up. The Greeks were thus obliged to attack them, but had great difficulty in dislodging some of them from the basements of the buildings. Quick-firing guns were then placed in the White Tower and fired up the Boulevard Hamidieh on some houses where the Bulgars still held out, and finally a field gun had to be trained on these houses. The street fighting went on all night, and the last Bulgar was captured at seven o'clock in the morning. It appears that of the Bulgarian officers some handed themselves up to the Greek authorities at once, while most of them fled disguised as Turkish women, having left orders to their men to fight and on no account to surrender. This is typical of the attitude of the Bulgarian officer towards the men of the ranks. The writer himself observed how Bulgarian officers would prod with their swords soldiers who were not marching smartly enough when a regiment was marching at attention through a town, just as though they were beasts. It is characteristic, too, of the quiet efficiency which the Greek military authorities have displayed throughout the last year that they dealt with the Bulgarian troops in Salonica and the Komitadjes so promptly, and that after the street battle was over, except for the ruins of some of the buildings which had been bombarded, there was no sign of anything extraordinary having occurred. On the morning of the 1st of July the town was in an atmosphere of perfect calm, and there was no panic of any kind among the inhabitants.

The same day the Greek Foreign Minister made a public declaration to the effect that his Government treated this attack on the part of the Bulgarians as an act of war, and said, "We are obliged to order our divisions in Macedonia to recapture the positions which have been taken from them."







BANNER CAPTURED FROM THE BULGARIANS HAVING THE WORDS "FORWARD TO  
ATHENS" EMBROIDERED ON IT.

## CHAPTER XXIII

### THE BURSTING OF THE BULGARIAN BUBBLE (*continued*)


#### *The Græco-Bulgarian Campaign*

SINCE the end of the war with Turkey a 9th Division had been formed out of levies made in Epirus, and a 10th Division had been made up out of independent bodies of troops, mostly Evzoni battalions. The 9th Division remained in Epirus, but Divisions I–VII and Division X had been concentrated round Salonica and Division VIII was brought up after the commencement of hostilities. The positions occupied by the Greeks on the 30th of June extended from the Gulf of Orfano to Lakes Beshik and Langaza, and from Salonica to Bœmitza on the Vardar. During the attack on the night of June 29th, when the Bulgarians attacked the Greek outposts on Mount Panghæon and subsequently those at Berova and Nigrita, these fell back on their main bodies in accordance with orders. The Greeks had fortified Salonica with a large number of siege guns, including some naval guns, and had also landed a naval detachment. The 7th Division was posted between Lake Beshik and the Gulf of Orfano, forming the extreme right; the 6th Division between Lake Beshik and Lake Langaza with the 1st Division on its left formed the right centre; the 4th, 2nd, and 5th Divisions which had received marching orders were grouped north-west of Salonica, with the 8th Division in reserve, and the 10th Division was on the right bank of the Vardar with the 3rd Division in reserve.

The Bulgarians under General Ivanoff had fortified themselves in positions well entrenched, and on heights varying

from 1,000 to 2,500 feet along the hills from Gevgeli through Kilkis, Lahana, north of Nigrita as far as the River Strymon, north of the Lake Tachinos as far as Kavalla. Generally speaking, their troops were spread over a very long front. The centre of their position was Kilkis, and they had constructed several lines of defences in front of that town. The importance of this position was well understood by the Bulgarians, and for the benefit of those readers who are not familiar with the geographical features of the country it will be well to give a short explanation. The Vardar Valley with its railway was in the hands of the Servians, and gave them a direct line of communication from their capital through Uskub to the front. Their front extended from Uskub in the north to Gevgeli, where it joined the Greek front which has already been described. The Bulgarian forces opposed to the Servians were necessarily split into two units by the impassable mountain range described in the Austrian staff map as the Plaskovitsa Planina, lying east of Istib and south of Kotchana. The only direct way of communication between Sofia and both this southern Bulgarian force operating against the Servians and the army operating against the Greeks was the valley of the Strymon. Along this, however, there was no good military road, merely a rough road which through the Kresna Pass was nothing more than a track. The Bulgarians found it impracticable to supply their army by this road, and they were therefore obliged to send all supplies by the railway line through Adrianople, Demotica, and Serres to Doiran, which thus became the base not only for their 2nd Army under General Ivanoff operating against the Greeks, but also for their 4th Army under General Kovacheff operating against the southern Servian army. From this it will be seen that the cutting of the railway line anywhere east of Doiran would mean the isolation of the whole of the Bulgarian forces south of the Plaskovitsa Planina, and that the loss of Doiran itself, at which immense stores

# THE SECOND WAR





had been collected, would prevent the Bulgarians remaining any longer in Southern Macedonia.

A good deal of dispute and discussion has taken place with regard to the numbers of the Bulgarian forces which were opposed to the Greeks. The Bulgarians themselves made out that they did not exceed 35,000 (obviously an absurd computation), whereas the Greeks put them down at more than 100,000. Captain Trapmann, who accompanied the Greek Army throughout the war, estimates them at 115,000, excluding the troops holding the lines of communication, which he puts at 25,000. It is known that four Bulgarian divisions were under General Ivanoff's command. A Bulgarian reinforced division in war-time consists of from 25,000 to 30,000 men, but a division which is not reinforced is the equal of a Greek division, *i.e.* 15,000 men. It will thus be seen that, according as the divisions were reinforced or simple divisions, the strength could vary from 60,000 to more than a 100,000. It seems fairly clear, moreover, that before General Ivanoff was hard pressed by the Greeks, he dispatched one division on a forced march to Krivolak in order to reinforce the forces operating against the Servians. It must not be forgotten, too, that the Greeks captured 93 field guns from the Bulgarians. A division of 15,000 men has 24 guns and a reinforced division has 36 guns. It is not suggested that the Greeks captured the whole of the Bulgarian guns opposed to them. From various indications it would appear, therefore, that the total of General Ivanoff's army was at least 80,000, and probably not less than 100,000, when hostilities broke out, and that these were reduced to between 80,000 and 60,000 by the removal of this division before the battle of Kilkis to the Servian field of operations. The number was, however, made up by the arrival of another division from Chatalja. Fortunately, however, for the Greeks this division did not arrive in time to help in the defence of the main positions of Kilkis, though it helped in blocking the road to Doiran.

King Constantine, realizing the importance of capturing Doiran, decided upon an attack in force along the whole line. The order to advance was given on Tuesday, July 2nd, and on that day Divisions IV, II, V, I, and VI managed to drive back the Bulgarian advanced detachments and become masters of the plains of Kilkis and Langaza. On the 2nd of July some of the Greek units marched as much as twenty miles. On the 3rd the attack was begun on the position of Kilkis itself. The Bulgarians had taken the range for their guns beforehand, and their artillery worked destructively on the Greek infantry. The King adopted the plan of attack in short bursts at the double in such a way as not to give the Bulgarians time to adjust their guns to each new range. These tactics, though expensive, met with complete success; an eyewitness likened the onrush of the Greek infantry to that of a succession of waves. As each infantry unit made good its position the artillery galloped into action, and with lightning speed unlimbered and shelled the Bulgarian positions with striking effect. In the meantime the 7th Division occupied Nigrita, and on that day the 6th and 1st Divisions attacked and captured the positions at Lahana, a 663-metre hill. This position was defended by 16 battalions and 24 guns. The Evzoni on the left recaptured Gevgeli and advanced and stormed the heights of Matsikovo. Thus it will be seen that the centre of the enemy's position at Kilkis was in danger of being outflanked, and, moreover, of being cut off from Doiran. Divisions IV, II, and V in the centre came in touch with the enemy's chief Kilkis positions on July 3rd; the attack was pushed home under cover of the Greek artillery, and the main trenches were taken at the point of the bayonet on the morning of Friday, July 4th. During the 3rd and the 4th of July the 14th Bulgarian Division arrived from Chatalja, and the units were detrained and brought into action as soon as possible. At Kilkis itself the Greeks captured 16 cannon and 8 mitrailleuses, the 7th Division took a whole regiment prisoners at Nigrita, and many guns fell into the hands of the 1st and





AFTER THE BATTLE OF KILGUS.



6th Divisions at Lahana. The Bulgarian forces which were at Kilkis and at Gevgeli retired towards Doiran, and placing their cannon on the heights above the lake made a desperate resistance. The Greeks were not to be denied, however, and after five hours' fighting they brought the great battle of Kilkis-Lahana-Doiran to a glorious conclusion by capturing Doiran itself on July 5th and driving the Bulgarians in disorder towards Strumnitza. The army stores and ammunition which fell into their hands at Doiran have been valued at not much under £100,000.

The movement on the part of the Greeks which ended in the capture of Doiran was the decisive stroke in the campaign in South Macedonia. Doiran was occupied on the 5th of July. It is instructive while keeping this date in mind to take a short glance at the Servian operations of the preceding days. The Bulgarians, as a result of their night attack, were on the 30th of June in possession of the line Krivolak, Istib, Redka-Budka. The Servians delivered their counter-attack on the 2nd of July, and by the evening of July 4th the 1st Servian Army had crossed the River Sletovska, had taken Redka-Budka and was threatening Kotchana. In the meantime the 3rd Servian Army which was massed between Krivolak and Istib had been forced back by the Bulgarian forces opposed to it in such a way that the Servian Morava Division was in danger of being isolated. The position remained the same until the evening of the 5th, when the capture of Doiran by the Greeks forced the Bulgarian forces to retire in the direction of Strumnitza. This event decided the first phase of the campaign definitely in favour of the allies. The Servian's 1st Army's attack to the north of the Plaskovitsa Planina was completely successful and had the effect of driving the Bulgarians back to Kotchana, but a complete victory was not won until the advance of the Greeks enabled the 3rd Servian Army to turn a doubtful struggle into a success also. During the 6th, 7th and 8th of July the 3rd Servian Army drove the Bulgars back as far as Radovista.

After the fall of Doiran, part of the Bulgarian forces which had been fighting between Kilgis and Doiran retreated towards Strumnitza along the road passing west of the Veles Mountains, while the remainder retired eastward towards Demir-Hissar. The 3rd, 4th and 2nd Greek Divisions advanced over the mountain with the 5th Division in reserve, and thus circumvented the entrenchments constructed by the Bulgarians in the Strumnitza Pass, but all the artillery was obliged to follow the road. The Bulgarians retreating before the Servians from Istib joined the Bulgarian forces retiring from Doiran at Strumnitza. The 10th Greek Division had fought its way up the Furka Pass and helped to turn the Doiran positions; the agile Evzoni were now sent to cut off the Bulgarian retreat along the valley of the river towards Petrici, but they were unable, having no field artillery with them, to prevent these forces escaping, and they were obliged to watch the great army retreating along the valley several thousand feet below the heights upon which they were standing. There seems, however, to be little doubt that if the Servians had advanced eastwards across the Malesh Mountains in the same way as the Greek troops did, they might have cut off the Bulgarians at the entrance of the Struma Pass, and then the Sedan which was prophesied by many would have come to pass. From accounts of correspondents who were with the Servian army, it appears that after carrying out their operations during the first week with great strategical and tactical skill, the Servians seemed to have proceeded on no properly organized plan of campaign during the last three weeks of the war. It may have been that they did not wish to crush the Bulgarians, but only to occupy such territory as they claimed. At any rate their generals, instead of calling upon their men to make an effort and so cut off the demoralized Bulgarian Southern Army, cried a halt and proceeded later at their leisure to attack Tsarevo-selo and one or two other strongly fortified positions which they wished to possess, when by making attacks on less formidable positions along the Bulgarian line they might have turned





BRIDGE OVER THE STRYMON DESTROYED BY THE BULGARIANS.



KRESNA PASS, LOOKING NORTH.

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Tsarevo-selo and gained their object by sounder and less expensive strategy.

While the centre and left of the Greek army was advancing on Strumnitza, the 1st, 6th, and 7th Divisions arrived at the Strymon River, north of Nigrita, and found the bridges at Orliako and elsewhere destroyed. Thus the town of Serres, which had been evacuated by the Bulgarians on the 4th of July, was completely cut off from the Greek regular forces. The events connected with the burning and subsequent Greek occupation of Serres are a little difficult to unravel. It appears that an irregular Greek force was formed out of some Andartes and some Serres citizens for the defence of the town, but that another Bulgarian force, which seems to have been retreating from the Kavalla district, shelled the town and subsequently burnt it. In this way the unfortunate city of Serres, which had only fallen into the hands of the Bulgarians by an error in November, 1912, was now sacrificed by another ironical stroke of fortune. When the Greek army was approaching Salonica from Veria a year ago some Greek irregular bands were known to be in the neighbourhood of Serres. The citizens sent out a boy on a bicycle to try and find one of these bands and ask its captain to take charge of the city. The boy failed to find any of them, however, and the next day the citizens surrendered the city to a band of less than twenty Bulgarian irregulars—an act which they have never ceased to regret.

The Bulgarian forces retreating before Divisions I, VI, and VII entrenched themselves on the heights south of Demir-Hissar. General Manusojannakis, the *divisionnaire* of the 1st Division, was in command of these three divisions, and when he had succeeded in bridging the Strymon he attempted to dislodge the Bulgarians from the heights south of Demir-Hissar. This he succeeded in doing after he had been able to place his artillery in a favourable position. The Bulgarians retreated from Demir-Hissar in a north-easterly direction, and the Greek right wing again joined forces with the centre and left in the neighbourhood

of Petrici. This closed the first phase of the campaign, during which the Greeks took about 8,000 prisoners, 18 siege guns, 67 field guns, and 30 mitrailleuses. The following chapter is devoted exclusively to the outrages on humanity and on civilization committed by the Bulgarians upon the Greek and Turkish population of Thrace and Macedonia, and so no reference is made here to what the Greek troops found when they entered Nigrita, Serres, and Demir-Hissar. It is, however, to be noted that their experiences in these towns fired the Greek soldiers with a kind of divine frenzy, and thus the Greeks, who as a rule are cool and cautious fighters, hurled themselves against the Bulgarian artillery and turned the tables upon the Bulgar by using the bayonet upon him with dire effect in the trenches. The story of the two Evzoni who, after finding the mutilated body of their brother, refused to return with the rest of their company when ordered to retire from an attack which was not pushed home, but dashed up the hill alone and won through to a Bulgarian battery which was creating havoc among the attacking Greek forces, and bayoneted some thirty Bulgarian artillerymen before being shot with revolvers by the Bulgarian officers, shows the heroic deeds to which the Greeks were roused by Bulgarian barbarity.

On July 9th Admiral Koundouriotis effected a landing at Kavalla by means of the ruse of playing with his searchlight on another point of the coast and thus inducing the Bulgarians to expect a landing at that point. In this way he undoubtedly saved Kavalla from destruction. The Greek fleet occupied Dedeagatch on July 25th, and Porto Lagos, Maronia, and Makri on July 28th. The 8th Division, under General Mathiopulos, was landed at Kavalla, and fulfilled the task of an army of occupation in Eastern Macedonia. The Bulgarian forces, amounting probably to not less than from 12,000 to 15,000 men, which were in Eastern Macedonia, had concentrated east of Serres, and finding their retreat by the valley of the Strymon cut off, took the coach-road through Zernovo and Libjahovo. General Manuso-







KRESNA PASS. ANOTHER VIEW.

jannakis' force, which had occupied Demir-Hissar, came in touch with these troops and pursued them up the valley of the Nestos River through Nevrokop, which was occupied on July 15th after a daring night attack, in which the artillery had great difficulty in getting within range of the Turkish batteries. These Bulgarians retired in great disorder towards their frontier, and 18 out of their 22 guns fell into the hands of the Greeks.

Meanwhile the Greek left and centre advanced along the Kresna Pass. One of the features of this advance was the march of some troops along the summit of the mountains on both sides of the pass. From July 20th to the 23rd these troops were fighting their way along Kresna, and by the 24th the Greek centre was at the top of the pass a few miles south of Djumaia. There a deputation of Turkish inhabitants from the town of Djumaia petitioned them to occupy their city and protect them from the Bulgarians, who had burnt its Turkish and Greek quarters.

The right wing, consisting of the 1st, 6th, and 7th Divisions, under General Manusojannakis, continued its advance along the east of the Strymon Pass, with its front extending as far east at Kremen, which was occupied by the 7th Division on July 23rd. This division advanced to Banska and Mehomia (Razlog) on July 24th and 25th, and then moved in a more westerly direction in order to keep in touch with the 6th Division, which was perched on the inaccessible crags to the east of the Strymon and to the north of Gradevo. The 6th Division pushed its way northward as far as 1,378-Metre Hill on the Arisvanitsa range, which became the scene of most sanguinary combats, being captured and recaptured on several occasions. At one moment the opposing forces, their ammunition having come to an end, hurled stones at one another across a ravine. At that time the 1st Division was on the road north of Uranovo, and the 5th Division was acting as a reserve in the Kresna Pass. The Bulgarians facing the Greek centre were defeated, and were forced to retire to the north of Djumaia on July 23rd and 24th. On

July 25th the 6th Division was pushing forward in pursuit of some 4,000 Bulgarians, who were retreating before it. On that day, therefore, the country east of the Strymon appeared to be practically clear of the enemy, but that afternoon the Bulgarians brought up 20,000 fresh troops, including their 1st Division, and while 5,000 attacked the weak garrison left by the 7th Division at Mehomia from the north-east the remaining 15,000 were sent against the 6th Division. A critical struggle ensued, in which the 6th Division was at one moment in danger of being annihilated. when reinforcements arrived from the 1st and 5th Divisions. A regiment from the latter enfiladed the Bulgarian line from its right flank and completely broke it up. Thus the terrible fighting to the east of Djumaia ended in a complete victory for the Greeks; but the carnage on both sides had been terrible. The 7th Division staff learnt of the attack which was contemplated on Mehomia, and Colonel Sotilis promptly retraced his steps and made a completely successful counter-attack. Thus all that the Bulgarians gained by their attack there was the capture of some baggage, including the famous mail-bag alleged to contain letters admitting atrocities by Greek soldiers, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

In the meantime interesting developments were taking place on the Greek left. The Bulgarians were in great strength between Kustendil and Tsarevo-selo. At the urgent request of the Servian General Staff the Greeks had practically lent two divisions (III and X) to co-operate with the Servians by attacking Tsarevo-selo from the south-east. As the Servians had somewhat relaxed their efforts in the direction of Tsarevo-selo, the Bulgarians, after their defeat in front of Djumaia, were able to transfer two divisions from Tsarevo-selo and to make an attack against the Greek left, consisting of Divisions III and X, under General Damianos: these two Greek divisions were obliged, in the face of overwhelming superior numbers, to fall back to Pechovo. General Moschopoulos, who, with his own and the 2nd Division, was at Simetli, having lost touch with





AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE ARMISTICE. GREEK TROOPS WITHDRAWING FROM ADVANCED POSITIONS.

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the Greek forces on his left, had to choose between retreating through the Kresna Pass or trying a bold stroke. He wisely chose the latter course, and, after hard fighting, established himself along the ridge Zanoga, Hassan Pasha, and at Leska, thus placing the Bulgarian forces which had advanced towards Pechovo in a very awkward predicament when "Cease fire" sounded. It is no wonder that the Bulgarians were not loth for an armistice. Their attitude in this respect is not to be explained by the presence of the Roumanian troops, because these had retired during the previous few days and were merely holding the ring. With regard to the Roumanians, it should be made clear that their invasion of Bulgaria did not take place until after the decisive battles of Bregnalitza and Kilkis-Doiran, which really overthrew the Bulgarian pretensions.

It will be seen that the operations during the past fortnight had been somewhat unsatisfactory, owing to the fact that the Servians, instead of helping the Greeks wholeheartedly to attain their object, which was to reach Sofia, made some attacks at Tsarevo-selo and on one or two other positions without any definite plan of campaign. As events turned out, however, General Moschopulos was on the point of completing a movement, which, in the opinion of competent military critics, would have resulted in the capture or else destruction of no less than two and a half Bulgarian divisions, amounting to about 50,000 men. Within some three or four hours this movement would have been completed; but unfortunately the Greek peace delegates at Bucharest could not be aware of the exact position; otherwise there can be no doubt that they would not have agreed to grant an armistice at the moment when they did so, for by waiting a little they would have been in a much stronger position at the Conference. The Bulgarians practically admitted the plight of their forces in the Pechovo district, for whereas they greatly advertised their temporary success in the Mehomia region, they said very little about their much

more substantial success over the Greek 3rd and 10th Divisions. They realized that it was wise to be discreet and not to say too much about it, but to get the armistice concluded as soon as possible.

The Greek losses during the month cannot have been less than 25,000—10,000 in the first week, 5,000 during the second and third weeks, and 10,000 in the last ten days. The sacrifices which he made and the enthusiasm which he showed during this campaign in this desolate country showed that the Greek soldier was more wonderful than any one had given him credit for, even after his victories over the Turk. The thirst and hunger, and the sufferings which the wounded had to endure who were taken back through the Kresna Pass is beyond description. General Eydoux, in an interview granted shortly after the close of the One Month's War, paid the following remarkable tribute to the Greek Army: "We had raw material of the first quality to work upon, soldiers of elevated *morale*, endowed with irrepressible enthusiasm, with unexampled patriotism. The men are all clever; they comprehend in a word what you tell them. Their needs are small, they are often satisfied with a piece of bread and some olives or cheese. Soldiers all the world over agree that, when the men of an army have all these qualities, that army is the most perfect in the world. I was so positive about the outcome of the second war that when the war was declared against Bulgaria, I said to King Constantine, 'Your Majesty, with such troops you may dare everything.'"

King Constantine's rôle in this short but arduous campaign must not be forgotten. Suffice it to say that his brilliant generalship and management of the campaign showed that his success against the Turks was not merely the result of good fortune, but that his great military exploits of the past year should be ascribed to exceptional soldierly qualities and organizing capacity, which if he lead his Army to yet further victories, may earn him the title of military genius from future historians.

A fact of particular interest is the success experienced by



the Greeks with inoculation with a new serum against cholera, with the result that while among the Bulgarians and the Servians and the Roumanians this terrible scourge numbered hundreds of victims, there were very few cases in the Greek Army which proved fatal.

## CHAPTER XXIV

### THE BURSTING OF THE BULGARIAN BUBBLE (*continued*)

#### *The Atrocities Committed by the Bulgarians*

THE subject of Balkan atrocities, especially atrocities in connection with the Bulgarians, is one that needs some caution in approaching, for Europe and Great Britain in particular have been sated with accounts of the ill-treatment of one race by another for the last forty years. To any one who had followed the history of the Balkans during the last few decades it seemed improbable that a war should be waged without many tales of atrocities being published. Thus, when in the Turco-Balkan War some of the Greeks were murdered at Serfidje by the Turks retiring, in the rage of their defeat, the world did not receive the news with amazement. It may be said that the Turks, except when a wave of Moslem fanaticism was set in motion, had not of late years massacred or even ill-treated their Christian neighbours. Most of the other regrettable incidents which occurred in the Græco-Turkish campaign were paralleled by events which took place in the South African War. They consisted mostly of such occurrences as a continuation of firing after the hoisting of the white flag, though there were instances of Turkish irregulars doing to death wounded Greeks, as at Sorovitz. The conduct of the Greek Army was really almost impeccable with regard to such matters, and accusations of any sorts were brought alone against some of the irregulars, who were at first operating in Epirus, but who, when they proved unsatisfactory, were disbanded. Of the Servians it may be said that in certain districts of Old Servia they

helped the Servian inhabitants to retaliate on the Arnauts, who had persecuted them under the Turkish regime, and Miss Durham has related from incidents which she herself witnessed that Montenegrin soldiers have not yet abandoned the barbarous custom of cutting off the noses of their vanquished foes. Of the Bulgarians, strangely contradictory accounts reached home during the first two months of the war. Some accounts describe the Bulgarian soldiery as having behaved in the most noble and humane fashion to their foes and also to the populations of the districts through which they passed. Others, which trickled through in rather indirect ways, told a very different tale, but these latter accounts were of such a nature that they were obviously genuine, and they made it evident that the former accounts, in so far as they were generalizations, were of very much the same character as Lieutenant Wagner's accounts of the fighting in Thrace. It seems to be the fact that the Bulgarian troops which were in touch with the headquarters staff, had behaved extremely well. The correspondents who sent back these flattering accounts had seen the behaviour of these troops, and had not witnessed what was going on in other parts.

Thus, if a few reports of the conduct of the Bulgarians which came through indirectly are disregarded, it can be said that the first war was not marked by accounts of atrocities of a more lurid character than have occurred in most wars. It may be said too, that until the month of June, the public had received no information which should lead it to alter its mind in any way. No particular attention had been paid to these unofficial accounts which had trickled through, and the Bulgarians were "such tremendous heroes" in the eyes of Europe that the general attitude was to wink at anything that was reported to their discredit. When an idea is obtained of what the Greek and Turkish population of Thrace and Eastern Macedonia had had to endure for six or seven months, it is impossible not to wonder why what was going on was not published far

and wide. What is the explanation of this? So far as the Turks are concerned it is to be ascribed to the fact that they found it impossible to publish the facts, and when they did do so, what the Turks said against the Bulgars was not heeded. In the case of the Greeks it is a testimony to their long-suffering and loyal character. The writer heard some of the facts before he left Greece early last May, but that great man, Eleutherios Venizélos, then still believed in the possibility of preserving the Balkan Alliance, and the Greek policy was to suppress any statement which might tend in the direction of impairing the prestige of the alliance. Thus a prominent newspaper editor in Athens was court-martialled for having published articles criticizing Bulgarians unfavourably, but the court (quite rightly, as it seemed to the writer, who was present at the hearing) refused to convict him, because he proved that he had said nothing that was not in reply to allegations by Bulgarian newspapers against the Greeks.

It is usual to say that no one can speak with any definiteness about atrocities committed in the Balkans, unless he has been practically in the position of an eye-witness. That may be true of isolated instances in which the facts may be used by opposite parties to tell quite different stories. In the case, however, of the atrocities committed in Thrace and Eastern Macedonia by Bulgarians, the events, which unquestionably took place, can bear only one construction. For this reason the writer considers himself justified in transgressing this generally accepted rule as to evidence, though reference is made later to conclusive evidence regarding what happened in particular localities. It will be remembered that in Eastern Macedonia and in Thrace Bulgarians are scarce. The Bulgarian armies poured over this district in November last, and received every kind of assistance from the Greek inhabitants, who at the time did all they could to help them against the common enemy, certainly not with the idea that the Bulgarians would claim the permanent occupation of their country. It is estimated

that the Greek inhabitants of these districts expended no less than £2,000,000 for the maintenance of the Bulgarian troops. The thick-skinned Bulgar, however, had a very different idea in his mind, which was that he was to become the master of practically the whole of what was Turkey-in-Europe, as is shown by the map of the "Czardom of Bulgaria," which has already been referred to and which is reproduced in this book. As Colonel Apostoloff, the Bulgarian Commander in the Ortakeui District of Western Thrace, told the inhabitants: "I am determined to kill you all off or to make you good Bulgarians. You can take your choice." A state of affairs similar to that which exists in Austria-Hungary was not what the Bulgarian wished to see in his country. It does not require a wide stretch of imagination to perceive that the clumsy and boorish Bulgar is not equipped with the tact and finesse of the Austrian; consequently, unless he can Bulgarize his non-Bulgarian subjects, he is incapable of managing them. This is probably the explanation of his conduct towards the inhabitants of Thrace and Macedonia. He made it clear to them that they must either become Bulgarians or else their lives would become a misery to them, if worse did not befall them. Put shortly, what seems to have occurred in most districts is, that in the case of the Turks, all the able-bodied men were either converted (in nearly every case forcibly) or else were done to death, the old men being for the most part spared.<sup>1</sup> The writer has been told instances of where Bulgarian officers calmly drew their revolvers and shot down Turks, who were working in the fields through which they crossed, like rabbits. The women too were in most cases forcibly converted, and few escaped outrage. The Greek population at first, to a great extent, escaped the worst horrors, but in most towns the women were systematically outraged, as it appears to the writer, partly with a view to the propagation of the Bulgarian race. As evidence of what happened before the Græco-Bulgarian war may be mentioned the experiences of Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, who visited several districts west

<sup>1</sup> In the text of the Treaty of Constantinople the Turks baptized during the Bulgarian occupation are specially referred to.

of the Maritza. It was he who heard the tales of the cruelty and oppression of the above-mentioned Colonel Apostoloff. Another witness of the Bulgarians' conduct in Thrace, is M. Edm. Ch. Szemere, a Hungarian correspondent, who addressed the following letter to an Athens acquaintance:

I was at the war for nine months. I followed the Bulgarian headquarters and went through Thrace by motor, on horseback, and by rail, in every way. I have seen villages, towns, and entire districts destroyed. I have been present at battles and saw the horrors of war continually before my eyes. I have often been moved in the presence of these horrors; but what made the deepest impression upon me was the appearance of *forty-four Greek corpses, frightfully mutilated, bound four together, with their hands behind their backs*; corpses which the Turks had pulled out of the Arda at Adrianople the very day of their entry. The assassination, that is to say the massacre, had been committed by regular soldiers of the Royal Bulgarian Army, acting under orders. Poor men! I knew three of them. They had been massacred with a ferocious cruelty passing imagination, for nothing but because they were Greeks! It is a shame, a mockery of humanity, this line of blood which the Bulgarians have traced behind them from the commencement of their evacuation of Thrace! There are moments when one is ashamed of being a man and when one blushes to think that it is man who has created the word "humanity!"

EDM. CH. SZEMERE,

Correspondent of the *Pester Lloyd*, Budapest;  
of the *Berlin Lokal-Anzeiger*, Berlin;  
and of *L'Information*, of Vienna.

SALONICA, 12 VIII, 1913.

When in March it was suggested that the partition of territory should be made on the principle of *uti possidetis*, which would have meant that the Greeks of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace would have all passed under Bulgarian rule, a wail of horror went up from them, and they addressed a protest to the Greek Government, giving an account of Bulgarian misdeeds and stating that they would rather die than be subject to the Bulgarian yoke. Fortunately for them, the Bulgarians tried to ride the high horse, and so the Greek Government went to war over the rights of its people in Thrace and Macedonia. These folk hailed the war of deliverance with joy. They little knew, poor souls, what was in store for them before they could gain their liberty.





SERRES, DESTROYED BY THE BULGARIANS.



The outbreak of hostilities was the signal for an outburst of unprecedented brutality and barbarous and odious crimes on the part of the Bulgarians. The massacres and outrages of Serres, Demir-Hissar, Nigrita, and Doxato, to mention those which were on the largest scale, are now common knowledge to all except those who have purposely blinded themselves to any blots on the Bulgarian record. There were some eight responsible English, French, German, Italian, American, and Russian correspondents with the Greek Army in Southern Macedonia, and these were able to verify by examination of exhumed corpses the accusations brought by the Greeks. Moreover, several consular representatives in Salonica, the Secretary of the French Embassy at Athens, and a German officer instructed by the Kaiser also verified and made reports upon these horrors. The Greek Government desired the publication of these reports, but rumour had it that the details were so horrible that in deference to the piteous appeals of King Ferdinand they were kept secret. The writer has, however, had the opportunity of learning the contents of the telegram addressed by the Austrian Consul-General at Salonica to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, and the following is a translation :

SALONICA, 22nd July.

I visited Serres to-day by motor-car in the company of my Italian colleague. Three-quarters of this town, which was up to now rich and flourishing, is to-day a heap of smoking ashes.

The Bulgarians had already abandoned Serres on the 5th of July.

On the 11th of July regular troops and Komitadjes appeared under the command of officers and officials.

They bombarded the town, which was undefended, with four cannons, pillaged and burnt the most beautiful quarters of the city from top to bottom, including our consulate and many houses belonging to Austrian subjects.

The damage is valued at about 45,000,000 francs.

Fifty notables have been massacred. The Hungarian, Albert Bíró, and many persons perished in the flames.

Five of the new stores of the Austrian firm, Herzog & Co., have been destroyed and are still burning. The loss is as much as 2,500,000 francs.

Our standard was not respected : the Vice-Consul Zlatko, who was

holding the standard in his hands, was taken to the mountains with 150 persons who had taken refuge in the consulate, and was only released after paying a ransom.

It is indispensable that help be sent to our subjects, who belong to some of the richest Israelite families.

I appeal for large sums to be sent for the provision of food and clothing.

Drama has been occupied.

At Doxato several hundred women and young girls have been found massacred by the Bulgarians.

At Demir-Hissar 140 persons were likewise massacred.

The paragraph which states that the citizens of Serres were only released after payment of a ransom illustrates how the Bulgarian regular soldiers and officers throughout behaved not only as assassins but as robbers and brigands, for there are many instances narrated of how they released their victims and allowed people to escape on receiving substantial *douceurs*. It was, however, not only the payment of money which saved these citizens of Serres, but the presence of mind of a Greek professor who spoke Bulgarian and who managed to play upon the superstitious fear of their captors. He assumed the attitude of a clairvoyant and described before them a vision of vengeance which he saw : then when he had worked upon their feelings he made all his companions hurriedly hand up notes, jewellery and coins. Thus they escaped to Serres where they found the Greek 7th Division, while the Bulgarians, with over £400 in cash and much jewellery, hastened after the rest of their army.

Further evidence is furnished by a letter received by the writer from Commander Cardale, R.N., who, being at Kavalla, visited Doxato for the purpose of verifying the awful tales which he had heard there. The letter was published in the *Nation* of the 23rd of August, and extracts from it are printed here:

HOTEL IMPÉRIAL, ATHÈNES

le 22/4 August, 1913.

MY DEAR CASSAVETTI,

I received your wire yesterday and have taken twenty-four hours to consider my reply. You see my reports of what I saw at Doxato have been so garbled by reporters and others that I am naturally chary of

saying anything—not that this applies in your case, of course ! Also as you may well imagine, the horrors of that place of blood have so got on my nerves that I hate to speak of them. Still, as you ask me, I will tell you all I saw, and you have full permission to make use of all or any portion of this letter you may think fit for the purpose of publication. I went to Kavalla immediately after the Bulgarians vacated the place ; my duties there I need not go into, I was acting under the orders of the Greek Government, which as you know I am serving at present. On my arrival there I heard many stories of the horrible occurrences at Doxato, and it was alleged that practically all the inhabitants had been massacred by the Bulgarian troops passing through on their retreat. You will probably understand that having had a surfeit of these yarns, and knowing that war is not fought in kid gloves, I did not believe all I heard,<sup>1</sup> and at first believed that it was purely a question of the burning of the town by retreating Bulgarians enraged by their reverses, and perhaps a few regrettable incidents where non-combatants had been killed in the excitement of a retreat. However, after seeing wounded and mutilated persons being brought into Kavalla from Doxato day by day, and hearing detailed accounts from disinterested persons in Kavalla of all nationalities, I determined to go to Doxato to see for myself what had occurred. I accordingly took a carriage and drove there accompanied by a Greek naval officer, a Greek gentleman of Kavalla, and my Greek “angeliophores.”<sup>2</sup> The distance is about seventeen miles ; I have not measured it on the map as I have none with me at present, but I estimate it at that. It took me about three and a half hours to drive. The Bulgarians must have left Kavalla in a hurry, as they did not even strike their tents, which we found standing some miles outside on the Philippi road. At each village we passed through on our way to Doxato we found some of the wretched survivors of the Doxato massacre who were homeless, but did not wish to return to their ruined homes there after all they had suffered. Arriving at Doxato, we found it like a town of the dead. Everything burned and devastated and such an odour of blood and decomposed bodies as I never hope to encounter again.

Indeed, five minutes before we entered the town while driving through the plain, the stench was insupportable. In this plain were heaps of corpses thinly covered with sand, where the survivors had tried for sanitary reasons to cover up their dead, but they were all too few to do so thoroughly, and for all practical purposes the bodies were unburied. On entering Doxato we found a few persons who were still living among the ruins of their former homes, and from them we endeavoured to get an account of what had occurred. Practically all the Greek portion of the town was burned, and one saw everywhere in the streets charred remains of what had been human bodies. Burial in the town had been impossible, so they had covered the bodies with petroleum and disposed of them in that way. In some of the gardens

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<sup>1</sup> = “Orderly.”

and courtyards we saw children's graves, each with a few wild-flowers on them, but they do not appear to have buried any except the children. Poor souls, after the horror of it all, one wonders how they buried any one! The Turkish quarter was with few exceptions unburned. According to the accounts of the survivors, it was there that the greater part of the massacres took place. I saw many rooms where the floors were soaked with blood and rugs, mats, and cushions were covered with blood and human remains. The very stones in the courtyards of these houses were stained with blood; it is said that most of those who were killed in these yards were stoned to death. . . . I can only say from my own personal observation that the place was like a shambles, and whoever did the deed there must have been a very considerable number killed in this place. In fact, the vineyard, courtyard, and the house leading out of them reminded me forcibly of stories one has read of the Cawnpore massacres. One hears of the places reeking with blood; without wishing to be sensational, this little town did literally do so. . . . I might perhaps give you more details of the evidence of atrocities which took place, but there are some things which one cannot bring oneself to speak about. I have been asked to estimate the number who were killed at Doxato. It is quite impossible to do so, as many who are supposed to have been killed have, I understand, since been found, having escaped at the time the massacres took place. By counting the bodies I saw and the heaps of charred remains and the evidences of massacres in the gardens and courtyards, I estimated that the number killed was not less than six hundred, and that the greater number of these were women and children: how many more than this number there may have been it is impossible to say. . . .

With kindest regards,  
Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,  
HUBERT CARDALE.

The behaviour of the Bulgarians to the Greek wounded was very nearly as bad, and there were several occasions upon which the Greeks after leaving some wounded comrades in Bulgarian trenches during a first unsuccessful attack, subsequently on a later decisive attack found only their mutilated bodies. Captain Trapman, who was practically the only correspondent to accompany the Greek army in the fighting line through its short campaign in Macedonia, and who nevertheless found opportunity to visit several of the towns in which massacres took place,



BULGARIAN EXARCHIST PRIESTS AND KOMITADJES.



has given a startling, but it would seem true, description of the Bulgar in an article published in the *Nineteenth Century* for October of this year. In this article he says :

"Of the Bulgar I can only say that all that has been written falls infinitely short of the truth ; of every land through which he has passed he has made a shambles, and his disgusting sensuality has known no limit. Never in recent history, with the possible exceptions of the French Revolution and the Indian Mutiny, has the cold-bloodedness of the Bulgarians been equalled, and seldom in the history of the world has any nation approached such a standard of wholesale butchery, bestiality, and lust." He remarks later : "It is only when one studies the Bulgarian character that one can understand how such orgies of carnage were possible. . . . The Bulgarian is only a rustic Tartar with the thinnest veneer of civilization and education. He is more arrogant and self-satisfied than the Prussian, more callous as to human life than the Chinaman, and has a more perverted sensual craving than that of any nation known to me. Cold-blooded, cruel, ignorant, vicious, and lustful, he wreaked his vengeance on all ; and if the true history of the last twelve months comes to be written it will be found that Tippoo Sahib, Nero, Robespierre, Catherine of Russia, and the Borgias were but mildly oppressive and unkind, as compared with the lustful brutes who wore the uniform of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria."

Before considering the charges which have been brought by the Bulgarians against the Greeks, the reader's attention is drawn to the fact that at first the Bulgarians denied the atrocities committed by them upon the Greek and Turkish populations. Later however, when they found that their own misdeeds had been conclusively proved by independent testimony, they shifted their ground and began to say, "Very well, war is not play : we have committed atrocities, but the Greeks have committed as bad or worse." *The Times* correspondent in the Balkan Peninsula, who may well be described as having played the part of the Bulgarian

barometer throughout the crisis from May to August, on the 17th of July (*Times*, July 19th) telegraphed to his journal:

"The war in Southern Macedonia is being carried on with a barbarity unexampled in modern times. Crowds of Bulgarian refugees from the districts of Kukush and Gevgeli are arriving here daily. As they wander through the streets they bear witness by their presence alone to the hideous story of savagery and devastation. I have conversed with many of them, but their narratives of the revolting barbarities committed by the Greeks may be left unrelated. The Bulgarians are unquestionably behaving in a similar way, especially since the slaughter of their comrades in the streets of Salonica."

To close observers this telegram has a particular significance. It emphasizes the point at which the Bulgarians began to shift their ground. This change of position on the part of the Bulgarians goes a long way towards throwing doubt on any charges which they subsequently brought against the Greeks not supported by specific details. As a matter of fact none of the charges brought against the Greeks are specific except (1) that in connection with the capture of the Bulgarian garrison at Salonica; and (2) the charge in connection with the Kutzo-Vlach village of Startuhishta, mentioned by *The Times* Balkan correspondent in his telegram of the 28th of July.

The capture of the Bulgarian garrison at Salonica is an incident which in no way reflects discredit upon the Greeks, as the account given in a previous chapter shows. It is a good illustration of the fact that the Bulgarians had so little material for bringing accusations against the Greek that they were obliged to have recourse to treating this occurrence, a measure of ordinary precaution which the Greeks were obliged to take, as a ground of complaint against them. As to the atrocities committed in the village of Startuhishta, the writer knows that no complaint was received by the Roumanian consul at Salonica, and a few days later a



telegram appeared in *The Times* from Bucharest, stating that a Kutzo-Vlach deputation had waited upon M. Venizélos and had emphasized the cordial relations which had always existed between them and the Greeks by addressing him in Greek.

The accounts which Mr. Bouchier heard from the refugees need not be treated seriously any more than those which were given him by the refugees at Rilo Monastery a few days later (*Times*, August 5th). Mr. Allen Upward, in his work "The East End of Europe," published in 1908, stated that "the local correspondent of *The Times* has not always shown that scrupulous care to avoid even the appearance of one-sidedness which is desirable in a time of such bitter jealousy," and found himself obliged to show up the unreliability of Mr. Bouchier's work by two examples. The first refers to the population of the Kaza of Florina in which the total number of villages was seventy-one, of which twenty-one were purely Moslem (in this the Patriarchate and the Turkish records are in agreement). Mr. Bouchier had telegraphed to *The Times* that in the Kaza there were eighty-four Christian villages alone—seventy-five Exarchist and nine Patriarchist. The second in his report of the trial of the men who tried to kidnap Colonel Elliott, in which, by using the word "peasants" and referring to three of the prisoners as coming from a Greek village, he caused the Turkish Embassy in London to insist upon the insertion of a correction "to the effect," says Mr. Upward, "that outrages attributed by its correspondent to Greek bands were really the work of the Bulgarians." It need hardly be pointed out that a man who could be hoodwinked with regard to such instances as those given by Mr. Upward could easily be taken in by "cooked tales" told him by refugees at the instigation of their Bulgarian protectors.

For this reason it is easy to see that Mr. Bouchier's challenge offering to show his notes of the conversation which he had with the refugees, taken at the time, in a letter published in *The Times* of August 21st, was not taken up

either by the Greek Minister who, with the authority of King Constantine, had published a point-blank denial of Mr. Bouchier's charges a few days before, or by any one else. His notes would have proved nothing.

The only other ground of accusation against the Greeks which in any way requires to be dealt with is constituted by the charges said to be contained in letters written by Greek soldiers alleged to have been found in a mail-bag left with the effects of the 19th Regiment of the 7th Greek Division at Razlog (Mehomia), which, as will be remembered, was evacuated and subsequently recaptured by the Greeks within a day or two of the arrangement of the armistice. One letter is frankly absurd. In it a single Greek boasts of having put to death fourteen out of sixteen Bulgarian prisoners who were entrusted to him. This letter bears the signature of Nico Theophilatos. Now, the only Nico Theophilatos in the Greek Army is a member of a well-known shipping firm with offices at Rotterdam, Cardiff, and Newcastle, who volunteered and fought in Epirus but did not take part in the Græco-Bulgarian campaign, and who denies being the author of the letter in question, as, moreover, is evident from a comparison of his own signature with that at the foot of the letter. Another states that all except forty of the prisoners taken at Nigrita were put to death. Considering that a friend of the writer, an Englishman, travelled in the transport in which several hundreds of these particular prisoners were conveyed from Salonica to the Piræus, the reader will know how much attention can be paid to such a letter. Now, if two (or even one) of these letters be proved by external evidence to be forgeries, then the remainder of the letters would be hardly looked upon as genuine until they were strictly proved to have been written by Greek soldiers.

There is, however, very strong internal evidence against their genuineness. In several letters academic handwriting, usually but not always disguised, is found in combination with illiterate spelling. It is true that the level of intelligence and education in the Greek Army is exceptionally high, and

one would expect to find letters written by common soldiers which are the letters of a gentleman, but what is not possible is to find a genuine letter with a combination of a gentleman's handwriting and illiterate spelling. Another very noteworthy feature of them is that many accents are missing. Now a Greek, however ill-educated he may be, is very proud of his accents, and if he is uncertain what accent to use or where to put it he will write two accents over one word rather than leave the accent out.

The following extract from a letter, written by Professor H. Pernot of the University of Paris, an accepted authority on linguistic paleography and Modern Greek, will show what view he has formed of these "Greek soldiers" letters! After referring to some arguments against their authenticity which have been mentioned above he goes on to say:

Il existe d'ailleurs d'autres motifs de suspicion contre ces documents.

1. Quoique sortis de l'Imprimerie de la cour royale de Sofia, ils sont publiés anonymement. Aucun auteur, aucun éditeur n'a pris la responsabilité de cette publication.

2. Le mode de reproduction employé est la similigravure et la zincographie au trait. Il n'offre aucune espèce de garantie. Avec ces procédés la falsification n'est qu'un jeu.

3. Aucune lettre n'est complète. Ce ne sont que des fragments quelquefois même une ou deux phrases seulement. Sur certains facsimilés on distingue nettement des traces de grattage et des coupures. Un exemple caractéristique de la façon dont ces documents ont été reproduits est fourni par les mots *Je vous embrasse. Costi* (en grec), qui appartiennent à la lettre la page 6 et qui, par une malencontreuse inadvertance, ont été placés sous la lettre de la page 7, de sorte que l'une n'a pas de signature et que l'autre en a deux différentes. De plus sur 14 lettres de la première publication, 10 ne portent pas l'indication du destinataire. Il est cependant peu probable qu'on ait saisi dans le courrier les lettres sans les enveloppes. Parmi les quatre dont a reproduit l'adresse, la première a une signature illisible, au dire des éditeurs eux-mêmes. La seconde est celle signée *Costi*, dont il vient d'être question. La troisième porte sur l'adresse le cachet du *Bureau de la sûreté publique de Salonique*; on se trouve par conséquent, semble-t-il, en présence d'une lettre écrite à la frontière bulgare, adressée à Réthymno (île de Crète), qui serait allée à Salonique et serait revenue à son point de départ pour tomber aux mains des Bulgares. L'adresse

de la quatrième enfin paraît être d'une main toute différente de la lettre, et la lettre elle-même est mutilée.

4., et ceci seul juge tout le reste, le texte grec a été par endroits indignement traduit. *La falsification voulue* est indéniable dans la traduction française jointe aux documents. . . .

J'ai éprouvé pour la Bulgarie, dès le début de la guerre turco-balkanique, une sympathie qui n'a pas encore complètement disparu et je veux me persuader que les brochures en question sont l'œuvre de patriotes égarés. Malheureusement on leur a donné une apparence officielle. A mon avis, le Gouvernement bulgare s'honorerait en déclarant que cette publication a eu lieu en dehors de lui. . . .

That the Bulgarians have in the past not scrupled to forge important documents is shown by an incident which happened in Kosane at the time when the Bulgarian bands first invaded that district. They sent a letter to the Bishop of Kosane purporting to come from the Patriarch of Constantinople, requesting him to help these bands in every way possible as they had come to work for the Christians. The Bishop, a simple soul, took the letter in good faith, but some shrewder fellow-citizens doubted its authenticity and took steps which resulted in proving that the letter was a forgery.

Moreover, any one who has any knowledge of the Greek character is aware that among the faults which he has he does not number cruelty. The writer, whose family have been established in this country as British subjects and citizens for three generations, and who was with the Greek army during the first war both in Macedonia and Epirus, being of Greek origin and knowing Modern Greek, ventures to claim that he was exceptionally well qualified to study the character of the Greek soldier at the front. He is able to assure the reader that even the Greek peasant, however primitive he may be in his superstitions, yet has his feelings civilized to a remarkable degree, and he was able to verify that the treatment of their prisoners by the Greeks was kindness itself. Captain Trapman has said: "The Greek is by temperament and nature the poet of the Balkans, and as a poet he has an immense and ever-present admiration for all that

is great and noble ; he has constitutional dislike for violence, and sensuality does not form part of his nature. Knowing the men of the Greek Army as intimately as I do, I cannot conceive of the Greek committing any cruelty, and far less an atrocity, any more than I can conceive a gentle Buddhist fakir wantonly taking life."

Mr. J. E. Flecker, in an eloquent defence of the Greek character against the loose and ill-considered charges brought against it, has said: "Any one who knows the Greeks knows that they are capable indeed of revenging themselves on a few *komitadjis*, but they have not that instinctive delight in savage cruelty that marks, and marked in their dealings with the unfortunate Macedonian populations years before the outbreak of the last war, the Bulgars, who are less Slavs than Huns—kinsmen of the Cossack and the Turk. . . . Both Bulgarian and Turk are undoubtedly perfect gentlemen until the one begins impaling Greek schoolmasters and the other flogging Armenian women. . . . I cannot here go into such a vast subject as the character of a nation ; I can only say this, that there is a class of British Levantines which is interested in no virtues except the virtue of commercial honesty, which protects his pocket. The heroism, the deep culture, the graceful gaiety of the Greek race he is not likely to appreciate. Especially it should be remembered that the Greeks, being far in advance of the Bulgar and the Turk in the way of civilization, are not like them all of one type. The Greek petty trader has perhaps all the meanness, sharpness, and vulgarity that distinguish the British or any other petty trader. The Greek gentleman, into whose society these Levantines would not be admitted, is as fine a gentleman as any ; and the Greek peasant, with his lovely ballads and original proverbs, as honest, brave, gay, and sound-hearted a fellow as one can find."

## CHAPTER XXV

### GRÆCIA IRREDENTA

BEFORE the Balkan War Greece's population barely exceeded 2,600,000, and yet the Greeks throughout the world amount to some 10,000,000. Even now those included within Greece's new boundaries do not exceed 5,000,000. M. Charles Vellay has observed in his book, "*L'Irredentisme Hellenique*": "*Le probleme de l'Irredentisme Hellenique offre un aspect exceptionnel*": while Danish irredentism in Germany, Italian irredentism in Austria, Roumanian irredentism in Hungary, Servian irredentism in Bosnia and in Herzegovina represent the effort of a minority detached from the bulk of their fellow-countrymen and striving to reattach themselves, in the case of the Greeks it has been the enormous majority of the race which has been deprived of the benefits of Greek Government. One redeeming feature of this has been that all the unredeemed Greeks remained subject to Turkey, and so there was very little chance of their becoming denationalized. Fortunately the One Month's War saved most of the Greek populations from passing under a foreign yoke, those in the district of Monastir allotted to Servia, and those in Western Thrace allotted to Bulgaria under the combined effects of the Treaties of Bucharest and Constantinople being the exceptions. The Greek and Mussulman populations of the districts lying between the Rivers Nestos and Maritza claimed the right to set up an autonomy under the suzerainty of the Sultan. It is not easy to see why this would not have been the best solution, for a district which is not a Bulgarian district.

So far as access to the sea is concerned the Bulgarians could have retained Dedeagatch, and a means of access to it past Ortakeui. Such an autonomous province, containing less than 300,000, would have formed a useful small buffer State between Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria. Now, unless Northern Epirus be rescued, nominally from Albania but really from Austria and Italy, an even more distinctively Greek region will be irredeemably lost to Hellas.

The population of the Ægean Islands other than Crete, which were occupied by the Greeks during the war, and all those which were previously occupied by the Italians, comprises nearly 470,000 Greeks out of a total population of 500,000. Under the Treaty of London (Art. 5) the Sultan and the sovereigns of the allied States "declare that they entrust to H.M. the Emperor of Germany, H.M. the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, and King Apostolic of Hungary, to the President of the French Republic, to H.M. the King of Great Britain and Ireland and all the Britannic territories beyond the seas, Emperor of India, to H.M. the King of Italy, and to H.M. the Czar of all the Russias the care of deciding the fate of all the islands of the Ægean, except the island of Crete, and all the peninsula of Mount Athos." Under the Treaty of Lausanne Italy is bound to evacuate all the islands occupied by her as soon as Turkey removes her last soldier from Cyrenaica. By far the greatest anxiety caused to the Greeks over the islands is in connection with those occupied by the Italians, but it seems inconceivable that Italy could be so dishonest as to attempt to hold purely Greek islands, which even under the treaty which she made with Turkey she only retained temporarily. Still her administration of these islands, and Rhodes in particular, is not by any means conducted in a way which suggests merely temporary occupation. The inhabitants have been treated like a conquered people, and though the Italians have not been guilty of outrageous conduct such as that of which the Bulgarians were guilty, so restrictive and oppressive a regime as that of General Ameglio could be hardly less galling to a

high-spirited people than the horrors of Bulgarian persecution. The only other Greek island in the Mediterranean is the island of Cyprus, which is under British rule subject to certain nominal rights of the Sultan. There is little reason to doubt that the policy adopted by the British Government with regard to the Ionian Islands, which is to hand Greek islands over to Greece as soon as she is in a position to undertake their administration satisfactorily, will be followed in the case of Cyprus. Greeks, however, themselves say that British rule, like Greek rule, is so fair and free that there is never any fear that Greeks subject to British government will lose their nationality. In fact, a pæan of joy would resound through the whole Hellenic world if it were known that the islands occupied by Italy could be handed over to Great Britain.

The Turkish Empire may be preserved for many years yet to come, and there is great talk of a thorough reorganization of its Asiatic provinces, but although the Young Turks have accomplished something practical in recovering Adrianople and a great part of Thrace from Bulgaria, they have to thank an extraordinary fortunate combination of circumstances for this. It is not conceivable that the Turk, who for 500 years has failed to set up an efficient government, will manage to do so now in his remaining possessions in Asia Minor. The Turkish Empire is doomed, and when it collapses Greece will come into her own again.

The following letter was written, during the peace negotiations of last winter, by a noble and distinguished lady, who has made Greece her adopted country, to a friend living in the country of her birth :

I am transported with joy at the glorious victories of our race. I am convinced that the consequences will be even wider than is now believed.

Every Greek is entitled and ought now to be not only proud but arrogant and dictatorial in his claims, especially when, at a time of warlike action, which we alone had the pluck to continue, negotiations for peace are being carried on.

I am incensed at the naïve impudence of certain foreign papers that discuss the future fate of the territories conquered by us ; as if



it depended on the will of foreign Powers, great or small. Nay more, I shudder when I behold Greeks cowed by them and humbly querying, "Will they, perchance, *allow* us to keep this or that?" For Heaven's sake, once and for all, taboo this grovelling tone. Let us not ask, but let us say openly, "This is what we want! This is what we are going to keep!" and woe to him who dares dispute our right to any of the fruits of victory. The period of weakness and self-effacement is over now. Foreigners have already begun to respect Greece. They will learn to fear her too! It would be unpardonable if she did not straightway occupy the place which all are ready to yield to her, the place proper to glorious and conquering Hellenism!

Doubtless you who dwell abroad feel this still more, as people necessarily talk to you every day about the war and the new state of things which will have been created in the East.

This is the time when we Greeks must not allow any one to doubt that we shall win that queen of cities, our legitimate and indispensable capital, Constantinople, nor that we alone have a right to it. What I used to say and write so often in years gone by has now proved to be no longer a pious aspiration but a well-nigh accomplished fact. For, indeed, nothing but the exhaustion of the Bulgarian forces, which obliged them to submit to the monstrous armistice, prevented our triumphant attack on Constantinople, both by land and by sea. Let us not allow the world to forget or to doubt this. What has not already happened will unquestionably happen to-morrow.

How many Greeks and foreigners have told me and written to me, in every language, during the last weeks: "You were right in your pamphlet 'Question d'Orient' and in your letters and in your conversation when we thought you were only indulging in Utopias, out of your love of Hellenism!"

I am more than ever convinced of the great and glorious destiny of the Greek race, and more especially that Greece alone is fit to acquire the "Empress of the East"!

This solution is the simplest for all the world. The Great Powers, which are torn by hatred and fear of one another, are still at a loss what to do with Constantinople. They do not even know what they would like to do with it, if its fate rested with them.

They know full well the difficulty would not be solved by leaving that city to Turkey for a few months. The only solution is to put it at the head of a Greek Empire. Friends and foes all admit this inwardly.

We are therefore compelled by necessity and by our duty to our country, and for justice' sake, to reply without faltering to every objection or hesitation on the part of strangers, whether they be politicians or not: "Do what you will, gentlemen, it will come to this! Vous en viendrez la, Messieurs, que vous le vouliez ou non!"

This is what we must go on saying openly and without yielding one

inch, if we are to break through the snares of the knavish tricksters who are afraid for the moment, but who are always ready to take advantage of the slightest yielding on the part of the rightful owners, in order to raise their shameless claims and hopes.

When a half-savage race like the Bulgarians insolently bray forth in their uncivilized tongue that forsooth they will take Constantinople, would not it be a disgrace if we, who are entitled to it, were not only to listen to their ravings in silence and dejection without retaliating, but also to refrain from enforcing our indisputable claims for fear of ridicule?

If you think I am right, please show this letter to other fellow-countrymen, especially to those who are the slaves of excessive Greek courtesy—a virtue which the so-called friends of Greece very often exploit in order to maintain that Greece is neither entitled to, *nor even dreams of*, recovering anything beyond what the kindness of the Great Powers will vouchsafe to grant her.

The attitude and words of one single man can influence a whole assembly of listeners, especially now that our affairs are the theme of universal interest.

At first sight much that is said may seem extravagant, but the principle underlying it is a sound one. The history of Constantinople is meaningless apart from Greek influence. That city was practically a Greek creation; it was overshadowed by Troy in pre-classical times, and in classical times civilization in its neighbourhood was hidden under barbarian occupation. Byzantine art and literature was Greek; the Court, though it called itself Roman, soon became Greek in all but name, and the overthrow of the Empire by the Turks caused the temporary eclipse of Greek supremacy in Eastern Europe. Even during the four centuries of Turkish supremacy the Greek influence was never crushed. The Patriarchate, though technically not now part of the Greek National Church, has always remained the temporal as well as the spiritual apex of the Greek race. The commerce and banking of Constantinople owe their success and fame almost solely to Greeks, and there are now more than 300,000 Greek inhabitants in the city. If the Turk be ejected, its future history cannot have any continuity with the past under any but Greek rule. The only possible alternative is the establishment

of a patriarchical state, but as in the case of the Papal states, the Patriarchate, like the Vatican, would sooner or later have to hand over its temporal authority to the Greek Government.

What has been said has reference to the future of Constantinople after the disruption of the Turkish Empire, but it is not Greece who is a menace to Turkey now or who will be an adverse influence to its preservation by being a near neighbour in Chios and Mytilene and the other islands bordering on the Asiatic coast. It is the Great Powers who are bargaining with one another over the delimitation of spheres of influence for railways and other concessions in Asia Minor who are the real source of danger to Turkey. Owing to the millions of Greeks who still remain Ottoman subjects, it is to the interest of Greece to see Turkey preserved intact and peaceful until the time comes when the miserable edifice of Turkish government collapses like a pack of cards. The Turks, in order to preserve and develop the resources of their country, cannot dispense with the help of their Greek subjects. While the Turks had Greek representatives, such as Kara Theodori Pasha at Berlin, Musurus Pasha as Ambassador in London, and Mavroyeni and others in similar posts, they kept their heads above water ; but since they have given up employing Greeks and have allowed the Young Turks to persecute the Greeks instead, everything has gone wrong with them.

Of Turkey's remaining territories, Thrace (including the vilayets of Adrianople and Constantinople, but excepting the town of Constantinople) contains about three-quarters of a million Greeks, some 200,000 of whom have passed under Bulgarian rule. The last stronghold of Hellenism is in Asia Minor. Its coast has been pure Greek for the last 3,000 years, the town of Smyrna numbers 150,000 Greek inhabitants, and inland there are important Greek centres such as Konia. There is also a large Greek population in the interior of Asia Minor which has preserved Greek traditions and customs and the orthodox faith (which in the

past it practised in secret), but which uses the Turkish tongue. What the explanation may be of this curious phenomenon among the Greeks, who are so tenacious of their language, it is difficult to say, though tradition has it that these Turkish-speaking folk are the descendants of many thousands of Greeks whose tongues were ordered to be cut out and sent to the Sultan in the fourteenth century. It is related how the children of the victims, not hearing any Greek spoken, learnt to speak only the Turkish tongue. It is to be hoped that in the future active steps will be taken for the encouragement of these unfortunate people in their struggle to preserve their Greek conscience and recover their lost language. The total Greek population in Asia Minor, including those who speak Turkish, cannot well be less than 3,000,000.

A word should be said about the Greeks in Egypt. Though their numbers do not exceed 400,000, they play such an important part in the commercial life of the country, that a friend who resides there told the writer that during the past year business in Cairo and Alexandria has been at a standstill owing to the large exodus of Greeks who went to fight for their country. There are Greek colonies elsewhere, the most important being that in the American continent, which now is said to approach half a million people. This, however, consists to a great extent of a shifting population who go to America for business purposes and by sending much money back to Greece have rendered inestimable services to their country. The wealthy Greeks throughout the world, particularly in France, Great Britain, Germany, and Russia, also for the most part retain some connection with their native land, and large portions of their fortunes are left to charities or for public purposes in Greece. Among the most munificent bequests was that of the late Panaghi Vagliano, who left half a million pounds in trust for the benefit of his native island, Cephalonia. Perhaps some of these wealthy Greeks in these countries, of whom there are many who own fortunes varying from £200,000 to over

£1,000,000, may now purchase estates in Epirus, Thessaly, or Macedonia, as has been suggested in Chapter XXI.

The patriotism of the Greek is proverbial, but that over 60,000 men scattered throughout the world should return at a moment's notice in response to their country's call, leaving business and other interests neglected, is a phenomenon unique in history. It is not generally known that the total number of Greeks who served with the colours during the past twelve months falls little short of 300,000, when the most that the Greeks themselves expected to raise was 125,000.

The undying flame of Hellenism is now rising up once more and proving the wisdom of Tricoupis' words: *Ἡ Ἑλλὰς προὐρίσται νὰ ζήσῃ καὶ Θὰ ζήσῃ* ("Hellas is foreordained to live and will live").

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
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


















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